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Abstract 
This research takes a cross-national approach to explore how police oﬃcers attempt conflict 
resolution in their day-to-day activities. Using comparisons of the behaviour of routinely 
armed oﬃcers from South Australia and routinely unarmed oﬃcers from New Zealand, this 
thesis chronicles a research journey which culminates with a new theoretical framework to 
explain police-citizen encounters.  
The research took a grounded theory approach and employed a mixed methods design. 
Quantitative data revealed that oﬃcers from South Australia used verbal and physical control 
behaviours more frequently and for a higher proportion of time during encounters than dur-
ing the encounters observed in New Zealand. There were no clear explanations for the 
diﬀerences, although there were variations in law and the profile of event-types between the 
research sites. The qualitative enquiry found that oﬃcers from both jurisdictions followed a 
similar diagnostic and treatment procedure during police-citizen encounters. Moreover, oﬃc-
ers in both jurisdictions experienced conflict from procedural frustrations or goal blockages 
arising from interaction with citizens.  
Findings provided the context for the construction of a substantive ‘procedural conflict’ 
theory.  This theory (1) illustrates how procedural conflict can cause a strain for oﬃcers, (2) 
posits that oﬃcers take corrective actions to overcome the conflict using control behaviour, 
and (3) explains that while oﬃcers may use force to regulate police-citizen encounters, other 
behaviour for resolving conflict during encounters is more common. Accordingly, procedural 
conflict theory provides a new framework for the explanation of the police use of force. Fur-
ther theoretical propositions about police-citizen interaction are set out in the final chapter 
and further research to test the validity of the theory is proposed. 
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Nomenclature 
A common diﬃculty of cross-national research is finding a shared nomenclature for similar 
objects, roles, or customs. Those working in policing are often confounded by acronyms, Ap-
pendix colloquialisms, and jargon specific to local custom. In this dissertation, an attempt has 
been made to reduce police-specific jargon and build a common nomenclature.  
 
Police agency an organisation that has an official capacity to maintain public order and/or 
investigate crime, within a legal jurisdiction, such as a nation-state, state, 
province, county, or metropolitan area. These include constabulary, police 
force, police service, police department, bureaus of investigation, crime 
agencies, and sheriff departments. 
Police officer a sworn or constabulary officer who has the powers of arrest, including 
constables, deputies, officers, agents, special agents. Not including police 
employees with limited powers such as authorised officers (New Zealand), 
police community support officers (UK), protective security officers or 
protective service officers (Australia).  
Routinely armed taken to mean routinely armed with firearms, where officers routinely wear a 
sidearm in a holster always while on duty. In most jurisdictions, this means that 
officers wear a sidearm (handgun, pistol). Some specialist police units may be 
routinely armed with semi-automatic rifles. 
Routinely unarmed taken to mean not routinely armed with firearms, but where firearms are 
available to officers if officers need to be armed. 
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101 Disorder incident code (SAPOL) 
1X Suicide attempt or related incident code (NZPOL) 
AMT Authority Maintenance Theory 
BFI Big Five Inventory (personality measure) 
CED Conductive electronic device (i.e. a TASER) 
CoA Course of action 
CPD Convergent parallel design 
ESF Encounter Situational Factors (form) 
GDP General duties patrol team 
GST General strain theory 
ICF Informed consent form 
IN Incident narrative 
IR Interaction ritual 
NRT Norm resistance theory 
NZC New Zealand City 
NZC officers Officer participants from the NZPOL research site 
NZC station Station at the NZPOL research site 
NZPOL New Zealand Police 
O2C1 Two officers, one citizen 
O2C2 Two officers, two citizens 
Officer Police officer  
PCE Police-citizen encounter 
PCT Procedural Conflict Theory 
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PJT Procedural Justice Theory 
PST Public safety team 
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POPN ‘Project on Policing Neighborhoods’ research project 
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SAC station Station at the SAPOL research site 
SAPOL South Australian Police 
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TASER A common brand of CED 
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 1 
Introduction 
The impetus for this research arose from an earlier cross-national study of routinely unarmed 
police oﬃcers from Norway and routinely armed oﬃcers from Sweden, which revealed that 
oﬃcers from Sweden and those from Norway did not agree that routine firearm armament 
aﬀected police-citizen interaction (Hendy, 2014). It appeared, at the time, that the perspectives 
of Norwegian oﬃcers were influenced by operational and cultural circumstances—except dur-
ing emergencies, Norwegian oﬃcers policed without wearing a firearm. Indeed, as a 
practitioner from another routinely unarmed police agency, I had reflected about changes in 
my demeanour during armed emergency events. Were any changes in my demeanour as a 
result of contemplating the risks associated with the task at hand or consequent to the sense of 
physical and cognitive empowerment associated with being armed with a firearm? Indeed, 
could it be possible that citizens, especially those present while routinely unarmed police are 
temporarily armed to respond to an ‘armed and dangerous event’, might attribute change in 
oﬃcer demeanour to be a consequence of how oﬃcers responded to the complex nature of 
such an event?  
Accordingly, the present research sought to devise insight of behavioural diﬀerences be-
tween routinely armed and routinely unarmed oﬃcers: if diﬀerences were found with the 
behaviour of routinely armed and routinely unarmed oﬃcers as they attempted to resolve in-
terpersonal conflict arising during police-citizen encounters, then hypotheses may be posited 
as to the broader eﬀect of how routine armament influenced police-citizen interaction. Curi-
ously, while variances in behaviour between the two research sites appeared during research 
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fieldwork, other factors arose to explain the behavioural variances—explanations that ap-
peared unrelated to the question of firearms. Indeed, during this research, firearms were only 
ever ‘used’ in two occasions (although not presented at citizens), when oﬃcers from the rou-
tinely unarmed New Zealand police deployed with rifles and sidearms to ‘weapons’ incidents. 
In contrast, South Australian oﬃcers never ‘used’ (or unholstered) their sidearms. As such, 
this dissertation is more of a discussion about how the routinely armed/unarmed status aﬀects 
the ‘character’ of encounters, as opposed to the ‘use’ of firearms.  
 Taking a grounded theory approach to the research enabled the observation of how con-
trolling behaviours were used to overcome procedural conflicts and goal-blockages during 
police-citizen encounters. Consequently, this dissertation chronicles a research journey that 
culminated in theoretical insight. It provides a narrative to contextualise the formation of the 
new theoretical framework, and in doing so, illuminates a new frame to theorise police-citizen 
interaction by applying Agnew’s general strain theory (1992; 2006) to decision-making during 
police-citizen encounters. Taking this approach provides an opportunity for the impact of 
verbal interaction, oﬃcer decision making and the use of physical control behaviour to be in-
corporated together to provide a context for oﬃcer behaviour. This approach is the 
foundation of a new theoretical paradigm for understanding conflict and conflict resolution 
during police-citizen interaction: procedural conflict theory. It advances Sykes and Brent’s use 
of general systems theory (1980; 1983).  
It should be noted that this research conforms to Deutsch’s framework of conflict-
resolution, namely that “a conflict occurs whenever incompatible activities occur” (1973, p.10, 
original emphasis). Unlike more common applications of conflict in the policing literature, 
the present research frames conflict and conflict resolution as activities that are concerned 
with goal attainment or blockage as opposed to more overt forms of violence that might be 
‘resolved’ with the application of force. Procedural conflict theory suggests that conflict origi-
nates from citizen deliberate or non-deliberate actions which frustrate or block oﬃcers’ ability 
to achieve their goals. Thus, conflict may be resolved, or indeed prevented, through the mini-
misation or avoidance of goal blockage. The merit of this approach is revealed when applied to 
all police-citizen encounters. Previous theoretical approaches have been limited to under-
standing deliberate disruptive behaviour (such as citizen disobedience) to explain why oﬃcers 
use force. However, procedural conflict theory provides a context for explaining oﬃcer con-
trol behaviour (as corrective actions) in situations where citizen disobedience is not always 
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present, yet their behaviour frustrates oﬃcer goals. This is born from the observation that New 
Zealand oﬃcers used a higher frequency and proportional duration of control behaviours 
during encounters with victims than with suspects. Such behaviour appears to be counterintu-
itive: it would be expected that oﬃcers would confront more conflict from suspects than with 
victims. The analysis herein shows that oﬃcers used controlling behaviours to overcome con-
flict from procedural frustrations and blockages found during ‘routine’ police-citizen 
encounters. 
1.1 Police-citizen encounters as teachable moments 
As Tyler et al. (2014) explain, routine police-citizen encounters are socializing experiences—
teachable moments that build or undermine legitimacy. Furthermore, exploring such interac-
tions is critical to building an understanding of how individual police-citizen encounters 
aﬀect police-society relations (Herbert 2006). Consequently, there is value in the pursuit of 
developing a further understanding of how police-citizen encounters play out.  
The degradation of public order following two recent fatal police-citizen encounters signals 
the value in understanding the factors which influence how police-citizen interactions play 
out. Indeed, media coverage of the shootings of Mark Duggan at London, England in 2011, 
and Michael Brown at Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 claimed that these fatalities were the trig-
gers for prolonged periods of general disorder and criminal behaviour (Taylor 2017; Swaine 
2014). Michael Brown’s encounter with police was spontaneous and procedurally routine; it 
began as an oﬃcer spotted Brown walking on the road and subsequently identified him as a 
person of interest for a recent theft. The interaction deteriorated, and a fight ensued between 
Brown and the oﬃcer, tragically culminating with the oﬃcer firing at Brown. Like many other 
routine encounters, it started as an investigative street-level interaction without an expecta-
tion that behaviour might deteriorate and rapidly ended as a fatal encounter. The case of Mark 
Duggan was also routine. Duggan was under investigation for oﬀences relating to organised 
crime and was being actively surveilled by oﬃcers from London Metropolitan Police (Wad-
dington 2012). The police operation changed from surveillance to enforcement when police 
suspected that Duggan possessed an illegal firearm. Within four seconds of a controlled vehi-
cle stop, Duggan was shot by an armed oﬃcer. The subsequent IPCC investigation failed to 
find evidence to counter the firing oﬃcer’s belief that Duggan was in possession of a firearm 
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and that he honestly believed that Duggan’s actions put his life and his colleagues in imminent 
danger (IPCC 2015).  
Both cases were ‘flashpoint’1 events where demonstrations of anger, rioting, and other pub-
lic order oﬀending arises in response to injustices and/or broader grievances with police and 
the state (Newburn et al. 2016; Moran & Waddington 2016) in addition to the demonstration 
of the outrage felt at the death of a citizen by police. Moreover, these cases became the topic of 
intense media and judicial scrutiny, with some media drawing on the disproportional nature 
of fatal police-citizen interactions in America compared with the United Kingdom (Lartey 
2015). The behaviour and actions of the firing oﬃcers were examined by the media in detail; 
drawing on an examination of police culture, institutional racism, police brutality, and human 
rights. Indeed, Brown and Duggan were portrayed by media as undeserving victims of police 
violence and brutality (Taylor 2017; Swaine 2014) whereas the oﬃcers were portrayed nega-
tively. However, while the actions of the oﬃcers were described as criminal, neither oﬃcer 
involved in the shootings were found to be criminally liable for the deaths, nor have juridical 
inquiries established fault on the part of Brown or Duggan. 
The functions and responsibilities of police agencies vary from one jurisdiction to another, 
but police oﬃcers perform the same core role within civil society: they are deputised sworn 
agents of the state with core functions to regulate behaviour and enforce legislation (Reiner 
2010). Oﬃcer behaviour is formally regulated by statute law, common law, and agency policy, 
yet oﬃcer behaviour has been shown to be influenced by agency organisational culture 
(Reiner 2010; Wilson 1968). Furthermore, oﬃcers remain individual actors whose gender, per-
sonal life and professional experiences, and individual personality influence their behaviour 
(Muir 1977). While society seeks a transparent and consistent level of service from police, in-
terpretation and oﬃcer practice is invariably aﬀected by oﬃcer individuality and 
interpretation. Indeed, the function of police discretion and devolved authority to act is a de-
fining principle of Anglo-Saxon common-law policing-by-consent jurisdictions: the decision 
to arrest and prosecute must originate from the investigating oﬃcer, not the complainant (cit-
izen, corporate or government). Such practices are the constitutional bedrock that protects the 
citizenry from totalitarian rule. Thus, as previous scholars have remarked (e.g. Lipsky 1980; 
Loftus 2009; Reiner 2010), understanding oﬃcer behaviour and decision-making processes are 
of high importance. Moreover, as evidenced in the aforementioned fatal police-citizen en-
                                               
1 See Newburn et al. (2016) and Waddington et al. (1989) for further discussion and definition of flashpoint events that act as the precursor of 
disorder. 
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counters, there is a great deal at stake: interactions between oﬃcers and citizens during an en-
counter not only have the potential to lead to conflict among participants within the confines 
of the encounter but in some extreme cases have the potential to undermine the peace and 
stability of ordered society.  
Is it possible that routinely armed oﬃcers behave diﬀerently to non-routinely armed oﬃc-
ers? Political rhetoric (e.g. Locke 2008) and some academic theorists (e.g. Buttle 2010; Sarre 
1996b) suggest that practice and behaviour does diﬀer between routinely armed and routinely 
unarmed oﬃcers. A small amount of literature compares the practice of routinely armed with 
routinely unarmed police with some research indicating that routinely unarmed police oﬃcers 
perceive risk diﬀerently to routinely armed oﬃcers (Hendy 2014; Waddington et al. 2009) and 
that responses to firearm-related incidents diﬀer (e.g. Knutsson & Norée 2010). Waddington 
et al.’s (2009) exploration of police behaviour found that German routinely armed oﬃcers be-
haved quite diﬀerently to routinely armed oﬃcers in Brazil.  
Within Australasia, oﬃcers from one jurisdiction are increasingly deployed in support of 
another. For example, oﬃcers from New Zealand and Australian police agencies have been 
deployed together in post-conflict environments of Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and the Solo-
mon Islands (New Zealand Police 2017b; New Zealand Police 2017a). Oﬃcers have also been 
deployed to assist with natural disasters and large-scale operations within Australasia. In the 
aftermath of the 22 February 2011 Christchurch, New Zealand earthquake (where 185 people 
were killed), police oﬃcers from many Australian jurisdictions were deployed into Christ-
church to assist New Zealand Police (McLean et al. 2012) with disaster recovery, provide 
reassurance policing and respond to general calls for service without being routinely armed. 
Similarly, a contingent of New Zealand oﬃcers that was deployed to assist the Queensland Po-
lice to manage the 2014 G20 world summit in Brisbane (New Zealand Police Association 2014) 
became routinely armed for that operation. If diﬀerences are identified in the present re-
search, then the utility of the interoperability of routinely armed and routinely unarmed 
police oﬃcers requires consideration. 
1.2 The present research 
This dissertation contributes to a deeper understanding of the diﬀerences between the opera-
tional behaviour of routinely armed and routinely unarmed oﬃcers proposed in Hendy 
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(2014), Knutsson and Norée (2010), and Waddington et al. (2009). The research examines the 
behaviour of oﬃcers as they attempt to resolve interpersonal conflict arising during police-
citizen encounters and considers the following analytical questions:  
(a) How do routinely unarmed police behave during police-citizen encounters?  
(b) Do routinely unarmed police oﬃcers behave diﬀerently to routinely armed police oﬃc-
ers during police-citizen encounters? 
(c) How do we explain how conflict resolution is managed by routinely unarmed police 
oﬃcers? 
The findings of this study make a significant addition to the criminological and policing litera-
ture in several ways. First, this is the first examination of oﬃcer behaviour in a comparative 
context between New Zealand and South Australia. The study observes oﬃcer interaction with 
citizens within New Zealand and compares these interactions with those from South Austral-
ia. This research provides an addition to the wider collection of cross-national studies of 
police behaviour. Second, the study is the first to directly compare operational behaviour in 
situ between oﬃcers from a routinely armed police agency and a routinely unarmed police 
agency since Banton’s (1964) study of American and Scottish oﬃcers during the 1960s. How-
ever, while Banton’s study was largely ethnographic, the present study is the first to 
quantitatively measure behavioural interaction comparatively. Previous cross-national studies 
of police behaviour have provided opportunities to measure and quantify diﬀerences in police 
practice across jurisdictions (Bayley 1990; Waddington et al. 2009). This was achieved in the 
present study by measuring participant behaviours, using a modified version of Braithwaite’s 
(1998) conflict resolution behavioural taxonomy, coding in situ and in real-time. This ap-
proach was also advantageous as it helped to reduce the risk of researcher bias—and perhaps 
unfamiliarity—when measuring behaviours of oﬃcers at each research site.  
Findings from the present research indicate that although oﬃcers from both jurisdictions 
followed a similar procedure during police-citizen encounters, RAP oﬃcers from South Aus-
tralia used controlling behaviours more frequently and for a greater proportion of time during 
an encounter than RUP oﬃcers from New Zealand. This was consistent when observing in-
vestigative, and enforcement encounters. However, while the findings suggest diﬀerences in 
the use of control behaviour, there is insuﬃcient evidence to conclude that the diﬀerences 
were determined by the jurisdiction’s armed status. It is a more compelling explanation that 
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the behavioural diﬀerences are related to legislative diﬀerences among the jurisdictions. Legis-
lation in South Australia equips oﬃcers with a general power to demand the identification 
particulars of any citizens whom an oﬃcer believes had witnessed an oﬀence. Consequently, 
normative oﬃcer behaviour appeared diﬀerent between South Australia and New Zealand. 
This conclusion provides a basis to reframe one of the widely-held beliefs that RAP oﬃcers are 
more ‘aggressive’ than the more ‘approachable’ RUP police; the present study suggests that 
oﬃcer behaviour is influenced more by legislative powers rather than armed status. 
1.2.1 THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation consists of nine chapters. The next chapter introduces the context for the re-
search; it outlines the evolution of policing in Australasia, including colonial history and 
contemporary structures of the South Australia and New Zealand police agencies. The third 
chapter discusses relevant literature. The fourth chapter describes the QUAN(qual) embedded 
mixed methods design, using quantitative data to measure variations in oﬃcer behaviour be-
tween samples of RUP oﬃcers and RAP oﬃcers, and qualitative data to explore the 
phenomena of oﬃcer conflict resolution behaviour during police-citizen encounters. 
The research findings are reported in three chapters. The fifth chapter details the findings of 
the quantitative study of 278 encounters (nNZ=136, nSA=143) spread between enforcement en-
counters2 (n=133, 48%) and investigative encounters3 (n=142, 52%). The analysis of the 
frequency and duration of conflict-resolution behaviours reveals an unexpected incidence of 
control behaviour used by oﬃcers during victim-encounters, and a variance in the use of ver-
bal and physical control behaviours between the New Zealand oﬃcers and South Australian 
oﬃcers. At this point, the focus of the dissertation shifts to the emergent procedural conflict 
theory. Chapter six examines the decision-making process used by oﬃcers when they engage 
in encounters with citizens and draws upon observational data from participant observation 
and oﬃcer-participant interviews. Chapter seven explores these data in the contexts of general 
systems theory (Sykes & Brent 1983) and general strain theory (Agnew 1992). The analysis 
suggests that police-citizen conflict arises from procedural problems such as goal blockage 
and it proposes that control behaviour is used by an oﬃcer in response to a procedural con-
flict. Chapter eight draws together findings from the qualitative and quantitative studies and 
                                               
2 Enforcement encounters included field arrest-, field action-, and field warning-encounters.  
3 Investigative encounters included victim-encounters and suspect-encounters.  
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forms the general conclusion of this research. The last chapter explores the emergent proce-
dural conflict theory through an essay that considers its key theoretical propositions.  
 
  
2 
Policing in an Australasian context 
This chapter outlines the development of the New Zealand (NZPOL) and South Australian 
(SAPOL) police agencies to provide an insight into their contemporary practices. The follow-
ing accounts are drawn from the History of Policing in New Zealand (Hill 1986; Hill 1995), 
published in association with the New Zealand Department of Internal Aﬀairs, and a history 
of the South Australian police by former oﬃcer and member of the South Australian Police 
Historical Society (Clyne 1987). As such, Hill and Clyne largely come from what Reiner de-
scribes as orthodox history (see Reiner 2010, p.40); they come from ‘cop-sided’ and 
hegemonic perspectives. Notwithstanding the inherent bias of orthodox perspectives, Hill and 
Clyne demonstrate the significance of Peel, Rowan and Mayne on the formation of policing in 
both jurisdictions. For instance, Hill writes:  
the outcome of half a century of policing debate, experimentation and evolution in England and its territories 
was to be transplanted to the new colony of New Zealand. (Hill 1986, p.10) 
It will become apparent that while the development of policing in Australasia diﬀers from 
other British colonial and frontier eﬀorts (such as North America, India, or Ireland), there is 
utility in not conflating policing in an Australian-wide perspective. For instance, South Aus-
tralia faced diﬀerent problems from her neighbouring colonies, as did the fledgling colony of 
New Zealand. Furthermore, the evolution of civil policing in New Zealand appears to have 
been hindered by their focus on quelling insurrection by Māori during the New Zealand Wars 
and it was not until 1886 that military and civil functions were devolved to separate agencies 
of the state.  
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2.1 The Australasian context 
2.1.1  THE POLICING OF FREE AND PENAL POPULATIONS 
Contemporary policing practice in Australasia is influenced by English policing of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Early policing was shaped by the challenges arising 
from the combination of colonial demands of the frontier and nation-building (Nettelbeck & 
Smandych 2010; O’Brien 1960), establishing police for the safety of free settlers (Hill 2012b; 
O’Brien 1960) and controlling the penal population of incarcerated and freed convicts 
(O’Brien 1960; South Australian Police Department 1972).  
Strategies informing the English colonisation of Australia and New Zealand in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries were not consistent. Following the arrival of Eng-
lish explorer Captain James Cook at New Zealand in 1769, and Australia in 1770, the initial 
colonisation of Australia was driven by Britain’s policy of forced convict emigration (Finnane 
1994; Hill 2012a; King 2004). Conversely, British colonisation of South Australia and New 
Zealand were not convict-centric, rather, ‘free’ settlers were encouraged to emigrate from 
Britain to profit from the natural resources abundant in the new frontiers (Clyne 1987; Hill 
2012a).  
British approaches to native peoples across the colonies were similarly inconsistent. While 
Australian aboriginal tribes were thought “too weak and dispersed to oﬀer significant re-
sistance” (Hill 1986, p.29), the Māori tribal-groups of New Zealand and the Moriori of the 
Chatham Islands were seen as more formidable (Hill 1986). Indeed, Belich (1996) remarks that 
when the British were planning the location of Antipodean penal colonies in the 1780s, New 
Zealand was eliminated because the British perceived Maori to be ‘dangerous and blood-
thirsty’. Relations between Māori and the British Crown were later codified in 1840 through 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi) which recorded the cession by Māori chiefs to 
the British Crown. In exchange, Māori became British subjects and were aﬀorded the protec-
tion of the Crown (King 2004). As New Zealand historian King observes:  
While that Treaty was in part a product of the most benevolent instincts of British humanitarianism, and those 
who signed it on 6 February had the highest possible hopes for benign outcomes, the document would turn out 
to be the most contentious and problematic ingredient in New Zealand’s national life (2004, pp.156-157) 
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No such arrangement was sought from the Aboriginal peoples of Australia (see Clyne 1987) or 
indeed other indigenous peoples that had been “conquered, enslaved, or killed by European 
firepower and epidemic diseases” (Ward 1999, p.8). 
British policing of the colonies 
British-styled policing came to Australasia with the arrival of the ‘First Fleet’ at Botany Bay, 
Australia in 1788. Among the convicts and settlers were the continent’s first constables and 
night-watchmen (O’Brien 1960). Population growth and crime pressures resulted in regular 
policing reform, including the marshalling of constables and night-watchmen of the First 
Fleet under the provost marshal in 1801, with control passing to magistrates in 1804, the estab-
lishment of the Sydney Police Act 1833 [NSW], and failed attempts during the remainder of the 
decade to adopt the principles and reforms espoused by Sir Robert Peel which formed the ba-
sis for the London Metropolitan Police (O’Brien 1960).1  
As the police in New South Wales were occupied with policing the convicts and emanci-
pists—believed to be 63% of the Sydney population at the time (O’Brien 1960)—the colonists 
of the newly-established South Australia became concerned for their safety due to the ‘wick-
edness’ of convicts from New South Wales. South Australia—not established as a penal 
colony—was initially free of convicts and populated with ‘free settlers’ from England who had 
emigrated of their own ‘free will’ (O’Brien 1960). This contrasted with the forced transporta-
tion of convicts to the penal colonies of New South Wales and Queensland.  
South Australia had been established, optimistically, without formal police as police were 
not initially thought to be required in the utopic colony of the free (Clyne 1987). Instead, the 
colony relied on a small number of marines who had accompanied the arrival of the first Gov-
ernor in 1836 to provide security for the colony (O’Brien 1960). However, in response to the 
concerns of colonists about the risk of convicts ‘flooding in’ from the other colonies, Gover-
nor Hindmarsh requested the establishment of a police force from the Colonial Oﬃce in 1838 
(Clyne 1987). Evidence of this is noted by the South Australian police: 
They planned to set up a respectable society; peopled by responsible and hardworking men and women whose 
tranquillity and safety would be secured by the absolute ban on the entry of convicts. In November 1837, 
Governor Hindmarsh wrote to the Colonial Oﬃce that “the number of bad characters arriving daily from 
Encounter Bay, and suspected to be runaway convicts, make it necessary that a strong police body should exist” 
(South Australian Police Department 1972, p.25).  
                                               
1 O’Brien comments that Sydney Police Commissioner William Miles’s attempt at reforms were stymied by lack of personnel, both in quanti-
ty and quality. He writes: “Although Miles favoured the appointment of free men, migrants and soldiers, the force still had a convict element, 
which materially added to the extent of crime as these men tended to collaborate with the criminals they were supposed to apprehend.” (O’Brien 
1960, p.21). Finnane (1994) concurs but cautions that the involvement of convicts in policing at the time should not be overstated. 
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Similarly, escaped and freed convicts from the penal colony at Port Jackson, New South 
Wales settled sporadically in New Zealand: those who became involved with the trade of seals, 
whales, flax and other commodities (King 2004). The first British representative posted to 
New Zealand, James Busby, requested formal protection of naval ships and two British con-
stables in 1835 from the Colonial Oﬃce (Carpenter 2009), however, this was dismissed as a 
“whining request” (King 2004, p.155) at the time by the Governor at New South Wales. The 
Treaty of Waitangi formally established the British colony of New Zealand (Belich 1996; King 
2004).2 Initial policing for the colony was provided by members of the New South Wales 
mounted police (Hill 2012a). However, over the next 46 years, policing in New Zealand jour-
neyed through several reforms: the creation of an armed police force (Hill 1986), the 
formation of decentralised independent provincial police forces in 1853, and the establishment 
of an armed constabulary in 1867 (Armed Constabulary Act 1867 [NZ]).3  
Provincial police forces in New Zealand unified in 1877 when they were merged with the 
armed constabulary. Before this time, forces were occupied with military conflict (such as the 
Māori Land Wars from 1845–1872) and civil and criminal conflict (such as problems associat-
ed with the Gold Rushes of the 1860s). The conflation of military and civil policing personnel 
was the antithesis of Peel’s reforms English policing: his ‘new police’ were to be independent 
of military authority (Reiner 2010). However, legislative reforms later disestablished the armed 
constabulary and created a unified national police force of civilian constables under the en-
actment of the Police Force Act 1886 [NZ] (Hill 1986). Hill (1986) argues that the style of 
policing in colonial New Zealand transformed from order imposition (such as that of the Irish 
Constabulary) to order maintenance (modelled on the British ‘new police’). As a defacto 
standing army, the Armed Police Force and the Armed Constabulary served under the com-
mand of New Zealand governors utilised to impose ‘colonial’ order and resolve internal 
conflict. At the same time, mounted police became responsible for the higher crimes of civil 
conflict and insurrection including the suppression of conflict arising from the Māori Land 
Wars, where the foot-based ‘civil’ police concentrated on ‘low’ crimes committed by the citi-
zenry.  
                                               
2 Financiers and directors of the New Zealand Company, also incorporated in 1840, were associated with the South Australian Association 
(Fairburn 1990). 
3 There was no specific reference to arming constables or oﬃcers in the Act. However, it is apparent from S.25 of the Armed Constabulary Act 
1867 [NZ] that constables were armed: “… And if any constable shall be so dismissed or shall otherwise cease to belong to the Armed Con-
stabulary, all powers and authorities vested in him by virtue of this Act shall cease and determine[.] And if any constable shall within one 
week after he shall be dismissed from or shall cease to hold and exercise his oﬃce deliver over all and every the arms ammunition and accou-
trements horse saddle bridle clothing and other appointments whatsoever…” (New Zealand Parliament 1867, p.453). 
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South Australia faced similar staﬃng problems. Unlike New Zealand, South Australia po-
licing was structured as a single force (with mounted and foot divisions) that did not serve 
military or quasi-military functions. As such, the South Australian police were structurally 
consistent with Peel’s model of civilian-police. However during a period of civil unrest in 1841, 
Governor Grey sought further manpower to assist the civil unrest and the fear of rioting 
(Clyne 1987). Clyne (1987) notes the unpopularity of military involvement: 
… a military presence in the colony may well have been practical and expedient, but deeply disturbed many 
colonists …. South Australia was not a penal colony requiring soldiers to supervise convicts; martial law had 
not been declared; the colony was not at war with either a foreign power or lawless natives; and the 
unemployed were peaceful, if resentful. No doubt the troops could be used in an emergency; but they were ill 
equipped and untrained for civil policing duties (p.71). 
Unlike in New Zealand, the police force of South Australia was not concerned with insurrec-
tion. From 1844, policing in South Australia was governed by a Police Act and a 
Commissioner who sought to professionalise and civilianise policing further. The Police 
Manual published in 1845 states that the principal objective of the police was to “prevent and 
detect crime” (Clyne 1987, p.83). Further guidance instructed oﬃcers to “conduct themselves 
with prudence and humanity, as well as promptness in dealing with native crime or conflict” 
(Clyne 1987, p.86).  
Routine armament/disarmament 
Both the South Australian and New Zealand colonial police forces were established as armed 
forces. Hill (1986) notes that the disarmament of the ‘civil’ police oﬃcers in New Zealand oc-
curred in 1878, before the disestablishment proper of the armed constabulary in 1886. At that 
time, the armed constabulary consisted of mounted oﬃcers and foot oﬃcers. Routine carriage 
of firearms by foot oﬃcers (those known as the ‘police branch’) ceased at the same time as 
other provincial police forces were amalgamated into the armed constabulary. Discontinua-
tion was not because of legislative change; the decision was one of policy. Likewise, the 
disestablishment of the armed constabulary of 1886 did not prohibit the use of firearms by 
oﬃcers. The Police Force Act 1886 (NZ) simply authorised the Governor4 to: 
from time to time may make, alter, or revoke such regulations respecting the training, arms and accoutrements, 
clothing, and equipment of such force (New Zealand Parliament 1886, p.75) 
                                               
4 This power transferred from the Governor to a Commissioner of Police in 1913 (New Zealand Parliament 1913). 
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The civilianisation of policing was most likely to have been influenced by domestic political 
concerns and the reorganisation of colonial aﬀairs (Hill 1986; King 2004). Up until 1885 (the 
time of the Russian war scare) New Zealand had not faced any external threats to its security. 
While the armed constabulary had acted as the colony’s ‘defacto standing army’, changes were 
required to address the threat of invasion by foreign forces. However, the influence of Rowan 
and Mayne’s reforms of London’s Metropolitan Police on the evolution of New Zealand’s 
should also not be overlooked. Hill draws attention to the publication of Rowan and Mayne’s 
British policing maxims in the New Zealand Police Gazette 1880 (1986). Moreover, while there 
was no legislative prohibition of the use of firearms, customary practice mirrored that of Brit-
ish police forces where the use of firearms was discretionary. Hill observed:  
Until the First World War [the Police Force] maintained links with the new military organisation out of the 
Field Force, but in circumstances it was essentially an unarmed force (Hill 2012a).  
Curiously, Hill’s assertion is representative of nomenclatural confusion: while the police force 
was no longer called an ‘armed constabulary’ it did, in fact, remain an armed force, with oﬃc-
ers able to draw firearms if the circumstances permitted. Indeed, although oﬃcers ceased to 
carry firearms routinely, oﬃcers remained armed with other weapons. The change of name of 
the force coincided with the ‘professionalisation’ of police through the formal division of po-
licing and military operations spelt out in the 1886 Act. Hill notes that from 1905, only senior 
oﬃcers and detectives were to be routinely issued with Smith and Wesson revolvers; all new 
constables would cease to be issued with firearms when enrolled (1995). Firearms remained 
available to all oﬃcers, but only for use during emergencies. The ‘routine unarming’ of police 
oﬃcers had begun. Perhaps representative of the social attitudes of the time, an unarmed Sgt 
McGuire (who was shot by a thief and later died from a stomach wound in 1910) responded to 
criticism of his unarmed state: 
I am glad I didn’t [have a firearm]. I would not have used it, at any rate. I might have shot him, but I am better 
pleased that he shot me (Hill 1995, p.193) 
The practice of the non-open carriage of firearms occurred earlier in South Australia than 
in New Zealand, by way of the Police Act 1884 [SA]. Slee (1998) noted that South Australian 
mounted and foot oﬃcers were first armed in 1839 with flintlock carbines and rifles. However, 
while the South Australian 1883 Manual of Instructions (Peterswald 1883) authorises oﬃcers to 
be armed (with a combination swords, firearms, and other weapons) the foot police should 
only carry firearms when circumstances dictate: 
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The Mounted Police are armed with swords and revolver carbines; the Foot Police with Martini-Henry rifles 
and staves, the former being only carried as occasion requires5 (1883, p.12).  
Peterswald’s instruction parallels the practice of the New Zealand forces: mounted oﬃcers re-
tained firearms on duty, but the foot-police carried firearms only when necessary.  
There are some references in the historical literature discussing the progression of how 
South Australian oﬃcers adopted the open carriage of firearms. Since its inception, South 
Australian oﬃcers were expected to show restraint when facing conflict. The Governor’s in-
structions to police of 1841 included the following advice: 
Not to make use of firearms or other weapons except for self-defence, and then only to the extent that may be 
absolutely necessary, or the capturing of prisoners, or the recovery of sheep (O'Halloran 1904). 
Similarly, instructions of 1845 instructed oﬃcers to show restraint: 
 
In general, the plea of self defence is the safest, but this can only be substantiated when acting against armed 
men or superior numbers and must in all cases appear that no other means would have been suﬃcient to eﬀect 
the apprehension of the party (Clyne 1987, p.92). 
Some sixty years later, Commissioner Madley’s instructions published in the 1903 Police Ga-
zette instructed oﬃcers that in ‘ordinary’ cases only batons were to be used, not firearms.6 
While some firearms were available at suburban stations, oﬃcers were not personally issued 
with side-arms (although some carried their side-arms on night duty). The death of two un-
armed constables in 1908 and 1909 prompted negative “public outcry” (Clyne 1987, p.233) and 
criticism from the Coroner who investigated the second constable’s death. While Madley pub-
licly protested at the criticism, he ordered a new consignment of revolvers so that the foot 
police could be armed at night (Clyne 1987). 
More recent accounts of the police carriage of firearms include O’Brien’s (1960) description 
of Australian police forces during 1960 where he noted that police on normal duties were not 
armed with a firearm, although he observed that elite oﬃcers from the Victoria police de-
ployed in ‘Wireless Patrol cars’ carried pistols. Sawer noted that during 1968, while South 
Australian detectives were routinely armed, constables on the beat during night shifts were 
too, but their arms were not to be prominently displayed (Hawkins & Ward 1970).  
Sarre (1996a) noted the 1979 announcement by South Australian government member 
W.A. Rodda stating that the policy relating to the carriage of firearms was to change to allow 
                                               
5 Italics are this author’s emphasis. 
6 These instructions originated after the arrest and trial of several ‘armed criminals’ who shot at an Adelaide constable while evading arrest in 
1902. 
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oﬃcers in the metropolitan area to have ‘hand guns’ available at all times during their patrol. 
While the policy at the time did not suggest that handguns would always be carried, policies 
from 1992 onwards required oﬃcers to use discretion as to whether handguns were to be 
overtly carried. In fact, a serving SAPOL member in the present research recalled that during 
the early parts of their career revolvers were either kept in the patrol vehicle glove compart-
ment, an oﬃcer’s trouser pocket, or a covert holster sling (Interview Transcript A82).  
Slee (1998) concurs, noting that the practice of wearing concealed firearms changed to 
permanent overt carriage on the hip after the shooting of two oﬃcers in 1977. Before the 
shooting, the public attitude towards routine overt carriage was one of complacency: 
Notorious crimes or incidents requiring the use of police handguns were rare and the low level of violent crime 
involving firearms had created an attitude of complacency that was shared by both police and public alike. It 
was understandable in such a relatively peaceful community that the public had even begun to equate their 
police, even though they were ‘secretly’ armed, with the unarmed English ‘Bobby’ (Slee 1998, p.93). 
After the 1977 shooting, a committee of departmental and union members recommended that 
all oﬃcers on patrol should be armed with a revolver worn in an exposed hip holster. This 
recommendation was rejected by the Commissioner at the time. It was not until 1979, under a 
new Commissioner, that it was agreed that revolvers were to be worn in an exposed holster. 
Subsequent procurement and uniform redesign problems delayed their introduction, and it 
was not until 1982 that all operational oﬃcers became routinely armed (Slee 1998).   
2.1.2  CONTEMPORARY POLICING  
Today, policing arrangements diﬀer between Australia and New Zealand. Policing in Austral-
ia comprises of eight policing agencies: six state agencies (New South Wales, Queensland, 
South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia), one territorial agency (Northern 
Territory) and a federal agency (which also provides service for the Australian Capital Terri-
tory). The South Australian Police has jurisdictional responsibility for general policing and 
criminal investigation in the state of South Australia, investigating and prosecuting oﬀences 
under state law where oﬀences under federal law in South Australia—including crimes against 
national security, immigration law, and drug traﬃcking—are investigated by the Australian 
Federal Police (Keane & Bell 2013). The New Zealand Police, however, is the sole agency re-
sponsible for policing within New Zealand. In addition to territorial policing responsibilities 
of public safety, order maintenance, criminal investigation and road policing, NZPOL have 
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responsibilities ranging from emergency/disaster response, coronial investigation, firearms 
regulation, and high policing activities relating to organised crime, national security, and 
counter-terrorism (New Zealand Police 2005).7 Other variations between NZPOL and SAPOL 
are shown below in Table 2.1—comparisons with the largest Australasian police agency New 
South Wales Police (NSWPOL) and the London Metropolitan Police Service (MET) are also 
included to provide context.  
Table 2.1 Cross-national comparisons of population, staffing, annual expenditure, recorded offences, responsi-
bilities and armament of the London Metropolitan Police, New South Wales Police, New Zealand Police, and 
South Australian Police as of the 2014–2015 financial years, or as otherwise stipulated. 
 New Zealand8 South Australia9 New South Wales10 London Met11 
Jurisdictional Population 4,596,700 1,698,600 7,565,500 8,633,000 
Total Constabulary officers 9,048 4,683 16,693 31,877 
Police to Population ratio 1:508 1:362 1:453 1:270 
Annual expenditure per officer (NZ$ converted) NZ$161,881 NZ$195,137 NZ$234,763 NZ$151,308 
Annual expenditure per citizen (NZ$ converted) NZ$319 NZ$538 NZ$518 NZ$558 
Total recorded offences per annum, per constabulary officer 38.7 34.8 42.0 23.6 
Total recorded offences per annum, per 10,000 citizens 818 960 927 871 
Differential characteristics     
Responsible for national security Yes No No Partial 
Responsible for general crime and disorder Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Routinely armed with firearms No Yes Yes No 
Routinely armed with CED (e.g. Taser) Yes No No No 
 
NZPOL has fewer oﬃcers per citizen among the four agencies (e.g. 1:508 cf. 1:362 of 
SAPOL). SAPOL has the lowest ratio, except for MET (although MET does assume certain na-
tional lead responsibilities including counter-terrorism, royal protection, which are not the 
responsibility of SAPOL). NZPOL has a lower rate of recorded oﬀences than SAPOL, but few-
er constabulary staﬀ per population results in a higher rate of oﬀences per constabulary 
oﬃcer. SAPOL serves approximately one third of the population served by NZPOL but has 
more oﬃcers per population, higher annual expenditure per sworn oﬃcer, and a higher annu-
al expenditure per citizen.  
                                               
7 New Zealand has separate enforcement or regulative agencies for aviation, customs, immigration, fisheries, maritime, and military matters, 
and maintains separate security intelligence agencies. 
8 Data sourced from the New Zealand Police Annual Report 2014/2015 (New Zealand Police 2015a). 
9 Data sourced from the South Australia Police Annual Report 2014-2015 (South Australian Police Department 2015) with currency conver-
sion from NZFOREX (New Zealand Foreign Exchange Services Limited 2017). 
10 Data sourced from the NSW Police Force Annual Report 2014-2015 (New South Wales Police Force 2015), the Local Government Area 
Crime Trends Tool for the year ending June 2015 (Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 2017) with currency conversion from NZFOREX 
(New Zealand Foreign Exchange Services Limited 2017). 
11 Data sourced from the London Metropolitan Police Statement of Accounts 2014/15 (Metropolitan Police 2015); Home Oﬃce (Home Oﬃce 
2016); Crime in England and Wales data tables for the year ending September 2016 (Oﬃce of National Statistics 2017) as no earlier data was 
available. 
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At the time of the present research, oﬃcers from South Australia were routinely armed 
with a semi-automatic sidearm. New Zealand first response oﬃcers were deployed with fire-
arms locked in patrol vehicle strongboxes: a standard response patrol vehicle contained one 
semi-automatic rifle, two semi-automatic side arms, and one CED Taser. It was ironic that 
although New Zealand oﬃcers were not routinely armed, they had immediate access to a 
greater quantity of firearms than their routinely armed SAPOL colleagues. Oﬃcers from both 
jurisdictions were armed with handcuﬀs, OC Spray, and expandable batons. 
New Zealand Police 
The literature concerning the contemporary practice and behaviour of NZPOL is scarce. There 
is a growing body of research in relation to the policing of domestic violence (Cross & New-
bold 2010); oﬃcer experiences of workplace stress (Akurangi & Evans 2006; Brough 2005; 
Thoreau & Lobb 2005; Howard et al. 2000; Stephens & Long 1999); staﬀ retention (Lynch & 
Tuckey 2008); oﬃcer personality (Lobb & Packman 2005); restorative justice (Winfree 2004); 
and community policing (Winfree & Newbold 1999). There are some data available from 
NZPOL regarding police-citizen encounters. For the annual report on the use of ‘tactical op-
tions’12 ending December 2014, police oﬃcers (excluding Armed Oﬀender Squad and Special 
Tactics Group oﬃcers) reported the use of 7,162 tactical options at 4,823 police-citizen en-
counters (New Zealand Police 2015b). While NZPOL also reported that 99.9% of “recorded 
face-to-face interactions with the public” (New Zealand Police 2015b) did not involve reporta-
ble use of tactical options, mandatory reporting is not required for all uses of coercive force 
such as handcuﬃng or physical searches. Handcuﬃng, for instance, is only reportable if used 
in association with pain-compliance or used in combination with another tactic. Verbal con-
trol behaviour, such as verbal threats of force, are not required to be reported and thus are not 
captured in these statistics. 
The initial trial and subsequent introduction of CEDs13 for all front-line oﬃcers in 2010 
created controversy (Robb et al. 2009; O’Brien et al. 2011). NZPOL report that from 2010 to 
December 2014, CEDs were deployed in 12.6% of ‘tactical option encounters’, fewer than emp-
ty-hand tactics (27.7%), handcuﬃng14 (25.0%), OC spray (22.2%), but more than dog 
                                               
12 NZP define ‘tactical options’ and report according to the following: “Handcuﬀs with pain compliance, or without pain compliance when 
used with another reportable tactical option; other restraints; OC sprat bursts; empty hand tactics; baton strikes; dog bites or other dog-
related deployment injuries; weapons or opportunity; sponge rounds; shows and discharges of a TASER and/or firearm” (New Zealand Police 
2015b, p.7).  
13 Taser 
14 See note 26 
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deployments (4.3%), or firearm show/use (4.3%). Over this reporting period, the total number 
of CED deployments amounted to 0.5% of all recorded apprehensions (New Zealand Police 
2015c). 
While NZPOL has been spared the misfortunes of systemic corruption endemic in some 
Australian police forces, it has faced criticism for problems associated with organisational cul-
ture. A commission of inquiry in 2007 established in response to sexual misconduct of oﬃcers 
during the 1980’s found that although misconduct emerged in the mid-2000’s, that such con-
duct was relatively rare (Bazley 2007). However, Rowe (2009) points out that although the 
occurrence of misconduct is low, scandal arising from the misconduct perpetuates in contem-
porary media narratives. 
South Australia Police 
Less is known about the contemporary practice of South Australian oﬃcers. Indeed, much of 
the literature that discusses ‘Australian’ policing attempts to, perhaps unhelpfully, construct a 
national narrative. However the absence of SAPOL from enquiries into systemic police cor-
ruption (such as the Fitzgerald Commission into Queensland Police, the Wood inquiry of the 
New South Wales Police, the Beach Inquiry in the Victorian Police, and the Kennedy Inquiry 
of the Western Australian Police (Oﬃce of Police Integrity 2007)) suggests that systemic or se-
rious corruption is either non-existent or undiscovered. Prenzler (1997) observes references to 
‘police culture’ found in the Wood and Fitzgerald inquiries, in a discussion of police culture in 
Australian policing, and concludes that ‘police culture’ behaviours described in the classic po-
lice literature (e.g. Reiner 2010) are observable in Australian police oﬃcers. Perhaps the most 
enterprising research into police behaviour of South Australian police oﬃcers originates from 
the work associated with the former National Police Research Unit. Research conducted in as-
sociation with the unit includes psychological research into the incidence of suspect resistance 
experienced by oﬃcers (Wilson & Brewer 1991), how oﬃcers deal with conflict (Wilson & 
Brewer 1993) and diﬀerences in the conflict resolution behaviour between male and female 
oﬃcers (Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). While oﬃcers from SAPOL were not always the direct 
subject of the research, these outputs provide a picture of oﬃcer behaviour within South Aus-
tralia. 
Aside from colonial and contemporary history, there is little in the policing literature that 
helps to identify qualities that might diﬀerentiate the practice or behaviour of the South Aus-
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tralian Police with other Australian police agencies. One analysis of the force’s approach to 
customer service indicates that SAPOL has the highest rating of community satisfaction indi-
cators of professionalism and supporting community programs between 2005-2008 compared 
with the other Australian Police forces (Baker & Hyde 2011). The absence of any inquiry into 
police conduct within the jurisdiction (such as those investigating corruption in the forces of 
New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, and Western Australia, and the conduct of New Zea-
land) suggests that disreputable behaviour and practice either does not exist, or not suﬃcient 
to generate a commission of inquiry, with contemporary South Australian Police.   
2.1.3  SUMMARY 
While the colonies of South Australia and New Zealand were not settled as penal colonies, 
they both suﬀered the risks associated with the proximity of ex-convicts and soon requested 
colonial support to establish policing systems. Clyne (1987) Hill (1986) and O’Brien (1960) 
show the influence of the reforms of British policing by Peel, Rowan and Mayne of the nine-
teenth century, seen at South Australia in 1844 and later in 1886 with the disestablishment of 
the New Zealand armed constabulary. From then onwards, policing in both jurisdictions fol-
lowed the British tradition of unarmed policing, albeit with SAPOL oﬃcers discreetly 
routinely armed, until 1982 when SAPOL oﬃcers were overtly routinely armed. 
 
 3 
Conflict and conflict resolution during  
police-citizen encounters 
This third chapter considers key components of the literature that are relevant to the present 
research. The first section is concerned with the ritualistic nature of police-citizen encounters. 
Applying Goﬀman (1961) and Collins (2004), the discussion considers the impact of power, 
authority, and deference asymmetries inherent in police-citizen interaction. This is followed 
by a discussion of factors relevant to investigative and enforcement encounters and use of 
control behaviour by oﬃcers during encounters. The second section considers normative, 
structural, and behavioural explanations for conflict during police-citizen encounters. The 
closing section considers Deutsch’s theory of conflict resolution and other empirical research 
on police conflict-resolution behaviour.  
3.1 Police-citizen encounters 
3.1.1  THE RITUAL OF THE POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTER 
The present research relates to the interaction between oﬃcers and citizens within public-
facing zones in the field. Punch (1979) observed how a police oﬃcer’s workplace is demarcated 
into two zones: a Goﬀmanian ‘backstage’1 that incorporates parts of the police station which 
ordinarily excludes citizens; and an operational ‘frontstage’ which includes public zones inside 
                                               
1 See Goﬀman 1959, p.133. 
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the station (such as the front-counter, interview rooms, and the custody suite) plus all public 
and private places outside of the station. The research is concerned with the behaviour of 
oﬃcers who respond to calls for service—those in the ‘front-line’.2 They are oﬃcers who do 
‘something about’ “something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-
had-better-do-something-now” (Bittner 1974, p.161).  
Policing agencies describe these oﬃcers with varying nomenclature; they are referred in the 
literature as beat, patrol, patrolmen (in older literature), emergency response, first response, 
front-line, or general duties oﬃcers. It is common that when these oﬃcers are not responding 
to calls for service they are ‘on patrol’ partaking in some level of ‘preventative’ action to deter 
oﬀending (Brown 1981). Patrol oﬃcers diﬀer from their investigative colleagues, sometimes 
known as detectives, who are non-uniformed, use unmarked vehicles and investigate serious 
crime. On the other hand, patrol oﬃcers are highly visible, use marked patrol vehicles, wear 
uniforms, focus on order maintenance and are the first responder to emergency calls for ser-
vice. While on patrol, oﬃcers are confronted with situations which cause them to come face-
to-face with citizens (Muir 1977; Brown 1981). 
The focused gathering 
Goﬀman diﬀerentiates between face-to-face gatherings which are focused and un-focussed 
(1961). As a unit of social organisation, a focused gathering occurs between two or more actors 
who are in each other’s immediate physical presence where they share a “visual and cognitive 
focus of attention” (1961, pp.17-18): 
“… [a] type of social arrangement that occurs when persons are in one another’s immediate physical presence, 
to be called here an encounter or a focused gathering. For the participants, this involves a single visual and 
cognitive focus of attention; a mutual and preferential openness to verbal communication; a heightened mutual 
relevance of acts; an eye-to-eye ecological huddle that maximises each participant’s opportunity to perceive the 
other participants’ monitoring of him.” (Italics are original) (Goﬀman 1961, pp.17-18) 
Collins advances Goﬀman’s original construct, adding that encounters or interaction rituals 
(IR) are such that participants become engaged in each other’s “bodily micro-rhythms and 
emotions” (2004, p.47). IRs occur when “two or more people are physically assembled in the 
same place, so that they aﬀect each other by their bodily presence” (2004, pp.47-48), they ex-
hibit “boundaries to outsiders so that participants have a sense of who is taking part [in the 
IR] and who is excluded” (ibid), “people focus their attention upon a common object or ac-
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tivity … and become mutually aware of each other’s focus of attention” (ibid) and “they share 
a common mood or emotional experience” (ibid). 
Power rituals 
Goﬀman (1961) draws attention to the importance of role and power during frontstage face-to-
face interaction: during encounters with citizens, a professional behaves according to the role 
of that profession, and this diﬀers to the role that the professional plays in the backstage. Po-
licing scholars who have applied Goﬀman’s encounter/interaction ritual framework to police-
citizen interaction observe that a ‘police-citizen’ encounter diﬀers substantially from a ‘nor-
mal’ citizen-citizen encounter as the former feature asymmetric levels of power and authority 
and often violate the principle of reciprocity (Alpert & Dunham 2004; Collins 2004). 
As the distribution of power among participants is asymmetrical, Collins (2004) posits that 
police-citizen encounters are ‘power rituals’. In a power-ritual framework, oﬃcers take the 
role of order-giver, and the citizens become the order-taker. Order-givers fulfil the role of 
those who have the power and authority to instruct order-takers while order-takers are those 
who have no choice but to defer to order-givers. Order-givers display a frontstage personality 
which is closely aligned to an ‘oﬃcial-self’ (portrayed in the frontstage) and less aligned to a 
‘private-self’ (reserved for the backstage). Order-takers portray a frontstage personality which 
hides their backstage personality (or any cynicism developed toward the order-givers). Collins 
also suggests that order-givers are susceptible to influence according to their personality: ac-
tors who have high mechanical solidarity are more likely to conform to tradition and are less 
likely to tolerate outsiders (who violate group norms); whereas actors who have low mechani-
cal solidarity are less conforming to tradition and more likely to be more tolerant of violators.  
Alpert and Dunham (2004), Manning (1977), and Lipsky (1980) consider the impact of 
normative behaviour on police-citizen encounters. Police-citizen encounters, through the 
function of legislation, have an ‘oﬃcial’ nature (Manning 1977). Alpert and Dunham (2004) 
suggest that the oﬃcial nature of police-citizen interactions ‘overshadow’ social status, age, 
race, or gender that often regulate interaction during citizen-citizen encounters. Sykes and 
Clark (1975) found that oﬃcers mostly encounter citizens of a lower sociological order than 
oﬃcers, such as working-class or lower-class citizens, and in many instances, citizens ap-
peared to be socialised to show deference to oﬃcer’s authority, and oﬃcers were equally 
socialised to expect deference from citizens.  
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Such imbalances of authority, power, and deference illustrate how police-citizen encoun-
ters appear to be distinct from citizen-citizen encounters through the violation of reciprocity 
(Alpert & Dunham 2004). Reciprocity occurs where participants of an encounter have equal 
status: “typical interactions involve a standardised exchange of actions and reactions or dia-
logue in which both actors receive ritual support” (Alpert & Dunham 2004, p.180). 
Reciprocity is also violated with respect to oﬃcer use of coercion and force. Citizens have lim-
ited legal entitlement to use force to achieve goals during citizen-citizen encounters. But while 
citizens have a right to use force in self-defence against other citizens (see Crimes Act 1961 
[NZ], S.48), oﬃcers have common law and statutory rights to use force during police-citizen 
encounters. Indeed, the act of resisting an oﬃcer in the execution of their duty constitutes a 
criminal oﬀence (e.g. Summary Oﬀences Act 1981 [NZ], S.23).  
As such, police-citizen encounters fit within Collins’s power ritual construct within limits. 
while oﬃcers may control the physical actions and movement of citizens in certain situations, 
oﬃcers cannot control the information they might require. While they may elicit information, 
oﬃcers are not empowered to retrieve information from a noncompliant citizen in a parallel 
manner to how oﬃcers may physically control citizens. Such a dilemma creates a power 
asymmetry in favour of the citizen: oﬃcers become information-seekers and citizens become 
information-givers. Aside from negotiating with citizens, or “cajoling, requesting, threatening, 
‘bullshitting them’” (Rubinstein 1973, p.274), oﬃcers are unable to force citizens to provide in-
formation. Even in circumstances where oﬃcers have lawful authority to demand information 
from citizens, non-compliance is remedied through the prosecution of an oﬀence rather than 
further attempts to extract the required information (Policing Act 2008 [NZ] S.32). Conse-
quently, citizens may withhold information or not possess the information which oﬃcers 
seek. 
3.1.2  VARIETY OF POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS 
Bayley (1990) categorised the functions of police into crime-based situations (crime emergen-
cy, criminal complaint and investigation, crime prevention) and non-crime-based situations 
(non-crime emergency, non-crime investigation, care of incapacitated/incompetent persons, 
disputes/quarrels, advising, traﬃc, crowd control). Police agencies commonly structure their 
workforce accordingly, to provide a responsive service for emergency and non-emergency 
calls for service, and an investigative service to investigate serious crime (Reiner 2010; Young 
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1991). Some jurisdictions organise their policing agencies to provide policing responsive or in-
vestigative agencies (such as American investigative bureaux). In the case of Australasian 
policing, agencies include both responsive and investigative divisions, structured to provide a 
‘general duties’ or ‘patrol’ branch and a detective branch (New Zealand Police 2016a; South 
Australian Police Department 2015). Within the context of front-line response policing, inves-
tigative encounters can be seen to diﬀer from enforcement encounters. Investigative 
encounters are those which are predominantly concerned with the collection of information 
from a citizen. This may include the collection of a field statement from a victim or witness or 
an informal field interview of a suspect. In contrast, enforcement encounters diﬀer in that the 
purpose of the encounter shifts from information-seeking to action-taking. Accordingly, inves-
tigative encounters may transform into enforcement encounters, should suﬃcient 
information be established to justify a criminal justice sanction (such as a prosecution or field 
action). 
Investigative encounters 
Investigative encounters include focused gatherings with citizens who are complainants, wit-
nesses, and victims (Westley 2005). The policing literature considers the eﬀectiveness of 
investigative encounters with victims and witnesses (e.g. Loftus & Palmer 1996) including in-
vestigative interviewing techniques of victims and witnesses (e.g. Cliﬀord & George 1996). 
Revealingly, research has identified a diﬀerential nature of oﬃcer attitude towards victims; 
such as the ‘worthiness’ of victims, particularly female victims of domestic violence (e.g. 
Westmarland 2002) and the legitimacy of victims (Wilson 1968).  
Oﬃcers fulfil the role of ‘information-seekers’ to collect information (Sykes & Brent 1980). 
Citizen cooperation with police has been shown to be aﬀected by the cognitive capacity and 
emotional demeanour of the witness/victim  (e.g. Watson et al. 2014), the citizen’s perception 
of procedural fairness and police legitimacy (Reisig et al. 2007; Sunshine & Tyler 2003), police 
eﬀectiveness (Tankebe 2009), police responsiveness trust and confidence (van Craen & 
Skogan 2014), personal experiences of treatment by oﬃcers (Skogan 2006). As previously not-
ed, the asymmetric nature of power in favour of the oﬃcer is unclear: although an oﬃcer 
keeps their role-based authoritative stature (as police oﬃcers), and citizens may continue to 
feel compelled to defer to the oﬃcer, the oﬃcer’s ability to collect information is contingent 
on citizen cooperation. Oﬃcers may attempt to ‘cajole, request threaten, or bullshit’ (Rubin-
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stein 1973), but oﬃcers rely on the cooperation of the witness or victim to collect relevant evi-
dential and intelligence information.  
The policing literature considers encounters between oﬃcers and those citizens suspected 
by the oﬃcers of having committed an oﬀence (suspects) and citizens who oﬃcers believe 
there is suﬃcient evidence against to justify an arrest or prosecution (arrestees). Studies of 
oﬃcer behaviour in these circumstances consider the legal justification (e.g. Bowling & Weber 
2011; Epp et al. 2014), oﬃcer decision-making when evaluating evidential suﬃciency (e.g. 
Bynum et al. 1982), decision-making at domestic conflict situations (e.g. Dai et al. 2011) appli-
cation of constabulary discretion (e.g. Mastrofski 2004), use of force (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 
2004; Terrill 2005; Terrill & Mastrofski 2002), mental or emotional state of citizens (e.g. Wat-
son et al. 2014), and oﬃcer prejudice of interactions with suspects (e.g. Westmarland 2002).  
Relevant themes emerge from the Anglo-American literature about investigative police-
citizen encounters with suspects. Prominence is given to the eﬃcacy of ‘stop and search’ (UK) 
and ‘stop and frisk’ (USA). Bowling and Weber (2011) best represent the critical approach to 
such encounters, warning that this practice targets disadvantaged ethnic minority communi-
ties which may result in threats to police legitimacy, damaging community relations though 
targeting ‘law-abiding’ citizens who may be targeted by police, which in turn may lead to the 
erosion of social solidarity. Epp et al. (2014) consider the impact of vehicular ‘investigatory 
stops’ in the United States as evidence of implicit intergroup bias. Indeed, Bradford and Load-
er (2016) argue that police use stop and search as a process to assert order and management of 
social marginality such as the routine process to regulate young working-class males evi-
denced in Scotland. While, Bowling and Weber (2011) and Epp et al. (2014) warn that such 
injustice experienced by ethnic minority group may threaten police legitimacy, it is important 
to note that investigative encounters do not necessarily lead to an erosion of police legitimacy 
or social cohesion. Research on the eﬀect of procedural justice messaging during investigative 
stops for testing alcohol indicates that such police practices can increase police legitimacy 
among resident populations (Mazerolle et al. 2012).   
Enforcement encounters 
The policing literature considers the impact of oﬃcer decisions and methods when taking ac-
tion. As noted previously, the literature provides evidence of links between oﬃcer behaviour 
and legitimacy, and how perceptions of fairness aﬀect legitimacy (e.g. Sunshine & Tyler 2003; 
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Bottoms & Tankebe 2013; Dai et al. 2011). The literature also explores the method and propor-
tionality of regulation during police-suspect encounters. While Sykes and Brent (1980) noted 
that oﬃcers regulate police-citizen interaction through conversational, imperative, or coercive 
regulation to achieve particular goals, the literature tends to focus on the utility and propor-
tion of force used by oﬃcers (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 2004; Terrill et al. 2003; Terrill 2005; 
Terrill 2001).  
3.1.3  CONTROL BEHAVIOUR 
It is accepted that in certain circumstances oﬃcers have the legal authority to control the 
physical movement of a citizen: a search, detainment, or arrest (see Policing Act 2008 [NZ]; 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012 [NZ]). The policing literature that considers these control 
behaviours explore why oﬃcers use force (Alpert & Dunham 2004; Sykes & Brent 1980; 
Worden 1996), how oﬃcers use force (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 2004; Alpert & MacDonald 2001; 
Hickman et al. 2015; Myhrer & Strype 2010; Kraska 2001) and the role of police coercion (e.g. 
Terrill 2001; Terrill et al. 2003; Terrill & Mastrofski 2002; Muir 1977). Some scholars agree that 
the literature lacks robust theoretical explanations for police coercion and the use of force 
(Terrill 2014), excessive use of force and police brutality (Worden 1996), perhaps because of 
definitional inconsistencies with regard to coercion3 (Klockars 1996; Terrill 2001) force and 
excessive use of force (Geller & Toch 1996).  
Coercion 
Predominant definitions in the policing literature consider coercion as a conflation of physical 
and verbal actions (Terrill 2001). Muir defines coercion as “a means of controlling the conduct 
of others through threats to harm” (1977, p.37) and posited that police-citizen interaction are 
coercive relationships which comprise of ‘extortionate transactions’. Muir explains that extor-
tionate transaction relies on a victimiser possessing extortionate power over a victim where the 
victim fears some level of injury from the victimiser and thus becomes the victimiser’s hos-
tage, and in order to prevent injury, the victimiser demands a ransom from the victim. In the 
case of a police-citizen encounter, the ransom is compliance. The extortionate transaction re-
lies on the citizen fulfilling the role of a victim; but a citizen will be free from oﬃcer coercion if 
the victim is ‘dispossessed’ (defined as “those who have nothing to lose, the life prisoner in 
                                               
3 Terrill helpfully observes that Klockars’ construction of coercion is limited to physical action (Klockars 1995; Terrill 2004). 
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solitary, the deadbeat, the bankrupt, and the visionary whose life is worth less than his mar-
tyrdom” (Muir 1977, p.37)). It is Muir’s thesis that oﬃcers use the extortionate relationship as 
a principal method to control citizen behaviour. 
Bittner (1974) argued that although oﬃcers have the power to use coercion/force, a skilled 
oﬃcer avoids the use of coercion/force. Muir considered the utility and variability of how 
oﬃcer personality aﬀected the use of coercive control. The professional is not afraid to use co-
ercion/force, but only when necessary, and prefers persuasion. The enforcer lacks empathy 
towards citizens, takes a binary view towards the citizenry (identifying the good and the bad) 
and, in contrast to the professional, is all too ready to use force. The reciprocator is hesitant 
and reluctant to use coercion/force and concentrates less on ‘fighting crime’ and more ‘help-
ing people’. The avoider is uncomfortable with coercion/force and avoids frontline duties 
(Muir 1977; Hochstedler 1981). The variability of personal preference towards coercion/force 
indicates that oﬃcers may choose to avoid using control behaviour during police-citizen in-
teraction.    
Control behaviour and encounter goals 
Sykes and Brent (1980) take a similar approach to Muir. Applying a general systems frame-
work, they incorporate coercive, definitional, or imperative actions as regulators of citizen 
behaviour. Definitional regulation includes oﬃcers asking questions: such behaviour focuses 
the citizen’s cognitive attention on the oﬃcer’s “domain of consequence to his professional ac-
tivity” (Sykes & Brent 1980, p.184). Imperative actions are defined as those which directly 
impact the behaviour of the citizen, for instance: “Do this or arrest!” (Sykes & Brent 1980, 
p.185). In contrast to Muir, Sykes and Brent separate ‘nonviolent threats’ from active ‘coercive 
threats’ (which they define as verbal statements accompanied by a physical action to reinforce 
the oﬃcer’s determination to take coercive action).  
Sykes and Brent (1983) deconstruct encounters into utterances and strings. A single state-
ment or action was defined as an utterance. Utterances relating to a topic may be grouped 
together for analysis as a string. This approach aided the analysis of situational determinants 
of encounter processes and outcomes. For instance, strings provided an opportunity to ana-
lyse conversational transactions to investigate oﬃcer decision-making (Sykes & Brent 1983) 
through the construction of oﬃcer-citizen interaction maps (Sykes & Brent 1980). Similar ap-
proaches have since been used to analyse police use-of-force transactions (Terrill & 
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Mastrofski 2002; Terrill et al. 2003) and measure the eﬀect of one utterance on the outcome of 
the encounter (Braithwaite 1998; Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). Equally, strings may be used by 
either actor in the encounter to control the interactions to achieve an ‘encounter goal’. Sykes 
and Brent (1980; 1983) argued that oﬃcers used control behaviour to achieve four goals during 
a police-citizen encounter: collect information, assert or maintain order, achieve respect from 
citizens, and achieve an acceptable resolution.  
Utterances—and strings—have been analysed to measure the eﬀect of how the action of 
one actor aﬀects another actor. Toch (1969), Sykes and Brent (1983), and Terrill (2005) apply 
this transactional approach to the analysis of police-citizen encounters. Transactional frame-
works have been used to explain models of interpersonal communication (Wood 2010) but 
they are not limited to verbal exchanges: the ‘listener’s’ body language is as important as the 
subject of the ‘speaker’s’ verbal communication. As such, eﬀective communication is a shared 
process; both the listener and speaker “share the responsibility for eﬀectiveness” (Wood 2010, 
p.24); or indeed as Sykes and Brent propose, “both actors in a relationship share responsibility 
for how the relationship develops” (Sykes & Brent 1983, p.253). Toch tested the transactional 
nature of police-citizen encounters with an examination of ‘violent’ police-citizen encounters. 
He concluded that citizens and oﬃcers were equally responsible for the tactics used by oﬃcers 
as the behaviour of the citizen determined the police oﬃcer’s response (1969). Sykes and Brent 
(1983), too, hypothesised that interactions between police and citizens are a “process in which 
acts of each participant at each point in time are, at least in part, contingent upon past acts” 
(1983, p.110). They conclude that police-citizen encounters are second-order Markov chains 
(where actions reflect the nature of the current state and the previous state).  
Sykes and Brent constructed a typology of utterance actions: definitional acts were those 
used by either actor to define or construct an understanding of the situation or topic of dis-
course; controlling acts were those which attempted to alter the behaviour of the other actor, 
such as physical actions (accusations, handcuﬃng, or the use of weapons) or making an arrest; 
resistant acts were those actions used by actors when they refused to answer a definitional or 
controlling question; and lastly, confirming acts are those such as acquiescence to control, fol-
lowing a direction (or order) or answering questions.  
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3.1.4  SUMMARY 
Within Goﬀman’s framework of face-to-face focused encounters, Collins identified the influ-
ence of asymmetric power relationships between oﬃcers and citizens. The predominant 
perspective focuses on the asymmetric relationship in favour of the oﬃcer: as agents of the 
state they operate as oﬃcial street-level bureaucrats and have legal protections to use force to 
achieve their goals. However, this perspective underestimates the diﬃculties faced by oﬃcers 
when collecting information from citizens. In some adversarial common-law jurisdictions, 
where the right to silence is protected in law, citizens are protected from coercive actions by 
agents of the state to elicit information (see Bill of Rights Act 1990 [NZ]). In this manner, pow-
er asymmetry may reverse in favour of the citizen: oﬃcers become information seekers and 
citizens become the information givers.  
As such, oﬃcers traverse between the modes of information collection and taking en-
forcement actions. While Bayley observed that the police function varies between crime-based 
and non-crime-based events, a goal-approached focus indicates how coercive and control be-
haviour provides insight into how oﬃcers regulate police-citizen encounters. The next section 
(3.2) addresses literature that considers how normative, structural, and behavioural influences 
explain the cause of conflict during police-citizen encounters.  
3.2 Conflict during police-citizen encounters 
A diﬃculty of policing within democratic, pluralistic societies is the inherent risk that that 
where there are competing groups, or indeed individuals, police action which advantages one 
party will disadvantage another. As Herbert (2006) explains, an important role of the police is 
to intercede during conflict, using a combination of problem solving, persuasion and coercive 
power to find a resolution. But in doing so   
[t]he quest for police legitimacy will be forever ongoing because the coercive power that oﬃcers possess will 
never be symbolically understood in like fashion across the populace. When an exercise of police power 
comforts one group of citizens, it may simultaneously alienate another (Herbert 2006, p.481). 
Indeed, the ‘taking of sides’ places police in conflict with those who are alienated. This is ap-
parent in the common law adversarial prosecutorial process: police act on the side of the 
victim and leads the prosecution of the suspect, but in advancing the victim’s cause, police be-
come adversaries of the suspect’s cause. 
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Deutsch’s ‘crude law of social relations’ (1973) considers the impact of cooperative and 
competitive behaviour. He stipulated that “characteristic processes and eﬀects elicited by a 
given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) also tend to elicit that type of so-
cial relationship” (Deutsch 1973, p.365). In other words, cooperation among actors fosters 
further cooperation whereas competition among actors breeds further competition. Deutsch 
explains that cooperative relationships emerge from the use of strategies of mutual problem-
solving, persuasion, and openness (1973). Conversely, competitive relationships form if parties 
adopt strategies which involve power or use coercive tactics, threats, or deception. Coopera-
tive situations between actors arise from the perception that the goals of the actors are 
positively linked whereas competitive situations arise when goals are incompatible and nega-
tively linked (Deutsch 1973; Braithwaite 1998).  
In a policing context, it could be argued that oﬃcers alternate between behaving with pre-
dominantly cooperative behaviour (interacting with victims, complainants, community 
groups, and informants) and predominantly competitive behaviour (interacting with suspects, 
oﬀenders, or groups who are in opposition to police goals and values). Herbert (2006) identi-
fies the complexity of these police-community relations and police function: oﬃcers navigate 
among the modes of subservience (collaborating with the community on community-based 
problems), separation (enforcing the law on community members) and generative (improving 
the community by leading change). 
Explanations to help understand how conflict develops between oﬃcers and citizens are 
discussed below. Sociological perspectives, including theories of norm resistance, deference 
and authority explain how structural and normative influences aﬀect conflict. Theoretical 
frameworks including procedural justice, organisational justice, and defiance theory consider 
the impact of fair and unfair behaviour by oﬃcers on police-citizen interaction.  
3.2.1 NORMATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Norm resistance theory 
Turk (1969) envisaged that conflict between police and citizens occurred at a structural level. 
Norm resistance theory (NRT) concentrates on the proposition that criminality can be seen 
through a lens of relations between those in authority (such as legislators or enforcers) and 
those subjected to authority (‘acceptors’ or ‘resisters’). Within this relationship, Turk suggests 
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that conflict arises from the issue of authority rather than from class, power, or wealth. NRT 
distinguishes between cultural norms and social norms: the former are those defined in law 
whereas the latter are those associated with how the law is enforced (Turk 1969; Vold & Ber-
nard 1986). NRT explains that the potential for conflict is inherent in all encounters between 
authorities and parties whose cultural norms are at odds with the norms of authorities. In-
deed, cultural diﬀerences between both groups are expected: 
Authorities are less likely to tolerate cultural diﬀerences when their cultural norm is strongly supported by their 
social norms. If their symbolisation is really important to them, they are likely to assume that those who see 
things diﬀerently are equally committed, and therefore to see a genuine threat in the diﬀerent symbolisation 
(Turk 1969, p.56).  
As such, norm resistance is most likely to occur when parties are acting “in accordance with 
their cultural norms” (Weidner & Terrill 2005, p.86) whereas conflict is least likely when “nei-
ther party acts in congruence with their cultural norms” (ibid). The closer the degree of 
cultural consensus between parties, the less likely that conflict will arise (Turk 1969).  
Turk sees that social order is regulated by authorities through a consensus-coercion bal-
ance (1969; Vold & Bernard 1986), and that: 
Authorities must prevent this balance from shifting to either an excessively coercive power relationship or an 
excessively consensual egalitarian relationship (Vold & Bernard 1986, p.280). 
Turk argues that criminality and police-citizen interaction are dependent on the structural re-
lationships of authority rather than social psychological influences. 
The application of NRT provides a valuable insight into the arrest process. The arrest of a 
citizen demonstrates the most extreme degree of congruence between cultural and social 
norms: not only has the arresting oﬃcer identified that the citizen has breached the cultural 
norm (law) but also decided that it was appropriate to take action to initiate a criminal justice 
sanction. NRT also suggests that conflict (norm resistance) can be predicted. Pro-arrest situa-
tions are predictive of higher overt conflict between the oﬃcer and citizen, as the chance of 
resistance and injury is higher than when compared with more tolerant or permissive ap-
proaches to citizen incongruence with cultural norms. Similarly, citizens with a prior record 
of criminality pose a higher risk of resistance as their history indicates a willingness to act in 
opposition to authority and cultural norms.  
Turk considers the eﬀect of organisation within cultural groups during police-citizen inter-
action is another predictor of conflict, positing that conflict was more likely to occur between 
parties when one of the parties has a higher level of ‘social support’ than the other:  
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[a subject] who has group support for his behaviour is going to be more stubborn in the face of eﬀorts to make 
him change (Turk 1969, p.58).  
Social organisation aﬀects oﬃcers and citizens alike. Oﬃcers have the advantage of routine 
organisation through the virtue of their existence. In the field, oﬃcers receive social support 
from the presence of patrol partners or indeed the presence of citizens whose norms are con-
gruent with the oﬃcers cultural and social norms. Group support provides fewer 
opportunities for oﬃcers to stray from their cultural and social norms. Conversely, citizens 
may receive social support from members of their family or other social groups present dur-
ing an encounter. For instance: individual protestors gain support from their peers; organised 
criminals from their criminal ‘gangs’ (Turk 1969). 
Turk also predicted that higher levels of sophistication, training or experience of the parties 
decreases the likelihood of conflict. Weidner and Terrill (2005) tested the influence of partici-
pant organisation and sophistication during police-citizen encounters. They found that an 
oﬃcer’s knowledge of a citizen, location, the presence of bystanders during an encounter, or 
proactive police action (not responding to a call for service), was positively correlated with the 
occurrence of overt conflict. Similarly, high levels of citizen intoxication were positively corre-
lated with high levels of conflict, and low levels of oﬃcer education were negatively correlated 
with high levels of conflict.  
Deference 
Further applications of NRT have considered the role and function of deference during po-
lice-citizen encounters. Lanza-Kaduce and Greenleaf (1994) considered the function of 
deference within a North American context. They posited that normative deference in Ameri-
can culture includes patterns of females deferring to males, younger persons deferring to older 
persons, and ethnic minorities deferring to white ethnic majorities and tested for deference 
reversals (Lanza-Kaduce & Greenleaf 1994). Their research found that conflict was more likely 
when race and age counter the positional authority of oﬃcers. In other words, norm re-
sistance occurred in situations such as when a young oﬃcer did not show deference to an 
older citizen. Sykes and Clark (1975) also considered the nature of deference during police-
citizen encounters but from a perspective of status asymmetry. Sykes and Clark proposed that 
oﬃcers had a higher status within society (as the arbiters of authority) and therefore expect 
deference from citizens. Conflict, then, would emerge when citizens failed to show deference 
to oﬃcers.  
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Authority maintenance theory 
However, Alpert and Dunham (2004) suggest that deference exchange theory alone does not 
adequately explain oﬃcer behaviour; instead they construct a framework based on authority. 
Authority maintenance theory (AMT), like NRT, takes a normative and an interpersonal ap-
proach to encounters. AMT applies interaction ritual theory to a policing context arguing that 
this ritual focuses on oﬃcer authority and citizen deference/resistance (Alpert & Dunham 
2004). The focus of AMT is to explain how and why oﬃcers use force during police-citizen 
encounters. Simply, AMT explains that force is used to overcome eﬀorts to resist or under-
mine oﬃcers’ authority during police-citizen encounters. Drawing on Sykes and Brent, Alpert 
and Dunham expand AMT into seven key propositions: police-citizen encounters (PCEs) 
must be understood as an interaction process rather than as discrete events where interaction 
is regulated through the balance of authority or power among actors; PCEs are more asym-
metrical with respect to authority than when compared with most other types of interactions; 
and thus, expectations and behaviours often violate the principle of reciprocity. In a similar 
vein to NRT, AMT explains that conflict occurs when the goals of citizen or oﬃcer are dis-
rupted or blocked. Oﬃcers respond with varying degrees of regulation depending on the type 
of blockage; citizens, in turn, respond with varying degrees of resistance; and a re-
sistance/force interaction escalates until one party changes their sought goal(s) voluntarily or 
involuntarily. In sum, AMT suggests that during police-citizen interactions, when the goals of 
oﬃcers and citizens are incompatible oﬃcers make choices to use force to assert and maintain 
their authority over citizens.  
The rational actor 
A weakness of AMT, and indeed other constructs that rely on cognitive decision-making and 
assessments by the citizen, are their reliance on the capacity for citizens to make ‘rational’ as-
sessments during the encounter. Research has revealed that cognitive impairment due to 
mental illness, intoxication or emotional distress inhibits citizen ‘rationality’, and that im-
paired citizens lacked the ability to correctly recognise the oﬃcer’s intent, accurately assess the 
consequences of their actions, and caused them to behave with a heightened level of irritation 
(Link et al. 1999; Mastrofski et al. 2015; Reisig et al. 2004). Research has also revealed that 
oﬃcers may misinterpret situational cues and have diﬃculty distinguishing mental impair-
ment from intoxication (McTackett & Thomas 2016; Rossler & Terrill 2016) and that some 
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citizens with ‘impaired rationality’ experience diﬃculties when assessing the procedural ‘fair-
ness’ of oﬃcer behaviour (Mastrofski et al. 2015). These findings illustrate the weakness of 
theoretical frameworks that rely on bounded rationality decision-making by citizens during 
police-citizen encounters.  
Alpert & Dunham explain that “reciprocity breaks down when one or both of the parties 
determine that their goals are not being realised due to the behaviour of the other” (2004, 
pp.184, emphasis added). As shown by Mastrofski et al. (2015), cognitive processes are de-
pendent on the citizen’s ability to coherently interpret visual or auditory stimuli. In the 
present case of AMT, the citizen’s determination of goal achievement can be susceptible to 
impairment. Furthermore, the ability of a citizen to determine an oﬃcer’s intention is critical 
to maintaining social order. Because oﬃcers respond to resistance using regulation (control-
ling behaviour), the likelihood of oﬃcer use of force or citizen resistance increases when 
reciprocity breaks down.  
A central tenant of exchange theory suggests that participants in an encounter “respond in 
kind to the rewards or punishments they receive” (Wiley & Hudik 1974, p.120). Thus, the abil-
ity of the citizen to recognise the likelihood of reward or punishment, or indeed the citizen’s 
ability to accurately determine the intention of the oﬃcer, is instrumental in the other theoret-
ical frameworks devised to explain citizen behaviour.  
3.2.2  JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS 
Procedural justice theory 
A significant body of literature considers citizen cooperation with police through the frame-
work of procedural justice theory (PJT). The central tenet of PJT is that the respectful and fair 
treatment of citizens by police oﬃcers facilitates their cooperation during and after police-
citizen interaction. Such behaviour promotes a level of compliance with the law (Reisig et al. 
2007; Dai et al. 2011; Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Bottoms & Tankebe 2013). Tyler’s model of pro-
cessed-based regulation illustrates how ‘process-based judgements’ positively influence 
citizen-level cooperation and compliance (see Figure 1). This, in turn, promotes positive ac-
ceptance of the legitimacy of regulatory authorities, and compliance with regulation. 
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Figure 1. Tyler's Model of "Process-Based Regulation" reproduced from Bottoms and Tankebe (2013) 
 
A variant model of process-based regulation for policing incorporates public judgement of 
police legitimacy through the display of ‘procedurally just’ practices of oﬃcer decision-
making, and the quality of treatment of citizens by oﬃcers (Bottoms & Tankebe 2013). Simply 
expressed: the quality of treatment by oﬃcers and the quality of oﬃcer decision-making dur-
ing police-citizen encounters enhance citizens’ obligation to obey the law and increase their 
trust in police oﬃcers, resulting in compliance and cooperation. Sunshine and Tyler argue 
that “legitimacy is a social value that is distinct from performance evaluations” (2003, p.534). 
As such, police-citizen relations can be influenced by a citizen’s subjective assessment of the 
‘fairness’ of their treatment by oﬃcers.  
Hough et al. (2010) draw attention to the influence of cultural values when constructing 
understandings of legitimacy, noting Tyler’s research that North American public perceptions 
of legitimacy are more aligned with fairness of the criminal justice system than its eﬀective-
ness (see Tyler & Huo, 2002). This observation highlights the diﬃculties of theory 
transferability across diverse cultures. However, while Roberts and Herrington’s (2013) sys-
temic review of procedural justice literature contends that procedural justice theory holds “for 
the most part” (2013, p.120) across diﬀerent cultures and nations, they draw attention to sever-
al deviations. In Australia, for instance, procedural justice was less eﬀective in fostering 
cooperation among ethnic minorities than ethnic majority groups (Murphy & Cherney 2011).  
Mazerolle et al. (2012) observed that the policing literature is replete with empirical evi-
dence in support of the principles of process-based policing. In contrast to the previous 
methods, they took an experimental approach to investigate processed-based policing. Their 
randomised control trial of roadside alcohol breath-testing in Brisbane, Australia, found that 
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“perceptions of procedural fairness, police respect, and trust and confidence in police, … were 
all significantly higher” (2012, p.17) when oﬃcers used a pre-defined script that incorporated 
legitimacy-enhancing statements. While instructive, this study suﬀered from a 13% response 
rate to the post-roadside encounter survey. 
To the contrary, Dai et al. (2011) found that some procedural justice factors had limited 
impact on citizen behaviour during police-citizen encounters. Specifically, only the eﬀect of 
oﬃcer demeanour and oﬃcer consideration of citizen voice showed an increase in citizen co-
operation (for oﬃcers) and compliance. Dai et al. also found that qualities of police 
interpersonal treatment (care, disrespect, force) were insignificant factors in the explanation 
of citizen noncompliance. The only significant indicator found to impact citizen noncompli-
ance during police decision-making was voice consideration (defined when oﬃcers “gave full 
consideration of the citizen’s request” (Dai et al. 2011, p.163)). Perhaps most importantly, the 
Dai et al. study revealed that a citizen’s ‘irrationality’ had a positive eﬀect on citizen disrespect 
and non-compliance, which is consistent with other research on the eﬀects of mental impair-
ment and intoxication (e.g. see Reisig et al. 2004). Dai et al. also caution against drawing 
conclusions from citizen-based subjective assessments of fairness: “citizen perceptions … may 
not accurately reflect what they received from the police” (2011, p.166). Indeed, the same cau-
tion was raised when investigating the racial prejudices of Norwegian police oﬃcers (Sollund 
2005).  
Organisational justice 
There is also a growing body of literature that considers the ‘inwardly facing’ application of 
organisational justice theory (Roberts & Herrington 2013). Procedural justice in these contexts 
factors “workplace procedures are perceived as being fair … free from bias, … applied con-
sistently between diﬀerent people over time, with decision makers using accurate and timely 
information to make their decisions, and there is the availability of a mechanism to correct 
decisions that are flawed” (Roberts & Herrington 2013, p.116). In research that considered the 
impact of organisational justice in the workplace of American correctional oﬃcers, staﬀ per-
ceptions of unfair outcomes in the workplace increased work stress leading to irritation 
(Lambert et al. 2007). Most importantly, Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that oﬃcers who 
held perceptions of just and fair organisational justice (through management practices) were 
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less likely to agree that justifications of police corruption in ‘noble pursuits’ were in fact justi-
fied and were less likely to participate in under-reporting of police misconduct. 
Procedural and organisational justice theories provide further opportunities to define the 
source of conflict between police and citizens. Certainly, within the North American context, 
poor perceptions of fairness in police-citizen interaction contributes to citizen dissatisfaction 
and results in low levels of cooperation with police. Indeed, Engel (2003) and Sollund (2005) 
established that citizens from ethnic minorities perceive the police practice of traﬃc stops as 
disproportionately unfair, when white/European citizens do not, even in situations where 
practices are routine or legally justified. In this manner, citizen perception of unfairness re-
sults in a prejudice of injustice. Consequences of injustice include decreases in cooperation, 
which ultimately aﬀects oﬃcers’ ability to collect information from victims, witnesses, and 
suspects (Roberts & Herrington 2013) thus limiting the ability of oﬃcers to achieve their in-
vestigative goals.  
In a similar vein to the procedural justice approach, Sherman (1993) explains that fairness, 
or indeed unfairness, contributes to an individual’s propensity to defy ‘sanctioning agents’ 
during police-citizen interaction. Citizens’ perception of unfair oﬃcer behaviour relates to 
disrespectful behaviour to the citizen, or to the group they identify with, or the oﬃcer sanc-
tion is perceived to be arbitrary, excessive, unjust or discriminatory (Sherman 1993). Defiance 
is the “net increase in the prevalence, incidence, or seriousness of future oﬀending against a 
sanctioning community caused by a proud, shameless reaction to the administration of a 
criminal sanction” (1993). Sherman explains that defiance occurs when all of the following 
conditions apply: (a) the citizen defines that a criminal sanction as unfair; (b) the citizen is 
‘poorly bonded’ to the ‘sanctioning agent’; (c) the citizen perceives the ‘sanction’ as stigmatiz-
ing; and (d) the citizen refuses to acknowledge the shame which the sanction causes (1993, 
p.460). In the context of a police-citizen encounter, disgruntled citizens will act with defiance 
if they perceive that they have been treated unfairly in the past or indeed believe that they are 
being treated unfairly at the present time. 
3.2.3  STRAIN AND CORRECTIVE ACTION 
General strain theory (GST) evolved from Merton’s theoretical work of anomie and strains as-
sociated with the failure to meet aspirations of financial security (Agnew 1992). While strain 
theories have previously been applied to explain criminal delinquencies (Sherman 1993), Ag-
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new suggests that a general strain theory (GST) can explain goal-driven conflict outside of 
criminal contexts (1992, 2006). GST explains that the failure to achieve goals leads to negative 
emotions and necessitates corrective action.  
Strains are those “events or conditions that are disliked by individuals” (Agnew 2006, p.4) 
and are grouped by Agnew (2006) in three types: (1) strains resulting from situations where 
individuals are treated in a negative manner by others; (2) strains occurring from circum-
stances where individuals lose something they value; and (3) strains occurring from 
circumstances where individuals are unable to achieve their goals. Agnew explains that strains 
increase the likelihood of crimes through the impact of negative emotions such as anger, de-
pression, and fear. When aﬀected by negative emotions, individuals take corrective actions to 
alleviate the strain with some individuals partaking in criminal activities. Agnew suggests that 
individuals who have successful coping strategies have the capacity to manage their negative 
emotions through non-criminal activities such as legal action/remedies, or utilising support 
systems. 
While GST emerged as a framework to understand criminal oﬀending, it is helpful for the 
present research. The policing literature indicates that social actors in police-citizen encoun-
ters set objectives to achieve particular procedural goals (e.g. Sykes & Brent 1980). In a GST 
framework, strain originates from the “failure to achieve positively valued goals” (Agnew 1992, 
p.51). GST explains that a negative emotion experienced by an individual can result in the in-
dividual taking a corrective action to alleviate or overcome the negative emotion. Agnew 
proposes that corrective actions of individuals who have low self-control or lack social sup-
port include violence and other criminal oﬀending (2006). Accordingly, oﬃcers who have 
high self-control, and indeed have access to social support systems, are less likely to use vio-
lence or criminal oﬀending as corrective actions. However, oﬃcers use ‘control behaviour’ to 
overcome goal blockages and regulate behaviour (e.g. Sykes & Brent 1980; Terrill 2001).  
3.2.4  BEHAVIOURAL EXPLANATIONS 
The eﬀect of personality traits and preferences on behaviour is often underdeveloped in struc-
tural and normative explanations of behaviour. While Turk’s theory of norm resistance 
considers the impact of participant sophistication, Muir’s (1977) typology of oﬃcer style illus-
trates how diﬀerent personalities—or perspectives—aﬀects police-citizen interaction. For 
example, Muir posits that the ‘professional’ oﬃcer is less likely to use coercive power in con-
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trast to the ‘enforcer’. Wilson and Braithwaite (1995) incorporated findings from the policing, 
social psychological, and psychological literature to explain suspect resistance with oﬃcers 
from a behavioural perspective. Their model, shown below, demonstrates how suspect re-
sistance is influenced by the personality and interaction skills of each actor, situational 
influences, and social psychological factors.  
 
Figure 2. C. Wilson and Braithwaite's behavioural model (Wilson & Braithwaite 1995, p.6) 
 
Social psychological influences 
Wilson and Braithwaite identify deindividuation and deference exchange as social psychologi-
cal influences. They suggest that oﬃcer behaviour is aﬀected by group norms in addition to an 
individual’s preferences or characteristics, and in some cases, group norms can override indi-
vidual preferences. Deindividuation emerges in circumstances where group unity is 
accentuated, and outgroup diﬀerences become prominent; this results in a reduction of self-
awareness and concern with the evaluation of others, leading to a “weakening of restraint 
against the expression of undesirable behaviour” (Wilson & Braithwaite 1995, p.8). Deindivid-
uation may occur across all types of police activities, but the likelihood of occurrence is 
greater in situations that have high arousal: disorder at licensed premises (such as bars, hotels, 
or clubs), high-speed pursuits, foot-chases, or mass disorder (Wilson & Brewer 1993). Their 
hypothesis was corroborated by research that found oﬃcers who worked in pairs used more 
confrontational methods to resolve conflict (e.g. resolving by making an arrest rather than is-
suing a warning) than those working alone. Furthermore, encounters that occurred in 
conjunction with a large number of bystanders (6 or more) influenced oﬃcer experience of 
resistance (1993).  
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Situational factors 
Drawing on situational antecedents to aggression discussed in the psychological literature, 
Wilson and Braithwaite (1995) identify that situational factors influence participant behaviour 
during confrontation encounters. Some situational factors are not controllable or readily in-
fluenced by police agencies: environmental factors, the nature of the event oﬃcers are called 
to, and alcohol or drug impairment of the citizen. Wilson and Braithwaite draw upon the 
work of Mulvihill et al. (1969) who considered diﬀerences in the tolerance of violence and ag-
gression among cultural groups. Mulvihill et al. suggested that there is a high acceptance of 
violence and aggression in ‘American culture’ and that aggressive behaviour may be perceived 
as a more acceptable response to situations than other cultures. This perspective is consistent 
with the views of Reiss (1971) who noted diﬀerences in tolerance between American, English 
and Scandinavian countries. In Mulvihill et al., the behaviour of sub-cultures in cities of Mex-
ico and Columbia were oﬀered as examples of the influential sub-cultural behavioural codes: 
these “may dictate the probability that coercion will be seen as a viable conflict resolution tac-
tic” (Wilson & Braithwaite 1995, p.12).  
Weather and noise were also identified as environmental factors that influence participant 
behaviours. Drawing from research that indicated correlations between warm summer weath-
er with violent crime and excessive noise that induces stress and aggressive behaviour (Geen 
& O'Neal 1969), Wilson and Brewer indicated that some influences of participant behaviour 
may be outside of the control of oﬃcers. Similarly, the type of incident that oﬃcers responded 
to aﬀect the display of aggressive citizen behaviour. Incidents such as ‘domestic arguments’ or 
‘fighting at a licensed premises’ had higher levels of resistance. Moreover, the likelihood of re-
sistance at incidents such as domestic arguments, requests for urgent backup, or street assaults 
increased significantly if the police response occurred at night (Wilson & Brewer 1991).  
Wilson and Brewer (1991) draw attention to positive correlations between the level of citi-
zen intoxication and citizen aggressive behaviour but omit a discussion of the citizen’s level of 
‘rationality’ (rational behaviour) or ‘irrationality’. Social interactionist theory suggests that the 
social exchange between parties involves situational factors, including the use and interpreta-
tion of body language, the presence of other people who might participate or witness the 
exchange, and the class status of each party (Reisig et al. 2004). It also suggests that where two 
parties are of equal status, and one disrespects the other, the disrespected party is more likely 
to reciprocate than if the disrespected party is of higher status. Reisig et al. (2004) found that 
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intoxicated suspects were neither more or less likely to act disrespectfully towards oﬃcers 
when issued with oral commands or threats from oﬃcers. This was not the case for coercive 
tactics directed towards intoxicated or ‘emotional’ suspects; such actions increased the likeli-
hood of disrespect. However, emotional suspects responded diﬀerently to verbal commands 
issued by oﬃcers: these reduced the level of disrespect.  
Wilson and Braithwaite (1995) highlight the influence of departmental or police agency 
‘style’ on oﬃcer behaviour. Unlike the preceding situational factors, police agencies can influ-
ence their policing approach. J. Wilson (1968) proposed that American police agencies could 
be characterised according to a three-part typology: watchman, legalistic, or service organisa-
tional style. Agency style becomes relevant as J. Wilson found agencies with more legalistic 
orientations (prioritised enforcement activities) had higher arrest rates than service-orientated 
agencies.  
Influences of personality 
Wilson and Braithwaite (1995) propose that both oﬃcer and citizen influence the progress and 
outcome of the encounter. They suggest that high levels of authoritarian behaviour, say from 
oﬃcers, will be interpreted as confrontational behaviour by citizens. Similarly, oﬃcers holding 
conservative and dogmatic traits will expect or demand deference to a higher degree than 
more liberal oﬃcers.4  
The literature examines the extent of the influence of oﬃcer personality on interactions be-
tween oﬃcers and citizens. As discussed, Muir (1977) proposed the existence of four 
‘personality types’ and considered how each type influenced police-citizen interaction: profes-
sional, reciprocating, enforcement, and avoidance. ‘Professional’ oﬃcers are those who work 
within the law (i.e. do not break laws, rules or policies), utilise persuasive tactics to overcome 
conflict but also use coercion when required. ‘Reciprocating’ oﬃcers are less comfortable us-
ing coercion or force but prefer to provide help: “His standard of success is his client’s 
happiness” (Muir 1977, p.28). ‘Enforcers’ embody cynicism, and views citizens either as good 
or bad; they have no hesitation to use force or coercion; often they are single-minded in catch-
ing criminals. ‘Avoiders’ are passive and unintimidating, are uncomfortable using coercive 
tactics, and lack an “empathetic understanding of human motivation and suﬀering” 
(Hochstedler 1981, p.458). Muir contended that each oﬃcer personality type had a distinct 
                                               
4 Wilson and Braithwaite define authoritarian personalities as “a dependence upon clearly delineated lines of authority” and have traits in-
cluding “conservative/conventional, dogmatic, and cynical attitude[s] or approach[es] to others” (1995, p.16). 
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perspective on the morality and utility of coercive tactics. Thus, oﬃcers from one type may 
approach the same situation diﬀerently: enforcers may be more prone to enforce a coercive 
solution to a problem than avoiders or reciprocators. While the personality types are not de-
terministic, Muir suggested each type may correlate with an oﬃcer’s propensity to use 
coercive behaviour during encounters with citizens. This becomes pertinent when considering 
the transactional nature of police-citizen interaction, and influential factors associated with 
the cause of conflict. Conflict may not only originate from a normative standpoint; incompat-
ible personalities may also be potential sources of conflict. While Muir’s work is held to be 
influential by some (Abrahamsen & Strype 2009), its validity has been challenged by others 
(Hochstedler 1981; Snipes & Mastrofski 1990). Hochstedler (1981) included Muir’s typology in 
a test of five police personality typologies5, but was unable to find any empirical evidence to 
support that such typologies existed. Moreover, Snipes and Mastrofski (1990) attempted to 
replicate Muir’s study but failed to generate Muir’s findings.  
In contrast to the ethnographic approaches of Muir, and Snipes and Mastrofski, Abraham-
sen and Strype explored oﬃcer personality using a scenario-based questionnaire. As a result, 
they were able to generate a larger sample (N=322, responses n=179) than Muir (N=28) or 
Snipes and Mastrofski (N=9). Abrahamsen and Strype incorporated the Big Five Inventory 
personality measure (John et al. 1991; 2008) to assess personality and asked oﬃcers to rank 
their preference of nine conflict resolution techniques across seven scenarios. Their findings 
identified diﬀerences between the personalities of police oﬃcers and members of the public6. 
Oﬃcers scored higher in agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability than a sam-
ple of the general population and scored lower in openness to experience. Curiously, there were 
no significant variations when controlling for oﬃcer gender (cf. Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). 
There were significant diﬀerences among oﬃcers as to the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent tactics in 
scenarios. There was no consensus among the oﬃcers as to an eﬀective tactic for each scenar-
io: some oﬃcers dismissed the utility of certain types of tactics while others rated some tactics 
as suitable for particular scenarios. 
Terrill et al. (2003) compared the use of coercive behaviour of oﬃcers during PCEs with 
how those oﬃcers identified with the personality traits that are traditionally understood of po-
lice culture and found that not all oﬃcers matched with the narratives espoused by police 
culture literature (lack of trust of citizens, the lack of engagement with supervisors and man-
                                               
5 These included the studies of Coates, Broderick, White, and O’Neill.  
6 Abrahamsen and Strype caution that the general population sample was not representative of the general population. 
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agement, overlooking procedural and legal requirements, aggressive control and selective en-
forcement). Using cluster analysis, oﬃcers were classified pro-culture, con-culture, or mid-
culture based on their use of coercion during encounters: those who aligned as pro-culture 
were found to have used coercive tactics more often than those who were aligned as con-
culture. This analysis raises questions about many commonly-held views of police culture. 
First, those traditional views of police culture are not pervasive throughout police workforces; 
not every police oﬃcer, for instance, distrusts citizens or detests upper police management. 
Second, that while police cultural attitudes might play some part in an oﬃcer’s decision to use 
coercive tactics—pro-culture oﬃcers used coercive tactics in 61.3% of the encounters observed 
when con-culture oﬃcers used 50.4% of encounters—force was still used in over half of all en-
counters, despite the oﬃcers’ culture classification. 
Interaction skills 
Wilson and Braithwaite drew from the broader psychological literature, that “individuals vary 
greatly in the skills that they bring to any task” (1995, p.19). They contend that oﬃcers who are 
more persuasive or more adept at communication will thus be highly skilled in conflict resolu-
tion. This is a similar approach to Turk (1969): the degree of a social actor’s sophistication 
influenced the likelihood of conflict arising between the parties. Weidner and Terrill (2005) 
tested Turk’s hypothesis and found that oﬃcers who displayed skills in conflict resolution 
were less likely to cause conflict. This was consistent with an earlier study of oﬃcers from the 
New York Police Department where Bayley and Garofalo (1989) found that oﬃcers who were 
identified as skilled in conflict resolution were more likely to attend conflict-prone situations 
(47% compared to 37%) and when they were in attendance they were more likely to take 
charge of those situations (57% compared to 34%). Oﬃcers from the skilled group were more 
likely on arrival to use force to control a conflict encounter in progress (20% of instances 
compared to 4.4%) and favoured authoritative or confrontational tactics (such as taking ver-
bal control or asking suspects to “explain themselves”). There were no significant diﬀerences 
in how skilled or regular oﬃcers concluded the encounter: the rate of arrests, citations, or 
summonses was equal between the two groups. As noted (Sykes & Brent 1980; Braithwaite & 
Brewer 1998), Bayley and Garofalo showed that oﬃcers used more than one type of tactic dur-
ing police-citizen encounters. Their dataset included 1,905 oﬃcer behaviours recorded during 
311 encounters, with oﬃcers from the skilled group using more behaviours during an encoun-
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ter (1.9) than those from the regular group (1.4) and was less likely to rely on a single course of 
action (44% vs 73%).  
The selection of ‘skilled’ oﬃcers from the research sample are curious. Bayley and Garofalo 
noted that oﬃcers who were considered to be superior performers (thus selected as ‘skilled’) 
were those who were adept at managing conflict situations but also those who had a propensi-
ty for violence. Braithwaite followed the same process to identify oﬃcers skilled in conflict 
resolution. Like Bayley and Garafalo, Braithwaite found that those oﬃcers used more control-
ling behaviours than cooperative tactics (1998, pp.240-241). However, Braithwaite dismissed 
the results, querying the utility of the nomination process to identify skilled oﬃcers. While it 
may be questionable to accept that the actions of the ‘skilled’ oﬃcers identified in these two 
studies—to illustrate best practice to resolve overt conflict—it is valid to conclude that the 
studies represent the views of how oﬃcers in the sample perceived best practice to resolve 
overt conflict. 
3.3 Conflict resolution  
This last section focuses on practical applications of conflict-resolution theory in the context 
of police-citizen encounters.  
3.3.1  DEUTSCH’S LAW OF SOCIAL RELATIONS 
Deutsch (1973) posed that goal interdependence influences three social-psychological process-
es. Braithwaite (1998) summarises these: ‘Substitutability’ is the “willingness to replace one’s 
own actions with those of another” (Braithwaite 1998, p.10). Promotive independence between 
the goals of actors are positively correlated7, successful actions of those actors, regardless of 
the instigator, encourage actors to become closer to goal achievement. Contrient independ-
ence relates to goals which are negatively correlated; those which reduce the likelihood of goal 
achievement. ‘Cathexis’ relates to the development of positive or negative attitudes between 
actors. When goals are positively correlated, one actor is more likely to develop positive atti-
tudes towards the other party and value their behaviour towards goal attainment. Negatively 
correlated goals generate negative attitudes (Braithwaite 1998). ‘Inducibility’ relates to an ac-
                                               
7 Deutsch refers to promotive goals as those “linked in way that their probabilities of goal attainment are positively correlated: as one’s chanc-
es increase or decrease so does the other’s chances” (Deutsch 1973, p.366). Conversely, contrient goals are those “linked in such a way that 
their probabilities of goal attainment are negatively correlated; as one’s chances increase, the other’s decrease” (Deutsch 1973, p.366).  
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tor’s willingness to be influenced by another actor. For instance, positive situations facilitate 
the actions of others whereas negative situations block the actions of one actor (Braithwaite 
1998). In simplistic terms, Deutsch’s proposition was that cooperative actions breed coopera-
tion, and competitive actions breed competition: cooperation is to be encouraged, and 
competition is to discouraged (Braithwaite 1998). Competition leads to destructive conflict: a 
situation where conflict expands and escalates to the point where it becomes independent of 
the source of conflict.  
Braithwaite’s test of Deutsch’s theory of conflict resolution 
 
Figure 3. Braithwaite’s model of conflict resolution (Braithwaite 1998, p.271) 
 
Deutsch aspirates that a mutually cooperative approach is the most eﬀective for combating 
and resolving conflict. But he also acknowledges the diﬃculty in resolving conflict in an 
asymmetrical relation. This occurs when one party is motivated to resolve the problem, but 
the other party is unaware that the problem exists or is unwilling to resolve it. In these asym-
metrical situations, mutual competition takes over from mutual cooperation. Deutsch 
proposes that some behaviours encourage resistance or alienation: illegitimate actions, nega-
tive or inappropriate sanctions, or influential behaviour that is excessive in nature. 
Conversely, there are behaviours that promote cooperative conflict resolution. These include: 
setting out clearly the expectations of actions required by the motivated actor; an expression 
or appreciation of the diﬃculties or problems faced by the reluctant party should they oﬀer 
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Figure 2.1.  Model of conflict resolution showing the effects of behavioural 
dimensions and specific tactics on the processes of conflict. 
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compliance; depict the advantages that the reluctant actor will achieve; outline the harmful 
consequences that are inevitable is a positive response is not forthcoming; or display an ex-
pression of power of the motivated actor’s resolve (Braithwaite 1998).  
Braithwaite (1998) tested Deutsch’s approach using an utterance-by-utterance analysis of 
conflict resolution behaviour used by police oﬃcers in South Australia. Utterances were coded 
using a model of five behavioural dimensions: information exchange, legitimacy, power, coer-
cion and antisocial strategies (see Figure 3 above). Braithwaite used lag sequential analysis to 
test changes in the probability of sequential events and found that supportive statements from 
one party led to supportive statements from the other. The analysis lends support to Deutsch’s 
approach that cooperation breeds cooperation, but Braithwaite considered that “while it is 
likely that competition breeds competition, it is not necessarily so” (Deutsch 1973). She posited 
that those ‘skilled’ in verbal communication might be able to “utilise competitive tactics and 
manage to avoid the intensification of conflict” (Braithwaite & Brewer 1998; Braithwaite 1998).  
Braithwaite tested Deutsch’s theory using a comparison of oﬃcers who were identified as 
being skilled at conflict resolution and those of ‘average’ ability. She hypothesised that skilled 
oﬃcers would use cooperative tactics, rather than competitive tactics. However, the findings 
did not support her hypothesis: the oﬃcers who were identified as ‘skilled’ were more control-
ling than the control group (of ‘average’ oﬃcers) using coercive and threatening behaviour. 
Braithwaite concluded that findings were a product of poor methodology (as she relied on re-
ferrals from police oﬃcers to nominate colleagues who they perceived to be skilled at conflict 
resolution). But a further analysis revealed that female oﬃcers took a less ‘competitive ap-
proach’ (Braithwaite & Brewer 1998)8; male oﬃcers were found to use tactics that included 
control, threat and physical action whereas female oﬃcers, on the other hand, used more 
‘supportive’ tactics than males. Females used tactics encouraging mutual power more often 
than coercive tactics (resulting in less physical resistance from citizens). Both male and female 
oﬃcers used controlling tactics to respond to abuse given by citizens. Findings also revealed 
that use of coercive tactics by males tended to result in verbal abuse by the citizen.  
                                               
8 Braithwaite and Brewer cautioned about the generalizability of these results. The sample set consisted of only four male and four female 
oﬃcers. 
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3.3.2  POLICE-LED CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Conflict resolution, resistance-prone oﬃcers and personality 
As noted, some literature has proposed correlations between oﬃcer personality and their op-
erational style (Muir 1977). Wilson and Gross (1994) tested English and Australian oﬃcer 
responses to 16 conflict-prone scenarios according to a typology of 12 conflict resolution tac-
tics.9 Participants scored the eﬀectiveness of each tactic for each scenario: from (1) for low 
eﬀectiveness to (9) to high eﬀectiveness. The most highly rated tactic was confrontational dis-
cussion (M = 6.31, SD = 1.31), followed by mutual discussion (M = 5.38, SD = 1.29) and 
bargaining/compromise (M = 5.08, SD = 1.35). These ‘conciliatory’ tactics rated higher than the 
‘competitive’ or ‘coercive’ tactics of physical force (M = 3.37 SD = 1.43) and verbal force (M = 
2.99, SD = 1.72). There were also correlations between the choice of tactics and the level of citi-
zen resistance they previously experienced. Oﬃcers who reported a high ‘resistance-prone’ 
operational experience chose arrest as a highly eﬀective conflict resolution tactic whereas 
oﬃcers who had a lower frequency of resistance in their experience preferred bargaining and 
compromising tactics over arrest. Oﬃcer preference also depended on situational factors in-
cluding citizen age, gender, and behaviour. It is curious that there were no statistically 
significant diﬀerences between the selections the English and Australian oﬃcers (oﬃcers who 
are routinely unarmed and routinely armed respectively) unlike the diﬀerences observed in 
Waddington et al. (2009). 
Similarly, Abrahamsen and Strype (2009) surveyed Norwegian police oﬃcers (n=179) to 
measure their tactical choice in response to a conflict-prone scenario and to establish the ex-
istence of diﬀerences between oﬃcer personalities and those of the public (using a modified 
version of Wilson and Gross’s (1994) conflict resolution tactical scale and the BFI scale to 
measure personality10). They found that the personalities of the oﬃcer sample diﬀered with 
citizen population: oﬃcers scored higher than the general population regarding agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and emotional stability; and oﬃcers scored lower than the population in 
openness to experience. There were significant diﬀerences in oﬃcer preference and eﬀective-
ness of diﬀerent tactics in scenarios: some oﬃcers dismissed the utility of certain types of 
tactics while others rated some tactics were suitable for specific scenarios. However, consistent 
                                               
9 Tactics included: wait and see, accept, diﬀuse, third party, physical coercion, bargain/compromise, manipulate, argue, confrontational discus-
sion, exchange information, call for assistance, arrest.  
10 The BFI test was translated into Norwegian. The researchers compared the police sample to a previous sample of Norwegian university stu-
dents (Engvik & Føllesdal 2005) which was collected to test the reliability of Norwegian translation. 
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with Wilson and Gross (1994), oﬃcers preferred conciliatory tactics instead of coercive tactics: 
confrontational discussion (M = 6.22, SD = 1.55), followed by mutual discussion (M = 6.58, SD = 
1.51) and bargaining/compromise (M = 5.22, SD = 1.64). There were no significant variations 
when testing by gender (cf. Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). 
Burn out 
Euwema et al. (2004) found a positive correlation between oﬃcer ‘burnout’ and their tactics 
used to resolve conflict. They hypothesised that “burnout coincides with less dominant behav-
iour” (Euwema et al. 2004, p.33) and that “burnout in police oﬃcers is negatively related to 
dominant behaviour in conflict situations” (2004, p.28). They observed 110 Dutch police oﬃc-
ers involved in 769 police-citizen encounters. Observers coded the level of dominance used by 
oﬃcers at the commencement and during the management of the encounter. Eﬀectiveness 
was measured using the level of oﬃcer satisfaction and citizen satisfaction of the encounter—
during the first engagement of the encounter and then of the solution reached—as well as 
measuring the level of escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. They concluded that oﬃcer 
burnout contributed to a reduction of dominant behaviour during the encounters and that 
those oﬃcers who were less dominant during encounters were more eﬀective in resolving 
conflict. Euwema et al. suggest that more cooperative, less confrontational behaviour is a 
more ‘eﬀective’ approach to conflict resolution. This behaviour diﬀers to the style of behaviour 
judged by oﬃcers to be eﬀective in the Braithwaite, and Bayley and Garofalo studies. In those 
studies, oﬃcers believed to be ‘skilled’ within their cohort demonstrated the more frequent 
use of authoritative or confrontational behaviour.  
3.3.3  SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Extant empirical studies of police-citizen interaction tend to focus on the police use of force 
and coercive tactics, yet few concentrate on conflict resolution techniques. However, because 
much of this literature originates from the examination of North American policing, it is pru-
dent to consider its degree of transferability and generalisability. While United States and 
Canadian policing have been influenced by Peelian tradition (Euwema et al. 2004), they diﬀer 
in structure and operational doctrine with other contemporary Peelian-influenced agencies. 
Diﬀerences such as decentralisation and routine armament pose potential vulnerabilities in 
the generalizability across other Peelian-influenced police jurisdictions. Similarly, while some 
50 | Conflict – Conflict resolution 
of the literature considers British police-citizen interaction, this tends to focus on the legitima-
cy of ‘stop and search’ encounters, specifically why a stop and search encounter is initiated as 
opposed to what happens during the encounter (Euwema et al. 2004).  
Nevertheless, the policing literature includes some studies that examine the personal at-
tributes of police oﬃcers and their propensity to use certain styles of conflict resolution 
tactics. These studies are instructive: they reinforce the capacity of an individual’s personality 
to influence the transactional nature of police-citizen interaction and aﬀect the degree of 
competition or cooperation that occurs during encounters. Braithwaite’s test of Deutsch’s 
general theory of conflict resolution is instructive. While it failed to show if ‘skilled oﬃcers’ 
responded to competitive actions without the use of a competitive response, it evidenced the 
utility of taking an utterance-by-utterance approach to examining conflict in the field. Indeed, 
it advanced Sykes and Brent and oﬀered a sophisticated framework for understanding the flu-
id and transactional nature of encounters. 
Deutsch’s theory of social relations is consistent with Turk’s theory of norm resistance, 
concerning conflict prevention and mitigation. Turk outlined ways in which the likelihood of 
conflict can be reduced. Similarly, Turk’s mitigating factor of sophistication resembles 
Deutsch’s proposition that skilled conflict resolvers use conflict constructively. This perhaps 
has the potential to be operationalised. Turk suggested that police oﬃcers that have higher 
education qualifications or have longer levels of police experience will be more skilled at con-
flict resolution than others. Braithwaite, too, hypothesised that ‘skilled’ oﬃcers would display 
“more conflict mitigation sequences, … use tactics associated with conflict less frequently 
… and would experience higher levels of cooperation” (Manning 2011) than averagely skilled 
oﬃcers. 
However, the question of a citizen’s degree of ‘rationality’ (e.g. Quinton 2011) poses a prob-
lem for the utility of Deutsch’s theory of conflict resolution: impaired citizens might not be 
able to work cooperatively during conflict situations. This observation might account for 
Braithwaite’s dismissal of her ‘skilled oﬃcer’ findings: practitioners might define conflict in a 
diﬀerent manner and assume that coercive tactics might be appropriate when dealing with 
impaired subjects. Further, it was found that oﬃcers who use their ‘authority’ to take ‘control’ 
are significantly less likely to receive disrespect (Braithwaite 1998, p.188) in return.11 And, cu-
                                               
11 The size of the police presence (the number of oﬃcers) did not aﬀect the level of disrespect shown by a suspect. They also found that police 
were more likely to receive disrespect from African American and low-income males than from any other minority groups (Reisig et al. 
2004).  
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riously, Dai et al. found that forceful behaviour by oﬃcers decreased the likelihood of citizen 
disrespect. This eﬀect appears to be inconsistent with Deutsch and Braithwaite’s contention 
that competition breeds further competition and Braithwaite and Brewer (1998). 
Several other themes have emerged from research of police-citizen encounters. First, that 
there are diﬀerences in how oﬃcers approach conflict resolution; the studies have shown these 
can be aﬀected by personality type (e.g. Reisig et al. 2004; Dai et al. 2011), gender (Reisig et al. 
2004, p.254), occupational burnout (Abrahamsen & Strype 2009; Terrill et al. 2003), and skill 
(Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). Second, the social, class and socioeconomic status of citizens 
have an influence on the behaviour of both the oﬃcer and citizen (Euwema et al. 2004). The 
findings from the cross-national study of Australian and English oﬃcers found that there were 
no significant diﬀerences in how police oﬃcer preferred to resolve conflict encounters 
(Braithwaite 1998; Bayley & Garofalo 1989). This is particularly relevant to the proposed re-
search as the Australian oﬃcers are routinely armed and the English oﬃcers are not routinely 
armed. Yet, while both Wilson and Gross (1994), and Abrahamsen and Strype (2009) are in-
structive, their utility is limited. Previous studies of PCEs in situ and in real time have 
established that there are many diﬀerent conflict resolution tactics are used during encounters 
(e.g. Sykes & Clark 1975).  
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4 
A mixed-method approach 
4.1 Research sites 
The present research examined police behaviour at New Zealand and South Australia. 
O’Dwyer and Bernauer (2013) explain that for experimental research, conditions surrounding 
the test group and the control group are tightly controlled to support propositions of causali-
ty. Despite the present research not being experimental, the routinely armed status of oﬃcers 
simulated an ‘independent variable’. At the outset of the design of the research, it was pre-
sumed that it would not to be possible to stage the research within a single jurisdiction as not 
one of the four OCED countries that routinely deploy RUP oﬃcers also deploy RAP oﬃcers 
outside of specialist roles. Similarly, due to the politicised nature about the merits of 
RUP/RAP practice within RUP jurisdictions (Hendy 2012), it was considered unlikely that po-
lice agencies would consider deploying RUP and RAP units for the purpose of research—nor 
was it was likely that a RAP agency would deploy RUP oﬃcers for the purposes of research. 
Consequently, a cross-national study remained the logical and practical approach to answer 
the research question. 
4.1.1  CROSS-NATIONAL POLICE RESEARCH 
The extant Anglo-American policing literature is heavily weighted towards perspectives and 
comparisons of police behaviour among agencies from the United Kingdom and the United 
States, with the majority of research focusing on behaviour within a single jurisdiction. Such 
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studies are instructive (Bayley 1999), but their transferability and generalisability are weak-
ened by their failure to consider how the predominant culture of the researched population 
aﬀects normative behaviour (Høigård 2011) or indeed the utility of comparing policing across 
metropolitan, urban or rural settings (Goddard & Jaeger 2005). Notwithstanding the Anglo-
American bias, previous cross-national research including that of Banton (1964) and Reiss 
(1971b), and the postulations of Manning (1977) illustrate the value in taking a comparative 
approach when exploring policing and police oﬃcer behaviour. 
Cultural identity and symbolism 
Banton’s (1964) cross-national study of American and Scottish police oﬃcers illustrates the 
merit of cross-national policing research. In the narrative below, Banton describes how cul-
tural identity, sometimes represented through symbolism, can be linked to contemporary 
practice:  
Another feature of the place of crime in American society which aﬀects police work is that the stakes are high. 
A great deal of money can be won or lost on particular operations, so the temptation to use violence is much 
greater. Certain kinds of violence were already legitimized by the tradition that the American hero is a 
frontiersman, cowboy, hunter or soldier, with his gun ready to hand. The greater tolerance of violence and the 
gains to be won by it have meant that the policeman in the United States is much more exposed to the risk of 
violence than his British counterpart, and it would be strange if this did not aﬀect his conception of his 
occupational role and the way in which he performed it (Banton 1964, p.88). 
Banton’s remarks are those of a Briton observing a North American context and brings in-
sight. First, his narrative illustrates diﬀerences of oﬃcer behaviour: the American ‘gun-ready 
hero’ in contrast to the British oﬃcer. Second, he comments about how American oﬃcers 
have a legacy of using violence in the manner in which the British oﬃcer does not. Manning 
alludes to the same: 
Emerging from a frontier society with great emphasis upon self-protection, individualism, violence and an 
almost fierce clinging to weapons as a means of ensuring safety, policing in America has always been action 
orientated, involving weaponry, and has viewed the public as a dangerous adversary. … As has been repeatedly 
emphasized in recent revisionist writings on the history of the United States, the use of violence is a traditional 
means of solving problems in America (Skolnick, 1969) (Manning 1977, p.96). 
The value of these narratives lies in the authors’ perspective of the importance of the sym-
bolism enshrined in police uniform. Uniform and equipment vary across jurisdictions, with 
the practice of routine armament and carriage of firearms arguably the most significant varia-
tion between North America and Britain. Muir connects utility with symbolism: “…the 
policeman, accompanied by his gun and other symbols of his authority” (1977, p.159) as does 
Manning (1977) and Reis (1971b); however, while the image of an armed oﬃcer is synonymous 
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with American policing, it is the antithesis of the unarmed English ‘benign bobby’ so epito-
mised in the British literature (Waddington 1988).  
Public perception, trust, and confidence 
Banton’s research also established diﬀerences in the citizenry’s perception of and expectation 
of police in Scotland and the United States. Below he describes how North American oﬃcers 
might be perceived to be more approachable than those from Britain: 
Some American police oﬃcers would wish their men to be more dignified and impersonal like their British 
colleagues. […] If British constables were to patrol an American town the public would probably think them 
stuﬀy and unfriendly; they might resent their detachment preferring the American-style policeman who seems 
‘human’ and approachable (Banton 1964, p.125). 
While Banton’s research originates from some 50 years previous, his observation that cultural 
diﬀerences exist among similar cultures remains instructive. For instance, the recent research 
of trust and confidence in police across the policing jurisdictions of Scandinavia provides 
some contrasting insights. Kääriäinen (2008) found that trust in police was aﬀected by varia-
tion of the expectations of diﬀerent communities. While there was some evidence for 
consistent measures of trust across the communities (such as perceived problems of crime, the 
proximity of the police in the community, and the quality of policing provided), the findings 
indicated that the utility of a visible police presence was dichotomous: the sight of police in 
Finland was associated with positive responses from the citizenry, but it was associated with 
negative responses in Denmark.1 Both Banton (1964) and Kääriäinen (2008) illustrate how 
cross-national comparison may inform the explanation of phenomena and are indeed instruc-
tive for the present research: what is perceived to be optimal in one jurisdiction may not be in 
another.  
Variation in the acceptability and tolerance of violence 
Cross-national research has also illuminated the acceptability and tolerance of violence among 
diﬀerent nations. Reis (1971b) identified diﬀerences among American, English, and Scandina-
vian society over the utility and acceptability of violence:  
In England and Scandinavia, the use of violence is sanctioned negatively more or less universally in the society. 
… If anything, in police and citizen relations, it is more serious for the citizen to behave with violence towards 
the police than the other way around, because the police may legitimately use force. … Equally important for a 
civil society is the granting of legitimacy to the police in their intervention. American society is more 
                                               
1 Kääriäinen revealed that Danish responses to visible police presence resulted in the sense of unease in the citizenry as it indicated something 
dramatic or dangerous had or was about to occur (2008). 
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inhospitable towards its police than most societies[.] (Reiss 1971b, pp.182-185) 
This theme is explored further in other notable cross-national studies. Manning (1977) also 
draws attention to the perceived legitimacy of violence as a ‘problem-solving’ response to 
conflict in American cultural contexts. Of relevance to the present research, Norris et al. 
(2006) explored oﬃcer disposition towards use of force; they revealed that oﬃcers from Texas 
were more disposed to use force against citizens than oﬃcers from other research sites in 
Mexico and Venezuela. Waddington et al. (2009) explored how oﬃcer perceptions of re-
sistance or violence diﬀered in the cross-national study of police agencies from England, The 
Netherlands, Germany, Australia, Venezuela, and Brazil. They found that German oﬃcers did 
not perceive the same degree of risk2 as oﬃcers from Brazil, and most saliently were the diﬀer-
ences in the responses from English authorised firearms oﬃcers and routinely unarmed 
response oﬃcers.  
Likewise, the research of Knutsson and Norée (2010) and Hendy (2014) found diﬀerences 
among Scandinavian police forces with regard to oﬃcers’ use of firearms. Variances were 
found among the Danes, Finns, and Swedes (where oﬃcers are routinely armed) regarding the 
use of warning shots, the proportion of firearm presentation with verbal threats, and actual 
shots fired. 
Utility of cross-national research 
However, cross-national research may suﬀer from weaknesses in transferability and generali-
sability. If culture diﬀers to such an extent (indeed the predominant culture in a multicultural 
setting), then can the insights found in one jurisdiction apply to another? Is it possible to de-
termine whether culture can explain why American police oﬃcers are routinely armed where 
the Scottish oﬃcers are not? Or, could it be that America is a more violent culture and there-
fore there is a greater necessity? In other words, phenomena commonplace in one cultural 
context should not necessarily be expected to be found in another context.  
On balance, the political and cultural similarities at nation-state level of these Anglo-
American policing agencies present an opportunity to learn from the activities of the constitu-
ent agencies. However, findings that originate from one jurisdiction should not be considered 
to necessarily translate into another jurisdiction. And in some cases, while agencies from 
                                               
2 Waddington et al. (2009) measured oﬃcer perception of risk from written responses to a ‘routine’ police scenario. 
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diﬀerent jurisdictions will share characteristics and have common social values, consideration 
needs to be given to the applicability and transferability of findings from the literature.  
4.1.2  THE PRESENT RESEARCH – THE AUSTRALASIAN DYAD  
It was presumed that if two nations shared cultural histories and legal frameworks, then the 
eﬀect of extraneous variables aﬀecting the comparison might be reduced or mitigated. Man-
ning (2011) distinguishes New Zealand, together with North America, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia, as exemplars of democratically-policed nation-states through the influence of 
‘Peelian’ policing principles: “visible, reactive, bureaucratically organized means of state-based 
resolution of conflict with minimal force” (Manning 2011, p.3). Yet while the policing agencies 
from this group may have more similarities in heritage and doctrine than the continental 
‘gendarmerie’-styled policing of Western- and Central-Europe (see Bayley 1990), or the ‘re-
pressive-styled’ policing of Eastern-Europe (Mawby 2011), these Anglo-American police 
agencies diﬀer. The organisation of policing in the United States is complex: it is decentralised 
with multiple uncoordinated agencies, some with overlapping responsibilities and jurisdic-
tions (Bayley 1990). Policing in Australia, Canada, and Great Britain are decentralised, but 
while they have multiple coordinated agencies, there is little jurisdictional overlap (Bayley 
1990). In contrast, New Zealand has one centralised national police agency (New Zealand Po-
lice) but incorporates a decentralised structure.3  
New Zealand and South Australia appeared to be a good fit for cross-national research 
sites4. Both jurisdictions shared a common language (a factor which would have added com-
plexity for the research with a Nordic comparison); they shared common colonial histories, 
but neither jurisdiction was established as a penal colony; they shared a common legal frame-
work; and both lacked the widespread systemic corruption endemic of other Australian police 
agencies. In addition, the NZ/SA dyad had the advantage that all oﬃcers deployed for duty in 
New Zealand and South Australia were trained and had the capacity to use firearms. This was 
                                               
3 Bazley (2007) states that NZP has a high level of regional autonomy concerning interpretation and implementation of national policy. As a 
result, district commanders (the equivalent to a British chief constable or an American police chief) have been delegated “substantial respon-
sibility for daily operations” (Winfree & Taylor 2004, p.246). 
4 Agencies from Australia, North America, and Northern Ireland deploy their oﬃcers routinely armed with a sidearm whereas oﬃcers from 
England and Wales, New Zealand, and Scotland were routinely unarmed. All deployable oﬃcers from New Zealand were trained and certi-
fied to use firearms, whereas only a small proportion of oﬃcers from England and Wales, and Scotland were authorised to use firearms. 
Similarly, agencies diﬀer with regard to ‘non-lethal’ weapons: all oﬃcers from New Zealand were routinely armed with the CED TASER, 
whereas only selected oﬃcers were in Australian agencies or the United Kingdom. Thus, suitable comparative dyads were identified as Eng-
land and Wales with Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, Norway with Sweden, or New Zealand with a state of 
Australia. 
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not the case in England and Wales, as only a small proportion of oﬃcers are authorised to use 
and receive firearms training.  
Choice of research sites 
The selection of research sites within New Zealand and South Australia was influenced by the 
following factors. The choice of South Australia as the comparative jurisdiction influenced the 
selection of the appropriate city within New Zealand. There was a deliberate strategy to over-
sample conflict-prone encounters. Both the literature (Bayley & Garofalo 1989; Braithwaite 
1998) and experience of the researcher supported the view that interpersonal conflict was 
more likely to occur during toward the end of the working week, in late afternoons, evenings 
and night-time. For this reason, a metropolitan entertainment area was selected as the pre-
ferred locale for the research in South Australia. The selection of South Australia City5 (SAC) 
was influenced by these sampling requirements. The choice of the police station to site the re-
search was subject to the operational requirements at the time of the South Australia Police. 
The selection of the New Zealand site was influenced by practicality. Factors influencing 
the suitability of New Zealand City (NZC) included the cost of staging the fieldwork, availabil-
ity of a suitably sized metropolitan city that had an entertainment quarter, and the ability to 
aﬀord the researcher anonymity. The latter consideration was to avoid risks for data contami-
nation; staging the research in a city where the researcher had worked as a practitioner and 
had knowledge of the research participants may have introduced bias. A further consideration 
for the choice of research site was to attempt to achieve a balance of citizen-participant ethnic-
ity between the research sites. It was desired that the percentage of indigenous peoples (Māori 
and Aboriginal) was in some balance at each site. 
New Zealand City 
NZC was one of the larger cities situated in the South Island of New Zealand. Its population 
was in excess of 100,000 and was less ethnically diverse than other urban areas of New Zea-
land, with fewer migrants but a larger proportion of tertiary students. The proportion of 
students aﬀected its age demographic, with a higher proportion of people aged 15-24, but a 
lower proportion of 25-64-year-olds, than at other areas within New Zealand. The high pro-
                                               
5 The cities for both research sites have been anonymised to South Australian City and New Zealand City.  
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portion of students were also associated with a higher proportion of one-person and multi-
person households.6 
NZC had a central police station which serviced the municipal area (central business 
district (CBD), industrial zones, and outer residential suburbs). It was located at the heart of 
the central business district. Although there were several community policing centres 
throughout the municipal area, the 24/7 emergency response units were centralised at the cen-
tral station. The station was situated in the CBD and was within walking distance of the heart 
of the city. The CBD comprised of retail shopping and entertainment zones, the tertiary edu-
cation precinct (university and polytechnic), student accommodation, a hospital campus, and 
sporting grounds. Within a 10-minute drive from the CBD were residential areas including 
the ‘student quarter’, lower-socioeconomic, and aﬄuent residential areas.  
NZC emergency response oﬃcers predominantly deployed as vehicular-based units, as the 
furthest area of responsibility was a 25-minute drive from the central station. Typical oﬃcer 
workload commonly consisted of responding to domestic disputes, shoplifting, trespass, men-
tal health events, and disorder. During the 2016 calendar year, the four most frequently 
reported oﬀences included ‘public order oﬀences’ (20.6%), ‘theft related oﬀences’ (15.1%), ‘un-
lawful entry, burglary, or break and enter oﬀences’ (8.2%) and ‘property damage’ (7.6%).7 
Other policing groups not party to the research were located at the central station, including 
criminal investigation, community policing, and road policing teams. 
South Australia City 
SAC was a large provincial city within the state of South Australia. The SAC environs occu-
pied a larger geographic area with a greater population than that of NZC. Consequently, 
policing in SAC was divided into four zones. The station subject of the research was situated 
in the central business district policing zone. It was within walking distance of the central 
shopping and entertainment area of the city, the business district, park environs, and inner-
city high-density accommodation. Like at NZC, there were several tertiary educational cam-
puses within the station’s jurisdictional area. There was a large proportion of resident tertiary 
students within the patrol area of the station, their accommodation was largely apartment-
styled, unlike the detached or semi-detached dwellings at NZC. The population that frequent-
                                               
6 Statistics New Zealand 2013 census data. 
7 Demand and activity data for the 2016 calendar year, accessed from http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/statistics-and-publications/data-
and-statistics/demand-and-activity. 
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ed the SAC station’s jurisdictional zone was transient; the CBD attracted workers and shop-
pers by day and revellers by night. Visitors from outer suburbs were well serviced with a 
public transport system. The four most frequent criminal oﬀences recorded in SAC for the 
year ending June 2016 included ‘theft related oﬀences’ (20.5%), ‘property damage’ (21.8%), ‘as-
saults’ (17.1%), and ‘serious criminal trespass’8 (12.8%).9 
The station subject of the research was located within the heart of the CBD and was staﬀed 
by foot-bound beat oﬃcers. Vehicular-based units were stationed at a nearby patrol base. Be-
ing beat-based, oﬃcers were in close proximity to citizens: SAC oﬃcers walked among 
citizens whereas NZC oﬃcers drove past citizens. Consequently, SAC oﬃcers were more-
likely to detect minor oﬀences that were non-dispatched. NZC events were dominated by do-
mestic violence, minor assaults and investigative enquiries, whereas SAC events were largely 
street disorder, liquor oﬀences and traﬃc oﬀences (refer to section 5.1 for further detail). 
4.2 Research design 
4.2.1  MIXED-METHOD APPROACH 
The strategy for using a mixed method approach was to provide methodological triangulation. 
Morse (1991) defines methodological triangulation as the use of qualitative and quantitative 
methods to address the same research problem. The design for the present research fits a 
QUAN(qual) embedded model (Creswell 2014) where an ethnographic study is staged in par-
allel with the collection of quantitative data. The QUAN(qual) approach diﬀers from other 
methodological triangulations like sequential designs (i.e. QUAL®quan) or convergent de-
signs (i.e. QUAL + quan) (Morse 1991). Parallel designs are beneficial as they allow for timely, 
eﬃcient and cost-eﬀective data collection compared with sequential designs (Creswell & Plano 
Clark 2011). In the present case, the practicalities of conducting field research in two countries 
resulted in the requirement of cost and time eﬃcient data collection. Additionally, the 
strength of triangulation lies in the premise that “the weaknesses in each single method will be 
compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another” (Jick 1979, p.110). A further ben-
                                               
8 These are similar oﬀences to the ‘unlawful entry, burglary, or break and enter oﬀences’ categorised by NZPOL. 
9 Crime statistics for the 12 months ending June 2016 acessed from https://data.sa.gov.au/data/dataset/crime-statistics/resource/19beeceb-
a870-4424-b533-43c774bcb03e. These statistics are SAC-wide oﬀence data; localized data specific to SAC station were not available. 
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efit of triangulation was the presumption that the combination of methods would limit any 
potential researcher bias inherent in practitioner-based research.  
The present research design combines ethnographic and quantitative methods. Ethnogra-
phy is an established method of the development and construction of academic perspectives 
of police behaviour. Ethnography is a research approach used by social scientists to develop 
written descriptions of cultures (Manning 2014). Many ‘classic’ policing studies have incorpo-
rated participant observation to build narratives about police operational culture and work 
methods (e.g. Banton 1964; Cain 1973; Holdaway 1983; Muir 1977), and it has continued to be 
used in recent studies (e.g. Herbert 2006; Loftus 2009; O'Brien-Olinger 2016). Ethnographies 
often incorporate in-depth interviews with participants (Heyl 2007) to supplement the de-
scriptive observational accounts made by the investigator. Systematic social observation is a 
further observational method used by police researchers (Reiss 1971a; Reiss 1971b; Mastrofski 
et al. 2002; Schulenberg 2012); it provides researchers with a framework to measure the occur-
rence of pre-defined variables in an observational setting. The combination of these methods 
is sympathetic to the generation of theory: the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss 
1999; Corbin & Strauss 2014) provides an opportunity for the data to transform the narrative 
from one of description to one of explanation (Corbin & Strauss 2014). 
A challenge with qualitative research—especially ethnography—is that it is time-
consuming, it can be diﬃcult for the researcher to infer from ‘complex and confusing’ materi-
als, and can be ‘engaging and engulfing’ (Manning 2014). Conversely, quantitative approaches 
may provide opportunities to simplify rich qualitative data (Maruna 2010) or oﬀer robust pro-
cesses to measure phenomena with objective variables (O'Dwyer & Bernauer 2013). Indeed, 
Braithwaite (1998) evidenced this through the measurement of human behaviour among 
diﬀerent groups to establish variation in the frequency and duration of particular behav-
iours.10 Thus, the present research combined both approaches: a quantitative study to measure 
oﬃcer behaviour and a qualitative study to explore a theoretical basis for oﬃcer behaviour in 
conflict-prone situations.  
Situational and demographic data were collected in support of an analysis of the compara-
tive nature of the study. Such data included demographic information about the participants, 
oﬃcer personality and resistance measures, and encounter situational variables. As such, the 
                                               
10 When Braithwaite and Brewer (1998) compared the use of conflict resolution behaviours between female and male oﬃcers, they found that 
male oﬃcers used coercive tactics more frequently than female oﬃcers. 
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mixed method approach allowed for the robust collection and analysis of data through a 
quantifiable description of police oﬃcers behaviour during police-citizen encounters simulta-
neously with the exploration of theoretical constructs. Together the methods were 
complementary: they “increase[d] the interpretability, meaningfulness, and validity of con-
structs and inquiry results by both capitalizing on inherent method strengths and 
counteracting inherent bias in methods and other sources” (Greene et al. 1989, p.259). 
4.2.2  THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
Previous empirical inquiries of police behaviour—including the use of force—have used sce-
nario-based questionnaires (e.g. Waddington et al. 2009), experiments (e.g. Sousa et al. 2010) 
participant observation (e.g. Muir 1977; Hochstedler 1981) and systematic social observation 
(e.g. Reiss 1971b; Mastrofski et al. 2002; Schulenberg 2012). Studies of police encounters in situ 
(e.g. Sykes & Brent 1983) suggest that encounters can be deconstructed as an aggregate of 
many diﬀerent behavioural interactions. For example, Braithwaite (1998) found that during a 
single conflict-encounter, oﬃcers used a variety of diﬀerent resolution tactics. This presents a 
problem for scenario-based questionnaires: they may lack the ability to accurately test the 
interactive nature of encounters. Generally, previous studies using questionnaires only allow 
for the examination of a singular police tactic; that one chosen by oﬃcers because of their in-
terpretation of the likely behaviour of the subject as portrayed in the scenario narrative. 
Similarly, questionnaires do not necessarily allow for variation or unpredictability of citizen 
behaviour; the test relies on the oﬃcer’s perception of citizen behaviour.  
Braithwaite’s taxonomy 
The quantitative study adopted Braithwaite’s approach to measuring the conflict resolution 
behaviours of oﬃcers and citizens during police-citizen encounters. Braithwaite’s method re-
lied on an operationalisation of Deutsch’s (1973) theory of conflict resolution, measuring the 
frequency and duration of the behaviours of each participant involved in police-citizen en-
counters. Braithwaite’s taxonomy of behaviours, shown in Table 4.2.1, is mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive: a participant must be at one behavioural state at a time. The behaviours are 
grouped into those shared by oﬃcers and citizens, those exclusive to oﬃcers and those exclu-
sive to citizens. Adjacent to each behaviour are her description and examples of the types of 
verbal statements or behaviours.  
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Table 4.2.1. Braithwaite’s Taxonomy of Conflict Resolution Behaviours, with descriptions and examples 
 Braithwaite’s description  
(Braithwaite 1998, pp.101-108) 
Example statements or questions 
Officer and Citizen behaviours 
Informational seek  Questions that elicit information about the parties 
involved, events that have taken place, or pro-
posed solutions 
“Where are you going to now?” 
“How are you feeling?” 
Information give Information provided in response to a question  
Officer behaviours 
Support Statement Statements which communicated empathy to-
wards the citizen, positive reinforcement, or 
compliments 
“That must be very hard for you.” 
“You did absolutely the right thing.” 
Accept statement Statements which indicated acceptance of the 
citizen or agreement with the citizen 
“You’re right.” 
“I hear what you are saying.” 
Control statement affect Changing the affective state or emotional behav-
iour of the citizen 
“Keep your voice down.” 
“Don’t shout at me.” 
Control statement conversation Statements which directly controlled the flow of 
conversation 
“Don’t interrupt when I’m speaking to you.” 
“Go back to the beginning and tell me again.” 
Control statement environment Statements that attempted to change the envi-
ronmental setting of the interaction 
“Can you people please leave.” 
“Sit down.” 
Reject statement Statements that the other party’s position is not 
accepted 
“Do you expect me to believe that?” 
Threat statement Insulting or derogatory remarks that were more 
extreme than reject statements and statements 
threatening negative consequences or warnings 
about future behaviour 
“Do you want to be locked up?” 
“If you continue swearing you will be arrested.” 
“Stop behaving like a fuck-wit.” 
Physical act Any physical touching or handling of the citizen Punching, striking, pushing, or handcuffing. 
Pat-down search. 
Citizen behaviours 
Information refuse Verbalised statement refusing to give information, 
or no comment made in response to an Infor-
mation seek 
“No comment.” 
“That’s none of your business.” 
Information excuse11 Defensive statements that justified or provided 
excuses for citizen behaviour 
“I didn’t do anything, it wasn’t me.” 
“I had no choice, I had to fight him.” 
Refuse control Actions, statements, or behaviours when the citi-
zen refuses or ignores the control statements 
behaviour used by officers 
Speaking over an officer’s control statement. 
Refusing to abide by an officer’s control statement. 
Resisting physical action or handcuffing. 
Verbal abuse Verbally aggressive statements that were insulting, 
derogatory or undermining. Also included shouting 
or threatening statements. 
“Fuck you pig.” 
“I’ll get you for this.” 
“You obviously got nothing better to do.” 
Physical abuse Any physical action directed at or against officers. Punching, striking, pushing, spitting or other 
assaultive behaviour. 
 
Systematic social observation 
Systematic social observation (SSO) provides a framework for a field researcher to gather data 
on subjects in their natural environment and the occurrence of natural phenomena in a con-
sistent manner (Reiss 1971a; Worden & McLean 2014). SSO was pioneered by Reiss (1971a) 
and has been shown to be versatile in large and small research settings. The 1977 Police Ser-
vices Study captured 5688 encounters and the 1996–97 POPN study captured 5600 encounters 
(Worden & McLean 2014). Both studies relied on research assistants to observe the encounters 
and code data. Smaller-scale studies have also used SSO including a recent Canadian study of 
                                               
11 Braithwaite called this behaviour “self defence” but it has been changed in the present research so that not to be confused with a physical 
action of self-defence. 
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406 police-citizen encounters conducted by a single field researcher (Schulenberg 2012). In the 
present research, SSO was used to collect situational characteristics about the police-citizen 
encounters. While Braithwaite’s taxonomy provided an opportunity to gather granular data 
about participant behaviour, SSO allowed the collection of situational variables relating to en-
counters.  
Psychometrics 
Two psychometric tests were administered to oﬃcer-participants to identify diﬀerences 
among oﬃcers from the research sites. Previous research had explored the relationship be-
tween the personality of an oﬃcer and their behaviour during police-citizen encounters (e.g. 
Muir 1977; Abrahamsen & Strype 2009). Indeed, Abrahamsen and Strype (2009) found that 
personality test scores of a cohort of Norwegian oﬃcers, derived from the Big Five Inventory 
(BFI) (John et al. 1991; John et al. 2008), were related to diﬀerences in preference for conflict 
resolution tactics. As such, the present study incorporates the BFI to provide a basis of com-
parison between the two research samples of oﬃcers. 
The relationship between the level of experienced resistance and oﬃcer decision-making 
had also been considered. Wilson and Gross (1994) found that ‘experienced’ oﬃcers who had 
experienced a high level of resistance from citizens tended to favour arrest as a highly eﬀective 
means of conflict resolution. Measuring oﬃcers’ exposure to citizen resistance in the present 
study was advantageous. First, it provided a useful alternative to measuring an oﬃcer’s length 
of service as a police oﬃcer. Length of service does not necessarily capture the type of inci-
dents that have been attended by an oﬃcer: an emergency response oﬃcer will likely have 
diﬀerent operational experience and exposure to conflict than an investigator. Second, it pro-
vided an opportunity to measure the magnitude of the exposure to conflict and if this was 
correlated with the style of preferred conflict resolution tactics used by an oﬃcer.  
Levels of physical resistance were measured using Wilson and Brewer’s Resistance Ques-
tionnaire (1991). Their instrument was designed to test oﬃcer and citizen behaviour, 
aggression and deindividualisation during high-anxiety patrol activities (Wilson & Brewer 
1993). It prompts the oﬃcer to score the level of physical resistance experienced during the 
most recent occurrence of a police event. The questionnaire contained 32 patrol activities. For 
example, one question asks if the oﬃcer had attended an incident where oﬀenders were found 
in the process of committing a burglary and if so, to indicate if an arrest was made, the num-
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ber of other oﬃcers and citizens present, and the level of any physical resistance used by the 
citizens present. In addition to calculating a resistance score, responses were used to calculate 
an incident count and an injury score. The incident count was used to compare oﬃcers’ level of 
experience: a high count indicated a more experienced career. Similarly, the injury score was 
used to measure the frequency and severity of injuries suﬀered. 
4.2.3  THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
Participant observation 
The qualitative study ran concurrently with the quantitative study. While the latter was de-
signed to measure participant behaviour during encounters and collect situational variables, 
the former was designed to collect descriptive encounter narratives using participant observa-
tion. The purpose of generating a narrative account of conflict resolution was to build a deeper 
understanding of why oﬃcers chose to behave in a particular way during encounters. The 
quantitative study measured behaviour in an abstract sense. While it provided an opportunity 
to measure variances between the practice of RAP and RUP oﬃcers in the study, it did not 
provide an opportunity to explore the motivation, rationale, or inherent prejudice that may be 
present in oﬃcer behaviour.  
Participant Interviews 
The qualitative study incorporated in-depth interviews with a proportionate number of 
oﬃcer-participants from each research site. The selection of interview questions followed 
Wengraf’s CRQ–TQ–IQ algorithm: where the central research question informs the selection 
of theory-questions (TQ) which are then used to inform the interview questions (IQ) (2001, 
pp.63-64). In the present research, eight interview questions were derived from three theory 
questions.  
The first TQ considered the findings of Muir (1977) and Hochstedler (1981) (and others), 
who proposed that police oﬃcer personalities can be grouped into typologies. Three interview 
questions were framed to prompt interviewees to consider if there were correlations between 
oﬃcer personality and behavioural preferences when dealing with conflict situations. These 
questions are as follows: 
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IVQ1: What kinds of incidents give you the most satisfaction as a police oﬃcer? What is it about these incidents 
that makes them satisfying?12 
IVQ2: When you are on patrol, either on foot or in a vehicle, what type of event would cause you to stop and 
intervene? 
IVQ3: Do you see any diﬀerences in the way you attempt to resolve conflict compared to the way other oﬃcers 
you work with? 
The second TQ was linked to the proposition that oﬃcers behave in a manner which they 
think is the ‘best’, ‘eﬀective’ and/or ‘appropriate’ way to resolve conflict (e.g. Bayley & Garofa-
lo 1989; Braithwaite 1998). The following interview questions were designed to elicit a 
response to establish their individual preference for ways to react to conflict situations.  
IVQ4: How did you learn to resolve conflict when dealing with members of the public? 
IVQ5: Describe an encounter where you witnessed eﬀective conflict resolution tactics being used. (This can be 
either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed). 
IVQ6: Describe an encounter where you witnessed ineﬀective conflict resolution tactics used. (This can be 
either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed). 
The third TQ related to the proposition that the manner of an oﬃcer’s initial approach to a 
citizen was pre-determined based on an oﬃcer’s assessment of service-entitlement and this 
will change if an oﬃcer’s assessment of entitlement changes (e.g. see Lipsky 1980). For in-
stance, the service-entitlement for a victim of a crime, a witness to a crime, and a suspect of a 
crime will diﬀer, as will the situation when a witness becomes a suspect and vice versa. Do 
oﬃcers, then, attempt to resolve conflict diﬀerently when they deal with victims, witnesses, or 
oﬀenders? 
 
IVQ7: From time to time, police oﬃcers run into situations where someone is a bully. What do you think is the 
best way to deal with a bully?13 
IVQ8: When thinking about when you attempt to resolve conflict, please provide an example when you think it 
would be appropriate to use communication tactics (such as talking) and when it would be appropriate to use 
coercive tactics (such as physical force)? 
It was intended that all oﬃcer-participants would be interviewed at the end of each shift. 
However, this proved to be problematic during the pilot study. Not only was it diﬃcult to 
generate enthusiasm among the oﬃcer-participants at the end of shift (with times varying be-
                                               
12 Adapted from Snipes and Mastrofski (1990). 
13 Adapted from Snipes and Mastrofski (1990). 
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tween 1am and 7am), oﬃcers appeared to be mentally fatigued. As a result, oﬃcer answers to 
the questions were short and sometimes lacked depth. During the research proper, only a se-
lection of oﬃcers were interviewed. 
4.2.4  THE PILOT STUDY 
As outlined above, the present research incorporated a pilot study prior to staging the re-
search proper. Pilot studies provide an opportunity for researchers to practice the skills 
required to collect empirical data, provide an opportunity for the researcher to become famil-
iarised with the research environment, and provide an opportunity to test the suitability and 
eﬀectiveness of the chosen research methods (Sarantakos 2012). Furthermore, the pilot study 
provided an opportunity to test the suitability of the stations at the research sites. The pilot 
also provided an opportunity for the researcher—as a practitioner-researcher—to identify any 
emergent issues for the researcher as ‘an employee’ of the research environment, such as risks 
to the researcher’s independence and freedom, risks associated with involving work colleagues 
as research participants, and any ethical or legal issues. 
Testing of Braithwaite’s taxonomy 
A primary consideration of the pilot was to test the suitability and utility of Braithwaite’s sys-
tem to measure participant behaviour. During the research pilot, it became apparent that 
changes were necessary. The first variation reflected the need to create a behavioural state to 
mark the absence of an oﬃcer (when an oﬃcer left the encounter) and the absence of any be-
havioural tactic (i.e. “doing nothing”). As the coding structure was exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive, a participant’s absence or inactivity needed to be recorded in an event log. The ab-
sence of an oﬃcer was a common occurrence during the encounters—such as when an oﬃcer 
left to speak to another party involved in the incident. Similarly, it was diﬃcult to find an ap-
plicable behavioural code when neither of the citizens or oﬃcers was engaged in any ‘overt’ 
behaviour. This frequently occurred when oﬃcers and citizens were waiting. For example, two 
oﬃcers and a citizen were waiting in a hospital lobby for a medical practitioner; all three wait-
ed together in silence. The citizen was not in custody but had agreed to be transported for a 
voluntary mental health assessment. Oﬃcers stood in silence not displaying any controlling 
behaviour (other than the implicit control exercised through their presence). As such, new 
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behavioural states of citizen-passive and oﬃcer-passive were added to the taxonomy.14 Similar-
ly, an ‘absent’ behaviour was added denote when any of the participants left the field of 
observation. The second variation reflected the need to record the complexity of control 
statements adequately. During the New Zealand phase of the pilot, the three control state-
ments (control aﬀect, control conversation, and control environment) were coded under the 
single category control statement. But after reviewing the data before the South Australian 
phase of the pilot, the conflated category was too broad. These categories were separated into 
the original three variants for the South Australian phase. 
The presence of multiple citizens at an encounter was problematic. For instance, when 
oﬃcers responded to a domestic incident there were times during the PCE when they would 
often interact with both the victim and the suspect simultaneously. When oﬃcers spoke to 
one citizen, then to another, the encounter had to be divided into two sequential encounters 
in Pocket Observer. When oﬃcers had to deal with more than one citizen concurrently, the 
coding became more cumbersome. These situations occurred in public spaces where incidents 
involved large numbers of people. As a result, v1.2 of the Pocket Observer protocol was 
amended to allow the provision to code the behaviour of two citizens concurrently.  
Nonetheless, the measurement of behaviour frequency and duration by each participant 
during encounters provided a quantifiable description of conflict resolution behaviour used 
by oﬃcers. From these data, datasets were created to compare the behaviours between the two 
research sites (NZC and SAC) and among the diﬀerent encounter types (such as investigative 
and enforcement encounters). Variations in behaviour among these groups informed the 
analysis.  
4.3 Data collection methods 
The research design incorporated several methods to collect data from three data sources: en-
counters, oﬃcers and citizens. Quantitative encounter data was collected using Braithwaite’s 
system to measure conflict-resolution behaviours and SSO to record situational variables. 
These data were supplemented with qualitative data sourced from participant observation. 
While these encounter narratives included descriptions of oﬃcer and citizen behaviour, quan-
titative data were also collected using SSO. Participant demographics and characteristics were 
                                               
14 The “passive” state is now referred to as “inactive” in subsequent chapters. 
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captured using SSO. Further oﬃcer data were collected using participant interviews and psy-
chometric testing. The relationship between the methods and sources are shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Data collection methods 
4.3.1  ENCOUNTERS 
Encounter behaviours - Pocket observer 
Encounter behaviours were collected using Noldus’ Pocket Observer v.3.215 (Noldus Infor-
mation Technology 2014b). It was a mobile application designed to be used in the field to code 
behavioural interactions (Noldus 1991). It served as a datalogger slave to the desktop computer 
program Observer XT (Noldus Information Technology 2014a) and coded data in real-time 
according to the behavioural schema that had been programmed into Observer XT. 
Pocket Observer’s interface provided the user with options to start, suspend, or stop an ob-
servation. At the beginning of an encounter, the user touched the start button on the touch 
screen to create an event log. Each line of the event log stored a subject code and subject be-
haviour; the first entries recorded the initial behaviour as <INITIAL CIT> for a citizen-participant 
or <INITIAL OFF> for an oﬃcer-participant (as shown in the left-hand image at Figure 5). The 
                                               
15 Pocket Observer is an application that runs on the Android platform. During the pilot study, and the subsequent quantitative study, the 
application was used on a Samsung Galaxy Pro 5 device.  
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next action required the allocation of the subject for which the behavioural state was ob-
served—shown as <OFFICER 1>, <OFFICER 2>, <CITIZEN 1> or <CITIZEN 2> in the bottom half of 
the left screen image of Figure 5. After a subject was selected, the program displayed the possi-
ble behavioural states (centre image of Figure 5). The program indicated the current state 
displayed as a blue box. To change the behavioural state, the operator touched the appropriate 
grey box. This action coded the behaviour to the event log (shown in the right-hand image of 
Figure 5) and completed the subject-behaviour coding sequence. Once coded, the program 
reverted to the subject selection screen (left image) and stayed ready for the next subject-
behaviour to be coded. The subject-behaviour sequence coded to the event log included a 
timestamp and remained active until another behaviour was coded to the log or the encounter 
was stopped.  
 
    
Figure 5. Screen captures of Noldus’ Pocket Observer:  
subject selection (left); behaviour selection (centre); event log (right).16   
Behaviours were coded in the same sequence which they were observed. Thus, the event log 
contained a continuous sequence of behaviour data which included the subject identifier, the 
behaviour of the subject, and the start time of the coding entry. The subject-behaviour coding 
took approximately 1–5 seconds from the time the researcher observed the behaviour, decide 
on how to code the observed behaviour, and select the correct sequence of the application’s 
subject and behaviour buttons. It was also possible to code ad-hoc comments to the event log 
(such as the “searching” comment shown above). Once the encounter had ended, a further 
                                               
16 Screen shots captured from the author’s device. 
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input screen was displayed to record independent variables to the event log. Variables includ-
ed the unique identifying code number of the “ride along”, the encounter, and the citizen and 
oﬃcer codes for those present. At the end of an encounter, the data can be transferred from 
Pocket Observer and imported into Observer XT. 
Encounter variables and narratives 
At the end of the encounter, situational variables relating to the encounter and subjects were 
recorded on a second hand-held device using the Qualtrics Surveys mobile application (Qual-
trics Labs, Inc. 2014).17 Variables included time, date and location details, event-type variables, 
occurrence variables, and actions taken (see Figure 6). Qualtrics Surveys functioned as a slave 
to Qualtrics Research Suite website (Qualtrics Labs, Inc. 2002) transferring data directly to the 
Qualtrics website through the Vodafone data network. When there was insuﬃcient data net-
work coverage to transfer the data, it was held pending on the device and transferred later. 
 
  
Figure 6. Screen captures of the Qualtrics Offline Survey Application screen (left)  
and Evernote’s note screen (right) 
Narrative information was annotated electronically using the computer program Evernote 
(Evernote Corporation 2007). Evernote comprised of two parts: a mobile application installed 
on a smartphone device and a computer program located on a laptop computer. Data entered 
                                               
17 At the beginning of the pilot study, situational variables were annotated on a paper form ESF-EF (see Appendix). However, it was discov-
ered that an electronic form was more convenient and durable than the paper form. It was diﬃcult to handwrite annotations on the paper 
form while travelling in the rear of the patrol vehicle, but the electronic form was easily completed during vehicular travel. The paper form 
also required lighting to read the form. The electronic form did not need a light source and text entry was easier to “tap” in using the applica-
tion onscreen keyboard. 
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into one automatically synchronised to the other through a wireless or mobile network con-
nection. Evernote was used at the completion of an encounter to store a short narrative of 
events (as shown on the right in Figure 6). This document also included a timestamp and GPS 
location data. When the shadowed patrol returned to the police station (i.e. at the end of the 
shift or if working inside the police station), the researcher was able to expand the narrative 
sketch into a detailed case narrative.  
The purpose of the case narrative was for it to act as the contemporaneous field note of the 
events which occurred during the encounter. As Marks (2003) described, field-notes comprise 
of observations and reflections on the interactions observed during the research, as well as the 
personal reflections, thoughts and emotions of the researcher. Indeed, the latter may contain 
theoretical discussion or insights described such as those described as memos by Glaser and 
Strauss (1999). Details relating to the patrol shift being observed were recorded on a paper 
form (see the ESF-SIF paper form in the appendix). A new form was used for each shift and 
recorded the shift code number, the codes of participating oﬃcers, the shift date, start and fin-
ish times, and listed the identification codes of any encounter that was coded for behavioural 
analysis.  
4.3.2  OFFICERS 
Oﬃcer psychometrics 
The BFI and Resistance tests were self-administered using Qualtrics Research Suite (Qualtrics 
Labs, Inc. 2014). A project portal was created within Qualtrics Research Suite to administer the 
tests. The project portal was protected by a password only known to the researcher. Qualtrics 
Research Suite operated on the internet using the encrypted https protocol. Once an oﬃcer 
agreed to participate, their code number and email address were inputted into the Qualtrics 
Research Suite. On activation, a unique link was generated and by email to the oﬃcer. Each 
test was presented as a separate questionnaire. Oﬃcers chose which questionnaire to attempt 
first. They began with an instruction page, requiring oﬃcers to enter their unique code num-
ber and a password before commencing the questionnaire. At the completion of the 
questionnaire, the oﬃcers’ responses were saved to the researcher’s project portal.  
The BFI used 44 questions to assess a participant’s personality across five factors: extraver-
sion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. Participants 
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responded using a 5-part Likert scale. For each question the participant responds with one of 
the following answers: disagree strongly, disagree a little, neither agree nor disagree, agree a 
little, or agree strongly. The 44 questions were arranged in four blocks of 11 questions; each 
block was displayed to the participant by Qualtrics Research Suite randomly. 
The second test asked oﬃcers to identify levels of physical resistance experienced during 
encounters with citizens throughout their police career. The resistance questionnaire prompt-
ed the oﬃcer to score the level of physical resistance experienced during the most recent 
incidence of a police-orientated event. The question asked if the oﬃcer had attended such an 
event and if so, to indicate if an arrest was made, the number of other oﬃcers and citizens pre-
sent, and the level of any physical resistance towards the oﬃcer used by any citizens present. 
The questionnaire contained 32 diﬀerent patrol activities which were displayed by Qualtrics 
Research Suite in a random sequence.  
Oﬃcer interviews 
Interviews were held in a private room. They followed a semi-structured format and com-
prised of eight questions (as shown in the PIS attached in the Appendix). The interviews were 
recorded on a digital audio recorder and stored on a secured server. 
4.3.3  CITIZENS 
Citizen demographics 
Data were collected about each citizen involved in the encounter using Qualtrics Surveys. All 
citizens involved in an encounter were given a unique identifier. These data included citizens’ 
demographic information, as it appeared to the researcher, actions of the citizen made to-
wards the oﬃcer(s), oﬃcer(s) actions towards the citizen, emotional states of the citizen, and 
the final police actions taken with the citizen.18 
4.3.4  PILOT STUDY EVALUATION 
As mentioned above, one of the primary functions of the pilot study was to test and evaluate 
the research methods chosen and data collection processes. The pilot was successful and 
                                               
18 As with the encounter situational variables, paper versions of the ESF-CIF forms used at the beginning of the pilot study were converted to 
electronic form. Citizen codes began with CA001 for those at SAC and CN001 for those at NZC. The CN prefix was applied after the fieldwork 
as the previous prefix was closely associated with the actual name of the research site. “N” was adopted to denote New Zealand. 
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proved that Braithwaite’s system could accurately measure diﬀerences between oﬃcer behav-
iour (despite the need for modifications to the behavioural taxonomy and the Observer XT 
setup).  
Pocket Observer 
The collection of behavioural data followed a similar approach to Braithwaite (1998). Each en-
counter observed during the pilot was observed in situ. Before the beginning of an encounter, 
the researcher activated Pocket Observer, and it remained in a ready state awaiting the ‘start 
observation’ command. Once an encounter began, it was easy to start the observation in Pock-
et Observer and assign initial behavioural states. This worked well when oﬃcers responded to 
an event that had been dispatched; activation was possible before the initial behaviour being 
observed began without loss of time or behavioural state changes. The process was also suc-
cessful for oﬃcer-initiated encounters as the application as Pocket Observer could be activated 
before the first behavioural exchange. However, this process was problematic when citizens 
approached oﬃcers without forewarning. This occurred regularly when oﬃcers were on foot 
patrol at SAC. In one example a citizen behind an oﬃcer called out to an oﬃcer for assistance. 
In these circumstances, a latency of 1–5 seconds was incurred in the event log while the Pocket 
Observer was activated, and the observation initiated. 
At the time of the New Zealand pilot, the researcher had not used Pocket Observer in the 
field. As there was no objective test that measured competence, or an alternate researcher to 
compare coding decisions (such as an inter-operator reliability test used by Braithwaite), the 
assessment of competence was measured subjectively. Aside from a lack of familiarity with the 
mobile application, the most significant risk to reliability identified by the researcher was cod-
ing latency. Coding latency was the time lag between the researcher’s observation of a 
participant’s behaviour, the cognitive assessment required to identify the appropriate or best 
match to the behavioural taxonomy, and the selection of the appropriate touch screen button 
on the handheld device (Grieco et al. 2015). Latency was minimal for coding initial actions 
and physical actions; it was easy to visually determine that a physical action had occurred. 
However, the researcher regarded latency to increase when interpreting non-information-
exchange-type conversations, such as control statements. At times, the determination of the 
behaviour was not apparent until a question or statement had been made.  
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While latency posed problems for the accuracy of temporal measurement, it was not prob-
lematic for frequency data; a lag in the coding of a behaviour did not interfere with an 
accurate count of a behaviour. Similarly, as Pocket Observer had an <UNDO> button, mistaken 
coding could be corrected. While a correction would not aﬀect frequency data, it did result in 
the temporal delay of inserting the timestamp of the new coded behaviour on the event log. 
Frequency data, though, could be corrupted if there was a rapid change from one behavioural 
state to another if the researcher was unable to correctly log the behaviours due to error, con-
fusion, or ‘missing’ the occurrence of the behaviour. This became an issue in one encounter in 
the New Zealand pilot during an intense argument between two oﬃcers and one citizen.  
Despite the absence of a documented competency and accuracy test, the researcher deter-
mined that the New Zealand pilot had provided an adequate period of familiarisation with the 
mobile application and competency in coding the observed behaviours. This was confirmed at 
the beginning of the South Australian pilot where the researcher did not identify any further 
coding complications or dilemmas.  
Oﬃcer interactivity 
At the beginning of an encounter, there was uncertainty as to whether one or both oﬃcers 
would interact with the citizen or citizens. In some encounters, one oﬃcer acted as the prima-
ry point of contact with the citizen with the other oﬃcer in an inactive role: ‘oﬃcer 1’ 
questioned the citizen while ‘oﬃcer 2’ remained silent. Yet in some other encounters both 
oﬃcers would interact directly with a citizen or citizens, or ‘oﬃcer 1’ started questioning a citi-
zen but then left the encounter leaving a silent ‘oﬃcer 2’ to take over questioning. In 
Braithwaite’s analytical framework, oﬃcers were seen as separate functional agents: “target 
oﬃcer” and “partner” (1998, p.130). However, in the present pilot study, oﬃcers did not neces-
sarily—or exclusively—interact with citizens in a primary or secondary manner. As the 
behaviour of ‘oﬃcer 1’ and ‘oﬃcer 2’ does not represent actions of specific roles (such as pri-
mary/secondary or contact/cover dyad) analysis of the present research combines the 
behaviour of ‘oﬃcer 1’ and ‘oﬃcer 2’ as cumulative ‘patrol’ behaviour. 
Oﬃcer workload 
The initial research protocol assumed that oﬃcer-participants would complete the two psy-
chometric questionnaires at the beginning of the shift before being dispatched or 
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commencing their patrol. However, one of the disadvantages of the sampling approach—
oversampling busy shifts to increase the likelihood of conflict-prone encounters—is that often 
there was little spare time between the completion of the briefings before the shadowed patrol 
was required for service. As such, the protocol was changed so that oﬃcers completed the 
questionnaires during their downtime. Similarly, attempting to conduct an interview at the 
end of each shift was diﬃcult. Not only was it diﬃcult to generate enthusiasm among the 
oﬃcer-participants at the end of shift (with times varying between 1am and 7am), oﬃcers ap-
peared to be mentally fatigued. As a result, oﬃcer answers to the questions were short and 
sometimes lacked depth.  
4.4 The sample 
4.4.1  RESEARCH ACCESS 
At the time of the research, access to New Zealand Police data and personnel was governed by 
the Research and Evaluation Steering Committee. Access was subject to an internal peer-
review and an assessment of the merit of the research, and the identification of an internal 
sponsor to host the research. A request was submitted to the committee in July 2013, which 
was provisionally accepted subject to refinement. A further submission was later rejected in 
August 2014, but final permission was provided in January 2015. The research was sponsored 
by a ‘southern’ police district. Similarly, research access to South Australian police was subject 
to an application to the research committee. Permission was provided in January 2015 for a 
pilot study, and full access granted in April 2015. Research access was limited to foot-based 
patrols within a metropolitan area of a provincial city.  
4.4.2  SAMPLING: SHIFTS AND PATROLS 
Pilot study 
The pilot was staged over a four-week period during January and February 2015. It began in 
New Zealand and incorporated eight shifts at NZC: six evening-shifts and two night-shifts 
from Wednesday to Saturday over two weeks. A two-week break followed the shifts at NZC to 
review the initial data and consider the research method. The second part of the pilot com-
A mixed-method approach – The sample | 77 
 
 
 
 
menced at SAC and incorporated four shifts: two evening shifts and two night-shifts from 
Wednesday to Saturday over one week.  
The pilot involved 11 oﬃcers from NZC drawn from the public safety team (PST) at NZC 
station and 10 oﬃcers from the general duties patrol team (GDP) at SAC station. PST and 
GDP oﬃcers were general duties patrol oﬃcers whose primary aim was to respond to emer-
gency calls for service and provide some proactive preventative patrols. Oﬃcers were selected 
according to the protocol shown in Figure 7. The pilot also involved 28 citizens from NZC and 
15 from SAC. 
Study proper 
Over a 21-week period from February to August 2015, 45 oﬃcers at NZC and 46 oﬃcers at 
SAC were shadowed during their routine patrol activities. The qualitative study continued the 
oversampling approach of the pilot to maximise the potential number of encounters which 
might provoke conflict resolution behaviour from the oﬃcers. During the NZ phase of the 
study proper, 48 shifts were observed: 42 evening shifts and six night-shifts; Thursdays, Fri-
days and Saturdays were the most frequent. The SA phase comprised of 37 shifts: 33 evening-
shifts and four night-shifts;19 Thursday, Friday and Saturday were the most frequent nights 
observed (see Table 4.4.1). 
Table 4.4.1. Patterns of shifts observed 
  New Zealand City  South Australian City 
  N Percent  N Percent 
Shift Team NZC A 8 16.7 SAC T 4 10.8 
 NZC B 11 22.9 SAC U 4 10.8 
 NZC C 8 16.7 SAC V 5 13.5 
 NZC D 12 25.0 SAC W 5 13.5 
 NZC E 9 18.8 SAC X 7 18.9 
    SAC Y 5 13.5 
    SAC Z 7 18.9 
Weekday Wednesday 8 16.7  1 2.7 
 Thursday 11 22.9  11 29.7 
 Friday 11 22.9  11 29.7 
 Saturday 11 22.9  11 29.7 
 Sunday 7 14.6  3 8.1 
Shift type Evening 42 87.5  33 89.2 
 Night 6 12.5  4 10.8 
 
                                               
19 These totals include the SAC segment of the pilot study.  
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New Zealand City 
The New Zealand phase of the field research involved 11 weeks of participant observation with 
oﬃcers from the public safety team (PST) at NZC.20 Their primary role was to respond to 
emergency calls for service, but they were also expected to perform some pro-active preventa-
tive activities. Members of the PST at NZC were arranged into five teams to provide a 24 hour, 
seven days per week service. Their shift pattern followed a 10-day pattern: oﬃcers worked two 
day-shifts, two evening-shifts, and then two night-shifts. At the completion of the six-day pat-
tern, oﬃcers were rostered to have four days’ rest. This ten-day pattern repeated over a 5-week 
period. The research occurred from Wednesday to Sunday during the evening- and night-
shifts. Two shift selection patterns were used: five consecutive evening-shifts from Wednesday 
to Sunday (Pattern A), and two evening-shifts on a Wednesday and Thursday followed by two 
night-shifts on a Friday and Saturday (Pattern B). This two-week pattern repeated three times 
over the first six weeks. The observation of night shifts (Pattern B) was discontinued at that 
point when demand for service reduced. Pattern A recurred each week for the remaining por-
tion of the NZC study.  
South Australia City 
The South Australian phase of the field research comprised of 10 weeks with oﬃcers from the 
general duties patrol team (GDP) at SAC. Like the PST oﬃcers at NZC, the role of GDP oﬃc-
ers was to respond to emergency calls for service. However, SAC oﬃcers were tasked to 
provide a foot-based ‘beat’ presence: oﬃcers in most cases would walk—or run—in response 
to calls for service. There were some occasions where SAC oﬃcers would respond by vehicle, 
such as responding with a ‘custody vehicle’ to transport an arrestee to custody. 
GDP oﬃcers were organised into seven teams on a 24-hour, seven days per week roster. 
The shift cycle covered a seven-week pattern combining morning, afternoon, evening, and 
night shifts. At the beginning of the SAC phase, observational research occurred with a ‘cover’ 
shift that started in the late afternoon and ended after night shift had commenced. The re-
search occurred from Thursday to Sunday.21 This pattern was modified after the first week so 
that the Saturday observational period extended into early Sunday morning. This meant 
working half of the evening shift with one GDP team and switching to a new GDP team at the 
                                               
20 PST oﬃcers (formally known as General Duties Branch oﬃcers) played a similar role to those of North American ‘patrol oﬃcers’. 
21 The roster of the cover shifts usually involved the following times: Thursday 1800-0230 hrs; Friday 1700–0130 hrs; Saturday 1500–2330 hrs; 
and Sunday 1500-2330 hrs.  
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start of the night shift at 2300 hrs. On four occasions, observations occurred during the com-
plete night shift to coincide with scheduled extraordinary events. Observations were made of 
oﬃcers from all seven GDP teams.  
4.4.3  OFFICERS 
The policing literature identifies the diﬃculties in ensuring voluntary participation of research 
subjects when the research subjects are sworn police oﬃcers (e.g. Marks 2003). The diﬃculty 
lies in that oﬃcers are obliged to accept lawful requests and directives of their direct supervi-
sors. In the case of the New Zealand Police, such obligations are legislated (Policing Act 2008 
[NZ], S.30). In some police workgroups, where there is a high degree of informality, a supervi-
sor’s polite request can be interpreted as a directive, ‘Constable, would you like to participate 
in some research?’ As such, care has been taken to ensure that potential research oﬃcers are 
aware that their participation is voluntary.  
Oﬃcer selection 
 
Figure 7. Officer participation nomination and opt-in process 
 
The oﬃcer selection process incorporates a nomination process and an ‘opt-in’ process as 
shown in Figure 7. At the beginning of each week, the supervisor of each rostered shift was 
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notified by the station senior sergeant (at NZC) or station inspector (at SAC) by email that 
their team roster coincided with a research project and invited the supervisor to nominate two 
oﬃcers to participate in the study. This email included the participant information sheet (PIS) 
and informed consent form (ICF). Supervisors then nominated two oﬃcers whom they be-
lieved would be interested in participating in the research. 
At the beginning of the first shift, each patrol team was given an introductory briefing by 
the researcher. This briefing lasted about 10 minutes. After the team briefing, a further briefing 
occurred with the oﬃcers who had been nominated to participate. Advice that participation in 
the research was voluntary, and that although they were nominated by their supervisor, they 
did not have to participate in the research. The nominated oﬃcers were given a further oppor-
tunity to read the PIS and complete the ICF. Once the oﬃcers had consented to participate, 
their email address was added to the Qualtrics website application to generate hyperlinks to 
the two psychometric questionnaires.  
The nomination and briefing process repeated each time the researcher first met the NZC 
teams and SAC teams. If the oﬃcers had not previously received the personal briefing or 
signed the ICF, time was taken to provide the briefing and complete the ICF. Throughout the 
research, all oﬃcers who had been nominated agreed to participate in the research. All partic-
ipating oﬃcers signed the ICF. 
As noted previously, it was originally conceived that all oﬃcer participants were to be in-
terviewed. However, only a proportion of oﬃcers were interviewed. This approach is 
consistent with mixed-method sampling protocols. Morse (1991) explains that sub-sampling is 
eﬀective when ‘good’ participants are selected rather than participants selected at random. 
Good participants are described as those who are the “most experienced and articulate” 
(Morse 1991, p.155). In the present case, an eﬀort was made to select research participants who 
provided a gender balance with diverse levels of operational experience.  
Demographics 
The research involved 91 oﬃcers from the two research sites. Table 4.4.2 indicates rank, sex, 
ethnicity, and age range of the sample. Most oﬃcer-participants were of the rank of constable 
(NZC=97.8%, SAC=87%). NZC had a slightly higher proportion of female oﬃcers than SAC 
(NZC=24.4%, SAC=19.6%). SAC had a slightly higher proportion of White/European oﬃcers 
than NZC (NZC=91.1%, SAC=95.7%). Ages ranged from 21–59 years or more. The Mann-
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Whitney U-test found that the age range of oﬃcers was not significantly diﬀerent in the two 
samples, U(n1=45, n2=46)=13,065, two tailed p=0.079. On average, SAC oﬃcers were involved 
in more encounters in the quantitative study (M=6.04, SE=0.668) than in NZC (M=5.73, 
SE=0.623). This diﬀerence −0.310, was not significant t(89) =	−0.339, p = 0.994, and the eﬀect 
size was small, r = 0.036. 
Table 4.4.2. Basic demographic information of officers (NNZ=44, NSA=40) 
  New Zealand City South Australia City 
  N %  N %  
Officer rank Constable22 44 97.8  40 87.0  
 Sergeant 1 2.2  5 10.9  
 Senior Sergeant 0 0  0 0  
 Inspector 0 0  1 2.2  
Sex Male 34 75.6  37 80.4  
 Female 11 24.4  9 19.6  
Ethnicity White 41 91.1  44 95.7  
 Maori 4 8.9  0 0  
 Asian / Indian 0 0  1 2.2  
 Other 0 0  1 2.2  
 Aboriginal 0 0  0 0  
Age Range 21–29 11 24.4  5 10.9  
 30-44 30 66.7  34 73.9  
 45-59+ 4 8.9  7 15.2  
        
Psychometrics 
Oﬃcer-participants were invited to complete the BFI questionnaire. The response rate was 
80% (n=36) at NZC and 76% (n=35) at SAC. The BFI comprises of five personality factors: ex-
traversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. The 
test scores for each site are shown in Table 4.4.3. There were no statistically significant diﬀer-
ences between the oﬃcers at NZC and SAC. 
Table 4.4.3. Personality test scores for NZC officers (n=46) and SAC officers (n=35) 
 New Zealand City South Australian City    
 M SD M SD t-value df p (two-tailed) 
Extraversion 3.52 0.750 3.61 0.782 0.494 69 0.623 
Agreeableness 3.99 0.500 3.80 0.617 –1.434 69 0.156 
Conscientiousness 3.87 0.451 3.78 0.486 –0.805 69 0.424 
Neuroticism 2.14 0.660 2.16 0.627 0.097 69 0.923 
Openness 3.35 0.519 3.41 0.545 0.441 69 0.660 
 
Oﬃcer-participants were also asked to identify levels of physical resistance experienced 
during encounters with citizens throughout their police career. Resistance was measured us-
                                               
22 Unlike New Zealand Police, South Australian Police have several ranks within the constable rank: constable, senior constable, senior con-
stable first class. The South Australian ranks have been grouped together under the ‘constable’ rank. 
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ing Wilson and Brewer’s Resistance Questionnaire which used a six-point scale with options 
consisting of: no contact with the oﬀender (1) (i.e., oﬀender fleeing or fled vicinity or false 
alarm), contact but no resistance – full compliance (2), verbal resistance (e.g., abuse, argument) 
(3), some minor struggling (4), assault police (no weapon) (5), and assault police with a weapon 
(6) (Wilson & Brewer 1993). As proposed by Wilson and Brewer, the first option in the scale 
no contact with the oﬀender was rescored from 1 to 0.  Responses from oﬃcers are shown in 
Table 4.4.4. The response rate was 87% (n=39) at NZC and 87% (n=40) at SAC. After incom-
plete responses were removed (NZC=1, SAC=5) the final sample for analysis dropped to 84% 
(n=38) at NZC and 76% (n=35) at SAC.  
The incident count is the sum of answers indicating that an oﬃcer had attended one of the 
32 patrol activities. This statistic provides a basic measure of an oﬃcer’s level of experience. 
The injury score indicates the level of injuries received by the oﬃcer associated with the patrol 
activities. Injury was measured on a four-point scale with options consisting of: no injury (0), 
minor – self-administered first aid (1), minor – seen by paramedic (2), or serious – hospitalised 
(3). The resistance score is the sum of the resistance levels reported by the oﬃcer per patrol ac-
tivity.  
Table 4.4.4. Resistance scores for NZC officers (n=38) and SAC officers (n=35) 
 New Zealand City South Australian City    
 M SD M SD t-value df p (two-tailed) 
Incident count 22.61 5.52 21.86 6.80 0.518 71 0.606 
Injury score 0.53 1.06 0.63 1.00 -0.423 71 0.674 
Resistance score 49.00 17.16 49.00 18.34 0.000 71 1.000 
 
There were no significant diﬀerences between the two sites in the means of the three 
measures. The diﬀerences between the means of the incident count MNZ = 22.61 (SDNZ = 5.52) 
MSA = 22.86 (SDSA = 8.80) were non-significant t(71) = 0.518, p = 0.606. The mean range 
(rangeSA: 3–32, rangeNZ: 11–31) indicates that the least experienced oﬃcers from NZC had ex-
perienced a higher number of patrol activities (starting at 11 incidents) than the least 
experienced oﬃcers from SAC (starting at three incidents). The diﬀerences in the means of 
the injury score were non-significant t(71) = 0.518, p = 0.606. There was no diﬀerence in the 
resistance score means. 
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Summary 
When comparing oﬃcers from NZC and SAC, there were no significant diﬀerences in oﬃcer 
age range, personality, levels of operational resistance, operational injury, or operational expe-
rience. There were a greater proportion of White/European SAC oﬃcers than NZC oﬃcers. 
NZC had a slightly greater proportion of female oﬃcers than SAC. SAC oﬃcers were involved 
in a greater number of encounters per oﬃcer than NZC oﬃcers, but this diﬀerence was not 
statistically significant. 
4.4.4  CITIZENS 
The qualitative study involved 358 citizens across the two research sites (NNZ=183, NSA=175).23 
Unlike the sampling protocol for oﬃcers, it was impossible to predetermine or select a citi-
zen’s involvement in the research. Consequently, when a PCE commenced data was collected 
on the basis that citizens would have the opportunity to ‘opt-out’ of the research. Citizens who 
were assessed as being under the influence of illicit drugs or alcohol, those who displayed be-
haviour that indicated they were suﬀering from a mental illness or disorder, and those citizens 
who were not of adult age (as determined by legislation) were assumed to be unable to provide 
informed consent. Despite the lack of ability to confer informed consent, data from these citi-
zens were incorporated into the dataset. As the present research sought to examine the 
interactions between oﬃcers and citizens who were intoxicated, mentally disordered, or oth-
erwise vulnerable, it was deemed necessary to include (and counterproductive to exclude) 
encounters in the dataset. 
Similarly, it was not deemed practical, nor safe in some cases, to administer psychometric 
tests to participant-citizens. As such, there was an absence of citizen personality data or de-
tailed histories of prior interactions with police. Some citizen demographics (Table 4.4.5) and 
situational factors (Table 4.4.6) were coded by the observer at the completion of each encoun-
ter: age, ethnicity, and sex were assessed visually by the researcher; citizen role reflected the 
oﬃcers’ actions; and degrees of intoxication, mental state, suicidal or self-harm indicators, 
physical injuries were coded on the basis of visual or behavioural cues. The level of the oﬃcers’ 
knowledge of the citizen was determined at the end of the PCE. 
                                               
23 This excludes two citizens who refused to provide consent by opting out. 
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Demographics 
There were variations in citizen demographics between the two research sites. The SAC sam-
ple comprised of a higher cohort of suspects (37.1%) and enforcementees24 (49.6%) than the 
NZC sample (17.5% and 33.9% respectively). The NZC sample had a higher proportion of vic-
tims (36.6%) and witnesses (6.6%) than the SAC sample (5.7% and 0% respectively). Citizen 
roles were attributed based on the final disposition made by oﬃcers. For instance, a citizen 
reporting a crime was classified as a victim or a witness. Citizens who were investigated, such 
as at a stop and search or vehicle stop, but were not warned or proceeded against were coded 
as a suspect. Citizens who received a criminal justice sanction, such as an arrest, warning, or 
issued with an instant fine, were coded accordingly. In some cases, citizen roles changed as the 
encounter progressed. In these situations, the citizen is coded according to the final classifica-
tion. For instance, a citizen may have been initially classified initially as a suspect but after an 
investigation classified as a victim.  
Table 4.4.5. Basic demographic information of citizens (NNZ=183, NSA=175) 
  New Zealand City South Australia City 
  N Sample 
Percentage 
Census 
Percentage 
N Sample 
Percentage 
Census 
Percentage 
Citizen role Victim 67 36.6  10 5.7  
 Witness 12 6.6  0 0  
 Suspect 32 17.5  65 37.1  
 Associate 10 5.5  9 5.1  
 Bystander 0 0  4 2.3  
 Enforcement (62) (33.9)  (87) (49.6)  
   Field arrest 38 20.8  23 13.1  
   Field action 6 3.3  34 19.4  
   Field warning 18 9.8  30 17.1  
Sex Male 96 52.5  142 81.1  
 Female 87 47.5  33 18.9  
Ethnicity Caucasian (White/European) 148 80.9 83.2 129 73.7 83.8 
 Māori 27 14.8 7.0 0 0 0.1 
 Asian / Indian 5 2.7 2.7 6 3.4 8.1 
 Pacifica 3 1.6 1.6 0 0 0.1 
 Other 0 0 0 15 8.6 1.1 
 Aboriginal 0 0 0 25 14.3 0.1 
Age Range 12–16 10 5.5  7 4.0  
 17–20 13 7.1  25 14.3  
 21–29 58 31.7  69 39.4  
 30-44 28 15.3  31 17.7  
 45-59 65 35.5  43 24.6  
 60+ 9 4.9  0 0  
 
                                               
24 The Enforcement category is a combination of arrested, field action, and field warning categories. The frequencies and percentages in pa-
renthesis are the combined totals of these three categories. 
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The proportion of citizen-participants’ sex was more balanced at NZC (male=52.5%, fe-
male=47.5%) whereas at SAC there was a higher proportion of males (male=81.1%, 
female=18.9%). The apparent ethnicity of the citizens was predominately White/European at 
each site. Ethnicity at NZC was Caucasian (80.9%), Māori (14.8%), Asian/Indian (2.7%), and 
Pacifica (1.6%) whereas the ethnicity at SAC was Caucasian (73.7%), Aboriginal (14.3%), Mid-
dle Eastern (8.6%), and Asian/Indian (3.4%). The citizens’ age range was 12–60 years or more. 
The Mann-Whitney U-test found that the age range of citizens in the NZC sample was signifi-
cantly older than the SAC sample, U(n1=183, n2=175)=13,065, two tailed p=0.002.  
Variables 
Citizen-participant variables are shown in Table 4.4.6. Fewer citizens at NZC displayed intox-
icated behaviour than those at SAC. The measurement scale relied on a subjective assessment, 
where the researcher considered visual or behavioural indications of impairment.25 At NZC, 
69.4% of citizens displayed no degree of behavioural impairment due to intoxication (includ-
ing when there was evidence of consumption), 14.8% were slightly impaired, 15.3% were 
strongly impaired, and 0.5% (n=1) was unconscious. This diﬀered at SAC where 32.6% of citi-
zens displayed no degree of behavioural impairment, 50.3% were slightly impaired, 16% were 
strongly impaired, and 1.2% (n=2) were unconscious. 
Table 4.4.6. Citizen characteristics (NNZ=183, NSA=175) 
  NZC SAC 
  N % N % 
Indication of intoxication Nil 116 63.4 40 22.9 
(drugs or alcohol) Indication of consumption – no impairment  11 6.0 17 9.7 
 Slight impairment 27 14.8 88 50.3 
 Strong impairment 28 15.3 28 16.0 
 Unconscious 1 0.5 2 1.1 
Indication of Mental Illness  25 13.7 11 6.3 
Displayed Suicidal behaviour  9 4.9 1 0.6 
Indication of physical injury nil 175 95.6 172 98.3 
 minor 7 3.8 3 1.7 
 serious 1 0.5 0 0.0 
Indication of self-harm reasonable suspicion 4 2.2 1 0.6 
 evidence  3 1.6 0 0.0 
Officer prior knowledge of citizen No knowledge – stranger 144 78.7 140 80.0 
 Recognises or knows (not detailed) 11 6.0 5 2.8 
 Knows by name 14 7.6 9 5.1 
 Knows well 1 0.5 1 0.6 
 Knows very well, circumstances, offences etc. 13 7.1 20 11.4 
 
                                               
25 It was not possible to measure citizens’ breath or blood alcohol level. 
86 | A mixed-method approach – Reliability and validity  
 
NZC had a higher percentage of citizens who behaved as if they had a mental illness, ad-
mitted having had a mental illness, or oﬃcers were aware that they had a mental illness 
(13.7%) than those at SAC (6.3%). Similarly, NZC had a higher percentage of citizens who dis-
played suicidal behaviour (NZC=4.9%, n=9; SAC=0.6, n=1) and those who self-harmed 
(NZC=3.8%, n=7; SAC=0.6, n=1). NZC also had a higher percentage of citizens who were in-
jured (NZC=4.3%, n=8; SAC=1.7, n=3). In both research sites, most citizens were not known 
to oﬃcers (NZC=78.7%, SAC=80%).  
Summary 
There was a greater variety of characteristics and demographics between the NZC and SAC 
citizens. At NZC there was more witness- and victim-encounters than at SAC whereas SAC 
had a greater proportion of suspect- and oﬀenders-encounters. NZC also had a greater num-
ber of citizens with apparent mental health illnesses, more than twice that of SAC, and a 
greater number of citizens who had self-harmed. The proportion of the citizen’s sex was more 
balanced at NZC, whereas at SAC only 19% of citizens were female. The citizens at NZC were 
statistically significantly older than the citizens at SAC. There was less variance among the 
apparent ethnicities. The proportion of Caucasian citizens was similar at both research sites 
(NZC=81%, SAC=74%) as was the proportion of indigenous peoples (Māori at NZC=15%; 
Aboriginal at SAC=14%).  
4.5 Reliability and validity 
4.5.1  PRACTITIONER-BASED RESEARCH 
The present research comes from an interpretivist philosophy with a twist of a practitioner’s 
perspective. While Waddington’s (1999) critique of research about police culture provides a 
useful reminder to consider the bias of non-practitioner research, Creswell (2014) draws at-
tention to the importance of being aware of how any researcher’s personal background and 
experience may aﬀect their research. This last section of the chapter includes a brief reflection 
about the role of practitioner-research research within the present research.  
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Piercing the protective shield 
Debate exists among researchers about the value of practitioner-led research. Practitioner-led 
research is common outside of policing, such as in education, health-care (e.g. Reed & Procter 
1995) and social work (e.g. Broad & Fletcher 1993). Incongruent with the positivist philoso-
phy, practitioner-led research may indeed discover alternative descriptions of phenomena to 
those constructed by non-practitioners.  
Divisions between practitioner-led and non-practitioner-led research about the police and 
police practice are apparent in the research literature. Non-practitioners have commented on 
the diﬃculty of conducting police research, particularly in obtaining access to conduct re-
search and overcoming sensitivities of ‘occupational secrecy’ (van Maanen 1978), but also 
reflecting on the utility and relevance of research objectives (Cain 1973) which then may sur-
vive scrutiny (Waddington 1999), and dealing with ethical conundrums (van Hulst 2013; 
Norris 1993; Punch 1979). Practitioner researchers also encounter challenges. Holdaway (1983) 
and Young (1991), both sworn oﬃcers at the time of their research encountered resistance 
from police supervisors, who questioned the relevance of their research and their suitability to 
conduct research of their peers in the field.26  Yet Holdaway and Young were able to ‘dig deep’ 
into police practice and reveal insights into police ‘work’ that may have been unobtainable by 
non-practitioners. Holdaway’s work documented how the lower ranked uniform oﬃcers un-
derstood and carried out that work. As a police supervisor, conducting covert ethnography, he 
reflected that he was able to “pierce [the] protective shield” held by oﬃcers so that he could 
develop an understanding their occupational culture of ‘common sense’ (Holdaway 1983, 
pp.2-5). Young, too, was able to explore the workplace norms of detective constables. He ex-
tolled the importance of ‘inside analysis’, squaring criticism at the previous ethnographers of 
police practice noting their failure to discern data that was “locked away in the heads of police 
oﬃcers” (Young 1991, p.19). 
As such, it is important to consider the validity of their research with a degree of scepti-
cism. Conclusions drawn from the policing literature oeuvre need to be tempered with an 
appreciation of the researcher’s background, experiences, and level of penetration into ‘police 
society’. As the very nature of policing is interpretative—oﬃcers interpret their environs and 
make decisions based on their interpretations—so too is the study of policing: the interpreta-
                                               
26 Both Holdaway and Young pursued degrees in sociology and anthropology, not legal degrees which the police hierarchy attributed greater 
legitimacy and utility to (Holdaway 1983; Young 1991). 
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tion of an interpretative activity can surely lead to misinterpretation and false interpretation. 
Cockcroft (2013) notes that a large amount of policing research suﬀers as a result of the failure 
of the researcher to understand their own political or cultural bias, or even how their life ex-
perience aﬀects their ethnographic experience.  
4.5.2  RELIABILITY OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
As noted above, the present research approach originates from an interpretivist philosophy, 
where the description and measurement of behaviour rely on the investigator’s interpretation 
of behaviour. Interpretivists assume that reality is socially constructed and suggest that inter-
pretation is shaped by the background of the researcher (Bloomberg & Volpe 2015). When 
designing the research, it was anticipated that a mixed-method design would provide a mech-
anism—through triangulation—to reduce the risk of researcher bias and researcher 
misinterpretation. The design also provided a balanced analytical framework: inductive quali-
tative inquiry contextualised with a quantitative assessment of behaviour.  
The design was a cross-sectional, non-experimental descriptive study. It was intended to 
detect any variation of behaviour between the research sites, if variations existed, rather than 
to test a hypothesis. The internal validity of non-experimental designs is susceptible to threats 
from extraneous variables (O'Dwyer & Bernauer 2013, p.163). Potential threats to the present 
study included the risk of sampling oﬃcer-participants who had worked in both research 
sites, cultural diﬀerences between research sites, and the repeated observations of oﬃcers. A 
further challenge for the research was to ensure that any advantage aﬀorded to the researcher 
due to a membership role (i.e. privileged access to data or the ability to ‘pierce the protective 
shield’) remained balanced to limit researcher bias.  
One consequence of the cross-national design of the study provided an opportunity for the 
researcher to consider any implicit advantage aﬀorded as an ‘insider-insider’ within the New 
Zealand Police, with the ‘outside-insider-ish’ relationship within the South Australian Police. 
This was apparent by the limitation of patrol mode during the fieldwork. While the choice of 
the station within each research site was limited to the availability of a suitably-sized station, 
the ability to conduct fieldwork at SAC was constrained by operational concerns. As a result, 
fieldwork at SAC was limited to beat patrols. At NZC, fieldwork incorporated beat and ve-
hicular patrols thus complicating comparative data analysis. For instance, comparisons with 
the encounter dataset were hampered by disparities of encounter types (e.g. investigative vs 
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enforcement encounters) and SAC encounters did not include a suﬃcient quantity of victim-
encounters. These disparities reduced the ability for corroboration of the presence of control-
ling behaviours in the NZC encounter dataset.  
Observer bias and data corruption 
Spano (2005) suggested that observational research of police may suﬀer from observer bias: 
confusion and error as a result of culture shock; error and cutting corners due to fatigue and 
burnout; losing objectivity through going native. Furthermore, the presence of the observer in 
the police environment may change the normal behaviour of the research subjects due to re-
activity (Spano 2006). It is assumed that these risks have been somewhat mitigated in the 
present research as it practitioner-led. Harvey et al. (2008) provide a degree of assurance that 
the live coding of human behavioural can be robust, although reactivity is common in studies 
that include direct human observation, it’s “impact on validity is often minimal” (2008, p.19), 
and that reactivity can have very little impact on the measurement of behavioural data.  
The issue of data accuracy was considered at the time of research design. The triangulation 
of data methods (see Krefting 1991, p.219) was used to strengthen the external validity of the 
research. Similarly, it was hoped that by employing more than one data collection method 
would mitigate any inherent deficiencies. In the present study, data of behaviour was collected 
in two ways. The quantitative study used statistical analysis to describe oﬃcer behaviour and 
was suﬃcient to identify variations in behaviour between the sites. The behaviour of the re-
search participants was analysed in two ways: the frequency of occurrence and the duration of 
behaviours. The qualitative study incorporated systematic social observation and participant 
observation to complement the quantitative data.  
The literature suggests that the potential eﬀect that that observers have on research partici-
pants diminishes over time (e.g. Harvey et al. 2008). Simply put, oﬃcers become acclimatised 
to being observed and either ‘forget’ they are being observed or fails to continue to ‘pretend’ 
to behave in the manner they wish to portray to the observer. During the present research, 
there were no obvious changes in participant behaviour that were called into question that 
behaviours were deliberately being altered for the purposes of the research. During discus-
sions with research participants and their first line supervisors at SAC, comments were 
alluded to that oﬃcers had become accustomed to being observed through an increase in ad-
hoc filming of oﬃcer behaviour by citizens, the extensive CCTV facilities in the entertainment 
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zone (often used by oﬃcers as an investigative aid), and a present trial of body-worn cameras 
occurring at the station. Surveillance of oﬃcers from NZC station was less sophisticated. Alt-
hough oﬃcers were accustomed to being filmed by citizens, they appeared more cautious of 
being observed than the oﬃcers at SAC.   
The pilot 
The pilot study had two key objectives. The first was to test if the ‘Braithwaite model’ and oth-
er software applications would provide a suﬃcient platform to detect variances of oﬃcer-
participant behaviour between the two research sites. After reviewing the initial pilot data, it 
was found that the taxonomy (after modification) was suﬃcient for such an analysis.27 Second, 
it provided an opportunity to improve researcher capability, including building familiarity 
with the research sites, their environments, and data collection techniques.  
The data collection tools proved eﬀective and robust: no data was lost during the pilot (or 
the proper study). In some encounters, oﬃcers separated to speak to diﬀerent citizens. The 
separation created some definitional diﬃculties for the researcher. The immediate dilemma 
was to decide which of the two oﬃcers should be followed to code. This became problematic 
when oﬃcers were dispatched to a verbal domestic incident between two citizens. In most 
cases, it was determined to observe the person who was most likely to have the greatest poten-
tial for conflict. In practicality, a very quick decision was required to choose which citizen to 
observe. Often the decision was made on the basis of which citizen might be the most emo-
tional of those present during the encounter, or a citizen who was identified as the suspect or 
oﬀender.  
4.6 Research Ethics 
The present research followed the ethical principles for research set out by the British Society 
of Criminology and were approved by the Institute of Criminology Research Ethics Commit-
tee. 
                                               
27 During the pilot, two further behavioural states (inactive and absent) were added to the coding schema. While these states are not truly 
active conflict resolution behaviours, their omission caused diﬃculties during the live coding process using the Observer XT system. 
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Informed consent 
Two protocols were adopted when obtaining informed consent from research subjects. While 
the involvement of oﬃcers could be predetermined before a shift commenced the identifica-
tion of citizens was not apparent until an encounter had begun. This ‘opt-in’ process for 
oﬃcers followed British Society of Criminology guidelines. Eﬀorts were made by the research-
er to ensure that participation was voluntary, oﬃcers were provided with accurate 
information about the research and were given the opportunity to consent to participate. 
Oﬃcers were aﬀorded the opportunity to read the project brief and Participant Information 
Sheet28 before beginning the shadowed patrol. Data collected during encounters comprised of 
actions and behaviour of oﬃcers and citizens. These data were collected to measure and de-
scribe how oﬃcers resolve conflict. Interviews and questionnaires were used to identify a 
context for why oﬃcers might behave in particular ways. As such, the collection of data from 
oﬃcers had the potential to be more intrusive than data from citizens. This distinction is not 
an attempt to minimise the experience of citizens being observed during an encounter, merely 
a reflection that the process of data collection is more involved, time-consuming, and riskier 
for the oﬃcer.  
Primary data sourced from citizens was limited to their behaviour during police-citizen en-
counters. Secondary data related to situational characteristics of citizens, based on how 
citizens appeared to the researcher and oﬃcer-participants. It was impossible to follow an 
‘opt-in’ process; it was also impractical, and in some cases unsafe, to pre-empt oﬃcers to re-
ceive informed consent from citizens before the start of an encounter. Furthermore, pre-
alerting citizens to the research may have increased the occurrence of observer reactivity. As 
such, an ‘opt-out’ process was adopted to allow citizen-participants to choose at the culmina-
tion of an encounter for their data not to be included in the dataset.  
There was also a concern about the citizen-participants who might lack the ability to pro-
vide informed consent, such as citizens who were mentally impaired, intoxicated, or drug 
aﬀected. Thus, if citizens appeared impaired, intoxicated, or drug aﬀected the researcher did 
not follow the opt-out protocol. Similarly, citizens who were under the age of adult criminal 
responsibility (18 years-old in South Australia29, 17 years-old in New Zealand30) were deemed 
                                               
28 See Appendix. 
29 See Young Oﬀenders Act 1993 [SA]. 
30 See Child, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 [NZ]. 
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to be unable to provide informed consent. Despite the inability to provide consent, data from 
these participants were added to the research dataset. 
Confidentiality 
The identity of all research participants remained confidential. Oﬃcer names and identifiers 
were stored electronically in a password-protected master-list. The only personal or identifia-
ble information stored on the master-list were participant’s name and contact email address. 
The names of citizen-participants were not recorded but were assigned an ID reference for use 
on research documentation.31  
Data security and integrity 
Procedures were put in place to maintain participant confidentiality and data protection. The 
master-list was password protected and stored in the researcher’s password protected en-
crypted laptop and was not shared. Names of oﬃcer-participants were not written on any of 
the paper instruments or used in the any of the computer programs or mobile applications. 
Paper forms were annotated in situ and scanned electronically for storage on the password 
encrypted file server and were kept in a locked steel file cabinet in the researcher’s oﬀsite re-
search oﬃce. Data recorded Qualtrics Research Suite, and Qualtrics Surveys were protected by 
Qualtrics’s secure website technology. The behavioural data coded in Pocket Observer was 
stored on a password and fingerprint-protected hand-held device. After the Pocket Observer 
data had been imported into Observer XT, on the researcher’s laptop at the end of shift, it was 
then deleted from the hand-held device. At the completion of the research, the hand-held de-
vice was reformatted to factory settings. 
Audio recordings of interviews were recorded on a password and fingerprint-protected 
smartphone device. Once recorded, it was not possible for anyone to access the audio file 
without entering the researcher’s password or using the researcher’s fingerprint. At the com-
pletion of the interview, the audio data was transferred to the researcher’s secure data server32 
and deleted from the hand-held device. 
                                               
31 IDs were formatted with a letter denoting their ‘role’ (O for Oﬃcer and C for Citizen), a letter denoting their geographic location (N for 
New Zealand and A for Australia) and a number denoting their sequence in the research (i.e. ON03 or CA45). During the analysis, oﬃcer IDs 
were reallocated on a random basis to appear as ZXX for New Zealand oﬃcers and AXX for South Australian oﬃcers. This provided a further 
opportunity to aﬀord participant confidentiality (as oﬃcers had often shared their IDs amongst themselves) and reduce the risk of researcher 
bias. 
32 The researcher maintained a secure website server through Dropbox. 
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4.7 Data analysis 
Embedded mixed-method designs—such as the QUAN(qual) approach taken in the present 
research—collect data concurrently but do not merge quantitative and qualitative data togeth-
er (Creswell 2014). In this manner, embedded designs function similarly to convergent designs 
where data are collected simultaneously and analysed separately. This creates opportunities to 
aﬀect timely, eﬃcient, and cost-eﬀective data collection (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011). Once 
analysed, the quantitative and qualitative data are pieced together like a puzzle to provide an 
answer to the research questions (Morse 1991, p.155). In the present case, a mixed-method ap-
proach was taken to address diﬀerent sub-research questions. The quantitative study staged to 
measure diﬀerences between RAP and RUP was embedded into the broader qualitative study 
designed to gather an understanding of how and why oﬃcers resolve conflict.  
4.7.1  QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
Analysis of the data from the quantitative study followed simple descriptive statistical proce-
dures. Data was grouped into sets according to the number of participants present during the 
encounter and the type of encounter. Data were also divided by research site. Two analytical 
statistics were computed using data extracted from the PCE event logs. The first measured the 
duration of each behavioural tactic during the encounter as a percentage of the overall total 
behaviour. These percentages were conflated into a ‘group’ score: for encounters with two 
oﬃcers and one citizen (O2C1) the percentages of both oﬃcers were combined to form a ‘pa-
trol’ score. The second statistic was calculated as the average frequency of the occurrence of a 
behavioural tactic per encounter. These two statistics—duration and average frequency—
provided an opportunity to compare the range of behaviours among diﬀerent encounter types 
(e.g. investigative and enforcement) and between the two research sites. Due to the small 
sample sizes, however, it was not possible to use statistical significance testing. 
4.7.2  QUALITATIVE STUDY 
The analysis procedure for the qualitative study followed a grounded theory approach (Glaser 
& Strauss 1999; Corbin & Strauss 2014) which incorporated formal and informal coding ap-
proaches. The process of informal coding or categorisation occurred throughout the study, 
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where emergent themes of oﬃcer-participant practice during encounters were notated in con-
temporaneous field notes. These themes ‘floated’ in the mind of the researcher, triggering 
spontaneous, informal interviews with oﬃcer-participants when appropriate, plus the writing 
of memos that alluded to theoretical insights.  
Formal analysis occurred upon the return from the field following the constant compara-
tive method detailed by Glaser and Strauss (1999). In brief, this analytical approach takes form 
over four stages: comparison of incidents according to the category; integrating categories and 
properties; delimiting theory; and writing theory (Glaser & Strauss 1999). Case narratives, 
memos, and interview transcripts were utilised as source material during the analysis. Inter-
view material was transcribed by a third party from the audio recordings of each interview. 
Once transcripts were approved33 they were imported, with the other source documents, into 
the qualitative data analysis computer program MAXQDA (VERBI GmbH 1995). This com-
puter program had a functionality to enable each document for review and the assignment of 
codes. Coding followed an inductive process; although some content of the transcript was 
known prior to the coding procedure. While field notes complemented the interview material, 
they were more descriptive of the observed encounters and thus used to support and verify the 
themes emerging during the post-field analysis. At the completion of the coding process, the 
theory writing began. This involved collecting the broad themes emergent from the analysis 
and structuring them into a collection of theoretical propositions.  
 
                                               
33 Some interviewees had indicated that they wished to receive a copy of the transcript of their interview. For those interviewees, copies were 
sent prior to data analysis. 
  
5 
Police-citizen interactions 
This is the first of three chapters to focus on the research findings, and it focuses on the quan-
titative study. The first section of this chapter discusses the characteristics of the encounters 
observed during the quantitative study in detail: it compares interactions according to citizen-
role (e.g. victims), durations and sources, and event-types. Analysis reveals that each research 
site had a diﬀerent distribution of event-types. This may be explained by the diﬀerent mode of 
oﬃcer patrol: vehicular-based patrol at NZC vs foot-based patrol at SAC. Therefore, it is pru-
dent to be cognizant of this when making comparisons between the two research sites. 
Participant behaviour during encounters with two oﬃcers and one citizen, and two oﬃcers 
and two citizens from both research sites are also analysed. The second section analyses diﬀer-
ences in the behaviour between investigative encounters and enforcement encounters between 
the research sites. The last section discusses the findings in the context of the first two research 
questions. Two themes emerge from the analysis: the high occurrence of control behaviour 
present during victim-encounters at NZC and the greater occurrence of control behaviours 
used by oﬃcers at SAC in comparison with NZC.  
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5.1 Interactions between police and citizens 
5.1.1 ENCOUNTER BEHAVIOURS 
The quantitative study measured the type of behaviour used by oﬃcers during police-citizen 
encounters to discern variation in behaviour between the groups of oﬃcers in the two re-
search sites. The behaviours of oﬃcers and citizens were coded according to a modified 
taxonomy of Braithwaite’s conflict resolution behaviours (Table 5.1.1). For the present analy-
sis, several of Braithwaite’s categories were conflated into new analytical categories1; these are 
shown in the first column of the table with the original categories in the adjacent column. 
Encounter categories 
The present research sought to improve upon Braithwaite’s (1998) approach to consider varia-
tions of conflict resolution behaviour among diﬀerent encounter categories. Previous research 
of the police use of force has focused on citizen-suspects or indeed those who have been ar-
rested for an oﬀence (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 2004). However, in the present case conflict was 
not defined to be limited to physical actions.  
Data were organised into two sets: investigative which included encounters with people 
categorised as victims, witnesses, associates, bystanders, and suspects; and enforcement en-
counters which included field arrests, field actions and field warnings. Categories were 
assigned at the end of the encounter according to oﬃcers’ final classification. If the citizen 
played several roles during the encounter, such as starting as a suspect but ending as an ar-
restee, the encounter was coded according to the citizen’s final role. A field arrest was made 
when an oﬃcer believed there was suﬃcient evidence that a citizen was guilty of an oﬀence 
and the circumstances of the oﬀence warranted taking the citizen into custody.2 A field action 
(e.g. a cease and loiter order in SA) diﬀerentiated from an arrest in that while an oﬃcer had 
determined some degree of culpability or criminal liability on the citizen’s part, the citizen was 
not taken into custody. The field action might cause a citizen to be removed from a place, pre-
vented from re-entering a place or prevented from having contact with a person. Similarly, 
                                               
1 Braithwaite (1998) adopted a similar approach, combining information seek and information give into information exchange and combining 
the verbal control statements together. 
2 This decision to arrest diﬀers to an arrest made pursuant to an arrest warrant. Valid arrest warrants are issued when the Court determines 
that there is suﬃcient evidence to make an arrest.  
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some encounters featured of a field warning where oﬃcers had determined a degree of guilt 
but chose to warn instead of arrest.  
Table 5.1.1. Braithwaite’s Modified Taxonomy of Conflict Resolution Behaviours 
Simplified code for analysis Braithwaite’s original category Description 
Officer behaviours 
Information exchange Informational seek Questions that elicit information about the parties in-
volved, events that have taken place, or proposed 
solutions 
 Information give Information provided in response to a question 
Verbal affirmation Support Statement Statements which communicated empathy towards the 
citizen, positive reinforcement, or compliments 
 Accept statement Statements which indicated acceptance of the citizen or 
agreement with the citizen 
Verbal control Control statement affect Changing the affective state or emotional behaviour of the 
citizen 
 Control statement conversation Statements which directly controlled the flow of conversa-
tion 
 Control statement environment Statements that attempted to change the environmental 
setting of the interaction 
Verbal refutation Reject statement Statements that the other party’s position is not accepted 
 Threat statement Insulting or derogatory remarks that were more extreme 
than reject statements and statements threatening nega-
tive consequences or warnings about future behaviour 
Physical control Physical act Any physical touching or handling of the citizen 
Citizen behaviours 
Information exchange Informational seek Questions that elicit information about the parties in-
volved, events that have taken place, or proposed 
solutions 
 Information give Information provided in response to a question 
 Information refuse Verbalised statement refusing to give information or no 
comment made in response to an Information seek 
 Information excuse3 Defensive statements that justified or provided excuses 
for citizen behaviour 
Refuse verbal control Refuse control Actions, statements or behaviours when the citizen refuses 
or ignores the control statements behaviour used by offic-
ers 
Verbal abuse Verbal abuse Verbally aggressive statements that were insulting, deroga-
tory or undermining. Also included shouting or threatening 
statements. 
Physical abuse  Any physical action directed at or against officers. 
Officer and Citizen behaviours   
Inactive  Present during the encounter but not exhibiting any of the 
above behaviours 
Absent  Not present during the encounter 
 
The quantitative study comprised of 278 encounters (nNZ=136, nSA=142); these are shown in 
Table 5.1.2. Encounters were almost equally distributed between enforcement encounters 
(n=133, 48%) and investigative encounters (n=142, 52%). The most frequent encounters were 
suspect-encounters (n=84: nNZ=30; nSA=54), followed by field-arrest-encounters (n=56: 
nNZ=34; nSA=22) and victim-encounters (n=46: nNZ=41; nSA=5). Encounters at NZC were long-
                                               
3 Braithwaite called this behaviour “self defence” but it has been changed in the present research so that not to be confused with a physical ac-
tion of self-defence. 
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er in duration (MNZ=18:27 SDNZ=17:07 MdnNZ=15:35) than those from SAC (MSA=8:21 
SDSA=8:17 MdnSA=5:23). Arrest-encounters were the longest (MNZ=25:05, MSA=15:56) followed 
by suspect-encounters (MNZ=15:17, MSA=8:14). When compared with encounters involving a 
field warning (MNZ=13:08, MSA=6:11), encounters involving a field action were shorter at NZC 
(MNZ=10:57) but longer at SAC (MSA=6:55). 
Table 5.1.2. Frequency and duration of encounters 
 New Zealand City South Australia City 
 n Mean  
(mm:ss) 
sd 
 
median 
 
Range 
(h:mm:ss) 
n Mean  
mm:ss 
sd median Range 
(h:mm:ss) 
Inves&ga&ve          
Victim 41 19:50 23:28 17:42 0:50–2:24:22 5 12:33 13:02 07:19 1:50–33:08 
Witness 6 10:29 12:12 5:34 1:06–33:14 0     
Associate 3 9:23 3:42 9:14 5:46–13:10 1 5:57 - - - 
Bystander 0     2 4:23 1:33 4:23 3:17–5:29 
Suspect 30 15:17 10:27 13:46 0:52–38:44 54 8:14 9:29 4:14 0:24–48:45 
Enforcement          
Fld Arrest 34 25:05 16:31 22:21 8:21–1:38:34 22 12:56 9:40 10:47 3:16–34:26 
Fld Action 6 10:57 7:29 11:15 2:12–23:34 32 6:55 5:41 4:48 2:03–29:20 
Fld Warning 14 13:08 8:32 11:59 0:37–30:16 25 6:11 4:25 4:33 0:37–17:06 
Other 2 22:30 10:36 22:30 15:00–30:00 1 2:29 - - - 
Total 136 18:27 17:07 15:35 0:37–2:24:22 142 8:21 8:17 5:23 0:24–48:45 
 
Encounter initiation 
Table 5.1.3. Encounter initiation sources 
 New Zealand City South Australian City 
 n % n % 
Dispatched (call for service) 98 72.1 22 15.5 
Officer initiated 21 15.4 94 66.2 
Supervisor directed 10 7.4 4 2.8 
Request by another officer 4 2.9 3 2.1 
On-scene citizens 3 2.2 17 12.0 
Other - - 2 1.4 
Totals 136 100 142 100 
 
Encounters were categorised either as citizen-initiated (where they occurred because of a call 
for service) or oﬃcer-initiated (where there was no call for service). Table 5.1.3 shows that 
there was a diﬀerence in the method of initiation between the two sites. Encounters at NZC 
were most frequently initiated by citizen calls for service (nNZ=98) whereas encounters at SAC 
site were most frequently initiated by oﬃcer interventions (nSA=94). The frequencies of the 
second-most common method of initiation were in reverse order: oﬃcer-led interventions at 
NZC (nNZ=21) and citizen-led calls for service (nSA=10) at SAC. On scene citizen requests for 
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service were prominent at SAC (nSA=17) but not at NZC (nNZ=3). Supervisor-directed encoun-
ters were prominent at NZC (nNZ=10) but not so prominent at SAC site (nSA=4).  
Encounter event-types 
Encounters originated because of diﬀerent problems or purposes. Frequently, encounters may 
initiate as one event-type or problem but conclude as a diﬀerent type. Table 5.1.4 shows the 
frequency and percentage of problem-types in three columns. The first shows the frequency 
and event-type of encounters as they were categorised and dispatched to a patrol. ‘Dispatched’ 
categories are determined by police dispatchers using information provided by the person 
who initiates the call for service, such as a victim or witness. The second column shows the 
categories assessed by the oﬃcers when they begin an encounter. Event-type categories can 
change from the initial dispatched status. For instance, an event where two people are seen ar-
guing in public may initially be categorised as ‘disorder’ but re-categorised as an ‘assault’ on 
arrival of the attending oﬃcers. This data is equally important in the present study, as it rec-
ords the event-type of non-dispatched encounters (i.e. those which were initiated by oﬃcers). 
The third column shows the event-type determined by oﬃcers at the end of the encounter. For 
instance, the initial disorder event, categorised as an assault, may be classified as a ‘domestic 
violence’ event if it established that the citizens involved are in a domestic relationship.  
Analysis of the event-types reveals several diﬀerences between the research sites. The first 
relates to the proportionality of non-dispatched encounters: at NZC 19% (nNZ=26) of encoun-
ters were not dispatched from calls for service, whereas at SAC 78% (nSA=111) of encounters 
were not dispatched. Consequently, the frequency of event-type change between the research 
sites reflects the high incidence of non-dispatched events at SAC. At NZC the final event type 
diﬀered from dispatch for 44% (nNZ=60) of encounters compared to 89% (nSA=126) at SAC. 
Possible explanations for this disparity are discussed later in chapter 8. The frequency of 
change between the start and end of events was consistent: 18% (nNZ=25) at NZC and 22% 
(nSA=31) at SAC. Second, there is a diﬀerence in the most frequent event-types at each research 
site. At NZC, the three most frequent event-types were domestic violence (13%), minor assault 
(13%), and investigative enquiries (7%). At SAC the most frequent event-types were disorder 
(21%), liquor oﬀences4 (11%) and traﬃc oﬀences5 (11%). Conclusions drawn from the compari-
                                               
4 Liquor oﬀences relate to breaching liquor bans, including drinking in a public place. 
5 Traﬃc oﬀences include pedestrian and jay-walking oﬀences. 
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sons should be treated with caution as the distribution of event-types diﬀered for each re-
search site. 
Table 5.1.4. Encounter event-types at dispatch, arrival, and end of encounter 
 Dispatched Beginning End 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Arrest warrant     1 0.7 1 0.7 1 0.7 3 2.1 
Attempted suicide 7 5.1 1 0.7 7 5.1 1 0.7 6 4.4 1 0.7 
Breach bail 2 1.5   3 2.2 7 4.9 4 2.9 10 7.0 
Burglary 2 1.5   2 1.5   2 1.5   
Civil dispute 2 1.5   3 2.2   3 2.2   
Court Order 1 0.7   3 2.2   3 2.2   
Disorder 12 8.8 11 7.7 12 8.8 35 24.6 6 4.4 30 21.1 
Domestic Incident 4 2.9 1 0.7 2 1.5 3 2.1 3 2.2 3 2.1 
Domestic Violence 19 14.0   20 14.7   18 13.2   
Drugs (cannabis)       4 2.8   5 3.5 
Drugs (not cannabis)       7 4.9   4 2.8 
Drugs (search)       2 1.4   2 1.4 
Enquiries     10 7.4   10 7.4   
Escort (custody)     2 1.5 1 0.7 2 1.5 1 0.7 
Intimidation 5 3.7 1 0.7 5 3.7 3 2.1 5 3.7 2 1.4 
Intoxicated person 3 2.2 1 0.7 4 2.9 4 2.8 3 2.2 5 3.5 
Liquor offences   1 0.7   15 10.6 1 0.7 16 11.3 
Lost property       1 0.7   1 0.7 
Mental Health 1 0.7   1 0.7 1 0.7 2 1.5 3 2.1 
Minor assault 9 6.6 3 2.1 12 8.8 5 3.5 17 12.5 2 1.4 
Missing person 4 2.9 1 0.7 3 2.2 2 1.4 2 1.5 1 0.7 
Obstruction     1 0.7 4 2.8 3 2.2 3 2.1 
Offensive weapon 1 0.7   1 0.7 1 0.7 1 0.7 2 1.4 
Preventative task 2 1.5   6 4.4   6 4.4   
Property damage 3 2.2 2 1.4 4 2.9 2 1.4 4 2.9 1 0.7 
Public relations 4 2.9   4 2.9   4 2.9   
Serious assault 1 0.7 1 0.7 1 0.7 1 0.7 1 0.7 1 0.7 
Sexual affronts 3 2.2   3 2.2 1 0.7 2 1.5 1 0.7 
Silent emergency call 4 2.9   1 0.7       
Suspicious behaviour 3 2.9 1 0.7 3 2.2 9 6.3   7 4.9 
Theft 6 4.4 5 3.5 7 5.1 5 3.5 6 4.4 6 4.2 
Traffic offences 2 1.5   5 3.7 16 11.3 6 4.4 16 11.3 
Trespass 3 2.2   3 2.2 2 1.4 4 2.9 2 1.4 
Vagrancy   2 1.4   6 4.2   6 4.2 
Vehicle crash 2 1.5   2 1.5   2 1.5   
Weapon offences 2 1.5   2 1.5   1 0.7   
Weapons search (random)       3 2.1     
Youth incident 3 2.2   3 2.2   3 2.2   
Nil offence         5 3.7 8 5.6 
Not dispatched 26 19.1 111 78.2         
Total 136  142  136  142  136  142  
5.1.2  EXCHANGE AND CONTROL  
The most frequent encounters were those comprised of two oﬃcers and one citizen (O2C1) 
(n=195: nNZ=83; nSA=112) and those of two oﬃcers with two citizens (O2C2) (n=69: nNZ=47; 
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nSA=22). Together these cases accounted for 95% of the dataset. The remaining cases were ex-
cluded from the analysis in this chapter, including encounters between one oﬃcer and one 
citizen (O1C1) (n=9: nNZ=4; nSA=5), one oﬃcer and two citizens (O1C2) (n=2: nNZ=0; nSA=2), and 
two oﬃcers and three or more citizens (O2C3+) (n=3: nNZ=2; nSA=1).  
Encounter analysis 
Pocket Observer created an event log for each encounter. Using data from the event log, the 
Observer XT programme calculated a summary of the time each participant had been coded a 
specific behaviour. This summary was used to provide two statistics. The first was the duration 
of each behaviour type coded during the encounter; this was displayed as a percentage of the 
total behaviours used during the encounter. The second counted the occurrence of each be-
haviour type coded during the encounter. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, the duration of behaviours expressed as a percent-
age of overall behaviour type and the average frequency of behaviour type’s occurrence are 
compared between the research sites. The duration percentages are shown as a ‘group’ score. 
For O2C1 encounters, each participant’s behaviour percentage was divided by three. This al-
lows for the three participants’ behaviour to be expressed as a percentage value; the sum of 
which would total 100. In the case of O2C2 encounters, each participants’ behaviour percentage 
was divided by four. However, in the subsequent analysis tables, the oﬃcers’ behaviours are 
combined and shown as a patrol statistic. Similarly, in the analysis of O2C2 encounters, the cit-
izens’ behaviours are shown as a combined statistic. The second statistic is the average 
frequency of the occurrence of participants’ behavioural tactic per encounter. The average fre-
quency is calculated by taking a count of each occurrence of a participant’s behaviour from 
the event log then dividing it by the total number of encounters in the dataset. These two sta-
tistics provide an opportunity to infer an understanding of participants’ behaviour during 
encounters.  
Encounters with two oﬃcers and one citizen 
O2C1 encounters comprised of 83% of the dataset (n=195) and were almost equally split be-
tween NZC (nNZ=83) and SAC (nSA=112). However, there were significant diﬀerences between 
the sites. The first related to the count of citizen-initiated events (including those dispatched 
as a result of a call for service) and oﬃcer-initiated events: more than three-quarters of events 
at NZC were citizen-initiated (77.1%) compared with one-quarter at SAC (25.6%). It is likely 
102 | Police-citizen interactions – Interactions between police and citizens 
 
 
that the disparity was a result of the mode of oﬃcer patrol. For NZC, the most frequent event-
types were minor assault (12%, nNZ=10), domestic violence (12%, nNZ=10) and routine investi-
gative enquiries (7%, nNZ=8.4). Whereas at SAC, the most frequent events were ‘street 
oﬀences’ disorder (23.2%, nSA=26), pedestrian and traﬃc oﬀences (12.5%, nSA=14) and liquor 
oﬀences (10.7%, nSA=12%).6  
O2C1 behaviours observed during encounters are shown in Table 5.1.5. Analysis of duration 
and frequency are separated according to research site. The first analysis column shows the 
behaviour duration percentages NZC for each party across both sites. The second analysis col-
umn shows the average frequency of behaviour per PCE. The behavioural rows show the 
percentage and average frequency of each behaviour. The analysis table also shows the mean 
of encounter durations for each site. Within each site column, statistics for the two participant 
sets are shown: the first is that of the patrol behaviour (abbreviated as O2) with the citizen 
scores adjacent (abbreviated as C1). 
Encounters at NZC were longer in overall duration than those at SAC (MNZ=16:14, 
MSA=12:40); the diﬀerence was statistically significant t(193) = 4.34, p = 0.000 and it did repre-
sent a medium-sized eﬀect, d = 0.60. The most frequent behaviour and that which amounts to 
the highest duration was information exchange for both encounter participants at both re-
search sites. The next most frequent oﬃcer behaviours were coded as inactive and verbal 
control for oﬃcers.  
Table 5.1.5. Analysis of behaviours during all O2C1 encounters 
Analysis Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a 
percentage of overall behaviour 
Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per 
PCE 
Research site NZC (n=83) SAC (n=112) NZC (n=83) SAC (n=112) 
Mean dur. (mm:ss) 16:52 8:28     
Participants O2 C1 O2 C1 O2 C1 O2 C1 
Behaviours ¯ (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%)     
Information Exc. 30.63 27.07 26.88 25.81 8.65 6.53 7.29 6.59 
Verbal affirmation 1.77 - 2.48 - 1.46 - 1.41 - 
Verbal control 3.55 - 10.98 - 2.48 - 4.39 - 
Verbal refutation 0.08 - 0.18 - 0.12 - 0.12 - 
Physical control 1.11 - 3.53 - 0.49 - 0.99 - 
Refuse verbal control - 0.53 - 1.98 - 0.45 - 1.04 
Refuse phys. control - 0.16 - 0.26 - 0.07 - 0.08 
Verbal abuse - 0.48 - 1.35 - 0.37 - 0.72 
Inactive 15.96 4.02 11.97 3.17 3.14 0.94 2.34 0.63 
Absent 12.86 0.21 8.58 0.09 1.23 0.08 0.65 3.00 
 
                                               
6 A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.1. 
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 Comparison between the research sites of the behaviours reveals variation in oﬃcer prac-
tice and citizen response in the datasets. The most prominent diﬀerences appear in the 
frequency and duration of verbal control and physical control. Oﬃcers used both to control 
citizens. Verbal control behaviours at SAC were almost twice as frequent (NZC=2.48; 
SAC=4.39) but three times as long (NZC=3.55%; SAC=10.98%) as at NZC. Similarly, physical 
control behaviours at SAC were twice as frequent (NZC=0.49; SAC=0.99) but three times as 
long (NZC=1.11%; SAC=3.53%) as at NZC. Variation in citizen behaviour between the sites 
can be seen in the average frequency and proportional duration of refuse verbal control and 
verbal abuse. In both cases, the average frequency was twice that in SAC than NZC. 
Further analysis reveals diﬀerences between the two research sites where behaviour has or 
has not been coded. In Table 5.1.6, occurrence frequency of all control and all resistance be-
haviours during encounters are summarised, showing the count of encounters where at least 
one instance of a control behaviour (verbal or physical), refuse control behaviour, or verbal 
abuse has been coded.  
Table 5.1.6. Occurrence of control behaviours during all O2C1 encounters expressed as a frequency and 
percentage 
  NZC SAC 
  n % n % 
Verbal behaviour Verbal control (officer to citizen) 61 73.5 93 83.0 
 Refuse verbal control (citizen)  20 24.1 51 45.5 
 Verbal abuse (citizen to officer) 14 16.9 35 31.3 
Physical behaviour Physical control (officer to citizen) 14 16.9 40 35.7 
 Refuse physical control (citizen) 2 2.4 7 6.3 
 
This analysis shows the incidence of control and resistance behaviours across the O2C1 en-
counters. It is apparent that the occurrence of control behaviour was more frequent at SAC 
than NZC, but this may be due to the diﬀerent distribution of event-types. Verbal control was 
used during 83% of encounters at SAC (nSA=93) and 74% at NZC (nNZ=61). This was not the 
case for citizen behaviour; refuse verbal control and refuse physical control occurred at almost 
twice as many encounters at SAC than NZC. Refuse verbal control occurred during 46% of en-
counters at SAC (nSA=51) and 24% at NZC (nNZ=20). Similarly, verbal abuse by citizens 
towards oﬃcers occurred during 31% of encounters at SAC (nSA=35) and 17% at NZC 
(nNZ=14). The occurrence of refuse physical control was relatively infrequent: 6% of encounters 
at SAC (nSA=7) and 2% at NZC (nNZ=2). 
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Encounters with two oﬃcers and two citizens 
O2C2 encounters were more frequent at NZC than SAC (nNZ=47; nSA=22) and accounted for 
25% of dataset (n=69). The mode of encounter initiation diﬀered significantly between the two 
sites. At NZC 85% of encounters were dispatched (nNZ=40) whereas at SAC 91% of encounters 
were oﬃcer initiated or citizen street calls for service (nSA=20). The most frequent NZC O2C2 
event-type was domestic violence at 17% (nNZ=8) followed by minor assault at 15% (nNZ=7), in-
timidation at 6% (nNZ=3), and civil dispute at 6% (nNZ=3). In contrast, the most frequent SAC 
O2C2 event-types were disorder at 14% (nSA=3) and theft at 14% (nSA=3), followed by suspicious 
behaviour at 9% (nSA=2) and liquor oﬀences at 9% (nSA=2).7 The mean duration of NZC was 
21:38 whereas for SAC it was 7:18. The diﬀerence was statistically significant t(67) = 4.03, p < 
0.001, d = 0.44. 
Table 5.1.7. Analysis of behaviours during all O2C2 encounters 
Analysis Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a 
percentage of overall behaviour  
Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per 
PCE 
Research site NZ (n=47) SA (n=22) NZ (n=47) SA (n=22) 
Mean dur. (mm:ss) 21:38 07:18     
Participants O2 C2 O2 C2 O2 C2 O2 C2 
Behaviours ¯ (50%) (50%) (50%) (50%)     
Information Exc. 25.55 28.22 20.50 27.03 12.62 12.51 6.59 8.09 
Verbal affirmation 1.68 - 2.93 - 2.30 - 1.14 - 
Verbal control 2.73 - 7.31 - 3.51 - 3.59 - 
Verbal refutation 0.05 - 0.04 - 0.15 - 0.05 - 
Physical control 0.40 - 3.87 - 0.47 - 0.68 - 
Refuse verbal control - 0.61 - 4.16 - 0.79 - 1.41 
Refuse phys. control - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.09 - 0.14 
Verbal abuse - 1.03 - 1.68 - 0.85 - 1.00 
Inactive 10.75 7.31 6.26 6.13 4.49 2.51 1.77 2.00 
Absent 8.49 9.73 6.87 4.60 1.40 1.85 0.95 0.45 
 
Of the encounters observed, O2C2 encounters shared similar behavioural characteristics 
with O2C1 encounters. First, information exchange was the most frequent behaviour for oﬃc-
ers and citizens. But in the case of patrol behaviours, the frequency of information exchange at 
SAC was approximately half the rate of NZC. The disproportionality was less extreme when 
comparing the total proportion of time during the encounter; patrol information exchange 
made up a quarter of all encounter durations at NZC whereas it comprised of a fifth of all en-
counter durations at SAC (NZC=25.6%; SAC=20.5%). The frequency disproportionality may 
                                               
7 A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.2. 
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be a result of the diﬀerence in the mean duration of encounters: shorter encounters provided 
fewer opportunities for participants to change from one behavioural state to another. 
The second similarity with O2C1 encounters relates to the diﬀerence in the use of control-
ling behaviour. Like in the O2C1 encounters, SAC patrols used verbal control more frequently 
and proportionately longer during O2C2 encounters in the dataset. While the variance of fre-
quency in O2C2 encounters is minimal (NZC=3.51; SAC=3.59) the diﬀerence in proportional 
duration is significant (NZC=2.73%; SAC=7.31%). Likewise, SAC patrols used physical control 
more frequently and proportionally longer than NZC patrols in their respective encounters.  
Analysis of the occurrence of control behaviours during the O2C2 encounters shows simi-
larities with O2C1 encounters (Table 5.1.8). There is a high incidence of the occurrence of 
verbal control used by oﬃcers: 86% of encounters at SAC (nSA=19) and 73% at NZC (nNZ=34) 
compared with 83% and 74% respectively. Similarly, the occurrence of physical control during 
encounters was twice as frequent at SAC than NZC: 23% of encounters at SAC (nSA=5) and 
11% at NZC (nNZ=5) cf. 36% and 17% respectively. However, in the case of O2C2, the occurrenc-
es of physical control were about two-thirds that of O2C1 encounters. 
Table 5.1.8. Occurrence of control behaviours during all O2C2 encounters expressed as a frequency and 
percentage 
  NZC SAC 
  n % n % 
Verbal behaviour Verbal control (officer to citizen) 34 72.3 19 86.4 
 Refuse verbal control (citizen)  23 48.9 11 50.0 
 Verbal abuse (citizen to officer) 12 25.5 8 36.4 
Physical behaviour Physical control (officer to citizen) 5 10.6 5 22.7 
 Refuse physical control (citizen) 2 4.3 2 9.1 
 
There were diﬀerences between citizen behaviour between O2C1 and O2C2 encounters. In 
the case of O2C2 encounters there was a higher rate of occurrence of refuse verbal control: 50% 
of encounters at SAC (nSA=11) and 49% at NZC (nNZ=23) cf. 46% and 24% of O2C1 encounters. 
There were also more O2C2 encounters with verbal abuse: 36% at SAC (nSA=8) and 26% at 
NZC (nNZ=12) cf. 31% and 17% respectively of O2C1 encounters. 
5.1.3 SUMMARY 
Analysis of all participant behaviours revealed the high frequency of information exchange by 
both oﬃcers and citizens. The use of verbal control by oﬃcers was frequent (>1 average fre-
quency per PCE), and the use of physical control was infrequent (<1 average frequency per 
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PCE). There was variation between the research sites in the use of verbal control. When exam-
ining O2C1 encounters, the average frequency of verbal control per encounter was twice that at 
SAC (4.39) than at NZC (2.48). The duration as a percentage of overall behaviour was also 
diﬀerent: 10.98% at SAC cf. 3.55% at NZC. This pattern was similar regarding physical control: 
the average frequency per encounter at SAC was 0.99 cf. 0.49 at NZC. The duration as a per-
centage of overall behaviour was 3.53% at SAC cf. 1.11% at NZC. This pattern was less apparent 
during O2C2 encounters. While the average frequencies of verbal control and physical control 
per encounter were similar between the sites, the duration as a percentage of overall behaviour 
diﬀered. Verbal control amounted to 7.31% at SAC cf. 2.73% at NZC with physical control 
amounting to 3.87% at SAC cf. 0.40% at NZC. 
There are two probable causes for the diﬀerences between the research sites in use of con-
trol behaviours in the dataset. This could have been a result of the variance of encounter 
duration. Encounters in SAC—in the case of O2C1 and O2C2 encounters—had statistically sig-
nificant diﬀerences in mean duration. This may be because of the high incidence of non-
dispatched encounters in SAC. For an oﬃcer to initiate an encounter, they have identified 
suﬃcient cause to aﬀect an intervention (i.e. an enforcement action). This contrasted with en-
counters originating from a citizen call for service; as in these cases, oﬃcers had to collect 
suﬃcient information to form a suspicion (i.e. investigate). Second, the mode of travel and 
geographical spread is likely to have influenced the distribution of encounter event-types for 
each site. Oﬃcers in NZC mostly used vehicular transport and therefore had a greater ability 
to travel outside the central business district. In contrast, oﬃcers from SAC conducted foot-
patrols, and therefore limited to dealing with ‘street’ oﬀences.  
5.2 Diﬀerences of investigative and enforcement encounters 
In the previous section, the analysis revealed that oﬃcers from SAC used verbal and physical 
control behaviours at a higher frequency and for a greater proportion of time during the en-
counter than oﬃcers from NZC. It is diﬃcult to establish if the use of behaviours were 
associated with the diﬀerent distributions event-types or related to the mode of oﬃcer patrol. 
Here, further analysis considers oﬃcer behaviour during investigative and enforcement O2C1 
encounters. Two types of investigative encounters were examined: victim-encounters (nNZ=27; 
nSA=3) and suspect-encounters (nNZ=13; nSA=41). Witness-encounters were not included as 
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there was an insuﬃcient quantity (nNZ=4; nSA=0). This is followed by the three types of en-
forcement encounters: field-arrests (nNZ = 26, nSA=21), field-actions (nNZ = 6, nSA=27), and 
field-warnings (nNZ = 5, nSA=18). 
5.2.1 O2C1 INVESTIGATIVE ENCOUNTERS 
Victims 
The majority of O2C1 victim-encounters came from NZC (nNZ=27; nSA=3). While the small 
quantity of SAC victim-encounters may not be representative, the SAC data is, nonetheless, 
included in these findings. The most frequent event-types at NZC (as determined at the end of 
the encounter) were domestic violence (nNZ=4) and mental health8 (nNZ=3). The remaining en-
counters were coded as routine enquiries (not relating to a specific event-type), oﬃcer-led 
preventative tasks, and minor oﬀending.9 The mean encounter duration was greater at NZC 
(MNZ=16:14, MSA=12:40). It should be noted that one NZC victim-encounter was an outlier 
(the search for an attempted suicide lasted 2 hours 24 minutes).  
The low quantity of SAC victim-encounters risks the reliability of a comparison with NZC 
victim-encounters. Nonetheless, the most frequent behaviour and the largest duration of 
overall behaviour for all parties was information exchange. For the NZC encounters, the sec-
ond most frequent active behaviour was verbal control both as a percentage of overall duration 
(4.20%) and the average frequency per encounter (freqNZ=2.44).10 Both these statistics were 
higher than those from the 3 SAC victim-encounters. However, when comparing the NZC 
victim-encounters with all NZC O2C1 encounters it is curious to note that the duration of ver-
bal control during victim-encounters (4.20) is higher than the accumulated duration of all 
encounters (3.55) while the frequencies are almost identical. This suggests that oﬃcers were 
spending a greater proportion of their time using verbal control when dealing with victims. 
Furthermore, analysis of the occurrence of patrol control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.1. 
Among the NZC victim-encounters, 70.4% (nNZ=19) featured oﬃcers using verbal control on 
at least one occasion during the encounter. Citizen responses included refuse verbal control in 
25.9% (nNZ=7) of the victim-encounters. Citizens were coded giving verbal abuse in 11.1% 
(nNZ=3) of victim encounters. There was one occurrence of physical control used by a patrol.  
                                               
8 These included responses to attempted suicide and other mental health incidents 
9 A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.3. 
10 A complete list of victim-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.4. 
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Table 5.2.1. Occurrence of control behaviours during O2C1 victim-encounters expressed as a frequency and 
percentage 
  NZC SAC 
  n % n % 
Verbal behaviour Verbal control (officer to citizen) 19 70.4 2 66.7 
 Refuse verbal control (citizen)  7 25.9 1 33.3 
 Verbal abuse (citizen to officer) 3 11.1 0 0 
Physical behaviour Physical control (officer to citizen) 1 3.7 0 0 
 Refuse physical control (citizen) 0 0 0 0 
 
Suspects 
There were more suspect-encounters at SAC than at NZC (nSA=41; nNZ=13). NZC suspect-
encounters had a longer mean duration (MNZ=13:55, sdNZ=9:56, RNZ=29:48) than SAC suspect-
encounters (MSA=8:29, sdSA=10:33, RSA=48:21). The event-type of the encounters were more 
varied than victim-encounters and more events were oﬃcer-initiated; more than one-third of 
NZ suspect-encounters were not dispatched (nNZ=5, 39%) whereas more than two-thirds of 
SAC suspect-encounters were not dispatched (nSA=29, 71%). The most frequent SAC end 
problem-types were disorder (nSA=9, 22%), suspicious behaviour (nSA=5, 12%), and dealing 
with an intoxicated person (nSA=3, 7%). Of the SAC suspect-encounters, 17% were coded as a 
‘nil oﬀence’ (nSA=7).11 As with the previous analyses, information exchange was the most fre-
quent behaviour at both sites for the patrol (NZC=7.15, SAC=6.10) and citizen (NZC=4.62, 
SAC=5.34). Likewise, information exchange had the highest durations for patrol (NZC=33.48, 
SAC=28.59) and citizen (NZC=26.75, SAC=25.66).  
There was a notable variation in the duration and frequency of verbal control when com-
paring datasets from the two sites. The frequency mean of verbal control per encounter was 
approximately double at SAC (MSA=2.68) than NZC (MNZ=1.31). But more intriguing is that 
the total proportion of time of verbal control at SAC was over five larger than at NZC 
(NZC=1.33%, SAC=7.63%). The disparity between the occurrence of physical control among 
the sites was also apparent. The frequency mean of physical control per encounter was greater 
in SAC (MSA=0.51) than NZC (MNZ=0.15) and the total proportion of time of physical control 
was greater in SAC (2.33%) than NZC (0.12%). 
There were also some variations of citizen behaviour between research sites. The frequency 
mean of refuse physical control per encounter was higher in SAC (MSA=0.61) than NZC 
                                               
11 A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.5. 
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(MNZ=0.31). The total proportion of time of refuse physical control was also greater in SAC 
(2.33%) than NZC (0.26%). Likewise, the frequency means of verbal abuse (directed to oﬃcers 
by citizens) were higher in SAC (MSA=0.54) than NZC (MNZ=0.08) and the total proportion of 
time of verbal abuse was greater in SAC (1.38%) than in NZC (0.06%).12  
Further analysis of the occurrence of patrol control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.2. 
Among the suspect-encounters, 54% (nNZ=7) involved patrols using verbal control on at least 
one occasion during the encounter at NZC whereas the occurrence of verbal control during 
SAC encounters was 66% (nSA=27). Patrols in SAC used physical control in 34% of the encoun-
ters (nSA=14) whereas patrols in NZC used physical control in 8% of the encounters (nSA=1). 
The occurrence of citizen refuse verbal control was similar between the two sites: 39% at NZC 
(nNZ=5) and 27% at SAC (nSA=15). Additionally, there was a diﬀerence in the occurrence of cit-
izen verbal abuse towards the patrol; 8% at NZC (nNZ=1) and 25% at SAC (nSA=10). 
Table 5.2.2 Occurrence of control behaviours during O2C1 suspect-encounters, expressed as a frequency and 
percentage 
  NZC SAC 
  n % n % 
Verbal behaviour Verbal control (officer to citizen) 7 53.8 27 65.9 
 Refuse verbal control (citizen)  5 38.4 15 36.6 
 Verbal abuse (citizen to officer) 1 7.7 10 24.4 
Physical behaviour Physical control (officer to citizen) 1 7.7 14 34.1 
 Refuse physical control (citizen) 0 0 1 2.4 
 
Summary 
Analysis of behaviour during victim-encounters and suspect-encounters present two insights. 
First was the higher incidence of verbal control behaviour used by oﬃcers during victim-
encounters than with suspect-encounters. During NZC victim-encounters, the occurrence 
rate of verbal control was at 70% and the average frequency per encounter was at 2.44. The oc-
currence of verbal control behaviour by oﬃcers during suspect-encounters was 54% at NZC 
and 64% at SAC with the average frequency of use per suspect-encounter of 1.31 at NZC (and 
2.68 at SAC)13.  
Second, is the variance in the degree of control behaviours with suspects. SAC oﬃcers used 
verbal control behaviours at a higher frequency than NZC oﬃcers. Similarly, verbal control 
                                               
12 A complete list of suspect-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.6. 
13 Although the SAC average frequency per encounter of verbal control for victim-encounters was lower than that of suspect-encounters, the 
sample size of SAC victim-encounters was n=3. As such any comparison may lack statistical integrity. 
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behaviour was longer in duration at SAC when compared with other behaviours as a propor-
tion of the total time of the encounter. This might be a result of the shorter in duration of SAC 
suspect-encounters (7.63%) when compared with NZC (1.31%). However, the average fre-
quency of verbal control at SAC (freq.MSA=2.68) was double that at NZC (freq.MNZ =1.31). This 
variance was also evident with physical control. The frequency mean of physical control per en-
counter was greater in SAC (freq.MSA=0.51) than NZC (freq.MNZ=0.15) and the total 
proportion of time of physical control was greater in SAC (2.33%) than NZC (0.12%). Thus, 
these findings reinforce the earlier analysis that during the encounters observed the research, 
SAC oﬃcers used control behaviours at a higher frequency and for a higher proportion of du-
ration than NZC oﬃcers.  
5.2.2 O2C1 ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS 
Field Arrests 
Field arrests were the most common enforcement encounter in the O2C1 dataset (nNZ = 26, 
nSA=21). The majority of NZC encounters were dispatched (81%, nNZ=21). The most frequent 
problem-types at NZC were domestic violence (15%, nNZ=4), followed by minor assaults, sexu-
al aﬀronts, theft, or trespass. These encounters resulted in arrests for minor assault (23%, 
nNZ=6), followed by attempted suicide, breach of bail, theft, and trespass. The encounters at 
SAC were mostly non-dispatched (62%, nSA=13,). The most common SAC arrests observed 
were made for breach of bail, followed by disorder, liquor oﬀences, oﬀensive weapons, and 
warrants to arrest.14 
NZC arrest-encounters were longer in mean duration (MNZ=23:12, sdNZ=11:02, RNZ=41:10) 
than SAC arrest-encounters (MSA=12:57, sdSA=9:54, RSA=31:10). The diﬀerence in durations 
may be a consequence of the mode of patrol. NZC patrols were exclusively vehicle-based. 
Thus, any arrested citizen being transported to the police custody suite was conveyed in the 
same vehicle by the arresting patrol oﬃcers. This allowed communication between citizens 
and oﬃcers to continue during the journey. However, as most SAC patrols were foot patrols, 
arrestees were transported in a custody vehicle with a secure ‘caged’ area for the citizen. This 
made communications impractical between citizens and oﬃcers and coding ceased at the time 
                                               
14 A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.7. 
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of the arrestee being secured in the vehicle. Coding of encounters occurred until the ‘arresting’ 
oﬃcers ceased to maintain the cognitive focus of attention (see Goﬀman 1961). Handing over 
arrestees to custody oﬃcers (as in the case of NZC) or passing over the arrestees to another 
crew to transport to custody, or even securing the arrestees in the rear of the custody 
transport vehicle severed the cognitive focus.  
As with the previous analyses, information exchange was the most frequent behaviour dur-
ing field arrest-encounters at both sites for the patrol (NZC=10.5, SAC=10.5) and citizen 
(NZC=10.3, SAC=9.9).15 Likewise, information exchange had the highest durations for patrol 
(NZC=25.1%, SAC=22.3%) and citizen (NZC=25.2%, SAC=23.6%). In the same fashion as 
suspect-encounters, there was a notable variation in the duration and frequency of verbal con-
trol between the two sites.  
The frequency mean of verbal control per encounter was higher at SAC (freq.MSA=7.59) 
than NZC (freq.MNZ=3.63). However, the total proportion of time of verbal control was over 
three times greater (NZC=4.1%, SAC=14.2%). This variation between the two sites was also ev-
ident with physical control. The frequency mean of physical control per encounter was greater 
at SAC (freq.MSA=3.62) than NZC (freq.MNZ=1.38) and the total proportion of time of physical 
control was greater in SAC (7.45%) than NZC (2.40%). A further variation between the two 
sites related to verbal aﬃrmation. The frequency mean of this behaviour per encounter was 
higher at SAC (MSA=2.19) than NZC (MNZ=1.23).  
There were also variations between the research sites of citizen behaviour. Refuse verbal 
control, refuse physical control, and verbal abuse was more frequent and comprised a higher 
proportion of time in SAC than NZC. The frequency mean of refuse verbal control per en-
counter was three times higher in SAC (freq.MSA=2.14) than NZC (freq.MNZ=0.69). The total 
proportion of time of refuse verbal control was greater in SAC (1.89%) than NZC (0.77%). The 
frequency mean of refuse physical control per encounter was higher in SAC (freq.MSA=0.38) 
than NZC (freq.MNZ=0.19). The total proportion of time of refuse physical control was greater 
in SAC (0.76%) than NZC (0.30%). Likewise, the frequency means of verbal abuse (directed to 
oﬃcers by citizens) was higher at SAC (freq.MSA=1.48) than NZC (freq.MNZ=0.81) and the to-
tal proportion of time of verbal abuse was greater in SAC (1.90%) than in NZC (0.69%). 
                                               
15 A complete list of arrest-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.8. 
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Further analysis of the occurrence of patrol control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.3. The 
occurrence of patrol verbal control during the field-arrest-encounters was at 92% in NZC 
(nNZ=24)16 and 100% in SAC (nSA=21). This is to be expected due to the controlling nature of an 
arrest procedure. There were more occurrences of citizen refuse verbal control at 71% at SAC 
(nSA=15) compared to 23% at NZC (nNZ=6) and for citizen verbal abuse with 67% at SAC 
(nSA=14) compared to 27% at NZC (nNZ=7). The occurrences of patrol physical control and citi-
zen refuse physical control was higher in SAC compared with NZC.  
Table 5.2.3 Occurrence of control behaviours during O2C1 field-arrest-encounters, expressed as a frequency 
and percentage 
  NZC SAC 
  n % n % 
Verbal behaviour Verbal control (officer to citizen) 24 92.3 21 100 
 Refuse verbal control (citizen)  6 23.1 15 71.4 
 Verbal abuse (citizen to officer) 7 26.9 14 66.7 
Physical behaviour Physical control (officer to citizen) 12 46.2 17 80.9 
 Refuse physical control (citizen) 2 7.7 5 23.8 
 
Field Actions 
A field action was an enforcement sanction that did not involve making an arrest or a charge. 
For such an action to be taken an oﬃcer had to believe that a citizen is culpable or guilty of an 
oﬀence, local ordinance, or by-law. The action may have involved issuing a notice of in-
fringement fine for minor oﬀences like the breach of alcohol regulations, illicit drug 
regulations or road regulations. Alternatively, the actions involved an order to prevent a spe-
cific behaviour, such as the issue of trespass (NZC) or barring orders (SAC) which bans the 
person from a private property, the service a police safety order (NZC) to prevent a person in 
a domestic relationship contacting their partner, or cease loiter order (SA) to prevent a person 
from loitering in a particular location after the presence of a disorderly event. Legislation con-
ferring police with powers to issue a prevention order also includes a provision for the oﬃcer 
to make an arrest if the citizen fails to comply with the order.  
Fewer field actions occurred at NZC (nNZ=6) than at SAC (nSA=27). Most SAC encounters 
were not dispatched (93%). Of the encounters, 41% were traﬃc incidents17 (nSA=11), 30% were 
                                               
16 The two field-arrest-encounters without verbal control featured physical control. This indicates that the arrest procedure was physical in na-
ture. 
17 Traﬃc incidents included pedestrian oﬀences such as crossing against a red pedestrian light. 
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disorder (nSA=8) and 26% were liquor oﬀences18 (nSA=7). Of the NZC encounters, 50% related 
to traﬃc incidents albeit a small quantity (nNZ=3).19 NZC field-action-encounters were longer 
in mean duration (dur.MNZ=10:57, sdNZ=7:29, RNZ=21:22) than the SAC encounters 
(dur.MSA=6:08, sdSA=4:01, RSA=14:46). 
Information exchange was the most frequent behaviour during encounters at both sites for 
the patrol (NZC=8.5, SAC=7.0) and citizen (NZC=6.2, SAC=5.8). Likewise, information ex-
change had the highest durations for patrol (NZC=34.6%, SAC=33.4%) and citizen 
(NZC=26.1%, SAC=28.5%). While there was a notable variation in the duration and frequency 
of verbal control during arrest-encounters between the two sites, the frequency mean of verbal 
control per encounter was approximately half of that of arrest-encounters. It is not clear if the 
variation is a result of the diﬀerent distribution of event-types. The total proportion of time of 
verbal control was nearly seven times longer (NZC=1.3%, SAC=8.7%). There was an absence of 
physical control, refuse verbal control, refuse physical control, or verbal abuse during encoun-
ters at NZC. The frequency mean of physical control per encounter for SAC encounters was 
0.21 and the total proportional of time was 0.97%. The citizen behaviours had similar low val-
ues: refuse verbal control (freq.MSA=0.43; durationSA=0.535), refuse physical control 
(freq.MSA=0.04; durationSA=0.03), and verbal abuse (freq.MSA=0.46; durationSA=0.69).20 
Table 5.2.4 Occurrence of control behaviours during O2C1 field-action-encounters, expressed as a frequency 
and percentage 
  NZC SAC 
  n % n % 
Verbal behaviour Verbal control (officer to citizen) 5 83.3 23 85.2 
 Refuse verbal control (citizen)  0  8 29.6 
 Verbal abuse (citizen to officer) 0  4 14.8 
Physical behaviour Physical control (officer to citizen) 0  5 18.5 
 Refuse physical control (citizen) 0  1 3.7 
 
Further analysis of control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.4. Like arrest-encounters, the 
occurrence of verbal control was high. However, the occurrence of physical control was low: 
0% at NZC and 19% at SAC (nSA=5). Levels of citizen resistance were also lower than during 
arrest-encounters. There was no occurrence of resistance during NZC encounters. At SAC the 
                                               
18 Liquor oﬀences included drinking alcohol in a public place. 
19 A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.9. 
20 A complete list of arrest-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.10. 
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occurrence of refuse verbal control was at 30% (nSA=8), verbal abuse at 15% (nSA=4) and refuse 
physical control at 4% (nSA=1). 
Field Warnings 
A field-warning comprised a warning given to a citizen in the field (i.e. not after an arrest or 
detainment21). Like field-actions, field-warnings were given to citizens because an oﬃcer de-
termined the citizen’s guilt or culpability for an oﬀence. More field-warnings were given at 
SAC (nSA=18) than at NZC (nNZ=5). In most cases the encounter problem-type related to mi-
nor oﬀences: the most frequent was disorder at 40% in NZC (nNZ=2) and 33% at SAC (nSA=6). 
NZC field-action-encounters were longer in mean duration (dur.MNZ=13:45, sdNZ=11:27, 
RNZ=28:15) than SAC field-action-encounters (dur.MSA=6:24, sdSA=4:14, RSA=15:59).22 
Consistent with the other encounters, information exchange was the most frequent behav-
iour during encounters at both sites for the patrol (NZC=9.2, SAC=7.0) and citizen 
(NZC=6.2, SAC=7.2). Information exchange during the field-warning-encounters had higher 
durations than arrest-encounters for both patrol (NZC=26.3%, SAC=24.2%) and citizen 
(NZC=28.9%, SAC=26.2%) participants. Consistent with the previous encounters, there was a 
notable variation in the duration and frequency of verbal control between the two sites. The 
frequency mean of verbal control per encounter was higher at SAC (freq.MSA=7.0) than NZC 
(freq.MNZ=3.2). The total proportion of time of verbal control was over four times longer (du-
rationNZ=4.2%, durationSA=17.1%). There was a greater frequency of citizen refuse verbal 
control at SAC (freq.MSA=1.8) than at NZC (freq.MNZ=1.0). The total proportion of time was 
greater in SAC (freq.MSA=3.9%) than NZC (durationNZ=1.5%).23 
Table 5.2.5 Occurrence of control behaviours during O2C1 field-warnings-encounters, expressed as a frequency 
and percentage 
  NZC SAC 
  n % n % 
Verbal behaviour Verbal control (officer to citizen) 4 80 18 100 
 Refuse verbal control (citizen)  2 40 11 61.1 
 Verbal abuse (citizen to officer) 3 60 6 33.3 
Physical behaviour Physical control (officer to citizen) 0 0 4 22.2 
 Refuse physical control (citizen) 0 0 0 0 
 
                                               
21 For example, warnings in the format of a formal Pre-Charge Warning (in NZC) or police caution were excluded from this category as the 
warning phase of the process was authorised by another member of police (such as a Custody Sergeant) not present during the initial stages 
of the PCE. 
22 A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.11. 
23 A complete list of arrest-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.12. 
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Further analysis of the occurrence of patrol control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.5. The 
occurrence of patrol verbal control during the field-warning-encounters was high at 80% at 
NZC (nNZ=4) and 100% at SAC (nSA=18). These encounters had a higher level of occurrence of 
refuse verbal control and verbal abuse than the field-action-encounters.  
Summary 
There were notable diﬀerences in the use of oﬃcer control behaviours among the categories of 
enforcement encounters. As the event-type profiles were likely to have been influenced by the 
mode of oﬃcer deployment, inferences must be measured against the risk of research site ac-
cess-related bias. Nonetheless, the average frequencies of the occurrence of verbal control 
during field-arrest PCEs (freq.MNZ=3.6; freq.MSA=7.6) and field-warning PCEs (freq.MNZ=3.2; 
freq.MSA=7.0) were twice that of field-action PCEs (freq.MNZ=1.5; freq.MSA=3.3). A similar pat-
tern was found with duration; when compared with other behaviours as a proportion of the 
total time of the encounter the mean duration of verbal control field-arrests (durationNZ=4.1%; 
durationSA=14.2%) and field-warnings (durationNZ=4.2%; durationSA=17.1%); and field-actions 
(durationNZ=1.3%; durationSA=8.8%). This suggests that less verbal control (in frequency and 
proportional duration) was required by oﬃcers during field-actions in comparison with field-
arrests and field-warnings. While this conclusion is subject to the vulnerability of small data 
sub-sets at NZC, it does pose an interesting question: is less control required during a field ac-
tion than an arrest or warning? Analysis of physical control fails to provide any further insight 
into this question.   
Diﬀerences between the two research sites, evident in the analysis of investigative encoun-
ters, were also present during the enforcement encounters. Variances between the frequency 
and proportionate duration of verbal control are evident in the paragraph above. During field-
arrests, the average frequency of oﬃcer control behaviour (verbal control and physical control) 
at SAC was twice that of the average frequency at NZC. Similarly, the proportional duration of 
oﬃcer control behaviour at SAC was more than three times that of NZC. This trend was simi-
lar when examining the use of verbal control during field-actions and field-warnings. 
However, this was not the case for physical control. There was no recorded incidence of physi-
cal control by oﬃcers at NZC and minor use by oﬃcers at SAC. The average frequency of 
occurrence of physical control per field-arrest was lower at NZC than at SAC (freq.MNZ=1.4; 
freq.MSA=3.6). The occurrence of physical control during SAC field-actions (freq.MSA=0.2, du-
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rationSA=1.0%) and field-warnings (freq.MSA=0.5, durationSA=1.0%) were minimal. There was 
no recorded use of physical control at NZC field-actions or field-warnings. 
5.3 Discussion 
This research has highlighted deficiencies in utilising data on police use of force to address a 
question of conflict resolution. While police agencies may methodically collect self-report use 
of force data from oﬃcers, the omission of data on the use of control or coercive verbal com-
munication, often absent from ‘use of force reporting’, prevents a comprehensive analysis of 
conflict resolution during oﬃcer-citizen interaction. Thus, the merit of the present study was 
that it measured all communicative behaviour to provide a descriptive analysis of conflict res-
olution behaviour. During the quantitative study, the predominant method of interaction 
between oﬃcer and citizen was the conversational-style information exchange. This was the 
case for both O2C1 and O2C2 datasets of investigative and enforcement encounters. The dataset 
comprised of events where SAC oﬃcers used controlling behaviour more often, and for a 
longer proportion of time during encounters, than NZC oﬃcers. The analysis of O2C1 investi-
gative and enforcement encounters revealed variations in the frequencies and durations of 
control behaviours.  
The analysis of investigative encounters revealed that NZC oﬃcers used verbal control 
more frequently than during suspect-encounters. (This was not revealed with SAC oﬃcers.) 
This poses the question of whether the increased frequency is a result of perceived necessity or 
personal preference of the oﬃcer. Previous research has found that oﬃcers develop personal 
preferences for conflict resolution behaviour (Wilson & Gross 1994; Abrahamsen & Strype 
2009). Similarly, a person’s degree of rationality may aﬀect their ability to interact with oﬃcers 
(Reisig et al. 2004). As the intoxication levels of the participating citizens were generally high-
er at SAC than at NZC, it is possible that oﬃcers believed it was necessary to use more control 
behaviour with citizens at SAC than at NZC. 
5.3.1 OFFICER BEHAVIOUR AT NZC  
The first research question seeks to gain an understanding of how routinely unarmed oﬃcers 
behave when resolving interpersonal conflict. The analysis of the usage of active conflict reso-
lution behaviours (all behaviours excluding oﬃcer absence or inactivity) of NZC oﬃcers 
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revealed that information exchange comprised 83% of the total duration of patrol behaviour 
during O2C1 encounters and 81% of O2C2 encounters. Control behaviour—including coercive 
and forceful physical actions—was used by oﬃcers from NZ in the minority. Verbal control 
amounted to 9.3% in total duration of O2C1 encounters and 8.8% of O2C2 encounters. Physical 
control behaviour occurred in 3% of total duration for O2C1 encounters and 1.3% of O2C2 en-
counters. Although usage varied slightly among investigative or enforcement encounters, the 
patterns form a consistent narrative: Most conflict-prone encounters comprise of information 
exchange (81–83%) between oﬃcers and citizens, relatively frequent use of verbal control (8.8–
9.3%) by oﬃcers and infrequent use physical control (1.3–3%) by oﬃcers.  
Citizen role 
The ratio of average frequencies per encounter of information exchange to verbal control and 
information exchange to physical control according to citizen role are instructive. If the occur-
rence of control behaviour indicates conflict between an oﬃcer and citizen, a ratio with a 
greater consequent compared with another ratio, indicates a greater use of control. Ratios of 
behaviour by NZPOL oﬃcers, categorised by citizen-role, are shown in Table 5.3.1.   
Table 5.3.1. Ratio of the frequency of information exchange to verbal control and physical control at NZC 
  NZC 
  ratio n 
Information exchange – verbal control ratio All O2C1 encounters 1:0.29 83 
 All O2C2 encounters 1:0.27 47 
 Investigative encounters   
 O2C1 Victim-encounters 1:0.29 27  
 O2C1 Suspect-encounters 1:0.18 13 
 Enforcement encounters   
 O2C1 Field-arrest-encounters 1:0.34 26 
 O2C1 Field-action-encounters 1:0.18 6 
 O2C1 Field-warnings-encounters 1:0.38 5 
Information exchange – physical control ratio All O2C1 encounters 1:0.06 83 
 All O2C2 encounters 1:0.04 47 
 Investigative encounters   
 O2C1 Victim-encounters 1:0.01 27 
 O2C1 Suspect-encounters 1:0.02 13 
 Enforcement encounters   
 O2C1 Field-arrest-encounters 1:0.13 26 
 O2C1 Field-action-encounters 1:0.00 6 
 O2C1 Field-warnings-encounters 1:0.00 5 
 
The highest consequent of verbal control (to information exchange) occurred with arrest-
encounters (1:0.34) and warning-encounters (1:0.38). This was expected as the act of arrest is a 
highly controlling behaviour and the verbal nature of warnings is also highly controlling. The 
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high consequent of verbal control ratios was not reflected in the information exchange to phys-
ical control frequency ratio. The highest consequent occurred during arrest-encounters which, 
like verbal control, was expected. Arrest-encounters regularly included oﬃcers touching the 
citizen to apply handcuﬀs or to conduct a ‘pat-down’ search.  
Conflict during citizen encounters 
It is notable that that victim-encounters had the greater consequent of verbal control (1:0.29) 
than suspect-encounters (1:0.18). This appears to be counterintuitive; it would be expected that 
victims would display less resistance to oﬃcers than victims and thus require less control be-
haviour. The policing literature on conflict resolution and use of force consider overt conflicts 
such as those between oﬃcers and suspects or ‘wrong-doers’ (e.g. Abrahamsen & Strype 2009) 
rather than overt conflict with victims. However although Sykes and Brent (1980) consider 
how oﬃcers use verbal control to regulate behaviour, and that their analysis is limited to en-
counters between police and suspects, it could be applied to understand encounters with 
victims. They posited that oﬃcers use regulation (in this instance control behaviour) to 
achieve four encounter goals: collect information; assert or maintain order; achieve respect 
from citizens; and achieve an acceptable resolution. The distinction between interpersonal 
conflict arising from goal blockages and that from incivilities is important to this argument. 
Of the victim-encounters, verbal abuse occurred in 11% (n=3).  
5.3.2 CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 
The analysis of the usage of active conflict resolution behaviours of NZC oﬃcers revealed that 
information exchange comprised 83% of the total duration of patrol behaviour during O2C1 
encounters and 81% of O2C2 encounters. The same analysis of the active behaviours of SAC 
oﬃcers shows that information exchange comprised of 61% of the total duration of patrol be-
haviour during O2C1 encounters and 59% of O2C2 encounters. Proportionally, SAC oﬃcers 
spent less time using information exchange during the encounters than NZC oﬃcers. SAC 
oﬃcer use of verbal control amounted to 24.9% in total duration for O2C1 encounters and 
21.1% for O2C2 encounters. Physical control behaviour occurred in 8.0% of total duration for 
O2C1 encounters and 11.1% for O2C2 encounters. While it can be concluded that SAC oﬃcers in 
the research spent less time during conflict-prone encounters using information exchange (59–
61%) between oﬃcers and citizens than NZC oﬃcers (81–83%), used more verbal control (21–
Police-citizen interactions – Discussion | 119 
 
25%) than NZC oﬃcers (8.8–9.3%), and more physical control (8–11%) than NZC oﬃcers (1.3–
3%), the generalisability of these findings is limited due to the potential for bias associated 
with limitations associated with research access. 
Control behaviours 
Analysis of frequency data revealed variations in the use of conflict resolution behaviours by 
oﬃcers from SAC and NZC. These diﬀerences are summarised in Table 5.3.2. As with the ca-
veat above, the reported ratios of the average frequency per encounter of information 
exchange to verbal control, and the average frequency per encounter of information exchange 
to physical control. Except for NZC victim-encounters, the ratios of both control behaviours 
(information exchange to verbal control and information exchange to physical control) were 
higher at SAC than at NZC. This pattern was consistent for both O2C1 and O2C2 encounters.  
For suspect and enforcement encounters, the consequents of SAC information exchange to 
verbal control ratios were 2 to 2.5 times greater than those of NZC. The variation of physical 
control was less consistent when O2C1 encounters were separated according to type. Suspect-
encounters at SAC had consequents of information exchange to physical control ratios 8 times 
greater than those at NZC. The consequents of field-arrest-encounters at SAC information ex-
change to physical control ratios were 2.5 times greater than those at NZC. There were no 
instances of physical control used at NZC during field-action- and field-warning encounters.  
Table 5.3.2. Ratio of the frequency of information exchange to verbal control and physical control 
  NZC SAC 
  ratio n ratio n 
Information exchange – verbal control ratio All O2C1 encounters 1:0.29 83 1:0.60 112 
 All O2C2 encounters 1:0.27 47 1:0.54 22 
 Investigative encounters     
 O2C1 Victim-encounters 1:0.29 27  1:0.23 3 
 O2C1 Suspect-encounters 1:0.18 13 1:0.44 41 
 Enforcement encounters     
 O2C1 Field-arrest-encounters 1:0.34 26 1:0.72 21 
 O2C1 Field-action-encounters 1:0.18 6 1:0.47 27 
 O2C1 Field-warnings-encounters 1:0.38 5 1:1.00 18 
      
Information exchange – physical control ratio All O2C1 encounters 1:0.06 83 1:0.14 112 
 All O2C2 encounters 1:0.04 47 1:0.09 22 
 Investigative encounters     
 O2C1 Victim-encounters 1:0.01 27 1:0.00 3 
 O2C1 Suspect-encounters 1:0.02 13 1:0.08 41 
 Enforcement encounters     
 O2C1 Field-arrest-encounters 1:0.13 26 1:0.34 21 
 O2C1 Field-action-encounters 1:0.00 6 1:0.03 27 
 O2C1 Field-warnings-encounters 1:0.00 5 1:0.07 18 
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These diﬀerences illustrate that while information exchange was the predominant behaviour 
used during encounters, oﬃcers from SAC used controlling behaviour more frequently than 
those from NZC.  
5.3.3 RELIABILITY OF FINDINGS 
The quantitative study mostly comprised of the analysis of O2C1 encounters. Furthermore, the 
sample sizes of the analysis of investigative and enforcement encounters were small—there 
were few SAC victim encounters, and few NZC field-action- and field-warning-encounters. 
Similarly, some citizen variables were diﬀerent between the research sites, as was the distribu-
tion of encounter event-types. As such, these analyses must be treated with some caution.  
Diﬀerences in the demographic variables between the two samples of citizen-participants 
may have aﬀected the data collected during the present research. Terrill and Mastrofski’s 
(2002) analysis of the POPN data found that males, non-whites, poor, and young suspects 
were treated more harshly by oﬃcers than suspects from other groups. Another study found 
positive relationship between alcohol impairment and the use of force: Kaminski et al. (2004) 
found that perceived levels (by oﬃcers) of suspect judgement impairment increased the odds 
of the use of harsher levels of force. Their findings are consistent with the increased use of 
controlling behaviour in the present study. The SAC citizen sample comprised of a higher 
proportion of males (81.1%) than the sample at NZC (52.5%). Likewise, the age range of citi-
zens was statistically significantly diﬀerent, with citizens at SAC younger than at NZC. There 
was also a higher proportion of citizens displaying signs of impairment due to alcohol intoxi-
cation at SAC (67.5%) than at NZC (30.6%). Oﬃcers at SAC were interacting with more 
males, who were younger in age, and more frequently intoxicated, than the oﬃcers at NZC. 
Sex, age, and levels of impairment are relevant to the police use of force literature.  
The demographics of NZC and SAC oﬃcer-participants were similar. The majority of 
oﬃcer-participants were at the rank of constable and ranged in age from 21–59. There was a 
slightly higher proportion of female oﬃcers at NZC (NZC=24.4%; SAC=19.6%) and 
White/European oﬃcers at SAC (NZC=91.1%; SAC=95.7%). However, on average, SAC oﬃc-
ers were involved in more encounters in the study than NZC oﬃcers, but the diﬀerence was 
not significant, and the eﬀect size was small. Oﬃcers who responded to the psychometric tests 
showed no statistically significant diﬀerences in the five personality factors, incident count, or 
injury score. There was no diﬀerence in the resistance scores. 
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5.3.4 EMERGENT ISSUES 
Analyses from this chapter highlight two issues relevant to the present research. First, can an 
explanation be found to explain the high incidence of control behaviour during investigative 
encounters? This is particularly apparent in the dataset of victim-encounters from NZC. 
Could the explanation be that this phenomenon is a systemic response to situation (i.e. it is 
necessary to do so when dealing with victims) or, is it possible that the control behaviour was 
a result of cultural pre-disposition to interaction with victims? Second, can an explanation be 
found for the higher incidence of control behaviours used by SAC oﬃcers? Could the explana-
tion be associated with the diﬀering encounter event-type profiles? 
The next two chapters present the research findings from the qualitative study. Chapter 6 
analyses encounter case narratives and oﬃcer responses from interviews to consider oﬃcer 
decision-making prior to and during police-citizen encounters. The findings suggest that 
oﬃcers follow a diagnostic and treatment procedure when involved in encounters. Chapter 7 
considers these narratives to examine how oﬃcers respond when faced with conflict during an 
encounter. Together the analysis and findings present a context for the quantitative findings 
in this chapter. 
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6 
Officer decision-making during police-citizen 
encounters 
The previous chapter considered oﬃcer behaviour during PCEs, particularly focusing on the 
use of information exchange, verbal control and physical control. The analysis outlined in the 
present chapter considers the decision-making behaviour of oﬃcers when they attempt to 
achieve oﬃcer-goals, how oﬃcers progressed through the encounter and how they dealt with 
disturbances.  
6.1 Intervention: the perceived harm, legality and acceptability 
The police oﬃcer’s workspace consisted of two distinct zones. The public-facing zone was the 
operational environment where oﬃcers and citizens had the potential to interact; and where 
there was an expectation that any actions of the oﬃcer were made in an oﬃcial ‘police’ capaci-
ty. This was the environment where police-citizen encounters were most likely to originate. 
Punch (1979) referred to this as the ‘frontstage’; oﬃcers referred to this environment as the 
‘street’. In contrast, the non-public-facing zone incorporated areas where citizens were nor-
mally excluded from and where oﬃcers did not expect to engage in police-citizen encounters. 
It was the zone where oﬃcers did not necessarily behave in an oﬃcial ‘police’ role (except 
when conducting telephone or computer-based enquiries) and where oﬃcers were not re-
quired to come face-to-face with citizens. In this zone, oﬃcers behaved diﬀerently to that of 
the public-facing zone; they behaved as any person might behave in any oﬃce-based occupa-
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tion. This was the ‘backstage’ (Punch 1979): oﬃcers had the freedom to move seamlessly be-
tween the frontstage and backstage whereas citizens did not. During the qualitative study, all 
PCEs occurred in public-facing zones.1 The PCE began when a police oﬃcer and a citizen be-
came engaged in a focused gathering: a ‘visual and cognitive focus of attention’ (Goﬀman 
1961, p.17).  
Encounters were triggered in one of two ways. The first was the result of a call for service 
where someone, somewhere had sought the assistance from police. It was routine for these 
calls to be relayed and dispatched to oﬃcers through the police command structure. Once 
dispatched, oﬃcers would arrive at a location and seek out the citizen who was the subject of 
the call for service. In the present research, 72.1% of PCEs at NZC were dispatched whereas 
only 15.5% of PCEs were dispatched at SAC. Other calls for service included a directed action 
or tasking from a supervisor or requests from other oﬃcers. In these cases, oﬃcers were fore-
warned before initiating contact with a citizen; the oﬃcer followed a process to gather more 
information about circumstances which have prompted the call for service.  
The second trigger occurred when oﬃcers observed a situation where the oﬃcers believed 
that an intervention was necessary. These situations were not necessarily an illegal or danger-
ous act: sometimes there was no obvious harm or wrong-doing, and sometimes oﬃcers 
thought that an infraction might occur. In the study, 15.4% percent of PCEs were oﬃcer-
initiated at NZC whereas at SAC 66.2% were oﬃcer-initiated. 
The oﬃcers’ decision to initiate an encounter appeared to be influenced by three factors. 
The first was a consideration of the harm, if any, that had occurred, or any harm that may be 
caused if an intervention was or was not initiated. The second considered the legality or ille-
gality of behaviour observed in the situation. Oﬃcers evaluated the available information to 
establish if the behaviour or circumstances were contrary to law. If there was prima facie evi-
dence to suggest that an oﬀence had occurred, consideration was given to the severity of that 
oﬀence and the degree to which the oﬃcer could tolerate the deviance. The third considera-
tion related to the social acceptability of the situation. Questions of acceptability related to 
whether the behaviour was acceptable to the social values of the community perceived by the 
oﬃcer, or those to the values held by the oﬃcer. Together, these three considerations formed 
                                               
1 While PCEs only occurred in the public-facing zone during the research, it was possible that PCEs could occur within the private-facing 
zone. For instance, if a citizen infiltrated into a non-public zone a PCE may well have occurred. Such a zone would then become public—for 
the purposes of the encounter—and revert to a private location at the completion of the encounter.   
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the oﬃcer’s intervention test: oﬃcers considered the perceived harm, legality and social ac-
ceptability of the situation before initiating an encounter.  
6.1.1 PERCEIVED HARM 
The perception of harm was constructed by oﬃcers in a variety of circumstances. When inter-
viewed, oﬃcers often discussed harm to be the product of physical action between two or 
more people. Constructs of harm also encapsulated self-harm, such as the act of a person in-
flicting physical injury on their body. Self-harm might include situations where a person 
makes deliberate attempts to commit suicide or makes non-life-threatening injuries to their 
person. Harm was not necessarily measured by an objective criterion; oﬃcers perceived harm 
as a physical act that may hurt or injure a person. 
But constructions of perceived harm were not limited to physical assaults or injuries. In the 
following extract, the oﬃcer indicates that harm can also be seen as certain ‘wrongful behav-
iours’ committed by a person. Here, Oﬃcer Z89 discusses how harm can manifest from 
victimisation: 
Case 6.1.1 Wrongful behaviour (Z89) 
If I saw a person being wronged by another person, whether it’s someone stealing something from their shop, 
someone’s verbally intimidating or abusing someone else, I’d stop. If there was an argument, like if there is a 
physical argument. […] I would stop if it felt like I can do something to help or help was needed by, by me, 
whether as a... I mean in the execution of work, if I could make a difference or... I should be making a difference. 
(Interview transcript Z89) 
As such, the wrongful behaviour of one person is a suﬃcient trigger for police intervention. 
Harm was also perceived in situations which fell outside a ‘wrongful behaviours’ construct or 
a criminal justice paradigm. In the example below, oﬃcers perceived harm in the circum-
stances of a citizen behaving in an odd manner. 
Case 6.1.2 Woman at bus stop needing care (PCE0139) 
This incident came as a result of a member of the public calling police to say that a woman had been waiting at a 
bus-stop for several hours, not taking any passing buses. It was now raining and she was getting wet. On arrival 
police found a 50-year old woman who appeared not to be in distress. After speaking to her, Officer Z07 quickly 
determined that she suffered from a mental health disorder. He used a combination of information seek and 
support statements to ascertain that CN156 was in need of immediate care. When detained CN156 was 
completely compliant. (Field note 10/04/15)  
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After speaking to the citizen, the oﬃcers established that the citizen required mental health as-
sistance. They believed that actions of the citizen were those of a person who was maybe 
mentally disordered, and as such were harmful. Similarly, a person suﬀering from a physical 
injury or a medical emergency can prompt an intervention.  
Case 6.1.3 Officer abandons assault investigation to attend to a medical emergency (A88) 
I suppose a good example is the other night when we were out, you were with us at the time actually. We went 
to identify somebody in a night club who had been involved in an assault, but at that time a lady was brought out 
of the club having collapsed with breathing problems. So my attention immediately went to her, so, because 
obviously that’s a life and death situation or could possibly be. So I left the assault guy with someone else and I 
prioritised her. (Interview transcript A88) 
Perceived harm, therefore, was conceptualised by oﬃcers to have occurred from a direct phys-
ical action of one person to another, or the behaviour of one person to another, or the 
individual actions of a person.  
Other perceptions of harm were constructions influenced by the personal circumstance of 
the oﬃcer. For instance, the presence of an intoxicated and dishevelled teenage girl, with her 
clothing positioned in such a way that made her brassiere visible, was taken aside by a senior 
female oﬃcer who quietly helped her adjust her clothing. The harm identified by the oﬃcer 
was not because of any wrongful act by another person, but a concern for the ‘appropriate-
ness’ of the dress of the person. The demonstration of harmful constructs was influenced by 
the environment or task assigned to the oﬃcers. In the context of the present research, the 
‘operational theatre’ was dominated by entertainment and suburban zones. As such, oﬃcers 
were influenced by harm originating from ‘street’ oﬀences: public order, personal safety, mi-
nor criminal oﬀending, but not necessarily responding to ‘non-street’ oﬀending such as 
corporate fraud, terrorism, national security. 
6.1.2 ASSESSMENT OF LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY 
In addition to considering perceived harm, oﬃcers evaluated the legality or illegality of citi-
zens’ actions that they observed. As a part of the evaluation, they considered their suspicion or 
belief that an oﬀence had occurred. For instance, when an oﬃcer observed one person assault-
ing another person, a belief was formed that an assault had occurred. Similarly, when an 
oﬃcer smelt the odour of cannabis from a person a belief was formed that a drug oﬀence had 
occurred. When illegal acts were not observed by the oﬃcer, information was collected to cor-
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roborate their suspicion. During the qualitative study, an oﬃcer discovered a male lying on 
the ground with a bloody face. This discovery caused the oﬃcer to suspect that the person had 
been assaulted but the possibility could not be ruled out that the person had fallen over or 
suﬀered a medical event.  
Oﬃcer-led interventions relied on the severity of the illegality of the behaviour. The greater 
the level of perceived severity of an oﬀence encountered by oﬃcers the greater the likelihood 
of intervention. When interviewed oﬃcers explained that when they were faced with a situa-
tion involving a physical assault, they would intervene immediately. However, when oﬃcers 
discussed the likelihood of initiating an encounter to address minor oﬀences, responses were 
more varied.  
Reluctance to respond to minor illegalities such as traﬃc oﬀences, pedestrian oﬀences, or 
other ‘technical’ oﬀences is described below by Oﬃcer A38. When asked to describe the type 
of situations he might ignore, the oﬃcer replied:  
Case 6.1.4 Ignoring technical offences (A38) 
[Technical] offences that generally are of no consequence or the public wouldn’t consider it to be an issue. You’d 
probably cause yourself more embarrassment while taking action than by not taking action. I’ll quite often ignore 
those ones, too. […] Oh, for example, oh, you know, skateboarding down a footpath, you know, walking against 
a flashing red man.2 I guess we’re talking traffic offences again, but those kinds of things. And it’s victimless and 
most people don’t have a problem with it. You’d probably just bring negative comment upon police for being 
seen to do something. There are times when you do need to do something, but I certainly wouldn’t take action 
in every instance, yeah. (Interview transcript A38)  
Oﬃcer A38’s perspectives were not held by all oﬃcers. Consider the following response by 
Oﬃcer Z69: 
Case 6.1.5 The small things can get me (Z69) 
…I’m quite pedantic, I’m quite pedantic about things [laughter]. And small things can get me. Like, just cars, 
police cars, things like that. Yeah, no, I’m big on communication, appearance, public perception of what we do. 
That’s all big things for me. […] And, I already know where my threshold is, to be honest, if it’s really against the 
law, I'll stop. I guess, you look at, say, traffic with people not wearing helmets. I'll still beep my horn or say: “Okay, 
excuse me, you should be wearing your helmet.” (Interview transcript Z69) 
The reluctance of some oﬃcers to initiate encounters to address minor illegalities illustrates 
the complexity of oﬃcer initiation decisions. Some oﬃcers tolerated certain types of minor il-
legal behaviour where others did not. For instance, minor traﬃc infractions or pedestrian 
                                               
2 A ‘red man’ was the term for a do not cross pedestrian traﬃc signal.  
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oﬀences occurred unchecked in plain sight of some oﬃcers.3 Despite the variability in re-
sponse to minor illegalities, oﬃcers were more consistent when confronted with serious 
oﬀences—those of which perhaps appear to be more harmful—than those which are deemed 
to be minor or technical in nature. 
6.1.3 ACCEPTABILITY  
Oﬃcers also considered the acceptability of citizen actions when initiating an encounter. Ac-
ceptability appeared to be measured by oﬃcers in two ways. The first tested the acceptability 
of the situation based on an oﬃcer’s perception of how it might be viewed by the citizenry. In 
other words, oﬃcers considered how a ‘law-abiding citizen’ might view a situation and would 
use this to guide their decision to intervene.  
Oﬃcers explained how their decisions to intervene were guided by observations of by-
stander responses to the behaviour of other citizens. In the first two comments below, oﬃcers 
discuss how changes in ‘bystander’ behaviour may trigger an oﬃcer-led intervention.  
Case 6.1.6. Officers observing the reactions of citizens 
If it’s causing disturbance, if it’s causing members of the public to take notice and, and stand and watch then I 
think we definitely have to do something. So, yeah, I don’t like to drive past that. I mean, it can be a minor thing. 
[…] [Anything] that makes the public stop and stare, I think. (Interview transcript A16) 
You can also judge it by public’s reaction around the people that are acting up. You know, a bunch of people 
acting like idiots on footpath. A bunch of kids maybe jump around on their skateboard, you can see people going 
by, they are irritated. (Interview transcript Z43) 
The presence of bystanders was not essential for oﬃcers to consider the impact of the ob-
served behaviour. Oﬃcers said that they would intervene in situations in the absence of 
bystanders, but on the basis that if there had been, how the bystanders might have reacted. In 
this case below, Oﬃcer A66 reflects on the influence of citizen feedback on oﬃcer behaviour. 
In this situation, an oﬀence constituting a minor illegality is perceived as being strategically 
important; it directly relates to citizen demand. 
                                               
3 It was diﬃcult to examine the variability in oﬃcer decision-making during the qualitative study. It was impractical to systematically define 
oﬃcer non-responses to minor oﬀences, as it was impossible to establish if an omission was deliberate or accidental. On several occasions 
during the research, oﬀences visible oﬀences were not acted on. In some cases, they appeared outside the oﬃcers’ field of view but in other 
cases they appeared inside the oﬃcers’ field of view. Some oﬀences were ‘technical’ in nature, such as road traﬃc oﬀending, and in these cas-
es, it was diﬃcult to establish if the oﬃcers were ignorant of the oﬀence or ignoring the oﬀence.  
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Case 6.1.7 Prioritise, not ignore (A66) 
No, I’m, I’m not one to ignore. I’ll prioritise. I’ll prioritise. If someone’s walking across a red pedestrian light and 
somebody else down the road is yelling, I’ll ignore the pedestrian light and go see what people are yelling at. But if 
there’s something there that’s blatantly obvious, even if it is a, a basic traffic offence, I’ll always stop and speak to 
them, more so for the fact that the public need to see that we’re actually speaking to people for these things. I 
would get more comments for stopping and speaking to people walking across a pedestrian light and saying, “Oh, 
thank you for doing that,” than... I get positive comments whereas if I didn’t speak to them. I’ve actually, we’ve 
actually received complaints from members of the public because we’ve actually done nothing, not me personally, 
but police in general. So I always think even if you just stop and say, “Hey, look, you know, what are you doing? 
Like I’m standing here, that’s pretty obvious,” type thing. So I’ll, I’ll always at least have a chat, yeah, even if it’s just 
a friendly chat to just reinforce that, “Do you think you’re doing the right thing?” (Interview transcript A66) 
However, in some cases oﬃcers argued that intervening in socially unacceptable behaviour 
can be counterproductive. Oﬃcer Z81 describes below that the presence of police in itself may 
be a suﬃcient deterrent to controlling behaviour.  
Case 6.1.8 Police presence sufficient (Z81) 
There are, there are times where police intervention doesn’t help, and I think if guys are just being boisterous, 
simply seeing police might be enough as a reminder just to keep it in check. (Interview transcript Z81) 
Similarly, some oﬀences, which might be socially unacceptable, were best ignored:  
Case 6.1.9 Ignoring socially unacceptable behaviour 
For example, we have, a lot of disorder at night where people would abuse police, who’ll potentially pull the 
fingers4 as an example, and we don’t tend to stop and deal with that. We potentially should, but that is 
something that I would ignore, because we always have [other things to worry about]. (Interview transcript A66) 
The second dimension of acceptability encompasses the degree to which the actions are ac-
ceptable or unacceptable to the personal perspective of police oﬃcers. For instance, 
discovering a male in a commercial location after dark would be regarded as suspicious by po-
lice oﬃcers, but not necessarily by the citizenry. Such actions are not illegal, nor are they 
physically harmful, but to an oﬃcer, they may be unacceptable given the circumstances.  
In the narrative below, Oﬃcer A66 discusses how his determination of unacceptable be-
haviour initiates a contact:  
Case 6.1.10 Suspicious male 
We were driving along on G Street where we’ve had a series of, of recent break-ins. Saw a male who just looked 
a little out of place. For no other reason other than the fact that he looked out of place, stopped and spoke to 
                                               
4 ‘Pull the fingers’ is an obscene hand gesture.  
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him. Turns out his last lot of history was for the exact same thing. And on Monday morning he got arrested after 
a DNA hit. So we prevented a break-in just because we saw somebody that looked out of place. (Interview 
transcript A66) 
When asked why he ‘looked out of place’ he explained: 
He was virtually a long way from anywhere that was open. There was nothing open in that stretch of street at 
the time. He was in all dark clothing. He was standing right next to an Asian restaurant in which we’ve had a 
series of break-ins similar. There was a metal plate from a grill in the ground leaning against a window. And as 
soon as he saw us he looked very nervous. So my instinct was we need to figure out what this guy’s up to.  
From the moment we spoke to him nothing added up. You know, “I, I’ve been drinking. I’m, I, I’ve just had a 
vomit.” “Well, where did you vomit? There’s no vomit anywhere, mate. I can’t, like, I’ve had a look around. No 
vomit. Why, why are you here?” “Oh, I was just getting some air.” “Where have you been drinking?” So he’d 
been drinking a long way from where he was now, couldn’t account for why he was there. Just the whole 
circumstances added up to the fact that we needed to speak to him. (Interview transcript A66) 
Oﬃcer A66’s explanation describes how he determines the acceptability—from the police’s 
perspective—of the male’s actions. This diﬀers to the assessment or prediction of a bystander 
response: not all bystanders would consider the presence of a person in or near a location un-
acceptable.  
Oﬃcers often assessed citizen actions according to a ‘time-place-circumstance’ construct. 
Similar to Epp et al.’s “out of place” construct (2014, p.70), this assesses that the degree of ac-
ceptability in the context of the time of day, the type of place, and the circumstances in which 
citizen actions occur. For example, the conduct of the male described above in Case 6.1.10 was 
believed to be suspicious because of the time of day (outside of business hours) the place (a 
restaurant which was closed) and circumstances (he was behaving ‘suspiciously’). In another 
example, New Zealand oﬃcer Z39 explains that even illegal actions can be subject to a reason-
ableness test.  
Case 6.1.11 Urinating in public 
Driving around the street, that’s not right heartland CBD, it’s slightly suburban and there’s maybe a party 
somewhere and it’s a couple of guys having a piss on a tree off the footpath. Yeah, that’s fine. Yeah. If it's on a… 
shop sign or a door or on a footpath on the main street, that’s not fine. Time, place, circumstance stuff. (Interview 
transcript Z39) (Author’s emphasis) 
In law, both instances of public urination are illegal in New Zealand (Summary Oﬀences Act 
1981 [NZ], S.32) yet the oﬃcer considers the location of the oﬀence—suburban verses central 
business district—to assesses the degree of acceptability. Oﬃcers discussed other examples of 
illegal actions that were tolerated without intervention.  
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In the example below, Oﬃcer A22 said that certain actions might be acceptable in one geo-
graphical location but unacceptable in another. When asked what type of behaviours he might 
ignore, Oﬃcer A22 responds:   
Case 6.1.12 Ignoring yelling and swearing (A22) 
As far as what you ignore... I don’t know if you can ignore. Out on [Location] street you ignore people yelling, 
screaming, and swearing all the time because it’s the norm on the street. (Interview transcript A22) 
Another oﬃcer explains how citizen actions in one location are permissible despite the illegal-
ity of the action perceived by the oﬃcer.  
Case 6.1.13 Tolerance of Swearing (A82) 
Or even just sort of the odd loud mouth, walking down the street, swearing at their mate further up the road, 
you know. It’s offensive to swear but not really important to stop everyone from swearing and that sort of thing, 
you know. (Interview transcript A82) 
Assessing the acceptability of an action, therefore, was a construction of the oﬃcer’s as-
sessment of the perceived or actual bystander response to a citizen action, together with, or in 
some cases alternatively to, an oﬃcer’s belief of the acceptability of the action. The reasona-
bleness test—also described as the time-place-circumstances test—appeared to be independent 
of the legality or illegality of the citizen’s actions. 
6.1.4 DISCUSSION  
Oﬃcers made several assessments to determine if citizen actions warranted an oﬃcer-initiated 
intervention. Oﬃcers explained that their decision-making took into account their percep-
tions of harm, the legality/illegality, and/or the acceptability of the citizen’s actions.  
Sampson and Bartusch (1998) proposed that there is a “distinction between the tolerance of 
deviance and cynicism about the applicability of law” (1998, p.784). Their thesis suggests that 
“ghetto” areas within larger cities “displayed elevated levels of legal cynicism, dissatisfaction 
with the police, and tolerance of deviance”, where there are “cognitive landscapes where crime 
and deviance are more or less expected and institutions of criminal justice are mistrusted” 
(Sampson & Bartusch 1998, p.800). They argue that in circumstances where there are commu-
nities that tolerate deviance and turns a cynical eye towards the law, that these are not 
necessarily linked to racial groups.  
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Neither of the cities which were the subject of the research (NZC and SAC) had “ghetto”-
type communities or locales. There were obvious ‘quarters’ within the station jurisdiction that 
attracted heightened calls for service distinct from the ‘normal’ commercial, urban, or subur-
ban ‘business as usual’ demand: NZC’s ‘student quarter’ and SAC’s ‘entertainment zone’ 
drove demand for police response to alcohol-related events such as disorder, (eviction and 
trespass from licenced premises, fighting), breach of alcohol regulations (drinking or pos-
sessing alcohol in an alcohol-free zone). The closest area resembling such places were the 
parkland areas at SAC where small groups of Aboriginal peoples congregated to consume al-
cohol. Yet, the activities of the Aboriginal groups resulted in fewer calls-for-service than the 
mostly white/European groups populating the NZC ‘student quarter’ and SAC ‘entertainment 
quarter’.  
Epp et al. (2014) examined oﬃcer-initiated police-citizen encounters in the United States 
and concluded that oﬃcers are prone to implicit intergroup bias. They found that American 
oﬃcers were influenced by negative racial and social serotypes, particularly towards African 
American and other ethnic minorities. This was not borne out in the present research: oﬃcer-
participants did not display any explicit indicators of racial stereotyping. For instance, there 
were no verbal indicators or cues that intimated that oﬃcers were targeting zones within their 
geographical jurisdiction because they would find a specific ethnic minority there. But there 
were indicators of stereotypical bias towards social groups within the cities. Oﬃcers were 
aware that some geographical zones were prone to alcohol-related disorder, such as the NZC 
‘student quarter’ at NZC and the SAC CBD ‘entertainment quarter’5. Consequently, oﬃcers 
heightened their observation of ‘students’ and ‘revellers’ in response to their perception that 
members of these groups were problematic. Other social groups associated with ‘community 
problems’ received heightened surveillance. For instance, street beggars were highlighted as 
being problematic at several SAC patrol meetings. Similarly, NZC oﬃcers were aware of ‘stu-
dent’ event planned in the ‘student quarter’.  
Concluding that oﬃcers within the present study displayed racial bias is problematic. 
Analysis of SAC oﬃcer-initiated encounters shows an over-representation of Aboriginal peo-
ple. Although the population of Aboriginal people was 0.1% of the population at SAC, they 
comprised 15.2% (n=21) of the citizen sample. However, during oﬃcer-initiated detoxification 
                                               
5 The naming of these “quarters” was given by the researcher to aid the anonymity of each research site. Oﬃcers did not refer to these areas 
using this nomenclature.  
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events intoxicated citizens were taken to ‘sobering-up centres’. At times, those who were in-
toxicated would passively wait outside or near the SAC station, and while actively initiating an 
encounter, there was a suspicion that they were seeking the assistance of the police for trans-
portation to the sobering-up centre. While there were fewer oﬃcer-initialled encounters at 
NZC (n=21), the majority related to white citizens (96.4% of citizens, n=27); Maori were un-
der-represented at 3.6% of citizens (n=1).  
Factors that influenced an oﬃcer’s decision to intervene and enforce minor oﬀences (de-
scribed as misdemeanours in American jurisdictions, summary oﬀences or traﬃc oﬀences in 
New Zealand) have been discussed in the literature. Brown (1981) discussed that minor viola-
tions are often ignored for rational reasons: the seriousness of the violation, the diﬃculty in 
initiating an encounter (such in a busy traﬃc environment), or the personal preferences of the 
oﬃcer (whether they are focused on detecting felony-level crimes). Brown’s analysis appears 
similar to the ‘time-place-circumstances’ construct evident in the present research.  
Herbert (2006) described that oﬃcers face a complicated role within modern society: they 
are expected to oﬀer subservience to individual and community demand for service, be sepa-
rate from society to faithfully and independently regulate the criminal code, and to be 
generative to improve society, within a ‘liberal’ context which espouses personal freedom. 
Thus, the decision for an oﬃcer to initiate an encounter with a citizen, or intervene in a situa-
tion, is informed by the construct of necessity. In the present study, necessity was determined 
by the oﬃcer’s opinion of the perception of harm, the socially acceptability of the observed 
behaviour (taking into their own personal and professional beliefs and those of the ‘good citi-
zen’ or the ‘law abiding citizen’) as well as the determination of the legality or illegality of 
citizen behaviour.   
6.2 The diagnostic phase  
This next section outlines the ‘diagnostic phase’ of the encounter. Borrowing from a medical 
procedure, an oﬃcer worked through a diagnostic process to construct an incident narrative 
(IN) before determining a course of action (CoA). The IN relied on the oﬃcer to collect in-
formation relating to the role of the citizens present (or not present but related to the 
incident) and establishing the ‘facts’ about the incident subject to the diagnosis.  
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6.2.1 ENCOUNTER INITIATION 
Triggers 
Police-initiated encounters occurred as the result of two triggers. The first was because of a 
dispatch (NZC) or a tasking (SAC) instruction from the departmental chain of command. In 
most cases, oﬃcers received these instructions from a central police communications centre 
that managed the police response to citizen calls for service. Alternatively, instructions were 
conveyed to oﬃcers by their field supervisors, sometimes independent of the communications 
centre. In both cases, instructions included limited details of the incident: a location, a de-
scription of relevant parties, and/or brief circumstances. These details formed an initial précis 
of the incident.  
Sometimes oﬃcers received instructions to conduct a preventative patrol in a geographical 
area. These types of instructions did not include a focus on a specific event or person; rather 
they were given to oﬃcers to be present at a specific place and at a time. They specified the 
type of problem that the patrols were designed to prevent. Consequently, oﬃcers were not in-
vestigating an event that had occurred—there was no initial précis to refer to—but they were 
instructed to look for a specific type of behaviour.  
It was often the case that no explicit oﬃcer goal was provided with the instructions. Calls 
for service were dispatched by code. For instance, at NZC a patrol was dispatched to a “1X” 
(incident code for suicide attempt) or at SAC a patrol was dispatched to a “101” (incident code 
for disorder). Associated goals were implicit. Other than responding to the initial tasking in-
struction, patrols were expected to formulate their response plan for the incident without the 
input, coordination, or control from a field supervisor or the communications centre.  
The second trigger for police-initiated encounters occurred when an oﬃcer discovered citi-
zen actions or incidents that they believed required a police response. In these circumstances, 
oﬃcers were alerted to the behaviour by their sensory triggers: sight, sound and smell. How-
ever, as outlined in Section 6.1, the awareness of the citizen actions did not necessarily lead to 
an oﬃcer-led intervention. In some cases, oﬃcers chose to ignore or avoid citizen actions. 
When it became apparent that oﬃcers had decided against initiating an encounter, their rea-
sons were justified because of prioritisation (for example see Case 6.1.7) or the belief that the 
actions were acceptable at the particular time, place and circumstance (see Case 6.1.11).    
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Cognitive preparation and awareness 
Oﬃcers prepared themselves before initiating an encounter by constructing a narrative of the 
citizen actions they had observed or those that had been reported. At the beginning of this 
process, the narrative focused on the information that justified the initiation of the encounter 
(i.e. a ‘police response’). For instance, narratives contained information about the type of citi-
zen actions observed and the roles of the citizens involved in an incident. Oﬃcers who were 
instructed to respond to an incident relied on the instructions dispatched to guide their 
awareness and collected more information to expand the narrative en route to the incident.  
Oﬃcers had a greater advantage when initiating non-dispatched oﬃcer-initiated encoun-
ters. As they were aware of the reason for the encounter, there was less information seeking 
than when attending a dispatched incident. Oﬃcers had already established the guilt or culpa-
bility of citizens present at the incident; circumstances were no longer a product of suspicion, 
more of belief (as the oﬃcer had witnessed the implicating citizen actions). This was evident at 
encounters starting as a stop and search. For instance, New Zealand legislation provides oﬃc-
ers with the power to conduct a road traﬃc stop of any driver on a road at any time (Land 
Transport Act 1998 [NZ] S.113, S.114). For such a stop to be legal, oﬃcers must decide to stop a 
vehicle for the purposes of enforcing transport legislation. If oﬃcers have witnessed a traﬃc 
oﬀence, then belief is formed. Oﬃcers initiate the encounter armed with the belief that an ille-
gal act has been committed. 
Citizen disadvantage 
When an oﬃcer initiated an encounter, the citizen may suspect the oﬃcer’s reason behind the 
initiation but they lacked certainty on this until the oﬃcer advised the citizen of the reason. 
Citizens appeared to be disadvantaged by the uncertainty of not knowing the reason for the 
encounter. They searched for reasons why an oﬃcer initiated the encounter. Frequently, citi-
zens would start conversations with questions as “Is there a problem oﬃcer?” or to pre-empt 
an oﬃcer explanation by exclaiming “I’m sorry for my speed, I was in a hurry”.  
Citizens were sometimes able to guess why an oﬃcer had initiated contact. In one case 
when oﬃcers at NZC were called to a family violence incident they found two citizens—a 
male and female—in separate parts of the dwelling. Both citizens said that they knew why the 
oﬃcers had arrived. Similarly, a two-person beat unit at SAC were waiting at a pedestrian 
crossing controlled by a red ‘do not cross’ light. Standing on the opposite side of the crossing 
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were two males. The males ignored the do not cross sign and ran across the crossing. The 
males did not initially appear to be aware of the oﬃcers until they were several metres from 
the oﬃcers: they saw the oﬃcers at the intersection they slowed and stopped in front of them. 
One of the males spoke to an oﬃcer and asked, “am I going to be fined”?  
In both examples, the citizens displayed an awareness of the situation they found them-
selves in and suspected that they might receive a criminal justice sanction, but they were 
unable to determine the oﬃcers’ objective—would they receive a fine for their behaviour? This 
placed the citizen at a disadvantage: the citizen was subordinate to the oﬃcer. Similarly, when 
oﬃcers were the subject of citizen-initiated encounters they found that there were unable to 
immediately determine the purpose of the encounter or the citizen’s objective. In these cases, 
oﬃcers were subordinate to the citizen: they did not know why the citizen had initiated the 
encounter. This occurred frequently when oﬃcers were patrolling. For instance, SAPOL oﬃc-
ers walking through the shopping precinct or when NZPOL oﬃcers were driving in the 
entertainment precinct on a Saturday night.  
Power interactivity 
Citizen-initiated encounters had diﬀerent power-relationships between oﬃcers and citizens. 
As oﬃcers were unaware of the citizen’s motivations, they were momentarily held captive by 
the citizen. The focus of the encounter at that point—visual and cognitive attention (see 
Goﬀman 1961, p.7)—was entirely on the citizen as the oﬃcer attempted to elucidate the citi-
zen’s motivation. As the oﬃcer formed an understanding of the citizen’s objective, the power 
positions changed: the oﬃcer moved from a subordinate position to a superordinate position.  
The transference of power was aided by the construction of an incident narrative. An 
oﬃcer could retrieve the power once suﬃcient information was gained from the citizen. The 
power reversal marked the transition from ‘information seeker’ to ‘action decider’. For in-
stance, it was routine for oﬃcers at SAC, who were patrolling by foot, to be stopped by 
citizens. Citizens stopped to ask the oﬃcer for directions or to advise oﬃcers of citizen actions 
or an incident. Once the oﬃcer had gathered a suﬃcient quantity of information from the cit-
izen to determine a course of action, the oﬃcer had the power to end the encounter. Similarly, 
oﬃcers at NZC were on vehicular patrol were ‘flagged down’ by a witness who had seen a 
male seen forcing a young person into a car. While the citizen recounted a description of what 
he had seen, the oﬃcers were captive; they did not wish to leave until they had heard a suﬃ-
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cient detail of the citizen’s report. Oﬃcers waited until the point of gaining a key piece of new 
information (or in fact at the point where they decided that the citizen had no useful new in-
formation).  
6.2.2 NARRATIVE DIAGNOSIS 
Once oﬃcers initiated an encounter, their attention focused on the construction of an inci-
dent narrative (IN). The IN had utility; it was the repository of information gleaned from 
various sources pertinent to the incident. It acted like a script for a film, establishing the key 
characters of the story, the plot and back-story. It helped the oﬃcers to determine criminal li-
ability and formulate a course of action (CoA).  
Citizen roles  
Oﬃcers classified citizens according to the role that citizens played in the incident. Classifica-
tions were dependent on how citizens represented themselves at the encounter but changed if 
oﬃcers discovered information that conflicted with the citizen’s initial representations. For 
instance, a citizen who identified themselves as a victim was treated by oﬃcers as a victim un-
til oﬃcers determined otherwise. Likewise, a citizen who presented as a suspect will be treated 
as a suspect unless the oﬃcer determined to be of another role such as a victim or witness. Cit-
izen-roles also aﬀected oﬃcer-citizen interactions. When oﬃcers interacted with victims or 
witnesses, they were investigating by obtaining information to establish or corroborate the oc-
currence of an oﬀence. When oﬃcers interacted with a suspect they were establishing if there 
was evidential suﬃciency and a necessity to make an arrest. 
For the present analysis, a typology of citizen-roles is arranged in two groups (see Table 
6.2.1). Primary roles were those instrumental in the creation of the IN. They were based on 
definitions sourced from customary police practice and legislation. Most criminal legislation 
was drafted on the basis that there is a person (or group of people) who suﬀers harm from a 
person who inflicts that harm. The Victims’ Rights Act 2002 [NZ] establishes these, respective-
ly, as victim and oﬀender.6 The Act defines an oﬀender as a person who has been convicted of 
an oﬀence. However, as PCEs occur prior to conviction, the roles in this thesis have been sep-
                                               
6 In fact, section 4 of the New Zealand Victim Rights Act 2002 has a broader interpretation of a victim: this includes a parent or legal guardian 
of a child victim, and a member of the immediate family of a person who dies or is incapable. For the purposes of clarity, however, the mean-
ing of victim in present research relates to the first subsection (a)(i) “a person against whom an oﬀence is committed by another person” 
(New Zealand Parliament 2002, p.8) 
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arated into suspect or arrestee. Witnesses were persons who observed a piece of relevant evi-
dence.7 These four citizen roles played a primary role in INs. Victims and witnesses described 
how the actions of a suspect (and arrestee) aﬀected them in some way. Likewise, suspects (and 
arrestees) provided information about their own actions during a time or event. 
Secondary roles related to people who did not contribute information to the IN but were 
present at the time of the encounter. Unlike primary roles, secondary roles are not derived 
from legislation. An associate was a person who appeared to have had some personal connec-
tion with a primary citizen but did not play a primary role in the construction of the IN. A 
bystander, like an associate, was nearby during an encounter but had no personal connection 
with a primary citizen. In some encounters, persons approached oﬃcers without seeking a call 
for service for oﬃcers to act in some oﬃcial capacity. Such situations included when a citizen 
approach an oﬃcer for directions or to give advice. The citizen played no formal role and as 
such was categorised as a casual.  
Table 6.2.1 The role of citizens during encounters 
Primary citizen-role Primary officer-goal 
Victim  Obtain information to establish offence 
Witness  Obtain information to corroborate offence 
Suspect  Obtain information to establish sufficiency/necessity to arrest 
Field Arrest  Control behaviour and take into custody 
Field Action Control behaviour, non-custodial 
Field Warning Control behaviour through warning 
Secondary citizen-role Primary officer-goal 
Associate  Control to avoid contamination or interference 
Bystander (non-witness)  Disperse from scene 
Casual  Engage 
 
Oﬃcer encounter goals were related to citizen roles. The connection between citizen roles 
and primary oﬃcer goals are shown in the second column of Table 6.2.1. The primary oﬃcer-
goals for victim-, witness-, and suspect-encounters were investigative—the collection of in-
formation. These citizens were the most significant contributors of information to the IN. 
Citizens who played secondary roles did not directly contribute information to the IN; their 
involvement or presence at an incident was seen to have the potential to interfere with the col-
                                               
7 This definition diﬀers from that described in the New Zealand Evidence Act 2016 as it does not include the condition that a witness must “be 
able to be cross-examined in a proceeding” (New Zealand Parliament 2006, p.16). 
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lection of information. As such, the oﬃcer-goals associated with these citizens focused on pro-
tecting the integrity of the IN from inadvertent or deliberate contamination. In some cases, 
associates provided contradictory information (or false information) to oﬃcers to reduce the 
clarity of the IN. Similarly, some associates attempted to extricate suspects from the scene or 
intervene in the arrest. As such, oﬃcer-goals for associates or bystanders related to control or 
dispersal of citizens (as discussed in Case 6.2.7).  
Role assignment 
Citizen roles influenced oﬃcer goals, and thus influenced how an oﬃcer determined the best 
course of action (CoA) to resolve an incident. Chapter 4 showed that oﬃcer actions towards 
citizens varied depending on an oﬃcer’s assessment of the citizen’s behaviour. However, the 
present analysis explores how an oﬃcer’s diagnosis and treatment plan was influenced by citi-
zen’s role in the encounter. In some cases, citizen roles were apparent to oﬃcers before the 
construction of the IN. For example, dispatched activities such as to take a report from a vic-
tim of a historic incident lead oﬃcers to expect to speak to a ‘victim’.  
In Case 6.2.1, citizen roles were presupposed by a witness, thus influencing the oﬃcer prior 
to the commencement of an encounter. Presupposition was reinforced by the actions of the 
field supervisor who instructed the oﬃcers to speak to the ‘victim’ to see if she would make a 
complaint. 
Case 6.2.1 Female denies being victim of assault (PCE0133) 
This encounter related to a victim welfare check. A member of the public had made a statement saying that the 
female CN146 had been crying and bleeding in the street the previous evening and said that “he’d hit me”. This 
encounter was to make contact with the citizen and to establish what had happened. On arrival police the door 
was answered by the suspected offender CN147. He was initially gruff to the contact officer Z49. Z49 asked to 
speak to CN146. When CN146 came to the door she was dismissive of the claim outlined in the statement. She 
said the witness may have made a mistake. She also said that the reason for the blood was that she “fell over”. It 
was clear that she did not want to make an allegation against her boyfriend (CN147) who was inside. At one 
point she said that she didn’t want CN147 arrested; acknowledgement that if she made a complaint he would be 
arrested. After several minutes of discussion, she continued to deny any offending. This was clearly overt conflict 
– both parties were aware of each other’s competing goals – the officer’s desire to illicit an allegation and the 
victim’s desire to prevent making such an allegation. At that point Z49 asked to speak to the male present. He 
came to the door, followed by CN146, and also denied that he’d hit CN146. They both stood together in 
solidarity denying the allegation. At this point Z33 came forward and put the allegation directly to both of them 
asking them to explain how Z33 had suffered a blood injury and why would the victim make something up like 
saying CN147 had said “he had hit her”. Neither changed their excuses. In the end police left commenting that 
they believed that CN146 had been assaulted by CN147. It was clear that [both officers] were frustrated at the 
outcome; it was unclear whether they were frustrated by the fact that they weren’t able to make the arrest (the 
intervention) or whether they were frustrated at being lied to. (Field Notes 8/4/15) 
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In this instance, the oﬃcers’ encounter goal was to collect information to establish if an 
oﬀence had occurred (see Table 6.2.1). While oﬃcers may have come away with a view that it 
was likely an oﬀence had occurred, they were unable to elicit suﬃcient information (a claim or 
formal statement) to establish that an oﬀence had been committed and to establish suﬃcient 
evidence to support the prosecution of the oﬀence (to make an arrest).  
The situation also posed a definitional question: had, in fact, an oﬀence occurred? Oﬃcers 
approached the encounter to obtain a statement from a ‘victim’ on the assumption that an as-
sault had occurred. However, without collecting documentary information to support this 
assumption, oﬃcers were not able to initiate a prosecution or in fact record the oﬀence as an 
assault. Oﬃcers amended the IN to include that although a witness had suspected an oﬀence 
had occurred, there was insuﬃcient evidence to support an arrest or prosecution.  
In some cases, role assignment and fact-finding occurred simultaneously. In the case below 
(Case 6.2.2) Oﬃcer A58 discusses how oﬃcers must make a superficial assessment of citizen 
roles while implementing a course of action before establishing a comprehensive IN. 
Case 6.2.2 Work out offence, handcuff, and arrest 
Yeah, there’s been a few where I knew as soon as I got there that [unclear], you know, fight in public, where 
people are fighting, straight away I’m just, you’re just handcuffing people sort of thing just to protect yourselves, 
because they’re just bashing the crap out of each other. But then, then there’s the other extreme where you, 
where you go to a situation where someone’s just really sort of full on angry and is it worth negotiating with 
these people straight up? No. You are just going to restrain them straight away, you know, work out the offence, 
handcuff and arrest them, go away, and then start trying to calm them down. And I’ve been in, I guess, several 
situations where, you know, as soon as you get up to it you know straight away I’m not going to start talking to 
this person, because he’s, he’s, whatever he’s done, he’s, you know, he’s just bashed someone or whatever or 
he’s got, you know, some guy had a glass bottle in his hand, for example, you know. I’m yelling straight away, “Get 
on your knees. Drop the bottle. Get on your knees. Drop the bottle.” You know, bang, handcuff, into the paddy 
wagon, out of there to the cells. (Interview transcript, A58). 
But in other cases (such as Case 6.2.3), the construction of the IN is dependent on the correct 
assignment of citizen-roles.  
Case 6.2.3. Domestic Violence incident (PCE0125) 
This incident arose when police attended a domestic incident which came through as a male and female 
physically fighting. On arrival Z39 dealt with the male party CN134 and Z85 dealt with the female CN137. The 
male was agitated and required some time to explain his position. At the same time the female party (who was 
outside) was trying to get inside the house where the male was. Z85 and the Acting Sergeant spent most of their 
time during the encounter preventing the female from entering. During the conversation with CN134 inside the 
house Z39 initially started speaking to him as he might be the offender on the incident. It transpired that the 
incident [became] aggravated by the female threatening to take an overdose of tablets. CN134 stated that his 
motivation was to keep [his] partner safe and this is what the conflict related to. At this point the ‘tone’ of the 
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encounter changed when Z39’s questioning changed from trying to establish criminal offending to welfare and 
care of CN137. The incident ended when CN134 prepared to leave the house. (Field Notes 2/4/15) 
Case 6.2.3 also illustrates how Oﬃcer goals can change during IN construction because of es-
tablishing citizen roles. Initially, oﬃcers responded to a ‘domestic incident’ which was 
reported to involve a male and female physically fighting. In this case, the property at the inci-
dent location belonged to the female citizen (CN137) and the male citizen was a visitor 
(CN134). As the incident was reported as a domestic, Z39’s goal was to establish if the male’s 
actions amounted to criminal behaviour. During the IN construction, the oﬃcer (Z39) lis-
tened to the male’s account of the circumstances while observing the female’s behaviour. Both 
parties were intoxicated. The male admitted that they had had an argument and a physical 
confrontation, but this was concerning a threat that the female had made to take an overdose 
of prescription medicine. When the oﬃcer realised that the physical nature of the encounter 
could have been explained as an act of self-defence (preventing the female from taking an 
overdose) his demeanour towards the citizen changed. His questioning changed from an at-
tempt to establish any illegality of the actions of the male, to collecting corroborative accounts 
of the actions of the female. The oﬃcer’s goal also changed: the male was no longer being 
treated as a suspect.  
This incident diﬀers to that described in Case 6.2.1 where oﬃcers determined that a crime 
had probably occurred, but they lacked suﬃcient evidence to make an arrest. In that situation, 
the male party was still a suspect, but the final course of action (no arrest) was influenced by a 
lack of suﬃcient evidence as opposed to a change of roles in the IN. However, in Case 6.2.3 
oﬃcers determined that a crime had probably not occurred as the male ‘oﬀender’ had been 
acting in self-defence. The incident changed from a domestic assault to a medical event.    
Narrative construction  
The construction of the incident narrative was a sub-process of the greater diagnostic process. 
At the beginning of an encounter, oﬃcers attempted to establish ‘facts’ about an incident by 
observing people and the surrounding locations and collecting verbal statements from citi-
zens. As seen in Case 6.2.1, the aim of this process was to determine what had occurred so that 
a CoA could be formulated. If the CoA required an intervention, then it became a ‘treatment’. 
Not all information presented to oﬃcers was in a logical or sequential order of events. 
Snippets of information were received from diﬀerent human and electronic sources. Oﬃcers 
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assembled and rearranged information into a correct temporal order to establish a reliable 
timeline of citizen actions to identify if a relevant problem existed and if the problem required 
a police ‘treatment’. Oﬃcers filtered out information that was not from trusted sources. Oﬃc-
ers initially sought information from victims, independent witnesses, other oﬃcers, or CCTV 
footage. Indeed, oﬃcers sought information from these trusted sources first before consider-
ing less trustworthy sources. Oﬃcers were wary of information from suspects, associates, and 
bystanders. Similarly, information from citizens who appeared to be intoxicated was treated 
with suspicion.  
At times the information was contradictory. Consider Case 6.2.1 where oﬃcers followed up 
the report made by a witness who located a female who’d claimed to have been assaulted. 
When oﬃcers spoke to the female, she denied that she had been assaulted. Case 6.2.4 further 
illustrates how the IN shapes the police CoA. Oﬃcers were dispatched to attend an incident 
which had been reported as a ‘verbal domestic’ by a neighbour of the people of interest. Oﬃc-
ers arrived with the knowledge that the witness had heard the argument. As the investigation 
progressed, oﬃcers established that a technical oﬀence of trespass had occurred; the female 
had asked the male to leave, but he had not.   
Case 6.2.4 Verbal domestic incident (PCE0138) 
This job related to a verbal domestic reported by a neighbour. Police arrived and found the female inside the 
house and a male CN155 outside sitting on a sofa. He smelt of alcohol. Z17 spoke to the male CN155 while 
Z67 went inside to speak to the female. During the conversation with CN155 Z17 enquired about the 
background to his relationship with the female and what had occurred prior to police arrival. His questioning style 
had a conversational tone; he used a combination of information seek and supportive statements. CN155 was 
behaving in a placated and compliant manner. He gave the impression of being relaxed and ‘go with the flow’; he 
stated that he had had an argument with his partner and she had told him to go outside to cool down. This 
changed when Z67 returned from the house. She spoke briefly to Z17 about the request for CN155 to leave 
the premises. At this point CN155’s demeanour changed completely from compliant to argumentative. He 
believed that it was unfair that he had to leave. (This was despite that he was a guest at his ex-partner’s house 
and that she was caring for their young child). He became argumentative and abusive. Both officers attempted to 
reason with him; pointing out that as he was the ‘guest’ and was not caring for a child, therefore it was not fair to 
ask her (the other party) to leave on this occasion. Z17 gave him the option that he could leave voluntarily or 
they would seek a Police Safety Order. (Field note 09/04/15) 
This case shows the construction process. First, the oﬃcers arrived with short precis of the 
event (based on the neighbour’s initial call). In some cases, oﬃcers are told (or able to view on 
their devices) the police histories of the parties at the location during the initial dispatch. On 
arrival, oﬃcers made their observations of the incident: an intoxicated male sitting outside the 
house in silence with a female inside. One of the oﬃcers spoke to the male (CN155), and the 
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other spoke to the female. Each oﬃcer gleaned information their respective citizen. When the 
oﬃcers reconvened, they conferred to establish what had occurred and to agree on the CoA. 
Together, the oﬃcers jointly contributed their gleaned information to the IN and agreed upon 
the CoA. 
While some oﬃcers noted information in their notebooks, many oﬃcers relied first on ver-
bal communication. In cases where there was a likelihood that an arrest or prosecution would 
be made during the encounter (such as if a suspect was present at the time), oﬃcers made 
notes of the information collected. In other cases, oﬃcers formulated decisions based on the 
willingness of victims or witnesses to participate in making formal statements. Formal signed 
documentation was not always required to trigger an arrest. If the victim indicated that they 
would make a statement, oﬃcers made an arrest and collected statements later.  
Course of Action  
Case 6.2.5. What action do I take? 
So, they’re, they’re my little three, when I tell someone, oh, what’s it like being a police officer, you know, sort of 
thing, they’re my little three, you know, first the, first the emotional, the anger, you know, second like ‘what the 
hell is going on here?’ sort of thing, and then third you just, you know, is there a law broken, who’s done it, and, 
you know, who do I arrest sort of thing or what, what action do I take? (Interview transcript, OA31) 
The final stage of the narrative diagnosis phase of the PCE occurred when oﬃcers had con-
structed the IN to a level suﬃcient to allow an appropriate police response. A variety of 
actions were available to oﬃcers when choosing an appropriate CoA and were dependent on 
the citizen’s role in the encounter. During a victim- or witness-encounter, oﬃcers had the op-
tion to take an oﬃcial statement, but this depended on the level of perceived evidential 
suﬃciency. For instance, in Case 6.2.1, oﬃcers had been tasked to speak to a potential victim 
about a case of domestic assault. The witness, who made an initial statement, provided suﬃ-
cient evidence to warrant further enquiries but insuﬃcient to make an arrest. At the time of 
speaking to the potential victim, oﬃcers were unable to gather suﬃcient evidence to take fur-
ther action. Had the potential victim corroborated the witness’s account the oﬃcers would 
have had the choice to commence a criminal justice process (arrest, interview, and charge). 
However, in this case, the CoA was to cease the investigation. 
Oﬀences of diﬀerent severity resulted in diﬀerent approaches by oﬃcers. It was clear that 
oﬃcers behaved with greater discretion when dealing with minor oﬀences, such as ‘technical 
oﬀences’ or ‘victimless oﬀences’. There was greater variability in responses to traﬃc oﬀences, 
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pedestrian oﬀences, and alcohol-related oﬀences: not all citizens who breached the legislation 
were formally penalised.  
CoAs for these minor incidents were normally made by the oﬃcer present at the incident, 
without conferring with other oﬃcers.8 Similarly, when an oﬃcer took a victim or a witness 
statement from a person—to submit the account for further enquires, to record the incident 
for reporting purposes, or to advise the victim or witness that no further police action was to 
be taken—the CoA was decided by the attending oﬃcer. 
However, there was less discretion used when investigating more serious oﬀences, such as 
domestic-related assaults or stranger-related injury assaults. For these incidents which were 
more complex, oﬃcers conferred with other oﬃcers, present or not present, and in some cas-
es, oﬃcers sought guidance from a field supervisor. This was routine for cases where oﬃcers 
were dealing with both a suspect and a victim (or witness) at the same time.  
Like the collaborative approach to the constructing of the IN (see Case 6.2.4), oﬃcers col-
laborated when deciding the CoA. If an oﬃcer interacted with a suspect, the decision to 
disengage, detain or arrest was dependent on the information relayed from another oﬃcer 
who had spoken to a victim or witness. In these situations, oﬃcers discussed their interpreta-
tion of the information collected. In the cases where oﬃcers received spontaneous admissions 
or had witnessed the illegal action, oﬃcers were less reliant on information from other oﬃcers 
and thus made CoA decisions independently.  
This collaborative approach can be further illustrated by the following case (see Case 6.2.6). 
The IN and CoA were constructed in collaboration with other oﬃcers, including oﬃcers of 
another agency monitoring the street-based CCTV system. 
Case 6.2.6 Male suspected of assaulted another male with a pole (PCE3037) 
This incident was dispatched to police by Ambulance after a call of a male who had been assaulted by a stranger 
with a pole. Police arrived and spoke to the victim (for about 20 minutes while waiting for the ambulance to 
arrive) and shortly before the ambulance arrived the victim identified a male [nearby] as someone who might 
have been involved in the attack. A26 ran after the male, I followed, and missed the initial beginning of A26 
catching up to him (they rounded a corner). But shortly after I saw A26 bring him back, compliantly, back to the 
scene of the assault. From there A26 went on to question him about the assault. The conversation starts out as a 
routine information exchange; the officer has difficulty understanding CA67 when he was spelling his name (the 
male was of African descent) and CA67 was also deliberately vague about giving his address and phone details. 
During this process the male started to ‘act up’ stating that the only reason he was being stopped was because 
“he was black”. A26 commented to him that this was not the case, that the victim himself was of African descent 
                                               
8 In some cases, inexperienced or probationary oﬃcers did refer to their field training oﬃcer or senior oﬃcer for guidance.  
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and that the victim had pointed him out as a possible offender. During this exchange CA67 continued to protest 
his innocence, reciting that he had nothing to do with anything and it was unfair that he was being held by the 
police. During this process other units arrived, and the ambulance, and the victim was transported to Hospital. 
Descriptions were sought from CCTV. This conversation went on repeatedly during which time the officer had 
to control the citizen, from either leaving or providing accurate details or an account of events leading up to the 
incident. The male CA67 was still being vague, argumentative and less than forthcoming with details; all of which 
A26 had to contend with. At one point, officer A24 came over to the suspect and said that CA67 looked very 
familiar. […]9 This didn’t go down very well. CA67 denied this and became quite annoyed (bordering on angry) 
at the suggestion. I think it further fuelled CA67’s “just because I am black” premise. After some time, the male 
was released as he did not match the description seen on CCTV. (Field note 04/07/15) 
The oﬃcer’s CoA to disengage from the PCE was because of an inability to gather suﬃcient 
information to attribute responsibility or culpability.  
Courses of action were also influenced by the citizen-role assigned to citizens by oﬃcers. 
The narrative below (Case 6.2.7) shows that the oﬃcer’s CoA was to prevent the bystander 
contamination of the existing investigation and preventing him from being arrested. 
Case 6.2.7 Efforts to prevent bystander from interfering with encounter (A58).  
So, you know, I was able to talk... […] And he was just, had way too much to drink. So at the point, there, there 
was, negotiations had to stop because I wasn’t getting anywhere. He was just simply going to get arrested for 
failing to cease loiter, but I was able to, the other mate I could see I, I was winning with him, so I said, “Grab him 
and go. Get in a taxi. Get in a taxi now. Here, taxi!” So I hailed a taxi, bang, they’re gone. So whilst I didn’t 
negotiate with the person I wanted to—I wasn’t going to be able to—I could negotiate with a friend. […] He 
didn’t need to be locked up. He would have been and quite rightly so, because he, he was just causing... Of 
course, as soon as he causes a—all of a sudden there’s more people mobbing us, you know, and it was just, it’s 
out of control. So the cease loiter, that’s where the cease loiter works perfectly, because you just need to get 
people out of there really quick. But they don’t listen. They think they’re helping their mate. They don’t want to 
leave him by himself. So I guess that, that’s one instance where I thought I negotiated well by preventing someone 
who didn’t realise they were breaking the law, but their only, their only intention was, his only intention was to 
protect his mate. He, you know, saying, oh, look, this, this, that, doesn’t matter. We, he wasn’t even a witness to it 
anyway. We had witnesses. We had, we had the offender. It was all going to be resolved, everyone walks away, 
you know. Sure, his mate gets arrested, but that’s, that’s the law. Did this guy need to get arrested? No. So that’s 
why I made a beeline for him. I thought I can just get him out of here, he goes home as opposed to two hours’ 
time he’s sitting in a cell thinking what the hell has just happened to me, which I’ve seen as well where a guy’s 
thinking, wait, I, I’ve never been arrested, why am I arrested? (Interview transcript, A58) 
Oﬃcer A58’s expressed that his primary goal was to control the bystander to prevent interfer-
ence in the original encounter, for which the oﬀender and witnesses had already been 
established. The secondary goal was to prevent the arrest of the bystander. By classifying the 
                                               
9 This section of the field notes has been redacted. It related to how the oﬃcer believed that he knew the oﬀender and redacted to protect the 
anonymity of the oﬃcer. After the encounter, I spoke to the oﬃcer and asked whether his belief was genuine and his explanation appeared 
plausible.  
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male as a bystander, the oﬃcer had predetermined the course of action—prevention of inter-
ference and dispersal from the scene. 
6.3 The treatment phase 
The final phase of the PCE began when one party initiated a course of action (CoA) to con-
clude the encounter. For most PCEs in the present study, the concluding actions were 
determined by oﬃcers. During investigative encounters, oﬃcers had the decision to initiate a 
criminal justice process where the citizen did not: oﬃcers had the power to report an incident 
as a crime, issue an infringement notice, or detain or arrest a suspect. These actions were 
treatments; they were the solution prescribed by oﬃcers to resolve a problem. Citizens could 
conclude PCEs in some situations. These situations included PCEs which were citizen-
initiated and which did not involve an investigative or enforcement component. For instance, 
sometimes citizens initiated PCEs for social reasons or to ask a question or direction.  
Potential for conflict 
Once an oﬃcer had formulated a CoA, it was conveyed to the citizen. It was at this stage of the 
PCE where overt conflict was most prone to emerge. In most cases, such as PCEs with victims 
or witnesses, CoA were conveyed verbally without any physical actions. Typical CoAs includ-
ed oﬃcer responses to the merit of the victim’s or witness’s report that an oﬀence may have 
occurred. If the oﬃcer accepted the citizen’s claim, then the PCE continued so that further in-
formation was collected, or new police processes were commenced. However, if the oﬃcer 
rejected the merit of the claim, then the oﬃcer progressed to the disengage from the PCE. Re-
jections were often justified based on a lack of evidential suﬃciency, unreliability (where the 
victim or witness was intoxicated or mentally ill), or that the reported problem was not a po-
lice matter (problems which were related to breaches of civil law). The rejection or 
disengagement was a source of conflict in some of the PCEs.  
Enforcement encounters were more likely to include physical actions than investigative en-
counters. Some investigative PCEs included a physical search of the citizen (such as SAPOL 
weapons searches). Enforcement encounters which included the arrest of the citizen featured 
physical actions. Oﬃcers at NZC would not necessarily handcuﬀ all arrestees, but each ar-
restee was searched before entering the police patrol vehicle. Most oﬃcers handcuﬀed 
arrestees at SAC. Handcuﬃng or searching of citizens acted as catalysts for those citizens who 
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were agitated or unwilling to comply with the arrest. Similarly, some compliant arrestees be-
came uncompliant when handcuﬀed or searched; some did not want to be touched by oﬃcers. 
Conflict also arose when there were no physical actions. When an oﬃcer advised a citizen 
that a formal criminal justice sanction would be initiated (such as the issue of an infringement 
notice, the service of a safety order, or cease loiter notice). These CoA’s were delivered verbally 
by oﬃcers without coercive physical actions. Conflict arose in these circumstances, however, 
when the citizen rejected the legitimacy, legality, or eﬃcacy of the CoA. Conflict in this con-
text was expressed verbally; there were no physical actions committed by citizens.  
6.3.1 CITIZEN RESPONSE TO THE COA 
A citizen responded to oﬃcer CoA’s in three ways: acceptance, negotiation, or rejection. If the 
citizen chose to reject the CoA, then oﬃcers chose to enforce the CoA or in some circum-
stances accept the citizen’s rejection.  
Acceptance  
Investigative PCEs with a victim or witness ceased when suﬃcient information was collected 
to establish that an oﬀence had occurred or when it was determined that there was insuﬃcient 
information to continue an investigation (e.g. Case 6.2.1) provided that the citizens accepted 
the oﬃcer’s CoA. In an example of acceptance, Case 6.3.1 shows the citizen accepts the oﬃc-
ers’ determination and CoA. 
Case 6.3.1 Male urinating in alley way (PCE3024) 
This encounter eventuated as the patrol unit were walking past an alley way and found a male urinating against 
the wall of a building. They started walking up the alley way, about 50 metres away, in a slow pace. The male 
urinating stopped and turned around. He saw the two police officers (and me) and dropped his head. It looked 
as if he had realised that he’d been caught. The male didn’t run away. He could have, and he probably would 
have gotten away had he chosen to run. A86 took the lead. He asked for the male’s details, which he gave 
without problem (and presented his ID – a driver licence). There was no overt conflict, CA49 admitted to the 
offence and was polite. A86 advised that he would be issuing a penalty notice, explaining that there was a zero-
tolerance policy towards public urination. The male said that he was “caught short and had to go”. (Field notes 
27/6/15) 
Acceptance of a CoA does not, however, necessarily result in a satisfactory resolution. In 
the case below (Case 6.3.2), the oﬃcer issues a warning for verbal abuse (the CoA) which re-
sults in the citizen disengaging but only to find another oﬃcer to report an incident.  
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Case 6.3.2. Abusive male storms off (A92) 
We went to a job where a male and female were having some kind of dispute. We spoke to them, spoke to 
another witness, resolved the issue. This gentleman comes back around the corner ranting and raving at us, 
abusing us for not doing our job, like completely off, just completely going off his head. And we were like, “Well, 
if you’ve seen something you need to tell us, because we, we don’t know. You haven’t said anything to us.” And 
he just went off his head. He was just ballistic, calling us fuckwits and saying we’re fucking useless and, “No 
wonder people don’t go to the police. You’re all fucking useless pricks.” And we were nice with him and tried to 
get him to tell us what he had seen so that if there was something that we could do then we would, but it ended 
up he just went off his head, saying we were fuckwits, and abused us. And I had to step up at that stage and say, 
“Look, mate, you need to stop swearing at us and stop abusing us.” I said, “It’s not tolerated. You don’t, you don’t 
have the right to come round the corner and abuse four of us, telling us we’re not fucking doing our jobs when 
we’re giving you the opportunity to tell us what you had seen, and all you can do is abuse us.” And he wasn’t 
happy with that and just stormed off. So that’s, that’s one scenario where he’s trying to, where he said like, 
“What’s your name?” and “I’m going to go speak to your sergeant about this. It’s not right what you’ve done,” 
and trying to make us feel uneasy about what we’ve done. (Interview transcript A92) 
Shortly after this encounter, the citizen located Oﬃcer A92’s supervisor and attempted to re-
port the assault again and complain about the actions of initial police response (Case 6.1.1).  
Case 6.3.3 Citizen complaining about police response to incident 
Oh, well, so there was an incident allegedly, an incident on Monday where my crew stumbled across this incident 
as it was being called over the radio. So they actually weren’t tasked, they just stumbled upon it. And the 
allegation was that a male was beating up a female and was intervened by a male witness. So this is the allegation. 
So they’ve dealt with the situation, and there was no assault, and neither party would report to police or provide 
their details or… So there was no ‘victim’. However, the male witness who intervened wasn’t happy with that, so 
he marched down here to make a complaint. And he wanted to submit a statement in relation to the witness, to 
the assault that he’d witnessed. And we tried to explain to him that there was no offence, because there was no 
victim, and that the assault as he described it is not what happened, because it was captured on CCTV, but he 
became extremely argumentative and belligerent and arrogant and was telling me how I should do my job and 
what I should and shouldn’t be doing. So, after trying to be diplomatic I lost patience and stopped talking basically. 
So someone else was talking to him, so that was okay, but he would not listen to reason from me, so he left 
eventually. And he came back yesterday and he was speaking to another officer, and I overheard, so I went, and I 
went to speak to him. And I said, “I spoke to you yesterday.” “No, you didn’t.” “Yes, I spoke to you.” “No, I didn’t 
talk to you.” “You didn’t talk to me. You stood there and barked at me.” (Interview transcript A60) 
This case illustrates the conundrum that despite the oﬃcers having the authority and ability 
to end encounters, citizens retain the ability to initiate a new encounter with other oﬃcers.  
Negotiate 
Case 6.3.2 and Case 6.3.3 illustrate how citizens negotiated with oﬃcers to alter the CoA. This 
also occurred with those citizens suspected of a transgression such as a traﬃc oﬀence where 
citizens attempted to pre-empt an oﬃcer’s decision. For instance, some citizens stated to oﬃc-
ers that “you don’t need to give me a ticket”. These attempts to negotiate the oﬃcer’s decision 
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were not necessarily eﬀective and, in some cases, were a precursor to conflict between the citi-
zen and the oﬃcer. 
Negotiation often occurred when citizens appeared to be intoxicated or emotionally dis-
tressed. In Case 6.3.4, oﬃcers were called to an incident where an intoxicated female was 
causing problems at a private address. On arrival, oﬃcers instructed the female that while they 
were investigating the incident—and checking on the welfare of her child—that she was not 
allowed to speak or interact with her child. After several attempts to negotiate with the oﬃcer 
to see her child, the citizen was arrested. 
Case 6.3.4 Female arrested after domestic incident (PCE0047) 
Police were called to a domestic/disorder incident at a house on [S street]. Communications reports that a 
female in the house is yelling and causing disorder at the house. On arrival police are welcomed by an intoxicated 
male who suggests that the offender - the female CN23 - is inside causing a problem and is ‘probably the 
soberest person there’. When we enter the house we find CN23 in an emotional state in the hallway. It appears 
that she is trying to get into a room. She explains to the officers that she is wanting to say goodnight to her 3-
year-old child (who she has custody of) and who is sleeping in the room off the hallway. There are about 3-4 
other people in the hallway preventing CN23 from entering the room. Police officer Z67 tries to calm the female 
down and explain to her that she needs to talk to them outside. Z67 makes a couple of attempts to explain this 
to CN23 but CN23 is unable to comprehend Z67’s requests. At this point Z67 forces (gently) CN23 into the 
lounge-room and on to the sofa. Z41 remains and talks to the people in the hallway and those caring for the 3-
year-old child. Over the next 3–5 minutes Z67 attempts to explain again to CN23 why she needs to explain 
what is going on so that police can help with the situation. CN23 repeatedly asks to say good night to her child. 
At one point CN23 suggests that Z67 ask the 3-year old who she would like to be with tonight. This elicits a 
strong verbal rebuke from Z67 that it is inappropriate to attempt to manipulate young children like that. CN23 is 
moderately intoxicated. Her dress is ripped on one side indicating that she has been in some sort of fight. Her 
nose is dribbling with mucus and she asks for a tissue to wipe her nose. [I go and ask Z41 if he could find some 
toilet paper to help]. He returns with some toilet paper. Over the next several minutes Z67 attempts to glean 
information from CN23 about what has happened prior to the arrival of police. CN23 does not provide any 
useful information at this point, just repeatedly asking to see her daughter so she can say goodnight. Z67 has to 
use conversational control techniques to advise that CN23 must stay with her for the time being and that she 
can’t see her daughter right now. It is a difficult situation as Z67 has no legal power to do this at this stage (CN23 
is not under arrest at all). However, it appears that Z67’s motivation is to keep CN23 under some sort of control 
so that Z41 can investigate further what is going on AND to try to keep the situation calm. A short time later 
Z67 leaves CN23 to sit on the sofa so that she can speak to Z41. She instructs CN23 to remain seated and not 
to go near the bedroom. She leaves. [I remain] After about 20 seconds CN23 stands up and goes to the hallway. 
At this point she is met by Z41 and Z67 who were trying to speak about what Z41 had gleaned from the 
situation. CN23 refused to go back to the lounge and tried to push past the officers. She was then arrested by 
Z67. She started to resist and Z67 attempted to handcuff her. She got one handcuff on and then struggled. Z41 
then assisted with the handcuffing. She was cuffed behind her back and taken to the patrol car. (Field note 
20/02/15) 
Case 6.3.4 also illustrates how oﬃcers attempt to control citizens during encounters. Control 
was used twice at this encounter for two diﬀerent purposes. During the diagnostic phase of 
the encounter, Z67 sought to control CN23 by occupying her in one part of the residence so 
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that the oﬃcer Z41 could gather information from other citizens present and to check on the 
welfare of CN23’s young child. This process of information collection was for the purposes of 
the construction of the IN. The goal for both oﬃcers was to collect suﬃcient information, 
through the formation of the IN, to form a course of action (CoA1). However, this was incom-
patible with CN23’s desire to see her child (CoA2). While Z41 sought information from 
witnesses, Z67 sought information from CN23. The second use of control was at the end of the 
encounter when CN23 was arrested; the arrest enforced the oﬃcers’ CoA.  
CN23’s arrest was preceded by negotiation. Negotiation was common during encounters 
with citizens who were suﬀering from a psychiatric condition or behaving in a suicidal man-
ner. In Case 6.3.5, Oﬃcer A20 negotiated with the citizen for 25 minutes to encourage him to 
consent to the psychiatric process. Negotiation occurred despite oﬃcers having the legislative 
power to use physical force to initiate the process.   
Case 6.3.5 Negotiating with suicidal male (PCE3058) 
This incident arose after a call from a friend that CA92 had threatened to hang himself in his backpacker’s room. 
[…] On arrival police met with CA92 in his room. CA92 was initially dismissive of the need for police 
intervention, and spent a considerable amount of time at the beginning expressing concern that police presence 
was going to get him evicted from his room. A20 took the lead during this incident. For some time the discussion 
was concerned with the fact that CA92 was depressed but he wasn’t going to do anything to harm himself. (This 
was despite there being a belt secured to the bunk bed and tied in a noose.) CA92 continued to deny that there 
was any chance of harm until A20 said that police were not going to leave without providing some sort of 
intervention or get some help. He expressed that the only way to do this was to take him to the hospital and get 
him assessed. [Section 57 SA Mental Health Act 2009] At this point the conversation changed to how the male 
didn’t want to be assessed and taken to the hospital by police. He recounted a previous incident where he had 
been handcuffed and assaulted by police. A20 mentioned that he didn’t know about the circumstances of the 
previous incident however this was different circumstances. When asked directly about how he was going to hurt 
himself, and being asked why the belt had been tied up on the bed as it was, CA92 went silent and after a few 
moments (10-20 seconds) changed the subject. Ultimately the police officers managed to convince the male to 
take the control of the situation and go with the ambulance to be assessed. He agreed and an ambulance was 
called for. At this point CA92 asked if he could have a cigarette in his room while he waited. The officers agreed. 
This gave a relative pause in the encounter, and something which seemed to put CA92 at ease. After about 15 
minutes of waiting the officers suggested that it would be quicker to transport to the hospital by police car, rather 
than by ambulance. The officers let the male have another cigarette on the street before he was transported. 
Conflict was overt: it was clear that the officers wanted to take CA92 to get assessed—this was the end goal— 
however CA92 wanted to be left alone. The situation was concluded by discussing and persuading CA92 (in his 
own time) to agree to be assessed. It was clear, though, that at some point police would have forced an 
intervention if CA92 failed to come to agree. (Field notes 17/7/15) 
In this encounter, the oﬃcers established the CoA (a psychiatric assessment) within minutes 
but spent a considerable amount of time negotiating with the citizen. Because the oﬃcers de-
cided not to use force, negotiation with the citizen prolonged the duration of the encounter.  
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Rejection 
Rejection of the oﬃcer’s CoA was most frequent during arrest situations. Often rejection 
would eventuate as passive or verbal resistance—such as an arrestee proclaiming some degree 
of innocence or injustice—yet not accompany physical resistance. The example of Case 6.3.3 
illustrates that rejection of a CoA can result in a disgruntled or dissatisfied citizen initiating a 
new encounter. Similarly, rejection can be evidenced by verbal and physical resistance such as 
in Case 6.3.4. 
In some instances, citizen negotiation and rejection can result in the same outcome. Case 
6.3.6 shows how a citizen attempted to negotiate with the oﬃcer to change the CoA (that be-
ing of waiting at the scene for an alcohol breath test) but then rejecting the oﬃcer’s CoA 
resulting in the citizen’s arrest.  
Case 6.3.6 Male driver arrested for obstruction (PCE0013) 
As we were walking towards the witnesses we heard a vehicle, in the distance, conducting a burnout in the car-
park at Countdown. We […] conducted a traffic stop. CN19 was in the driver’s seat and immediately began to 
protest at the conduct of the officers (that they had stopped him as he was driving out of the car-park onto the 
road). […] Z27 attempted to commence alcohol breath screening procedures and was able to administer the 
first stage of the breath test (i.e. the passive screen). When he attempted to continue to the second stage, the 
breath screening test, he was unable to find a breath tube. This caused some delay in the procedures. Z01 
decided to walk to the station to get a tube, and this left Z27 to deal with CN19. [The station was about 150 
metres from the location of the traffic stop.] After some time CN19 started […] threatening to leave. Several 
times he alighted from the driver’s seat, despite Z27’s instructions for him to remain at the vehicle. Z27 was using 
assertive and calm instructions in order to maintain control of CN19. During the conversation, CN19 showed 
signs of being affected by alcohol. He repeatedly asked Z27 if he could move the car. He asked this a number of 
times despite being told by Z27 that he could not move the car and that he was to remain in the driver’s seat. 
The nature of the discussion was circular, CN19 asked if he could move the car, Z27 told him that he couldn’t, 
CN19 would then complain that he wasn’t allowed to leave the car where it was as it was blocking the car-park 
exit. In addition, CN19 made patronising comments to Z27 about “how he must be a new police officer ‘cos you 
are doing this all wrong”. After about 2-3 minutes, with Z01 about 50 metres away, CN19 gives up his discussion 
with Z27 and walks away from the car. Z27 follows him and arrests him for obstruction. (Field notes 22/01/15) 
This case also illustrates how oﬃcer goals can change during an encounter. At the beginning 
of this encounter, the oﬃcers’ goal was to establish criminal liability relating to an oﬀence. 
Their interaction with the citizen began on that basis: to establish suﬃcient information to 
make an arrest relating to the ‘burnout’ (O1). However, during the process to establish O1 a 
second objective was formed: establish the criminal liability for driving under the influence of 
alcohol (O2). Tension emerged between the citizen and oﬃcer due to the delay in administer-
ing the evidential test (as Z01 went to retrieve a breath screening tube). This results in the third 
objective (O3), to maintain control of the citizen to achieve O2.  
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The challenging behaviour of CN19 was a negotiation: he repeated requests to move to car 
to change the oﬃcer’s CoA. At the point when he walked oﬀ from the car, the challenge be-
came a rejection of Z27’s CoA (now being O3) which resulted in Z27 physical enforcement of 
O3. 
Rejection of the oﬃcer’s CoA caused oﬃcers to face the same accept-negotiate-reject re-
sponse that citizens experienced when oﬃcers advised their course of action. Oﬃcers had to 
decide whether to accept the citizen’s rejection (seen in Case 6.3.3), negotiate with the citizen 
(e.g. Case 6.3.5), or enforce the CoA (e.g. Case 6.3.6). Each decision was a response to conflict. 
Case 6.3.6 further illustrates the enforcement decision-making process: Z27 had to decide to 
either accept the citizen’s action (walking away from the vehicle), negotiate with the citizen 
(discuss or encourage him to return), or enforce the oﬃcer’s course of action (arrest). In each 
of these cases, oﬃcer actions were prompted in response to the citizen’s behaviour. Had CN19 
not started to walk oﬀ then Z27 would not have had to make an arrest to enforce the course of 
action.  
6.4 The police-citizen encounter – the oﬃcer’s procedure 
Deconstruction of the police-citizen encounter into the diagnosis and treatment phases shows 
the procedural approach oﬃcers observed during the present research. This procedure is illus-
trated in the diagram (Figure 8) as a simple linear sequence, starting with the diagnostic 
phase, comprises of procedural sub-stages of role assignment, narrative construction, and de-
termining a course of action. In some instances, the stages of the diagnosis occurred in a 
diﬀerent order or indeed simultaneously. However, in most instances oﬃcers moved through 
the procedure to progress to the treatment phase. Oﬃcers were reliant, at the treatment phase, 
on the citizen’s response: would they accept, negotiate, or reject the ‘police’ CoA.  
Disruptions to the progression from one stage to the next prevented oﬃcers from moving 
through the procedure. Disruptions included interruptions, contradictory or false information 
as these frustrated oﬃcer attempts to construct an adequate IN. In some cases, these disrup-
tions resulted in goal blockage (as evident above in Case 6.2.1) where oﬃcers were unable to 
progress from the diagnostic phase to the treatment phase. During investigative and enforce-
ment encounters, the inability to adequately form the diagnosis prevents the oﬃcers from 
moving to the treatment phase.  
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Sykes and Brent (1980; 1983) explained that PCEs are regulated by oﬃcers’ desire to achieve 
four essential goals: seek information; establish control over any disorder; obtain respect from 
the citizens involved in the encounter; and achieve an appropriate resolution. In the present 
study, it was evident that in some fashion, oﬃcers sought to collect information (i.e. construct 
the IN), establish order, and achieve an appropriate resolution. However, it was not evident 
that oﬃcers routinely sought respect. In some PCEs compliance and deference occurred with-
out proactive oﬃcer demands: this was common during interactions with victims, witnesses, 
and in some cases suspects and arrestees. However, oﬃcers did not overtly demand deference 
from non-compliant citizens: oﬃcers exerted control behaviours.  
Figure 8. The PCE as a diagnostic and treatment process 
The goals or objectives found in the present research are summarised below in Table 6.4.1. 
In Section 6.2 of this chapter, it was proposed that oﬃcer-goals were associated with the per-
ceived citizen-role (see Table 6.2.1). However, in the present research, it was also evident that 
oﬃcer behaviour was influenced by the encounter event-type. As such, these diﬀerent encoun-
ter event-types are shown with a corresponding oﬃcer encounter-goal. Oﬃcer goals for 
investigative encounters were associated with the investigation of an incident or an oﬀence: 
oﬃcers would seek information from citizens relating to events by asking questions or collect-
ing other physical or electronic information. Investigative goals transformed to enforcement 
goals in the cases where oﬃcers had decided that there was suﬃcient information to action a 
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criminal justice sanction. Oﬃcer goals for rescue encounters were less investigative but more 
interventional. This included rapid response, searching, initiating medical interventions (such 
as psychiatric or medical). Social encounters featured very little investigative or interventional 
behaviour. They were characterised by more general conversational behaviour and sharing of 
personal anecdotes.  
Table 6.4.1. PCE-types and officer-goals 
Officer-initiated PCEs Officer encounter-goal 
Enforcement Investigate a complaint or offence and then enforce by taking action against the ‘wrong-doer’ 
Investigative Investigate an offence or solve a community problem 
Protect Care and/or protection of a vulnerable person (i.e. child or elder) 
Rescue  Rescue a vulnerable person or initiate a medical intervention 
Social Interact with citizens to achieve positive community relations 
Citizen-initiated PCEs Officer encounter-goal 
Complaint Take a complaint and assess suitability for an investigation 
Social Interact with citizens to achieve positive community relations 
 
There was some cross-over with citizen-initiated PCEs. When approached by citizens who 
sought to make a complaint, oﬃcers used similar investigative behaviours to that of oﬃcer-led 
investigative encounters. Similarly, citizen-led social encounters shared the behaviours of the 
oﬃcer-led social encounters. However, a diﬀerence between the two was that citizen-led social 
encounters were more likely to include questions from citizens, such as geographical ques-
tions or legal questions. 
6.4.1 SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored the process that oﬃcers followed when they conducted PCEs. It has 
been presented as a preamble to an understanding of the cause of control behaviour evident in 
the quantitative study. The analysis of the observational data of this study suggests that oﬃcers 
followed a procedure when interacting with members of the public: intervention (self-initiated 
or call for service), diagnosis, treatment. It has become apparent that control behaviour was 
the common response to conflict; but in the cases observed, the conflict originated from inter-
ruptions, frustrations or goal blockages experienced by oﬃcers who followed the ‘encounter 
procedure’. The next chapter will include a further discussion how conflict originates from 
‘procedural disturbances’ and how oﬃcers respond to this type of conflict. 
 7 
Conflict and conflict resolution during  
police-citizen encounters 
In the previous chapter, police-citizen encounters were viewed as a procedure. PCEs com-
prised of diagnostic and treatment phases, and each phase comprised of a series of stages that 
participants progress through to achieve a particular goal. Chapter 7 examines how conflict 
occurs from procedural problems such as goal blockages and procedural frustrations. It pro-
poses that when conflict arises between oﬃcers and citizens, this creates a procedural 
problem. The analysis is contextualised in Sykes and Brent application of general systems the-
ory to PCEs (1980) and general strain theory (Agnew 1992). Whereas Sykes and Brent used 
general systems theory to explain how oﬃcers behave to regulate and control PCEs, the pre-
sent analysis considers general systems theory and general strain theory to explain how 
conflict occurs between oﬃcers and citizens.  
These discussions are informed by analysis of the empirical observations of PCEs and re-
flections from oﬃcers drawn from the interview data. The first section of the chapter 
considers conflict as covert and overt. It suggests how ‘procedural conflict’ can be explained as 
one party becoming frustrated by the other when their goals or aspirations are blocked. The 
second section considers how oﬃcers responded to procedural disturbances. It discusses how 
oﬃcers take a proportionate approach to conflict resolution and limit physical actions to situ-
ations where it is necessary. The third section examines the factors that influence how oﬃcers 
attempt to resolve conflict. This includes a discussion on how oﬃcer preferences, skills and 
abilities, aﬀect their decisions to use physical force to overcome procedural disturbances. The 
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section also discusses the use of pre-emptive actions taken by police oﬃcers. These discussions 
are summarised in the fourth section. 
7.1 Procedural conflict 
‘In general systems theory a distinction is made between “regulation” and “control” (Ashby, 1956; Buckley, 
1968). Control is the choice of goals. A disturbance is any event which blocks realization of chosen goals. 
Regulation is preventing disturbances from blocking goal realization. Taking charge is a mode of regulation. 
Taking charge is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.’ (Sykes & Brent 1980, p.183) 
Existing narratives in the policing literature which discuss interpersonal conflict tend to con-
sider conflict arising from a demonstration of resistance. Typically, these are framed in a 
theoretical construct which examines how citizen resistance is met by force from an oﬃcer, 
namely physical actions ranging from trifling force through to fatal force, and analyses which 
explore the necessity and proportionality of that force used by oﬃcers (e.g. see Alpert & Dun-
ham 2004). Unfortunately, such studies may not examine encounters which involve non-
physical conflict, which is characterised by a lack of physical resistance or the use of force by 
police. Non-physical police actions, such as the use of controlling verbal communication dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, fall outside the common definitions of ‘force’ in policing contexts (Alpert 
& Dunham 2004).1 Furthermore, unlike the mandatory reporting of physical force by police 
agencies, the use of verbal control behaviour is not reported unless it is used in conjunction 
with the use of non-trifling physical force. While the occurrence of abusive verbal behaviour 
by oﬃcers may be reported through police complaint mechanisms, there is no such system to 
record non-abusive verbal control behaviour methodically. Consequently, oﬃcial datasets 
may exclude the magnitude of encounters involving non-physical conflict and any subsequent 
resolution. 
Empirical studies which focus on the police use of force take a suspect- or oﬀender-centric 
approach (e.g. Terrill et al. 2003). As a result, they do not necessarily allow for the examina-
tion of conflict during witness or victim encounters. As discussed earlier, the existence of 
verbal control behaviours during victim-encounters during the behavioural study indicates 
the existence of the occurrence of conflict outside of the suspect or oﬀender framework. The 
existence of such conflict is supported by Turk’s proposition that conflict (norm resistance) is 
                                               
1 Alpert and Dunham suggest that empirical studies of the police use of force rely on three major data sources: oﬃcial records from police 
departments, observational data from police observers, and citizen complaints (Alpert & Dunham 2004, p.23). 
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probable between oﬃcers and citizens when they are behaving in manners according to their 
cultural norms (Weidner & Terrill 2005).  
Conflict observed during the qualitative and quantitative studies of PCEs with victims, wit-
nesses, and bystanders, arose from non-physical procedural disturbances where citizens 
appeared to be distracted or when they unknowingly behaved in a manner which was incom-
patible with oﬃcer-goals. Victims who were emotionally distressed were not always aware that 
their behaviour frustrated oﬃcer attempts to collect adequate information. While the citizens’ 
actions were not malicious, they led to oﬃcer frustration. Equally, citizens who behaved dis-
tractedly during an encounter also created diﬃculties for oﬃcers. This type of conflict 
occurred covertly; it manifested as an internalised problem in the mind of one individual 
(Buehler et al. 1998). In these circumstances, conflict/frustration emerged because of citizen 
distress or distraction which disrupted the ability of oﬃcers to achieve an encounter-centric 
goal.  
The conflict that arose from citizen disobedience, such as the occasion where a suspect 
refused to provide information, developed into a more overt form of conflict. Overt conflict 
diﬀers from covert conflict as it manifests as “hostile behaviours and aﬀect which indicate di-
rect manifestations of negative connections between [individuals]” (Buehler et al. 1998, p.121). 
Thus, conflict was overt when an oﬃcer and citizen were aware of the conflict. 
Overt conflict 
Conflict was overt when both the citizen and oﬃcers were aware of the conflict. It was not de-
pendent on the occurrence of physical resistance. In the following encounter between two 
oﬃcers and a slightly intoxicated youth (Case 7.1.1), conflict occurred because of the youth 
failing to provide his identification particulars to the oﬃcers.  
Case 7.1.1 Male refuses to provide identification (PCE0025) 
CA08 was “cocky”, he had consumed some alcohol (this was evident), but he was highly charged, antagonistic 
and belligerent. When the officers asked him for identification and contact details he was semi-compliant: he said 
that he didn’t want to give his home address to police. He then asked police for their identification. When the 
officers pointed to their uniform (clearly identifying themselves as police), he asked to see their identity cards. 
Officer A88 took the lead with the male. She informed him that he was under a legal obligation to provide his 
identification details and would be arrested if he failed. CA08 then noticed me (as I was in about 2 metres 
proximity) and I became the target of his attention. He demanded that I move away from his location. Officer 
A88 moved CA08 away, about 7 metres away, to de-escalate the situation. I was able to continue to monitor the 
information exchange (although not being able to hear the words mentioned). (Field note 11/02/15) 
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Conflict occurred because of a procedural blockage: CA08 did not provide his personal iden-
tification information to the oﬃcers. He justified his refusal on the basis that police had not 
identified themselves to him—in the same manner that he was expected to identify himself—
and that as an observer was nearby, he did not wish to provide his private address details to 
someone who was not a police oﬃcer.  
CA08’s actions also constituted a separate oﬀence under South Australian law (Summary 
Oﬀences Act 1953 [SA] S.74A). While this oﬀence was relatively minor,2 CA08’s actions pre-
vented the oﬃcer’s ability to progress through the diagnostic phase. His behaviour disrupted 
the oﬃcer’s ability to complete the narrative construction and formulate a course of action. 
This caused frustration for the oﬃcer. Consequently, the oﬃcer used coercive tactics (the 
threat of arrest) to alter CA08’s behaviour. Once CA08 had provided the details, the oﬃcer 
was able to continue with the remainder of the procedure: the completion the IN and formu-
lation of the CoA.  
In another example, overt conflict developed when a citizen bystander (CA03) approached 
oﬃcers at SAC to express dissatisfaction with their involvement with an incident she had wit-
nessed (Case 7.1.2). The bystander was not directly involved in the original encounter, 
however, when she began to speak to the oﬃcers dealing with the original encounter, another 
two oﬃcers commenced a new encounter with her (Case 7.1.2). 
Case 7.1.2 Citizen complains to police about their behaviour (PCE0027) 
Two officers (A06 and A50) were attending to an incident of a suspected stolen bicycle. The second set of 
officers (A76 and A80) were nearby the scene of that incident and decided to walk over to see what was 
occurring. On arrival, we found saw that A06 and A50 were speaking to a male and about to conduct a search of 
his property. It appeared that they had discovered [he was using a knife] to cut through a bike lock. The officers 
and male were on the road side (in a gutter) [where] a clear plastic sheet divided a street-side cafe style set of 
tables. There were about 10 people seated at the tables. It was obvious that the members of the public were 
observing the officers and the male. After about 30 seconds from when we arrived, a female CA03 who had 
been seated in the cafe approached the police officers. From her perspective, she could see five police officers 
(she counted me as an officer) dealing with someone who clearly did not look like a bicycle thief. She took the 
position that police were being unnecessarily oppressive in the way they were dealing with him. At this point, 
A80 asked CA03 to one side. In discussing this with A80 afterwards, it was his goal to remove the CA03 from 
the immediacy of the main event (i.e. dealing with the suspected bicycle thief). A80 listened to CA03’s concerns, 
and then he advised her for the reasons of why there were four police officers. He advised that I was a 
researcher and said that he and his partner (A76) had come to the scene to assist and check that there was 
nothing needed doing. He also explained that they had the right to search him, as they did, and that they had the 
right to investigate the male as the circumstances were suspicious; a male using a knife to cut a bicycle look 
(without using a key). The female did not accept the legitimacy of A80’s explanation and rejected the need for 
                                               
2 The penalty described in the Summary Oﬀences Act 1953 [SA] S.74A(3) amounts to a maximum fine of $1,250 or maximum three-month 
term of imprisonment. 
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there to be as many police officers present. The officer tried to explain again, but the female started to speak 
over him. At this point, A80 attempted to take control of the situation [with] assertive comments such as: “we’ll I 
have explained the circumstances to you, and, that is why police are doing what they are doing”, and, “to us we 
have the responsibility to investigate suspicious situations, and this is suspicious as most owners would have a key 
to unlock their bike”. CA03 ignored these controlling statements and continued to challenge the legitimacy of the 
presence of the police. After a short time, she left and went back to her drink. At the culmination of the incident, 
when A76 and A80 decided to leave I made contact with the female CA03. I explained the reasons for my 
presence. She asked if I was interested in hearing her perspective, which I said that I was, and she told me that 
she thought that the officer was not listening to what she was trying to say. I asked her how many glasses of 
alcohol she had consumed and she said that she had consumed two tall glasses (pints?) of beer. (Reflecting on 
the observation of her encounter I thought that it was clear that she was not listening to what the officer was 
trying to say. I did not tell her this, but I thought the situation was rather ironic). (Field note 12/02/15) 
Case 7.1.2 illustrates how a procedural disturbance may originate from the interference of par-
ties outside the initial encounter. In this case, the bystander (CA03) approached the oﬃcers to 
challenge their behaviour she had observed. Her initial goal appeared to intercede in the orig-
inal encounter to alter the oﬃcers’ interactions with the ‘bike thief’. The bystander believed 
that the male in question did not appear to be a bicycle thief and the presence of five oﬃcers 
dealing with the male was excessive.  
The conflict in this situation was overt: interference with the oﬃcers’ response to the bicy-
cle thief. Oﬃcers acted to resolve this conflict by relocating the interference so that the 
remaining oﬃcers could complete their investigation with the bicycle thief. However, this ac-
tion caused further overt conflict. When oﬃcers explained the reasons for their actions (that 
the male was acting suspiciously, and the additional oﬃcers had only arrived to assist), the cit-
izen responded by stating that oﬃcers were not listening to her concerns. Her frustration 
increased on the basis that she was not being listened to (although she probably meant that 
oﬃcers did not accept her point of view) and that she was unable to modify the oﬃcers’ be-
haviour. This further conflict was also procedural in nature. CA03 failed to accept the merit of 
the oﬃcer’s argument and their CoA: to do nothing about her concerns about the manner the 
bicycle thief was being treated.  
It was apparent (from the observer’s perspective) that despite A80’s attempt to convey to 
CA03 his reason for the increased level of police presence, CA03’s advocation of her position 
confused her ability to recognise the merits of A80’s explanation. As a result, she formed a 
view that she was being ignored. This behaviour blocked both party’s abilities to communicate 
and to form an understanding of each other’s perspective. In this situation, both parties were 
aware of the competing goals—A80 wanted to prevent CA03 from interfering with the origi-
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nal encounter whereas CA03 wanted to prevent oﬃcers present during that encounter from 
behaving in a particular way—and as such the conflict was overt.  
In both cases, the actions of one party frustrated the actions of the other. Oﬃcer A88’s goal 
was to identify CA08, a reasonable request (as well as a legal obligation) and one which was 
commonplace in police practice. The refusal of CA08 frustrated the procedure; it caused a 
strain on the interactions between A88 and CA08. The strain continued until the oﬃcer was 
able to adjust the surroundings and coerce the citizen to provide the information. Similarly, 
CA03’s initial actions towards oﬃcers dealing with the bike thief interfered with, by distrac-
tion, their investigation. This hindered the oﬃcers’ ability to achieve their goal: the 
investigation of the incident. 
Covert conflict 
While overt conflict was easily detectable, the covert conflict was less obvious to the observer 
and thus diﬃcult to identify. It was challenging during the present research to recognise situa-
tions that might suggest the presence of the covert conflict but it was possible by watching for 
specific indicators. In Case 7.1.3, covert conflict was signalled by the oﬃcer’s subtle displays of 
frustration while conducting an interview with a victim. The conflict—in this case, the fre-
quent interruptions caused by the victim serving customers—was experienced by the oﬃcer 
and appeared unknown to the victim. The encounter occurred because of a theft at a busy re-
tail store. Some details of the oﬀence had been reported by the victim using a telephone to 
police communications. As a result, a patrol had been dispatched to collect further infor-
mation from the victim in person: a signed statement and CCTV footage that could be used to 
help the investigation of the oﬀence. On arrival, one oﬃcer spoke to the shopkeeper (the vic-
tim CN29) to collect information to construct an incident narrative. 
Case 7.1.3 Taking a statement from a shopkeeper (Z71) 
Officers arrived and located CN29 and a member of the public, who had witnessed the incident. After taking 
initial information, the officers split up. Officer Z71 spoke to CN29. No overt conflict between occurred citizen 
and the officer. […] The citizen was serving customers during the encounter, and this interrupted the flow the 
statement details. Also, Z71 had to control the conversation so that he could take a fluid statement. Officer’s 
opening demeanour supportive. Many supporting statements and control statements [that] indicate control of 
conversation. [After the encounter] we had an interesting conversation about conflict. I suggested that conflict 
could (and did) occur when Z71 was attempting to take a statement. Z71 had to take control several times 
[during] the interview so that he could maintain control of the conversation in order collect a reliable statement 
(to establish the correct order, facts and sequence of events). I made this comment [but] Z65 thought that there 
wasn’t any conflict—he saw conflict in a negative sense—where one might be engaged in an argument, not 
necessarily in a positive sense. […] I suggested that if a person has to use controlling techniques in a situation, 
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then there would have to be a case of conflict, i.e. an incompatible set of goals. He took the point (although I am 
not sure if he agreed and just conceded for politeness.) (Field note 19/02/15) 
The actions of the victim—serving customers while the oﬃcer was attempting to gain a state-
ment—interrupted the oﬃcer’s attempt to fulfil his encounter goal of collecting information. 
Each interruption caused the victim to stop answering questions. When questioning was re-
sumed, the oﬃcer sometimes needed to recast or repeat his questions to prompt the victim to 
respond with the desired information. The oﬃcer permitted the interruptions nonetheless. 
While he did not express this frustration to the victim, nor did it seem that the victim became 
aware of his frustration, the actions of the victim disturbed and frustrated the oﬃcer’s proce-
dure. 
The oﬃcer experienced other impediments. When the victim was attentive, the oﬃcer en-
couraged her to recall and narrate the circumstances of incident in a logical and sequential 
order. As the oﬃcer wrote the citizen’s statement by hand, he did not have the ability to 
amend or elaborate details of the statement once it was written down on the page of his note-
book. As such, the oﬃcer attempted to solicit information ordered in a particular way so that 
the statement would follow a logical and time-ordered structure. But information was written 
down in the order that was given by the victim. When the victim made comments or clarifica-
tions, which related to events that had already been written about in the notebook, Oﬃcer Z71 
had to reframe the existing written notations to reflect the new information. The encounter 
was further frustrated as the victim was not native to New Zealand and was not fluent in Eng-
lish. As a result, Oﬃcer Z71 had to repeat some questions, and then explain the meaning of his 
questions in simplistic terms.  
The disturbances experienced in this PCE appeared to frustrate the oﬃcer at the time of the 
encounter. This internalised frustration was confirmed during a later discussion with the 
oﬃcer: frustration at the inability to capture the victim’s attention without interruption; the 
diﬃculty experienced in creating a sequentially-ordered account of events; and the diﬃculty 
of communicating with the victim because of the diﬀerent skill-level of English communica-
tion. These frustrations illustrate the notion of covert conflict: conflict experienced by one 
party that is invisible to (or without the knowledge of) the other, an intrapersonal conflict 
arising from interpersonal interaction (see Deutsch 1973, p.10), which diﬀers from covert con-
flict behaviours such as passive-aggression or hostility (e.g. see Buehler et al. 1997). In the 
present case, goal blockages emerge from the oﬃcer’s frustrated eﬀort to glean information in 
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a procedurally-helpful manner. Deutsch posits that “conflict exists whenever incompatible ac-
tivities occur” (1973, p.10), so despite the victim appearing not to be aware of the oﬃcer’s 
frustration incompatible activities have occurred. Indeed, she too may have experienced frus-
tration. She appeared to display frustration at not being able to communicate with the oﬃcer 
in her native language. The oﬃcer did not indicate that he was aware of any the diﬃculties she 
was experiencing other than commenting that she was trying to be as helpful as possible while 
also trying to manage her business.3 In the same way that the victim appeared unaware of the 
oﬃcer’s diﬃculties in achieving his primary goal, her diﬃculties did not appear to be obvious 
to the oﬃcer. These diﬃculties were apparent to the researcher during the observation. The 
same cues displayed by the oﬃcer were apparent in the behaviour of the victim: the inability 
to devote suﬃcient time to provide an adequate period of time to answer the oﬃcer’s ques-
tions; and the frustration of not being able to serve customers due to her requirement to 
answer the oﬃcer’s questions. 
In this case, these frustrations were mitigated with diﬀerent variants of control behaviour. 
In applying general strain theory (Agnew 1992), the frustration shared by both the oﬃcer and 
citizen occurred because each party was unable—during that particular moment in time—to 
achieve their positively aligned goal. The oﬃcer sought to collect suﬃcient information to 
progress the investigation; the citizen attempted to provide that information sought by the 
oﬃcer while at the same time selling products to her customers. According to the GST, the 
frustration was the negative emotion, and the participants’ attempts to wrestle control during 
the situation were corrective actions. 
Summary 
In the examples above, the presence of conflict was detected in circumstances that did not in-
volve physical actions. Furthermore, each circumstance was resolved in a manner that would 
not ordinarily be reported or recorded as a citizen complaint about police actions or through a 
use-of-force report routinely submitted by police oﬃcers. The examples illustrate that conflict 
does occur in ways that frustrate the ability of the oﬃcer to progress through the encounter 
procedure.   
Procedural conflict, therefore, occurs during police-citizen encounters when the intention-
al or unintentional actions of a citizen interferes, frustrates, or blocks the oﬃcer’s ability to 
                                               
3 Private communication, 11 April 2016 
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achieve a procedural goal. Procedural conflict can occur at any stage of the encounter. As the 
oﬃcer progresses through each encounter-stage, blockages, or disturbances (such as citizen 
resistance, citizen distraction) will impede the oﬃcer’s ability to progress to a new stage or 
phase of the encounter. The blockages or disturbances lead to conflict. 
These procedural conflicts diﬀered from conflict that arose from non-civil behaviour. The 
most common type of non-procedural interpersonal conflict was expressed as verbal abuse 
between oﬃcers and citizens. While infrequent verbal abuse, including swearing and insults, 
redirected the attention of oﬃcers. During investigative encounters, incivilities (see Bottoms 
2006) moved the topic of verbal exchange from an investigative frame to an enforcement 
frame or controlling frame. For instance, the focus of oﬃcer questioning ceased to be related 
to construction of an IN to that related to dealing with the incivility. This did have a negative 
eﬀect on the progression through the encounter procedure 
 Most verbal abuse directed towards oﬃcers did not constitute an oﬀence, but it was clear 
that it was an annoyance. It was common to hear people calling out “Fuck the Police” or 
“Pigs”. In some cases, oﬃcers tolerated the behaviour and simply ignored it. Most oﬃcers re-
frained from initiating an encounter when hearing abuse from afar. When abuse occurred 
during encounters oﬃcers used verbal control behaviour to respond or admonish the citizen. 
Verbal control behaviour was not necessarily used to clear procedural blockages, except in the 
case where abuse was used to delay, distract, or interfere with the encounter procedure.  
7.2 Responses to procedural disturbances 
When oﬃcers were confronted with procedural blockages they faced a choice to take a 
corrective action to attempt to clear the blockage or disengage from the procedure. Control-
ling behaviour was used by oﬃcers to overcome disturbances. For example, the actions of 
oﬃcer A88 threatening to make an arrest during Case 6.1.1 or oﬃcer Z71 using less overt ver-
bal tactics to control the flow of information from citizen CN29 during Case 6.1.3. In these 
cases, controlling behaviour was used in proportion to the type or degree of procedural dis-
turbance, and it was only used when it was necessary. It was used during the ‘diagnosis’ phase 
to facilitate the collection of information to form the incident narrative, as well as implement-
ing the treatment plan through advising and enforcing of the ‘police’ course of action.  
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Proportionality and necessity 
A recurring theme during discussions with oﬃcers throughout the qualitative study and in-
terviews was the self-perception that their actions during encounters were influenced by the 
actions of citizens. This was also evident in the observation of oﬃcer behaviour as they inter-
acted with citizens: vocal tone, style of language, and use of controlling behaviour was for the 
most part responsive to the behaviour of citizens. This position is consistent with many stud-
ies on the use of force in the literature (e.g. Terrill & Mastrofski 2002). Polite or compliant 
citizens received polite and friendly behaviour from oﬃcers whereas citizens who were abu-
sive and non-compliant received controlling and forceful behaviour from oﬃcers.  
Oﬃcers from both research sites discussed that they took a ‘proportionate’ approach when 
initiating contact with citizens in conflict-prone encounters. Oﬃcers said that their responses 
were of a similar ‘level’ to that of the procedural disturbances or disruptions caused by the cit-
izen. Use-of-force policies at NZPOL and SAPOL stipulate that any force used by oﬃcers 
against citizens should follow a graduated model based on the premise that only the minimal 
amount of force should be used to overcome resistance. In simple terms, both policies state 
that the use of force used to overcome resistance should be necessary and proportionate to the 
resistance oﬀered (New Zealand Police 2016b). 
Oﬃcer perspectives towards conflict resolution were influenced by departmental use of 
force policies. Common among many police agencies, use of force continua provide a frame-
work for oﬃcers to conceptualise what type of tactic or what level of force may be appropriate 
to overcome citizen resistance or assaultive behaviour (Alpert & Dunham 2004). The continua 
did not dictate an ‘eye for an eye’ approach. They did not suggest that force necessarily should 
be used, nor specify that the level of force used to overcome resistance be equal to the re-
sistance posed. The continua provide a visual model for oﬃcers to use when deciding what 
tactic or technique it may be appropriate to use. 
 One of the important components of the NZPOL continuum is the explicit recommenda-
tion that communication may have utility at all levels of threat (New Zealand Police 2016b). 
For instance, the model indicates that when faced with situations where oﬃcers feared death 
or grievous bodily harm, while it might be appropriate to use a potentially lethal option such 
as firearms, it may still be appropriate to use communication tactics at the same time. While 
there might be some situations where it may be appropriate for the immediate use of lethal 
Conflict resolution – Responses to procedural disturbances | 165 
 
force, it is the expectation that lethal force is not the only tactic available or applicable in such 
encounters.  
While it is possible that any PCEs might require an oﬃcer to use force, and in some cases, 
the level of citizen resistance may justify the use of force by an oﬃcer, it is necessary to con-
sider the necessity to do so. This important distinction is encapsulated in the NZPOL 
operational threat assessment acronym TENR: threat, exposure, necessity, and response (New 
Zealand Police 2016b). The presence of a weapon during a PCE does not necessarily indicate 
the willingness of the citizen to use the weapon. As such, it is incumbent on the oﬃcer to 
judge if the citizen is likely to use the weapon against the oﬃcer and if so to consider what is 
the likely harm that might be associated with the use of the weapon. It is conceivable that any 
item within reach of a citizen could be used as a weapon of opportunity, such as an item of 
furniture. Equally, it is conceivable that a citizen may use their own body to exert force. As 
such, while an action by an oﬃcer may be proportionate in nature, it may not always be re-
quired. 
While use of force continua relate to the use of force, oﬃcers in both research sites applied 
similar principles of proportionality and necessity when considering their use of controlling 
behaviour. In case 6.2.1, oﬃcer Z23 describes below how he takes a ‘low’ approach when faced 
with a conflict situation. 
Case 6.2.1 Officer discusses taking a proportionate response 
I like to, I guess, start low by just talking and to resolve conflict. Other people might go at a whole lot higher with 
options, tactical options to resolve situations, and so I’m probably, I don’t know, depending on what information 
I’ve got would dictate how I kind of get my mind set up to tackle situations. But I like to talk to people. I mean, 
that’s probably your best tool you’ve got. And then you can always go up from there, can’t you? (Interview 
transcript Z23) 
Oﬃcer Z71 discusses how his use of verbal or physical control behaviour is modified by his 
perception of a citizen’s actions. 
Case 6.2.2. Citizen actions dictate the response (Z71) 
When they dictate the situation. So they’ve got weapons, they’ve got guns, they’ve got or they are physically 
assaultive. There’s time for talking, there’s time for acting. If a situation depicts that we need to take action to stop 
from hurting someone or hurting us or hurting themselves, then we just have to do it. (Interview transcript Z71) 
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Themes of proportionality and necessity were also present in the reflections of SAPOL Oﬃc-
ers. For example, A80 comments below about his preference on how to initially approach 
conflict situation.  
Case 6.2.3. KEEPING CALM (A80) 
I try to keep things as calm as possible for as long as possible. But if the person’s not reacting to that, well, then I 
do sort of bring the level up. (Interview transcript A80) 
A80’s response also illustrates his/her perspective that the response may increase in severity if 
the circumstances require it.    
Evidence of oﬃcers adopting a proportionate approach is not necessarily surprising. Such 
evidence is consistent with Sykes and Brent’s systems theory dictum that oﬃcers will use ‘reg-
ulation consistent with the disturbance’ when attempting to overcome a disturbance (Sykes & 
Brent 1980, p.188). It is pertinent to note, however, that oﬃcers from both sites aspired to a 
proportionate response. It has been posited that oﬃcers who are routinely armed (SAPOL in 
this case) may display more aggressive behaviour towards citizens (Buttle 2010; Locke 2008). It 
is notable that during the behavioural study, SAPOL oﬃcers were using controlling behaviour 
(including physical control) more frequently and for a longer proportion of time during en-
counters than the NZPOL oﬃcers. Notwithstanding, oﬃcers from both sites who were 
interviewed believed or stated that they took a proportionate approach when overcoming re-
sistance. As such, it can be concluded that oﬃcers attempted to use reasonable and 
proportionate control behaviour when attempting to resolve procedural blockages or disturb-
ances. Proportionality, however, relied on how the citizen responded to control behaviours.  
The intoxicated and mentally ill 
While oﬃcer behaviours recorded during the observational study appeared to be mostly influ-
enced by citizen behaviours, citizen behaviours did not always appear to be influenced by 
oﬃcer behaviours to the same degree. Furthermore, oﬃcers believed that their actions were 
ultimately governed by those of the citizen: as Oﬃcer Z71 remarked ‘the actions of the citizen 
dictate the situation’ (Case 7.2.2). This was true in both how oﬃcers were deployed to encoun-
ters (such as in Case 7.1.2 where oﬃcers responded in larger numbers because of the presence 
of a suspect with a knife) as well as influencing how oﬃcers behaved during a PCE.  
When oﬃcers interacted with citizens who were highly intoxicated or mentally ill, their be-
haviours did not always appear to influence the citizen. For instance, at times oﬃcers 
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endeavoured to maintain dominance of the conversation when the citizen was intoxicated but 
were not always successful. Intoxicated citizens seemed less able to accept the reasoned expla-
nations from oﬃcers (Case 7.1.2). The problems associated with dealing with intoxicated or 
disordered citizens were reflected in oﬃcer comments during the interviews: they were diﬃ-
cult to interact with. Consider the following comment from oﬃcer A40 who describes the 
diﬃculties he has experienced with alcohol- or drug-aﬀected citizens, particularly those relat-
ed to the changeability of an aﬀected citizen’s mood and their lack of responsiveness to verbal 
communication. 
Case 7.2.1 Drug-affected people are difficult 
For instance, you know, drunk people or drug-affected people are very difficult, because their moods will change. 
Immediately they’re telling you everything and apologising for their actions. Next thing, I don’t know whether it’s 
confidence or whether it’s, what it is, but something comes from somewhere and they just completely change. It 
doesn’t matter how much I talk to them. Sometimes it’s better just to, to close the door and let them sit for a 
while, and then attempt it again later because it doesn’t matter. You, you, you start an argument and it just keeps 
getting higher. It’s better just to let give them some time, so, yeah. (Interview transcript A40) 
In this instance, A40 advocates disengagement as opposed to perseverance. But disengage-
ment is not always appropriate in all instances when interacting with disobedient citizens. In 
the case below, citizen disobedience resulted in physical action after the citizen refused to 
drop a pair of scissors after using them to self-harm.  
Case 7.2.2 Female cuts herself with scissors (PCE0007) 
Officer Z37 attempted to speak calmly to both females but was unable to maintain control through verbal 
communication. CN09 continued to be audibly upset, yelling and complaining that she didn’t want her friend to 
leave. CN08 was also belligerent and appeared to be competing for attention. She continually yelled about 
wanting to kill herself. Most of the attention was being directed towards CN09 at this stage. When the parents of 
CN09 arrived, the mother began to insist that her daughter’s boyfriend had to leave. This further encouraged 
conflict. During the encounter, the four citizens moved in and out of the property. It was difficult to maintain 
control. [While Z37 was] speaking to the parent of CN08, CN09 picked up a pair of scissors and started to cut 
herself on her right wrist. Officer Z37 observed this and attempted to retrieve the scissors. She was very loud 
and continued to yell at everybody. He asked her to drop/pass the scissors but she refused. At this point, he took 
hold of her arm and forced her to the ground while holding the scissors. She was arrested for possession of an 
offensive weapon. Z37 was struggling to hold the scissors and managed to take them from CN09. At this point I 
took the scissors from Z37 for safety purposes. Once on the ground the female calmed sufficiently. She was 
lifted from the ground and taken to the police car. Once in the car, she was taken to [hospital] where her cuts 
were assessed. She was then taken to [the mental health service]. (Field note 15/01/15) 
The oﬃcer explained that in this case, there was a necessity for an intervening action. Before 
CN09 started to self-harm, Z37 attempted to address the conflict between the parties present 
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through dialogue. Additionally, Z37’s first attempt to control CN09’s behaviour (to drop the 
scissors) relied on verbal commands. When this approach was ineﬀective, he resorted to phys-
ical action.  
This case illustrates how an oﬃcer’s actions during a PCE appear to be influenced by those 
of a citizen. The oﬃcer’s verbal command to drop the scissors and the resulting physical re-
trieval of the scissors were because of CN09’s disobedience. Furthermore, Z37’s case shows 
how the actions of the oﬃcer do not necessarily aﬀect the actions of the citizen: the citizen ig-
nored the initial verbal command to drop the scissors, which caused the oﬃcer to use physical 
control to retrieve the scissors. 
These examples illustrate how an oﬃcer’s decision to acquiesce to, resist or overcome any 
blockage was dependent on the oﬃcer’s perception of the severity of the harm that might oc-
cur if the oﬃcer did not overcome the blockage. In this way, the greater the severity of 
perceived harm, the greater the necessity to overcome the blockage. In the first case of the 
drug-aﬀected male (Case 7.2.1), the oﬃcer described how in some instances it could be benefi-
cial not to take direct action and to ignore a particular citizen behaviour. In the second case of 
the female with the scissors (Case 7.2.2), the oﬃcer took immediate action to stop the self-
harming behaviour and secure a weapon.  
In another case, oﬃcers were dispatched to locate a male who had a behavioural and learn-
ing disorder who had absconded from a residential care facility. The patient CN86 was being 
followed by care workers who were not permitted to use force to bring him back into custody. 
When oﬃcer Z57 located the patient, he attempted to begin the encounter. In the narrative 
below, the first paragraph is extracted from field notes and the second is from an interview 
with Z57 after the event.  
Case 7.2.3 Absconding male assaults officer (PCE0091) 
Police were called to assist IHC4 workers as a male in-patient had walked out of the house. Two care workers 
were following the IHC patient CN86. [While driving searching for CN86 a] police patrol saw CN86 walking 
towards them when they entered the target street. One officer alighted from the vehicle quickly and walked 
towards CN86. He asked for the male by his name to stop but the male continued to walk. CN86 threw a punch 
at Z57 in response. Z57’s approach was not confrontational; his tone was neutral. At this point, Z57 immediately 
restrained the male. This resulted in a scuffle, with Z57 pushing CN86 against a fence and then onto the ground. 
CN86 continued to thrash and attempt to escape from Z57. (Field note 14/03/15) 
We pulled up to a guy that was walking down [a road] and he was being followed by two staff members and he 
was intellectually handicapped. He was under a compulsion to reside at an address and he’d left, so the staff 
                                               
4 IHC New Zealand was formally known as Intellectually Handicapped Children.  
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members called for our assistance to detain him I suppose, so he could be put into appropriate care. I've seen 
him walking down the street, he was quite a large male and fat size and really was quite short, he was shorter 
than me. We pulled up saw the male, pulled up on the side of the road, he was walking towards the patrol car so 
I jumped out of the patrol car, I think my partner jumped out at the same time. His name was [Brian]5. I said 
“[Brian] stop there mate.” He said “No”, carried on walking, sort of walked beside him and towards him and said, 
“[Brian] you need to stop, we need to chat to you.” He said “No.” At that point you could tell that, we already 
knew he had intellectual disabilities but you could tell by looking at him that he was quite agitated, especially by 
looking in his eyes. Although he didn’t show any signs of aggression towards me, he was just continuing walking so 
he was only passively resistant. Or actively resisting, he didn’t appear assaultive at that stage. So I didn't want him 
to continue walking, I didn't know what could happen from there or where he could go from there or what he’s 
capable of so I stood in front of him. I'm very non-confrontational at all. I stood in front, put my arms up, I can’t 
remember I might have placed one hand on his chest. I said, “[Brian], stop there.” and then he took a swing 
towards my head a couple of times. I don’t think he got a proper shot on but I restrained him from there and 
pinned him on the ground and once he was on the ground he was compliant and handcuffed. I didn’t have any 
problems with him from that point on. (Interview transcript Z57)  
In this encounter, the initial actions of Z57 (asking CN86 to stop) did not result in obedience; 
the disobedience created a procedural blockage. To overcome the blockage, Z57 moved to an 
enforcement action, using physical control to detain CN86.   
Summary 
At both research sites, oﬃcers described that their approach to the use of controlling behav-
iour (including verbal and physical tactics) were governed by the principles of proportionality 
and necessity. Control behaviour would be used in a proportionate manner and would only be 
used when it was necessary to do so. The attitudes and behaviours of oﬃcers at NZC appeared 
to reflect the departmental policies of TENR and the Tactical Options Framework. However, 
oﬃcers from both sites relied on verbal control behaviours unless physical control was re-
quired. Physical control was not used in situations unless citizen actions dictated. However, it 
was also apparent that the utility of communication (verbal exchange and verbal control) was 
diminished if the citizen was intoxicated, mentally ill, or intellectually challenged. When deal-
ing with this group of citizens, oﬃcers were less reliant on verbal communication and more 
reliant on physical actions. 
7.3 Variances in verbal and physical control behaviour 
Oﬃcers have explained how their actions were influenced by the actions or disposition of citi-
zens. Responses to citizen-led procedural conflict were seen by oﬃcers as being proportionate 
                                               
5 The patient’s name is substituted to maintain anonymity.  
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and necessary. But while oﬃcers explicitly believed that their own actions were ‘dictated by 
the citizen’, oﬃcers also acknowledged that their actions, their preferences, or skill set, had an 
instrumental eﬀect on the citizen’s behaviour and thus their ability to resolve conflict.  
Use of force continua 
The NZPOL and SAPOL use of force policies assume verbal and physical actions as legitimate 
levels of ‘police’ force. In fact, verbal communication is intertwined with the use of force: 
warnings or threats of force act as explicit signals that non-compliance may result in the use of 
force, as do less coercive oﬃcer requests where citizens may feel obliged to comply in order to 
avoid more coercive actions. During the quantitative and qualitative studies, most physical 
force used by oﬃcers against citizens was trifling (at force level 2 according to Alpert and 
Dunham’s Suspect Resistance and Oﬃcer Force Level schema6). These lower levels of physical 
force were often carried out during routine police activities when oﬃcers conducted physical 
searches, applied handcuﬀs, or escorted citizens who were in custody. Physical actions used 
during ‘stop and search’ were limited to facilitating a rub-down or pat-down search of a citi-
zen’s body and/or the search of citizens’ possessions. Physical actions were also used during 
an arrest procedure. Some arrests (or detainments) occurred without the use of handcuﬀs. In 
these cases, oﬃcers relied on their physical presence to control the behaviour of citizens. 
While these physical actions occurred regularly, oﬃcers displayed no level of emotion or frus-
tration. The actions appeared casual, natural, and routine.  
When more advanced levels of force were used, such as open-handed strikes, pain compli-
ance, OC spray (pepper), or takedown techniques, the actions appeared less casual and more 
calculated. These actions were precipitated by citizen actions who resisted arrest, attempting 
to evade capture or deliberate assaultive actions towards oﬃcers. In these situations, force was 
used in a more assertive manner to combat citizen resistance. Oﬃcer verbal communication 
during these situations was also more assertive: instructions were more commanding than 
those used during routinized arrest actions and less verbose. Oﬃcers also used less eloquent 
language, regularly swearing at citizens who were struggling or resisting.   
The use of force at these higher levels was infrequent (at force levels 3–5 according to 
Alpert and Dunham’s Suspect Resistance and Oﬃcer Force Level schema). It was evident that 
all oﬃcers were aware that they were accountable for their actions and their decisions to use 
                                               
6 Suspect Resistance and Oﬃcer Force Level Scale (Hickman et al. 2015).  
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force. Certain levels of force appeared to be routinized: handcuﬃng, touching, or searching 
occurred regularly without comment or discussion among other oﬃcers. These actions were 
regarded as routine behaviour when taking a citizen into custody. As such, it appeared that 
oﬃcers appeared to confer less significance to these actions than the more direct actions such 
as applying force for pain compliance, using physical strikes against a citizen, or using of non-
lethal weapons or chemical agents.  
7.3.1 VARIANCES OF OFFICER SKILL AND PREFERENCE 
Several of the interview questions invited the participants to comment on how their own prac-
tice diﬀered from their colleagues. But this process also occurred outside of the context of the 
present research. It was commonplace for oﬃcers to reflect on their practice using informal 
comparisons with other oﬃcers. Narrative accounts of encounters were often shared among 
colleagues informally. The phenomenon of police ‘storytelling’ has been documented else-
where (see Waddington 1999; van Hulst 2013).  
At times oﬃcers would share narratives in a boastful enterprise. But there was some degree 
of utility in taking account of discussions where oﬃcers provided their own opinion of others’ 
accounts, sharing their own narratives and continuing discussions about how they might have 
resolved the original situation similarly or diﬀerently. During these informal discussions, 
oﬃcers’ ‘reputations’ were formed: for instance, oﬃcers might be classified as talkers, hot 
heads, a chicken, a cool operator, heavy-handed or a loose unit’.  
During the formal interviews for the present research, oﬃcers were invited to reflect about 
their personal capacity to resolve conflict. Oﬃcers were prompted to discuss how they as-
sessed the appropriateness and necessity of the actions they had used or witnessed during 
encounters where conflict occurred. These discussions were aimed at gleaning insight from 
oﬃcer responses to overt procedural conflict.  
Expertise, temperament, and physiology 
Some oﬃcers reflected about the eﬃcacy and utility of their expertise when using conflict 
resolution techniques. Oﬃcer Z13 commented that verbal control communication is prefera-
ble to physical control, but it may not always be eﬀective when dealing with a citizen who is 
emotionally or physically aroused. Z13 also discussed how the self-assessment of her abilities 
shapes the way she interacted with some types of citizens.   
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Case 7.3.1 Female officer reflects about her ability to deal with aggressive people (Z13) 
Officer Z13 [In] some situations by the time we get there, [are] so amped up that [communications] aren’t 
necessarily going to work and you need to go on with the stronger approach, and perhaps the physical, restraint 
or the handcuffing would initially be required to bring that person down, and then you could use 
[communication]. Definitely sometimes [communication], specifically if alcohol is involved do not work, and I’ve 
been in that situation where I’ve tried and there’s no point at all. Often people too are a bit confused as to, if 
you’re yelling, for example, at them who it is that’s yelling as well. So you are best to get in if they need to be 
handcuffed or dealt with, keep the situation under control and then use [communication].   
Interviewer And have you a specific example in mind that you can recount?   
Officer Z13 Often if it’s a situation like that then I would be with someone else. And the men would potentially 
go in and deal with the person with it, and I may assist with it. And if it was my arrest for example, I’d get the 
person back to the car and then used [communication] in the car and say, you know: “Everything’s fine, let’s calm 
down, take a deep breath.” Cause, again, I don’t have that strength. If the person was volatile, the person I’m 
working with generally would be male, and they would take the arrest and deal with them. I may be left to speak 
with the victim, which is totally fine, and I have, I have had that situation many times where I’ll be left at the scene 
to deal with the victim. And it’s fine, if the person is aggressive and it’s not appropriate, I don’t deal with them. 
But it’s also been the other way around where you can start with [communication] and everything’s going fine 
and next thing something might happen. You might say something that they don’t like and straight away the 
situation is amped up, and, again, [communication] may not work. It’s always my first option, but I do know when 
it’s not an option as well, I can see that straight away. Yeah. And most of the times, I’m not going to jobs by 
myself where I need to get in and be physical. There’d always be someone there to assist. (Interview transcript 
Z13) 
Another female oﬃcer Z03 made a comment about her physical ability: 
Case 7.3.2 Officer reflects on physical abilities (Z03) 
I don’t have the physical strength to go on a rugby tackle with someone straight away. I have to talk. In my last 
resort, that’s to have to be physical. I have to talk to them. If that’s calming people down by taking the piss out of 
myself or joking or say: “Hey, you don't want to look like a tool in front of the girls.” Or... That works. Some 
times. (Interview transcript Z03) 
In both examples, Z13 and Z03 indicated that when faced with a citizen who challenged their 
ability to control behaviour, due to physical reasons, their solution was to use a diﬀerent tactic 
at the same force level, rather than choosing a tactic at a higher level. In other words, when 
faced with citizen resistance, their action was not to increase the level of force.  
The consideration of comparative physical stature was not limited to gender nor research 
site. Male oﬃcers who were of slight build had the same approach to the importance of com-
munication. For instance, here oﬃcer A82 discusses his awareness of relative size and strength 
to citizens he may interact with. 
Case 7.3.3 Male officer aware of his size (A82) 
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You know, I’m only a small fellow. I might be working with another small one [and] we’re approaching a 6 foot 8, 
150-kilo person. (Interview transcript A82) 
Furthermore, oﬃcers who were of larger stature shared similar views of the importance of 
communication and remaining calm. In this example, oﬃcer Z69 indicated how he regulates 
his own behaviour when dealing with aggressive or confrontational citizens. Rather than in-
creasing the response force level, he opts to disengage from the confrontation. 
Case 7.3.4 Intoxicated person in custody area 
[If] someone comes in in a high level of, of aggression or confrontation I generally either meet them or go above 
it. And then you’ll find these situations where you’re just screaming at each other. To me that’s untidy, especially 
on the watch-house7 when you’re in, you know you’re not gonna win. You best just put them in there and let 
them cool down. And I see that with police officers, especially on the watch-house counter where they try and 
dominate and you just are not gonna win. You know, especially when you’ve got someone who’s intoxicated 
and.... They don’t really care. They know, they know they’re in custody. All the questions in the world, they’re not 
prepared to answer. There’s no use yelling at them, and it just, to me, it looks like we lose composure when we 
start yelling at them. But, yeah, but generally with a bully or someone who’s like that or I’ll try and meet them at 
that level. I might not be using, I might not be using my voice commands so much that my actions, my physical 
actions where I’m not backing down, I guess, will hopefully show. I’m 6ft, fraction over 6ft. Not... I'm reasonably 
solid-ish build, so I guess that sort of helps me as well. (Interview transcript Z69) 
While Case 7.3.4 relates to a custody situation where oﬃcers can easily disengage from a 
confrontation by closing a cell door, disengagement from verbal confrontation can be more 
diﬃcult. During the behavioural study, Z69 and his partner were dispatched to a domestic in-
cident in a residential area. On arrival, they were confronted with an argumentative male who 
challenged their authority and lauded his gang history and aﬃliation, to intimidate the oﬃc-
ers.  
Case 7.3.5 Charming male threatens officers (PCE0080) 
Police were called to this address by neighbours of the occupants of a house which was having a party. The 
occupants had family staying due to a family wedding that day. The neighbour who called was concerned at the 
presence of one particular male. The neighbour thought that the male was behaving in a threatening manner to 
one of the people in the house. The male who was the subject of the neighbour’s concern was standing on the 
deck on the opposite side of the driveway. As a result of this police walked around the exterior of the house and 
found the subject of the incident CN72 standing on a deck. He was speaking in a loud voice expressing concern 
that he had lost his wallet down the side of the deck between the deck and large shrub. Police officers attempted 
to help him search for the wallet but could not see it. The group at the house were making a moderate amount 
of noise. The attending police officers asked the occupants to keep it quiet and encouraged some to leave the 
address (some were staying at another address). After a short amount of time some did leave and others 
quietened down. Police left. They decided to stay in the patrol car, which was parked in a carpark about 50 
metres from the house. After a few minutes a member of the family at the house and asked police to return as 
                                               
7 The ‘watch-house’ is a term used by New Zealand oﬃcers to denote to custody area of a police station. 
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the male CN72 was abusive and they wanted him to leave. On return the male CN72 was in a completely 
different state of mind. He was no longer “charming” as he had been previously. He swore loudly at the police 
officers and made gang-style chants. He was large. Officer Z69 stood about 5 metres from the male. After a 
number of control statements from police, and verbal abuse from CN72, Officer Z69 were able to de-escalate 
the level of conflict from the male. He eventually calmed down after being told that he was not going to be 
arrested, just that he was being encouraged to leave and that police would not leave until he did. This took 
approximately 15 minutes before he eventually left. As he did he wanted to shake hands with both officers (and 
me) and said that he was from the North Island and the “cops up there aren’t as respectful as the cops in [South 
City]”. (Field note 7/5/15) 
This incident illustrates how an oﬃcer may de-escalate a conflict encounter with a suspect by 
using clear and eﬀective verbal communication. However, when discussing this incident dur-
ing an interview afterwards, Z69 commented that during his verbal communication with the 
male, he was considering what level of force would be appropriate if an arrest had to be made.  
We’ve turned up and there’s been quite a lot of hostility from this man towards the police. He's made it quite 
clear that he's from up North, he's gang affiliated and he would have a crack at police, and just sort of started off 
softly, softly, talking about to him and trying to find out what's going on. And he got quite to a, sort of, a high 
level where I thought things were going to turn quite physical with him. I just didn't back down really. I had a taser 
in my possession. It was absolutely pouring down rain, so we were getting horribly wet. I sort of levelled with 
them to some degree where I didn't go, I didn't... too involved into that, someone may have been assaulted or 
there was a domestic incident. My thoughts were as it, we're not gonna get anywhere with that, and I just wanted 
to get away from the property, really. So while I was keeping an eye on him, I was trying to, to arrange for 
someone to come and pick him up and to get him out of the... I sort of if it can be his friend as such and he trust 
me to a certain degree, then it's not gonna kick off. Cause, really, all I could think was they would be locking him 
up for is him assaulting police. It was what, what my thoughts were. Yeah, I think, because I didn't back down to 
him, but the way I sort of said: “Look, you know, if you're gonna come towards me, I'm not gonna back down.” I 
think he sort of backed away a bit. I think that's where the conflict was resolved, I guess. Which... yeah, I, I believe 
that it was probably more to it. You know, the guy is saying he's lost his wallet, I don't believe that was, that it 
even had happened. And to say again, he had a couple of hundred dollars in his wallet I don't believe that either. 
(Interview transcript Z69) 
When asked to comment on how he thought his behaviour was eﬀective in resolving the con-
flict, Z69 replied that it was his statement that he wasn’t going to ‘back down’ if a fight began.  
I think the effective thing is that he was threatening to have a go at us, and I basically said: “If you do that, you 
know, I'm not gonna back down. And if you come down those stairs, and assault police or take it any further, 
then I won't back down.” So for his threats and her telling me about his reputation and “I’ve bitten people’s ears 
off” and all that sort of stuff didn’t scare me. I wasn’t frightened. I think he probably knew that, I think he was 
expecting a different reaction from me or others, and he didn't get it. Not that I wanted to fight with him, but if it 
happened that... I was more worried that if it did happen others at the address might have jumped in. That was 
probably my big concern, that I would be in a position where I would have been fighting for survival. I had a 
female partner who was very new, and I knew that she was a bit intimidated by this male. So it was my, my 
concern. If I was going one on one with this guy, I wouldn’t have a problem, but it was the other younger guys at 
the address which I was 50/50, really. … He didn't worry me, but others [did]. And we were, sort of, in a 
reasonably confined space in the back, back part of the property. (Interview transcript Z69) 
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This encounter was notable in the mind of the researcher, too. The conduct of CN27 signalled 
a looming danger that he may well engage in a physical assault. It was apparent by the posi-
tioning and body language displayed by the less experienced oﬃcer that she was feeling 
intimidated. The pressing circumstances in this situation was that Z69 had determined that he 
could not walk away from the conflict; the presence of CN27 was posing a risk to the order 
and safety of those remaining at the house.  
Oﬃcers from SAC also talked about the importance of calmness and communication dur-
ing conflict encounters. Oﬃcer A02 below indicated that his preference was to always start at 
a ‘low level’ and adjust as appropriate. In the second extract, oﬃcer A82 discusses his prefer-
ence to use calming behaviour when dealing with citizens.  
Case 7.3.6 SAC Officers discuss taking a 'low' approach to conflict (A02, A82) 
I’ll always try to attempt first with, I suppose, just calming something down or just seeing what you can do to 
resolve it initially, and then from there so you have to escalate upwards, but it also depends on what’s happening. 
If it’s something, you know, that’s physical, then you have to be physical straight away. (Interview transcript A02) 
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I’ve had quite some time on the road as a police officer, not simply just in SAPOL. I 
mean, it’s only been a short period here, but also in [another force]. My approach initially is that communication 
basis, to go in there, try and resolve the matter using one of those tactical options of communication. I will judge 
that person as to how, what level of tone that I would use before approaching that person and assessing on that 
basis. It may mean that I have to intervene a little more strongly in terms of the way I communicate with that 
person or it may simply mean I can just calm that person down by talking to them softly and ascertaining what’s 
going on. So I’ll always take that approach. You know, others may see it as a different means, but it’s been 
fortunate in my policing career thus far that that approach has, has allowed me to, to continue, without too many 
incidents. (Interview transcript A82) 
However, while all oﬃcers discussed the importance of eﬀective communication, it was 
clear during the observational study, and during the interviews, that oﬃcers observed diﬀer-
ences in style, ability, and eﬀectiveness among other oﬃcers in their team. Oﬃcer A92 
indicated that some oﬃcers had a more aggressive style when speaking to citizens than he 
does.  
Case 7.3.7 Taking a calm approach (A92) 
I guess there are some officers that will go in to an incident starting way up here, like quite aggressive, quite in 
their face like that, whereas I like to go in, speak to people, assess the situation and work out what level I need to 
speak to that person to decide whether, all right, I can speak nicely and calmly to them, just have a good chat, 
find out what’s going on, and then there’s times obviously where I’ve got to be more direct and firm, not so 
much aggressive, but I, I will be aggressive if somebody starts abusing me and yelling at me. … So, yeah, there are, 
there are people that start high and work their way down, whereas I like to come in, give everyone a chance to 
speak nicely, make sure the situation is calm and go from there. (Interview transcript A92) 
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Oﬃcer Z57 also indicates an awareness of variability among team members. 
Case 7.3.8 Officer is more patient than other officers (Z57) 
I think I might be at times, not all the time, but at times a little bit more patient than some officers. As an example 
last night we went to a party and a couple officers were quite keen and get in and move the party on-wards, 
could have been quite confrontational but I thought if we left it for as long as possible then the party would 
disperse itself, which is sort of did. There are times we do have to go and do that sort of thing but I suppose 
sometimes I am more patient than others. (Interview transcript Z57) 
In contrast, oﬃcer Z81 remarked on the utility of a direct approach. 
Case 7.3.9 Officer with more direct approach (Z81) 
Oﬃcer Z() I have a more direct approach. I feel for me that works. And I appreciate all different perspectives. 
Every officer will approach a situation differently, and I don't think one is right or wrong over another, and 
different people bring different strengths. And I said, the direct approach – I'll be straight up with people, and if 
they’re being foolish, I’ll tell they're being foolish. But I’ll approach someone with, what's the best way to put it, I’ll 
approach someone, even if I’ve met them before, with an open mind and on even ground and give them a 
chance to explain themself and explain the situation.    
Interviewer So you used the word “direct.” You have a direct approach. Does that mean you observe other 
people being indirect or how, how is what you do different to, to other people?   
When, when I say “direct” I guess, I cut to the point or can cut [to] the point sooner than some other officers. 
And, once again, no one way is right or wrong, but rather than... skirting around an issue, I’ll go straight to an issue. 
(Interview transcript Z81) 
The discussion of ability and practice among oﬃcers did not diﬀer between the two re-
search sites. Oﬃcers from both sites reflected on their personal preferences, their physiology, 
and their ability to resolve conflict. There was no apparent explanation for any cultural or per-
sonality factors might have influenced the variation in control behaviour evident in the 
behavioural study.  
7.3.2 PRE-EMPTIVE ACTIONS 
One notable operational diﬀerence between the two research sites was the impact of preventa-
tive actions. A common theme emerging from the comments of SAPOL oﬃcers—and seen 
during the observational study—was the tactic of taking direct pre-emptive actions to avoid 
potential victimisation or oﬀending. This ethos seemed to pervade across all patrol 
workgroups at the SAC station in a stronger manner than at the NZC station.  
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The legislative triggers for detaining an intoxicated citizen diﬀered between the two sites. 
The Public Intoxication Act 1984 [SA] specified that an intoxicated person may be detained if 
they are “in a public place, under the influence of a drug or alcohol and that by reason of that 
fact the person is unable to take proper care for himself” (Parliament of South Australia 1984, 
p.3). In New Zealand, the Policing Act 2008 [NZ] specified that an intoxicated person may be 
detained if found “in a public place or intoxicated while trespassing on private property” and 
is “incapable of protecting himself or herself from physical harm, or likely to cause physical 
harm to another person, or likely to cause significant damage to any property” (New Zealand 
Parliament 2008, p.22). 
It was a regular occurrence for SAC oﬃcers to detain intoxicated citizens and transport 
them to a ‘sobering-up centre’8: it was common for some citizens to wait outside the SAPOL 
station and ask to be taken to the sobering-up centre. In the following example (Case 7.3.10) 
oﬃcers located the intoxicated citizens at the commencement of their shift within metres of 
the station.  
Case 7.3.10 Transporting woman to detox centre (PCE0030) 
Intoxicated female (Aboriginal) drinking alcohol outside police station. When the unit walked out [of] the station 
they came across a group of three intoxicated females within 5 metres of the station. The female struggled to 
spell and enunciate her name due to the state of her intoxication. She was able to stand and walk unaided but 
looked sleepy and slurred and mumbled her words. The officers attempted to take her details three times. They 
were extremely tolerant. After the third attempt they took her into the police station front counter so that they 
could use the counter computer terminal rather than [their handheld] mobile device. Her name was checked and 
verified. She was not wanted. Due to her level of intoxication she was detained for public intoxication to be 
transported to the local detox centre. At that point her two other friends were offered a ride to the detox 
centre. They agreed. There was no disagreement between any of the other citizens and the officers. Any sense of 
conflict arose would possibly have existed through frustration of the officers being unable to get the citizen’s 
details. (Field note 13/02/15) 
The legislation that provided police powers to detain for intoxication was similar in the two 
research sites. Both required that oﬃcers were to take detained intoxicated citizens to places of 
safety, however despite the legislation, no “sobering-up centre” or “temporary shelter”9 existed 
at NZC. As a result, NZC oﬃcers were faced with the choice of transporting an intoxicated 
citizen to the citizen’s home or to the police custody area.  
                                               
8 See section 7(3) of the Public Intoxication Act 1984 [SA]. 
9 See section 36 of the Policing Act 2008 [NZ]. 
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Oﬃcers from both sites took pre-emptive action against citizens who were intoxicated to a 
lesser degree than the “being unable to take care of themselves” threshold. For instance, oﬃcer 
A16 comments on the wisdom of preventative actions against intoxicated ‘idiots’: 
Case 7.3.11. Take an idiot off the street early (A16) 
I’m certainly more inclined to, to stop for anything that’s happening there and then. If you can prevent it then we 
save ourselves a lot of work, we save people a lot of grief. ... Certainly when it’s busy and there’s, and there’s 
plenty of police on then your tolerance is, is lower. Take an idiot off the street early; it saves him becoming a, a 
bigger idiot later, I think. (Interview transcript A16) 
The oﬃcer also suggested that this was a common approach taken by other teams at the SAC 
station as it is seen as preventing work later during a busy shift: 
Case 7.3.12 Saving work for yourself (A16) 
I think there’s a mentality that if you get in there quick and nip it in the bud then you’re saving yourself work, 
you’re saving people hassles, so I think everybody is of a similar mind here in that if it’s, if it’s go in, then intervene. 
You don’t necessarily have to arrest, but if it means pushing people away and that kind of thing then I think 
everyone on my team is pretty much the same. There’s no one who’d shy away from it. So I don’t think there’s 
much difference in the way that we deal with conflict. (Interview transcript A16) 
NZC oﬃcers shared this perspective. When asked what would cause this oﬃcer to stop and 
initiate a PCE, oﬃcer Z23 replied: 
Case 7.3.13 Getting someone off the street before something happens (Z23) 
Yeah, well, I mean it could be, it could be a broken down car, and you stop to help to get them back on the 
road, get the car going, right through to an assault taking place or potentially someone that could start an assault 
that you would get off the street before that happens. (Interview transcript Z23) 
The pre-emptive action to remove intoxicated, vulnerable, or troublesome citizens from 
‘the street’ appears to be rooted in the situational crime prevention approach. Both routine ac-
tivity theory (Cohen & Felson 1979) and opportunity theory (Clarke 2012) are constructed on 
the basis that crime can be prevented if the presence of a victim or oﬀender can be eliminated 
from a location. But while the oﬃcers’ approach was not necessarily about conflict resolu-
tion—it was perhaps more about conflict prevention—it shows that oﬃcers were concerned 
with both the wellbeing of potential victims and to minimise the potential for citizens to 
oﬀend. 
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7.4 Discussion 
Procedural conflict occurred during police-citizen encounters when the intentional or unin-
tentional actions of a citizen interfered, frustrated, or blocked the oﬃcer’s ability to achieve a 
procedural goal. Procedural conflict can occur at any stage of the police-citizen encounter. 
The conflict was covert or overt. It occurred during investigative and enforcement encounters. 
Procedural conflict diﬀered from interpersonal conflict that arose from incivilities, such as in-
sults, verbal abuse, or physical abuse. While procedural conflict originated from the 
frustration that one party may feel when prevented from attaining their goals, incivility-based 
conflict was more adversarial; it aﬀected the emotional state of individual. 
Responses to conflict 
Oﬃcers who cleared goal blockages used controlling behaviour to overcome the resistance or 
interference. The use of controlling behaviour was proportionate to the level of resistance or 
type of interference. Oﬃcers used controlling behaviour when it was necessary to clear a 
blockage but also used controlling behaviour as a pre-emptive tactic to prevent the occurrence 
of victimisation or oﬀending.  
Verbal communication and physical actions were used by oﬃcers in both sites in response 
to conflict to overcome citizen resistance. While the oﬃcers who were interviewed indicated a 
preference for taking a calm approach (or starting ‘low’), they indicated that this was not nec-
essarily the case for all other oﬃcers they had worked with. Nonetheless, these findings 
indicate that oﬃcers from both sites prefer a calm approach. In addition, most physical actions 
of oﬃcers observed during the observational study were at a ‘low’ level. The actions of touch-
ing, searching, handcuﬃng were routine, if not normative. In the occasions where greater 
force was used (at levels 3–5 on the Alpert and Dunham score), oﬃcers appeared to be less re-
laxed in their demeanour. This is indicative of the infrequency of these types of actions: they 
appeared less rehearsed. The utility of communication (verbal exchange and verbal control) 
was diminished if the citizen was intoxicated, mentally ill, or intellectually challenged. When 
dealing with this group of citizens, oﬃcers were less reliant on verbal communication and 
more reliant on physical actions. 
When some oﬃcers perceive themselves to be ‘weaker’ than a citizen in a conflict situation, 
or those who doubt their level of skill, they do not necessarily rely on higher levels of force to 
overcome any resistance. There was no evidence of threshold creep or weapon substitution—
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i.e. the use of weapons to overcome the perceived lack of ability. Both male and female oﬃc-
ers, from each research site, indicated that their preference was to use and that they relied on 
verbal communication to overcome resistance. Similarly, the preference to engage with verbal 
communication was shared by those oﬃcers who had a larger physical stature. These views re-
inforce the existence of proportionality and necessity: force was used when required but not 
relied on as the only method to resolve a conflict.   
There were no significant diﬀerences between the responses from SAPOL and NZPOL 
Oﬃcers who were interviewed during the observational study: oﬃcers from both sites dis-
cussed the importance of proportionality and necessity when dealing with citizen resistance. 
However, it was notable that there were more transportations of intoxicated citizens for de-
toxification at SAC than at NZC. NZPOL oﬃcers were more reluctant to use their powers to 
detain intoxicated citizens. SAPOL oﬃcers extended the pre-emptive approach to those who 
were less intoxicated (those who were capable of looking after themselves) but assessed as 
‘likely’ to oﬀend or become victimised, as evidenced in the comments from oﬃcer A16: “Take 
an idiot oﬀ the street early, it saves him becoming a … bigger idiot later” (Interview transcript 
A16). This oﬃcer’s remarks represented an ethos held by other members of the SAC station 
(Case 7.3.12) and illustrated how oﬃcers believed that environmental and situational factors 
influenced their practice.  
7.4.1 SUMMARY 
Findings from the quantitative study (Chapter 5) sought an explanation for the observed vari-
ance in the frequency and proportionate duration of control behaviours between the two 
research sites. To address this question, observational data were analysed to explore if there 
was a systemic explanation for the variance. The concept of procedural conflict was proposed 
as an explanation for the frustration and strain evident during the observation of oﬃcers. In 
the present chapter, definitions of overt and covert conflict were explored in relation to pro-
cedural conflict. In the forthcoming chapters, the findings reported in the preceding chapters 
are discussed in the context of the central research questions.  
 8 
Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 How do routinely unarmed police behave during police-
citizen encounters? 
The findings of the present study point to the significance of the decision-making process used 
by oﬃcers to initiate a police-citizen encounter. During the quantitative study, oﬃcers at NZC 
mostly (72.1%) initiated encounters in response to calls for service; the decision to initiate an 
encounter was influenced by a victim or witness to an event. But when oﬃcers self-initiated 
encounters (15.4%), they followed a decision-making process to consider: (1) the level of per-
ceived harm that had been inflicted or that might occur if there was no intervention; (2) an 
assessment of the legality or illegality of an action, behaviour, or event; and (3) the level of so-
cial acceptability of an action, behaviour, or event. The decision to intervene was not reliant 
on all three triggers; one trigger may be deemed suﬃcient.   
Oﬃcers commented that their peers had diﬀerent ‘thresholds’ at which they would engage 
with a citizen. In many cases, oﬃcers tolerated citizens who displayed incivilities, insults, or 
aggressive behaviour directed towards them. Such behaviour was not ignored—oﬃcers were 
indeed aware that these behaviours had occurred—but intervention was not deemed neces-
sary or having merit. In some cases, oﬃcers would comment that they noticed a behaviour but 
did not initiate any action. Epp et al. (2014) proposed that oﬃcers can be prone to implicit in-
tergroup bias when choosing whom to stop when conducting self-initiated encounters. Epp et 
al. drew on bias towards ethnic minorities. In the present research, there was no indication of 
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over-representation of ethnic minorities (compared to census data of Māori at the NZ site, 
although there was an over-representation of 0.9% of Aboriginal people1) compared with an 
over-representation of 0.2% of Caucasian/White/European people2. However, there was evi-
dence of some stereotypical bias towards social groups within the cities: oﬃcers were aware 
that some geographical zones were prone to alcohol-related disorder, such as the ‘student 
quarter’ and the CBD ‘entertainment quarter’. At diﬀerent times of the shift, the focus of oﬃc-
ers transformed from crime control to order maintenance with the ‘student’ and the ‘drunk’ 
becoming the ‘symbolic assailant’ (see Skolnick 2011).  
8.1.1 NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 
Factors that influence an oﬃcer’s decision to intervene and enforce minor oﬀences3 have been 
discussed in the literature. Brown (1981) discussed that minor violations are often ignored for 
rational reasons: the seriousness of the violation, the diﬃculty in initiating an encounter (such 
in a busy traﬃc environment), or the personal preferences of the oﬃcer (whether they are fo-
cused on detecting felony-level crimes). In contrast, policing strategies such as zero-tolerance 
policing, often synonymous with broken-windows policing popularised by Wilson and Kel-
ling (1982) and Bratton (1998), advocated the merit of acting against oﬀenders of all minor 
oﬀences. While the occurrence of oﬃcer-initiated encounters during the NZ phase of 
quantitative study was low (15.4%)4, those oﬃcers interviewed described how their decision-
making process for initiating an encounter was shaped.   
Three triggers (perceived harm, legality or illegality, and social acceptability) were identi-
fied as instrumental in the decision-making process. The consideration of these factors by 
oﬃcers suggests that oﬃcers were influenced by the principles of necessity and proportionali-
ty. Oﬃcers explained that they considered the views of the wider community, or cues from an 
individual when assessing the acceptability of a citizen’s behaviour in public. For instance, one 
oﬃcer said that they take the reaction of bystanders as an indication of the necessity to inter-
                                               
1 See Table A8.1 in the Appendix for a complete comparison. The population of Aboriginal people was measured by Census at 0.1% of the 
population; the population sample for the present study was 14.3%; and the percentage of ethnic groups for oﬃcer-initiated encounters was 
15.2%. Waddington et al. (2004) identify the risk of calculating racial proportionality using census data and advocate the utility of measuring 
‘available population’. In the present study, no measurements of available populations were made, nor available, and as such, the present 
analysis relies on comparison to census data. 
2 The population for White/European people was measured by Census at 83.8% of the population; the population sample for the present 
study was 73.7%, and the percentage of ethnic groups for oﬃcer-initiated encounters was 73.9%. 
3 Minor oﬀences would be described as misdemeanours in American jurisdictions, summary oﬀences or traﬃc oﬀences in New Zealand. 
4 The proportion of citizen-initiated compared to oﬃcer-initiated varies in the literature. Finstad’s study of the Norwegian police found that 
42% of observed police encounters were police-initiated (Finstad cited in Hølgård 2011). 
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vene. This ‘situation testing’ suggests that oﬃcers were taking a ‘community-centric approach’ 
to determining the civility or incivility of behaviour, oﬃcers were indeed testing against a ‘law 
abiding’ citizen’s measure of acceptability.  
Brown’s (1981) construction of police oﬃcer operational styles considered how aggressively 
an oﬃcer pursues the goal of crime control and how selectively the oﬃcer behaves when en-
forcing the law. In the present study, the oﬃcer’s aggressiveness and selectiveness appear to be 
informed by the victims’ or bystanders’ reaction to an antisocial or criminal behaviour: neces-
sity was defined as a product of the oﬃcer’s perception of how the citizen’s behaviour 
impacted the community.  In this respect, the oﬃcers at NZC leaned towards Muir’s ‘profes-
sional’ oﬃcer model, behaving as “a mouthpiece for someone else’s soul” (1977, p.100). 
However, selectivity was influenced by the severity of the citizen’s behaviour and situation of 
the place. The necessity to intervene during a behaviour occurring in a public place (‘the 
street’) diﬀered to those cases that had occurred in private places. Even in situations where 
victims received similar physical injuries, such as a ‘street fight’ between two intoxicated males 
or a ‘domestic assault’ between two intoxicated intimate partners, diﬀerent responses were 
elicited from oﬃcers; the perceived severity of the latter outweighed the perceived severity of 
the former.  
Oﬃcers’ constructs of the necessity to use force in the present study can be gleaned from 
occurrence of controlling behaviour during encounters. For instance, while there was a high 
rate of the occurrence of verbal control during arrest-encounters (92.3%), the occurrence rate 
of physical control was half the rate of verbal control (46.2%): from these data, it can be in-
ferred that not all citizens who were arrested were handcuﬀed or searched. Thus, the use 
physical control was not arbitrary; it was only used in circumstances when it was deemed nec-
essary. Similarly, there was no occurrence of physical control during field-warning and field-
action encounters. The occurrence of control behaviours during suspect-encounters, the oc-
currence rate of physical control is very low (7.7%).  
The degree of physical force used by oﬃcers during encounters was not measured during 
the quantitative study. Consequently, it was not possible to establish a quantifiable measure of 
the degree of force used in response to the resistance experienced such as a force factor para-
digm (see Wolf et al. 2009), but it is instructive to observe that oﬃcers interviewed during the 
qualitative study identified the importance of proportionate intervention in response to citi-
zen resistance. This indicated a self-awareness that their behaviour could aﬀect the behaviour 
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of the citizen but also that their behaviour had to be appropriate in the circumstances, and it 
demonstrated professionalism.  
Herbert (2006) outlines the inherent complexity of how competing police-community rela-
tionships may shape notions of police legitimacy by the community. Conflict emerged, and 
thus threatened the legitimacy of the police when community problems or calls for service 
were ignored, or their utility dismissed. Herbert draws attention to oﬃcers’ preference to at-
tend ‘dangerous’ or ‘serious’ incidents, but his thesis omits any reference to granular ranking 
of the importance or necessity of police action. In the present research, the conflict between 
liberalistic and democratic applications of law was apparent. Greater tolerance and neutrality 
towards citizens occurred when oﬃcers responded to street incidents (such as public disorder 
or fighting) compared with incidents involving property oﬀences (such as theft or shoplifting) 
or oﬀences at private locations (such as domestic-related harm).  
8.1.2 PREVALENCE OF CONTROL 
As previously noted, while the findings from one jurisdiction may not naturally be generaliza-
ble or transferable to another, cross-national comparisons of police agencies can be 
illuminating. The American POPN study provides one such opportunity to compare with the 
findings of the present study. Of conflict-prone police-citizen encounters,5 almost 60% 
(58.4%) involved some level of verbal or physical force on at least one occasion during the en-
counter with 50.3% of encounters involving only verbal force (Terrill 2001). Terrill defined 
verbal force as “acts that threaten … physical harm on citizens” (2001, p.2). The present study 
used a broader construction of verbal control where statements made by oﬃcers did not have 
to overtly refer to physical harm to be categorised as ‘control’. Control statements made by 
NZC oﬃcers at least once in the absence of physical control occurred in 56.1% of encounters6. 
Terrill concluded that the POPN encounters indicated that force—albeit verbal—occurred 
frequently during police-citizen encounters with suspects. Regarding the present data from 
NZC, verbal control was prevalent in all types of encounters (regardless of the citizen type).  
Terrill makes three observations that are pertinent to the present study. First, he com-
ments—with surprise—that there was no diﬀerence in the rates of coercion used by patrol 
                                               
5 These were encounters which had “the greatest potential for use of force” (Terrill 2001, p.53) involving suspects and ‘disputants’ (such as 
those citizens who were unable to be classified as being either a victim or suspect). 
6 This includes 89 encounters from NZC but excludes victims, witnesses, and the ‘other’ category. 
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oﬃcers and community-policing oﬃcers: “the view of community policing as noncoercive is 
more a misperception than reality” (2001, p.235). This observation is instructive as while the 
present study was limited to ‘patrol’ research subjects, Terrill’s analysis suggests the present 
findings might have a wider generalisability across diﬀerent workgroups. Second, oﬃcers in 
the POPN study did not, on average, respond with force to disrespectful citizens or incivility. 
This observation validates the present study; oﬃcers tended to tolerate incivilities or verbal 
abuse from citizens. Third, Terrill recommends that police agencies attempt to curb oﬃcer re-
liance on taking a “command nature” when interacting with citizens in the absence of “citizen 
resistance, threat to personal safety and no threat to citizen safety” (2001, p.230). In other 
words, he advocates that oﬃcers should adopt a less verbally coercive/control demeanour 
when interacting with citizens. Terrill’s recommendation, however, assumes that ‘citizen re-
sistance’ is overt in nature. The present study demonstrates that conflict may also manifest 
covertly, which may lead to procedural conflict (e.g. an emotionally distraught victim, or a 
confused witness).  
As previously noted, interview responses indicated that oﬃcers at NZC were influenced by 
a doctrine of proportional coercion. Control behaviour was not used arbitrarily or exclusively. 
Verbal control was more common than physical control. This approach was consistent with the 
preference expressed by a cohort of routinely unarmed Norwegian oﬃcers who preferred to 
use conciliatory tactics when attempting to resolve conflict (Abrahamsen & Strype 2009) but 
at odds with some studies involving routinely armed oﬃcers (e.g. Bayley & Garofalo 1989). It 
is pertinent to draw attention to Muir’s construct of the ‘professional’ oﬃcer: coercion is used 
only when necessary as the “professional response characteristically involved teaching 
through talk” (1977, p.145). In other words, control/coercion is used only when necessary and 
is only used in a proportionate manner. In contrast, Muir’s construct of an enforcement ap-
proach is less flexible or responsive to the circumstances of relating to the citizen’s “head and 
heart” (ibid), behaves with greater impatience and aggression, but uses words as “weapons or 
to incite, [but] never to probe the soul” (ibid).  
8.1.3 SUMMARY 
From the outset, this research has proposed deficiencies in applying ‘police use of force’ data 
to illuminate conflict resolution. While police agencies may methodically collect self-report 
use of force data from police, the omission of data on the use of control or coercive verbal 
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communication, often absent from ‘use of force reporting’, prevents a comprehensive analysis 
of conflict resolution during oﬃcer-citizen interaction. Thus, the present study measured all 
communicative behaviour to provide a descriptive analysis of conflict resolution behaviour: 
Control behaviour was mostly used to overcome procedural conflict—resistance that blocked 
oﬃcer-goals—rather than in direct response to civilian incivilities. 
In summary, the present study provides the following insights to the first research ques-
tion. First, most police-citizen encounters at NZC occurred because of citizen calls for service 
(72.1%). In the instance of oﬃcer-initiated encounters, there was an under-representation of 
Maori involvement. This finding is at odds with Epp et al. (2014) who concluded that Ameri-
can oﬃcers were prone to intergroup bias towards ethnic minorities. This was not evident in 
the sample of oﬃcer-initiated encounters. Second, when engaged in PCEs, oﬃcers mostly 
used information exchange, frequently used verbal control behaviour, and infrequently used 
physical control. This indicated that control behaviour was used when oﬃcers believed it to be 
necessary. Third, oﬃcers used control behaviour during interactions with citizens: this sug-
gested that conflict did not necessarily originate from incivilities; control behaviour was used 
to address systemic conflict (i.e. procedural conflict).  
Conclusions drawn from the present research must be considered in the context of the 
scope of the research. The research of routinely unarmed police was cross-sectional and lim-
ited to one research site (NZC). The research was also limited to the study of front-line first 
response oﬃcers: oﬃcers from other policing workgroups including road policing, communi-
ty policing, or criminal investigation, did not contribute to the dataset. Diﬀerences in attitudes 
and workplace practice among diﬀerent police workgroups have been previously documented 
(Ingram et al. 2013). Similarly, while Harvey et al. (2008) posit that observer reactivity dimin-
ishes over time, the conspicuous absence in the present research of unprofessional oﬃcer 
behaviour in reaction to citizen incivilities requires some consideration. Some factors may al-
so have influenced oﬃcer behaviour. Oﬃcers were aware that their actions were routinely 
captured by CCTV in the entertainment zones and they were aware of ad-hoc videoing by cit-
izens. Likewise, some SAC oﬃcers were trialling body-worn cameras during the research. 
Further research of oﬃcers in settings where CCTV was absent would be enlightening.  
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8.2 Do routinely unarmed police oﬃcers behave diﬀerently to 
routinely armed police oﬃcers? 
This second question is addressed by comparing the behaviour of oﬃcers from NZC and SAC. 
Two explanations for the diﬀerences were found in the frequency and duration of control be-
haviours used by NZC and SAC.  
8.2.1 DIFFERENCES IN LAW 
One explanation for the variance in the frequency and duration of conflict resolution behav-
iours might be a result of legislative diﬀerences between the jurisdictions. In South Australia, 
police had a general power under the Summary Oﬀences Act 1953 [SA] S.74A to require a per-
son to provide their name, date of birth, residential address, business address, and location of 
any place that person works7 where an oﬃcer has: 
reasonable cause to suspect—(a) that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit, an oﬀence; 
or (b) that a person may be able to assist in the investigation of an oﬀence or a suspected oﬀence (Parliament of 
South Australia 1953, p.8). 
Consequently, many encounters at SAC began with the oﬃcer asking for identification of the 
citizen, such as asking the question “do you have something with your name on it?” This style 
of communication was coded as control statement conversation or control statement aﬀect (lat-
er conflated in the present analysis as verbal control) as it caused the citizen to present their 
identification or provide their personal details. In New Zealand, there is no such general pow-
er; the power to demand identification of citizens is limited to specific statutes (e.g. Land 
Transport Act 1988 [NZ] or the Sale and Supply of Liquor Act 2012 [NZ]) and only of those 
who are suspected of committing oﬀences. Similarly, there is no general power for those who 
are suspected of committing criminal acts (codified under the Crimes Act 1961 [NZ]) or wit-
nesses to any oﬀence. Consequently, oﬃcers at NZC gleaned details of witnesses or victims in 
a less controlling or direct manner to SAC oﬃcers; posing questions such as “What was your 
name?” Without ‘demanding’ or ‘requiring’ the presentation of an item of oﬃcial identifica-
tion, the style of questioning at NZC was more definitional regulation than imperative 
regulation (Sykes & Brent 1980, pp.184-185) and thus coded as information exchange.  
                                               
7 The location of any place a person works is subject to suspicion of sexual oﬀences relating to children (S.74A(4)(f)). 
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Working personalities 
Comparison leads to a hypothesis that SAC oﬃcers were more attuned to ‘demanding’ citizen 
identification than NZC oﬃcers. Unlike the oﬃcers at SAC, NZC oﬃcers did not tend to 
begin encounters with questions that related to identity; they tended first to advise citizens of 
the reason they were present and why they had been called. An alternative explanation for this 
variation might originate from the higher proportion of dispatched events (81%) attended by 
NZC oﬃcers compared to that of SAC oﬃcers (22%); knowledge of a citizen’s name may have 
been known to oﬃcers prior to commencement of the encounter and a lesser necessity for 
NZC oﬃcers to ask for identification at the beginning of encounters. Nonetheless, should the 
former hypothesis be correct, then this cross-national observation provides new insight into 
existing policing theory. Skolnick’s theory of the police oﬃcer’s working personality (2011) 
draws on how the social and occupational environment aﬀects the oﬃcer personalities and 
how they behave in the occupational setting. Skolnick’s chief influencers on personality are 
danger and authority, which are fuelled by police culture, social isolation, and solidarity. 
However, the present research suggests that legal capacity may influence oﬃcer behaviour: the 
restriction or freedom to use legal powers to execute police processes aﬀects how oﬃcers col-
lect information and consequently interact with citizens.  
Quantity of law 
Oﬃcers from South Australia made use of two other legal powers that were unavailable to 
those from NZC. South Australia law allowed oﬃcers to conduct searches for weapons in or 
near a licensed premises (Summary Oﬀences Act 1953 [SA] S.72A, S.72B) and to use drug de-
tector dogs in public places (Controlled Substances Act 1984 [SA]). This legislation provides 
police with the power to conduct random searches of citizens in public places and venues. The 
‘stop and search’ for weapons allowed oﬃcers to detain citizens at random to conduct a search 
for weapons using an electronic detector wand. Drug detector dogs were deployed in public 
areas and an illicit drug ‘stop and search’ would commence if the detector dog gave a positive 
indication. Stop and search powers available to NZC oﬃcers required a higher burden of sus-
picion. Searches for firearms or weapons required oﬃcers to suspect that the person was in 
possession of a weapon, whereas oﬃcers had to believe that a person was in possession of illic-
it drugs before a search (Search and Surveillance Act 2012 [NZ]). Consequently, stop and 
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searches for drugs and weapons at NZC relied on some level of evidence, unlike the random 
searches at SAC, and were thus less frequent.   
Black (2010) suggests that ‘law’ is quantifiable. Legislatively, the thresholds to conduct 
drugs or weapons stop and searches were lower at SAC than NZC (due to the ability to con-
duct random searches) which appears to be associated with the frequency of stop and search 
encounters: it was ‘easier’ for an oﬃcer to conduct a search in SAC than at NZC. The applica-
tion of Black to the present research suggests that the quantity of law was greater at SAC than 
at NZC. Black proposes that “law varies inversely with other social control” (2010, p.6) and 
predicts that societies with higher levels of law have lower levels of other social controls. If one 
accepted that SAC had a higher level of law than at NZC, then the present cross-national re-
search provided an opportunity to observe the influence of high law on oﬃcer behaviour. 
Thus, the present research might lead to an initial hypothesis that a higher level of law is posi-
tively associated with higher levels of oﬃcer control behaviour. As such, the variance in law 
may explain the variance in oﬃcer behaviour, as opposed to attributing the variability of rou-
tine armament.  
8.2.2 SITUATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
Mode of travel 
A key diﬀerence between the two research sites related to the mode of patrol deployment. As 
outlined earlier, SAC oﬃcers predominantly travelled to incidents within their patrol zone on 
foot as beat patrols, whereas NZC oﬃcers were predominantly vehicular-based. This was a 
limiting factor for SAC oﬃcers, as they were only able to attend events within 10–15 minutes 
walking distance from the SAC station8. Similarly, the location of the SAC station—within the 
shopping and entertainment precinct—influenced the type of events available to contribute to 
the data set. These were mostly disorder, alcohol oﬀences, and traﬃc oﬀences, which mostly 
began at an outside location. Almost all SAC encounters occurred at a public place (outside = 
85.2%; inside = 13.4%) with only a small number of encounters occurring in private premises 
(outside = 0%; inside 1.4%). In contrast, NZC oﬃcers had a wider geographic reach; they were 
not limited to events within walking vicinity of their patrol station. Consequently, the most 
                                               
8 In some limited circumstances, beat patrols used prisoner vehicles to transport arrestees to the custody suite or transport victims or wit-
nesses to residential locations outside their patrol zone. 
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frequent events at NZC related to domestic violence, minor assaults, and investigative enquir-
ies. There was also less of a disparity of beginning location with most encounters being at 
private premises (outside = 17.2%; inside 38.8%) compared with those at public places (outside 
= 29.1%; inside = 14.9%).  
Limitations of the mode of patrol travel may explain the disparity in the frequency of in-
vestigative and enforcement encounters. Encounters at SAC were predominantly enforcement 
encounters (55.6%), compared with investigative encounters (43.6%). This was not the case at 
NZC: three-fifths of the encounters were investigative (58.8%), and two-fifths were enforce-
ment encounters (39.7%).  
Another compelling disparity between the two sites relates to the quantity of oﬃcer-
initiated encounters. At SAC, 66.2% of encounters were oﬃcer-initiated whereas only 15.4% of 
NZC encounters were oﬃcer-initiated. The SAC encounters related to liquor oﬀences, disor-
der, traﬃc oﬀences and suspicious behaviour events which were relatively minor and did not 
rely on a witness or victim to make a complaint. Terrill’s (2001) analysis of encounters with 
suspects from the POPN data found that oﬃcers who were involved in self-initiated encoun-
ters were more likely to use verbal control than physical control. Physical control was more 
likely when oﬃcers responded to citizen-initiated encounters as oﬃcers had anticipated the 
need to use physical control, according to the information available at the time, before the 
commencement of the encounter.  
Duration 
In all instances, the mean duration of encounters was shorter at SAC than NZC. One explana-
tion previously discussed (Chapter 5) relates to the transportation of arrestees. At NZC 
arrestees were transported to custody by the arresting oﬃcers in a sedan patrol vehicle (where 
oﬃcers and citizens were able to freely able to continue to communicate) whereas at SAC ar-
restees were transported to custody in a secure ‘cage’ vehicle, unable to be in contact with the 
arresting oﬃcers. Consequently, coding of SAC arrest-encounters concluded when the citizen 
was secured in the cage vehicle, whereas coding for NZC arrest-encounters ended once the 
citizen arrived at the police custody centre. While this provides an explanation for arrest-
encounters it does not explain the diﬀerence in mean durations across other encounter types. 
The most extreme diﬀerence was found between investigative encounters: SAC suspect-
encounters were almost half the mean duration of NZC suspect-encounters (MNZ = 15:17; MSA 
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= 8:14). The same pattern, while not as extreme, was found in mean durations of the encoun-
ter-types. Oﬃcers observed these oﬀences in situ and they were able to proceed without an 
investigation. Accordingly, this reduced the duration of the encounter diagnostic phase and 
oﬃcers were able to move quickly on to the treatment phase.  
It is probable (but not proven) that the diﬀerence in mean durations correlates with the 
high proportion oﬃcer-initiated encounters at SAC. As oﬃcers did not have to collect infor-
mation to construct the IN for witnessed oﬀences to the same degree as non-witnessed 
oﬀences, oﬃcer-initiated encounters devoted less time (or in some cases no time) to the inves-
tigative phase and moved directly to the treatment phase.  
8.2.3 SUMMARY 
During conflict-prone encounters observed during this research, SAC oﬃcers spent less time 
engaged in information exchange than NZC oﬃcers did with citizens, used more verbal control 
than NZC oﬃcers, and more physical control than NZC oﬃcers. The present research could 
not attribute a single explanation for the disparity. While legislative diﬀerences between the 
two sites (such as the power to demand identification, conduct random weapons and drugs 
searches) are the most likely explanation for the increase in the frequency of controlling be-
haviour at SAC, they do not account for the variation in the proportion of control behaviour. 
It is more feasible that environmental factors influenced oﬃcer behaviour. The SAC station 
was positioned within the centre of a night-time entertainment district, and catered to vic-
tims, suspects, and oﬀenders of alcohol-related ‘street’-oﬀences: disorder, minor assaults, 
pedestrian oﬀences, and breaching liquor-free zones. There were other SAC stations (not par-
ticipating in the present research) that had the responsibility for calls for service from 
residential areas within the city. Alternatively, the disposition and demeanour of citizen-
participants may have aﬀected oﬃcer behaviour. Citizen-participants at SAC were younger in 
age, were more frequently of White/European ethnicity, and had a greater proportion of male 
sex than those in the NZC sample. As discussed above, citizens with these characteristics are 
more prone to experience police oﬃcer use of force.  
SAC oﬃcers were not dealing with the same distribution of encounter event-types as those 
by NZC oﬃcers. The eﬀect of this was also borne out during the proportion of diagnostic to 
treatment phases of encounters. SAC encounters required less initial investigation during the 
diagnosis phase (witnessing a pedestrian or traﬃc oﬀence required less time than investigating 
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a domestic assault) thus increasing the durational proportion of the treatment phase. This was 
a consequence of restrictions placed on the research access at SAC City which ultimately 
shaped the profile of event-types available for observation during the research. Indeed, the 
findings may have been diﬀerent if the research access had included SAC station vehicular pa-
trols.  
8.3 How do we explain how conflict resolution is managed by 
routinely unarmed police oﬃcers? 
The final research question seeks to understand how routinely unarmed police seek to resolve 
conflict. The quantitative study found that there were significant diﬀerences in the use of con-
trol behaviour between routinely unarmed and routinely armed oﬃcers. The qualitative study 
considered the process that oﬃcers followed during encounters: diagnosis (role assignment, 
narrative construction, course of action) and treatment (outcome advised, acceptance, negoti-
ation/enforcement or rejection/enforcement, disengagement). The qualitative study also 
found how oﬃcer encounter goals influenced oﬃcer behaviour. Encounter goals were associat-
ed with the type of encounters. For instance, oﬃcers were motivated to investigate an incident 
during investigative encounters; rescue a vulnerable person or initiate a medical intervention 
during rescue encounters; form positive relationships with communities during social encoun-
ters; or make an arrest or another type of enforcement action during arrest encounters. 
Blockages, or frustrations, that interfered with these goals created conflict for oﬃcers as they 
were prevented from or impeded in achieving these goals. Blockages occurred because of de-
liberate resistance actions from citizens as well because of non-deliberate actions, accidental 
actions, or impairment. Conflict arose overtly and covertly.  
The concept of a procedural conflict—a type of interpersonal conflict—originated from ob-
serving how blockages or frustrations prevented the realisation of an oﬃcer’s procedural goal. 
It diﬀers from other more personal interpersonal conflict, such as those arising from incivili-
ties or abuse directed at the oﬃcer. Observations during the present research revealed that in 
most instances oﬃcers ignored or tolerated verbal abuse or incivilities directed at them by cit-
izens (cf. Sykes and Brent, 1980). Such abuse and incivilities occurred at both research sites, 
and oﬃcer response to these circumstances was similar. But unlike verbal abuse, oﬃcers re-
sponded to procedural conflict by adapting their behaviour to overcome procedural 
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blockages. Their style of communication changed from non-controlling (information ex-
change) to the more coercive behaviour of verbal control or physical control. Verbal control 
behaviour included statements aimed at controlling the behaviour of the citizen, the conversa-
tion between the oﬃcer and citizen, and the immediate physical environment where the 
encounter occurred. Physical control included any physical application of force by the oﬃcer 
to the citizen, including searches, handcuﬃng, defensive tactics or use of weapons. Procedural 
conflict became resolved once the conflicted oﬃcer overcame the goal blockage. In some cas-
es, oﬃcers dealt with citizens who did not have the cognitive capacity to understand oﬃcers or 
empathise with their encounter goals. Control behaviour during encounters with impaired 
citizens (intoxicated) or mentally ill citizens relied more on physical control than verbal con-
trol.    
8.3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Various theoretical frameworks have been applied to previous research of police-citizen en-
counters to explain oﬃcer behaviour. Below, several relevant frameworks are discussed to 
establish how they relate to the concept of procedural conflict.  
Regulation, control, and authority 
Sykes and Brent (1980) proposed that oﬃcers regulate (control) PCEs through an initial estab-
lishment of their authority, and then at subsequent times during the encounter if disturbances 
eventuate that block the achievement of four oﬃcer goals. Definitional regulation can occur 
when oﬃcers take charge by asking a question thereby assuming the cognitive control. Imper-
ative regulation includes verbal communication behaviour that is not questioning but is used 
to control the behaviour of a citizen in a non-threatening or coercive manner. Threats or 
physical actions are regarded as coercive regulation. Regulation enables the oﬃcers to achieve 
four goals: collect information, assert or maintain order, achieve respect from the citizens, and 
achieve an acceptable resolution (Sykes & Brent 1980). In the present study, information seek-
ing, order maintenance, and resolution goals were present. However, there was no evidence 
that oﬃcers actively sought to be treated with respect. Oﬃcers did not directly challenge inci-
194 | Discussion – How do we explain how conflict resolution is managed by routinely unarmed police oﬃcers?  
vility or abuse; in many cases, this was tolerated without recourse.9 Notwithstanding, oﬃcers 
referred during the qualitative study (during interviews and informal conversations) to their 
desire to be treated with respect by citizens between encounters.  
Sykes and Brent’s application of a general-systems view of encounters holds some merit. It 
accounts for the transactional nature of police-citizen interactivity: the actions of one aﬀect 
the actions of the other. This aligns with Tedeschi and Felson’s theory of coercive actions 
which, as described by Terrill: “the use of coercion is part of a rational decision-making pro-
cess based on ‘the expectations of success in achieving outcomes, the values of outcomes, and 
the expectations and negative values of costs’” (Terrill 2005, p.109). However, the weakness of 
this approach is that it does not necessarily account for the behaviour of those who may not 
be able to make a ‘rational’ decision, such as those are mentally or physically impaired. A ‘ra-
tional’ person may weigh the consequences of arguing about the futility of a traﬃc notice for a 
crossing a pedestrian crossing illegally; a citizen with a cognitive impairment is not necessarily 
able to consider the consequences of disobedience (see case 6.26). This is an important con-
sideration when building a theoretical model to explain police-citizen behaviour during 
encounters.  
Authority maintenance theory (AMT) draws on the work of Sykes and Brent (1980) and is 
cast as a theoretical framework to understand the police use of force. It examines how the 
roles of authority and reciprocity diﬀer from non-police-citizen encounters and rests on the 
assumption that PCEs are a ritual characterised by oﬃcers use of authority and the citizen’s 
response to that authority (deference or resistance) (Alpert & Dunham 2004). This approach 
relies on the citizen having the cognitive ability to make ‘rational’ assessments during the en-
counter: “reciprocity breaks down when one or both of the parties determine that their goals 
are not being realised due to the behaviour of the other” (Alpert & Dunham 2004, p.183). 
                                               
9 The absence of any evidence that oﬃcers actively sought to be treated with respect was curious. Verbal and physical displays of respect were 
apparent during my own practitioner experience; including witnessing the behaviour by oﬃcers and engaging in similar verbal behaviour 
myself. This was explicitly demonstrated during verbal arguments with non-compliant suspects or arrestees, or in some extreme cases implic-
it at the end of a foot or vehicle chase where the fleeing citizen was physically apprehended. Statements such as “you don’t run from the 
police” were made while oﬃcers engaged in an aggressive or rough physical apprehension. Some oﬃcers justified this as “street justice” or 
simply to “teach them a lesson”. The absence of such behaviour at the research sites may be due to observer reactivity, that the social and cul-
tural norms were diﬀerent (i.e. that this behaviour was localised to the geographical zone of my own practice), or that the phenomenon had 
ceased to exist.  
     During one informal conversation with an oﬃcer-participant at NZC who had worked in the same geographical district that I had previ-
ously worked, the topic of diﬀerences between that district and the research district arose. That oﬃcer commented that the ‘ethos’ of the 
present station was diﬀerent: it was more relaxed, more informal, and oﬃcers were less likely to respond to certain events with the same rig-
our or speed in comparison with his formal station. Diﬀerences were also discussed during the interview of another oﬃcer-participant who 
had previously worked in a diﬀerent metropolitan station. The oﬃcer reflected that at a previous station, oﬃcers treated arrestees held in cus-
tody with less empathy and ‘compassion’ than at the present station. Thus, it was diﬃcult to determine—as a researcher and as a 
practitioner—why there was an absence of this phenomenon. 
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When reciprocity breaks down, the likelihood of oﬃcer use of force or citizen resistance in-
creases. Oﬃcers respond to resistance using regulation (controlling behaviour). 
Alpert and Dunham’s fourth, fifth and sixth AMT theoretical propositions relate to partici-
pant expectations, goals, and goal blockages (2004, pp.180-182): one party is less likely to 
cooperate to the mutual advantage of another party, if in doing so it prevents that party from 
achieving their goal: the actors abandon mutual benefit or cooperation in preference to 
achieving personal goals. Yet, central to AMT is authority. While this applies to the encoun-
ters where police use-of-force occurs—oﬃcers draw on the legal authority to use force—the 
present research locates conflict in covert circumstances where force is not an appropriate or 
utilious option. The procedural conflict arising from the oﬃcer’s attempt to write a victim 
statement from a distracted shopkeeper originated from the requirement to construct a 
quality and functional document. The goal blockage was associated with three problems. The 
first related to the interruptions during the encounter so that the victim was able to serve her 
customers. The lack of deference shown to the oﬃcer partially related to the citizen’s failure to 
prioritise her attention to the oﬃcer but was not a challenge to the oﬃcer’s authority. The sec-
ond and third problems related to the issue of gleaning data in a logical and temporal order 
and the language diﬃculty. Once again, neither of these problems related to—or challenged—
the authority of the oﬃcer. Reciprocity had not broken down: both parties remained commit-
ted to the shared goal of making a victim statement. 
General strain theory 
General strain theory has been proposed to explain goal-driven conflict outside of criminal 
oﬀending: strains originate from the “failure to achieve positively valued goals” (Agnew 1992, 
p.51) and procedural blockages that frustrate the achievement of goals are a “disjunction be-
tween expectations and actual achievements” (Agnew 1992, pp.51-52).  
The present research has illustrated how oﬃcers develop strain from procedural blockages. 
For example, when an oﬃcer sought to write a victim statement from a distracted shopkeeper, 
his eﬀorts were frustrated by the victim’s interruptions (tending to customers) and language 
diﬃculties. The oﬃcer was motivated to construct an accurate, methodical, and correctly-
ordered statement promptly. The desire to construct a quality document was linked to the 
oﬃcer’s desire to collect a statement that had utility (details of the event in a logical, sequential 
order). The desire to complete the statement promptly was motivated by the desire to com-
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plete the task so that oﬃcers could investigate the incident further and equally, complete the 
task so that they would be able to move to next policing task. 
Agnew explains that strains lead to negative emotions. Oﬃcers in the present study did not 
use criminal behaviour as corrective action. Of course, the criminality of controlling action 
was defined by the status of the oﬃcers. Many of the physical control actions used by oﬃcers 
in the study would be deemed to be criminal but for the privileged position that oﬃcers have 
authority to use physical force/control. While citizens are authorised to use force in some sit-
uations, they are not authorised to use handcuﬀs, OC spray, empty hand-tactics, conductive 
energy devices, or firearms to overcome resistance.  
General strain theory also explains the mechanism that disturbs the oﬃcer’s progression 
through the encounter procedure. For example, the strain caused by the “disjunction between 
just outcomes and actual outcomes” (Agnew 1992, p.53) describes the frustration felt by the 
bystander (CA03) who intervened in Case 6.1.2 due to a perception of unfair police treatment. 
Like oﬃcer corrective actions, the citizen’s response to his strain was not a criminal action (at 
most it amounted to a mild incivility). General strain theory provides an adequate explanation 
for the behaviour of the cognitively impaired citizen. In Case 6.2.6 the male in-patient (CN86) 
attempted to evade the oﬃcer’s initiation of an encounter. This citizen’s goal—to maintain his 
freedom and not return to his secure care facility—was frustrated by the oﬃcer’s actions. 
Agnew suggests that an individual’s coping mechanism for strain may fall into one or more 
of three categories: behavioural, cognitive, and emotional coping strategies (2006, pp.89-92). 
Behavioural strategies attempt to address the level of strain. These behaviours are designed to 
“protect or retrieve those things they value, terminate or escape from aversive treatment or 
achieve their goals” (2006, p.90). Cognitive strategies include those behaviours that are con-
sistent with ignoring or minimising the importance of the strain. Emotional strategies include 
actions to “alleviate negative emotions” (ibid) through medication, drug taking (legal or ille-
gal), exercise, or escapism. In the context of the present research, the modification of oﬃcer 
behaviour during conflict-prone encounters can be seen as a behavioural strategy to overcome 
the strain of the procedural blockage or frustration.   
Summary 
The utility of these theoretical constructs can be assessed through their capacity to answer the 
question: Why did oﬃcers in the present research ignore citizen behaviour connected to inci-
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vilities but acted to address conflict from procedural disturbances? We can see that general 
strain theory explains why oﬃcers are motivated to resolve conflicts that frustrate or interfere 
with the process of attaining goals. Conflict originating from incivilities or verbal abuse is tol-
erated or ignored because while they are unpleasant, they do not necessarily interfere with 
attainment of procedural goals. In this respect, questions in the present research asking how 
and why do routinely unarmed oﬃcers resolve conflict become redundant to some extent; the 
question becomes how do oﬃcers resolve conflict. In this analysis, the data has shown that 
there is no diﬀerence in the procedure used by oﬃcers to resolve conflict; albeit that the oﬃc-
ers from SAC used a greater frequency and proportional duration of control statements. 
8.4 Conclusion 
8.4.1 GENERAL FINDINGS 
Of the encounters observed, NZPOL oﬃcers spent 81–83% of their time using information ex-
change, 8.8–9.3% of time using verbal control, and 1.3–3% of their time using physical control. 
The NZPOL oﬃcers interviewed believed that the use of control behaviour was proportionate 
and used only when necessary. This belief was consistent with the observational findings. The 
behaviour of routinely armed SAPOL oﬃcers confirmed the predominance of information ex-
change during the observed encounters. However, there were disparities between the two 
research sites in the usage of control behaviour. Significantly, SAPOL oﬃcers used control be-
haviour more frequently and for a longer duration than NZPOL oﬃcers. SAPOL oﬃcers spent 
less time during conflict-prone encounters using information exchange (59–61%), used more 
verbal control (21–25%), and physical control (8–11%).  
The research was not able to identify the reason for the disparity; however situational fac-
tors and legislative diﬀerences may have been contributing factors. There were significant 
diﬀerences with the encounter event-types at both sites. The SAC dataset had encounters that 
were shorter in mean duration, they were mostly oﬃcer-initiated and had a higher proportion 
of enforcement encounters than the NZC set. Disparities in the use of control behaviour ap-
pear to be influenced by the use of verbal control. This was most apparent when SAC 
encounters were initiated. As SAPOL oﬃcers were accustomed to requiring identification at 
the beginning of the interaction with citizens, and although it was a matter of routine, the ap-
198 | Discussion – Conclusion  
proach came across as being ‘harsher’ and more authoritarian than the approach of the NZC 
oﬃcers. 
The presence of firearms did not appear to impact the behaviour of SAPOL oﬃcers during 
the research. There were no occasions where SAPOL oﬃcers de-holstered their handguns dur-
ing an encounter, no threats were made that involved reference to firearms—explicitly or 
implicitly—and there were no allusions made that compliance was necessary because oﬃcers 
were armed. It was not possible to test whether citizen compliance was related to the implicit 
threat of firearms, but this cannot be excluded from citizen decision-making. Ironically, the 
only time firearms were drawn were at NZC when NZPOL oﬃcers were issued with handguns 
and semi-automatic carbines prior the arrest of a known gang member. The arrestee had a his-
tory of firearm possession and oﬃcers took a precautious approach when making the arrest. 
Even then, no explicit comments were made by the oﬃcers that they were armed, although the 
citizen remarked with surprise that oﬃcers were armed when he was first approached. 
The present research adopted a cross-national approach to explore the central research 
question. In most respects this approach in the present study was successful. As Bayley es-
poused: international comparisons to help describe variation in phenomena, particularly in 
policing research, as description helps to explain or build criminal justice theory (Bayley 
1999). The present research has identified two important phenomena. The first relates to the 
diﬀerences in how oﬃcers deal with two types of interpersonal conflict. That oﬃcers from 
both research sites tended to tolerate personal abuse/incivilities directed at them yet actively 
sought to control situations where procedural conflict arose, this depicts professionalism. 
Most people within society will have experienced the negative outcomes of receiving unwant-
ed personal abuse from another party, yet oﬃcers in the present research actively chose to 
ignore such abuse. One explanation for this behaviour could relate to observer reactivity. Al-
ternatively, the level of skill involved in managing conflict in demanding situations surely 
must be a further aspect of police professionalism. Taking control of a demanding situation is 
not necessarily a skill that most members of society could acquit.  
The second relates to the variation in the use of controlling behaviour of oﬃcers from the 
NZPOL and SAPOL. The detection of the variation could only have been established from a 
cross-national study. However, the utility of the findings might help to identify a mechanism 
for measuring degrees of professionalism through describing the ‘operational ideology’ and 
‘operational style’ of police agencies. For instance, two questions might be posed: to what de-
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gree do oﬃcers within a police agency tolerate personal abuse before (a) initiating a police-
citizen encounter or (b) initiating a criminal justice sanction. These two measures might en-
hance Brown’s construction of aggressiveness and severity of police action. 
The observation of the impact of legislation on oﬃcer demeanour during encounters is also 
notable. The absence of a New Zealand statutory power to demand identifying details from 
those present at a crime scene has led to oﬃcers resorting to alternative methods to collect this 
information. It was apparent that NZC oﬃcers used a diﬀerent opening ‘script’ when first 
speaking to citizens than oﬃcers at SAC. Rather than directly asking for a name, NZC oﬃcers 
began the conversation seeking information about the incident itself or asked why they had 
been caused. In another example, the availability of the ‘sobering-up centre’ at SAC promoted 
a less rigid approach to detaining a citizen for intoxication. Despite legislation providing the 
capacity for a facility, there was no such facility at NZC. As such, oﬃcer decisions to detain for 
intoxication were influenced by the likelihood of whether the citizen had a responsible person 
to care for their wellbeing at a residential address. If not, then oﬃcers were faced with bring-
ing the person to police custody and creating an added burden on police custody staﬀ.  
8.4.2 LIMITATIONS 
Design limitations 
The present study was a cross-sectional, non-experimental descriptive study. It was not de-
signed to test a hypothesis nor suggest causality, but to identify the variation of behaviour 
between the trans-national research sites. Some aspects of implementing the research design 
were problematic. While the selection of research sites was made for reasons of practicality, 
the choice of station within each site was limited to the availability of a suitably-sized station 
within NZC and within SAC that could provide suﬃcient security for the researcher to con-
duct the field research. As a result, patrols from NZC with predominantly vehicular compared 
with beat patrols at SAC. This resulted in a level of complexity for comparative analysis. Com-
parisons with the encounter data set were hampered by disparities of event-type and 
encounter types (e.g. investigative vs enforcement encounters). The SAC sample did not in-
clude a suﬃcient quantity of victim-encounters. This reduced the ability for corroboration or 
refutation of the presence of controlling behaviours in the NZC encounter data set.  
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External validity, generalizability, transferability, and trustworthiness 
Curry et al. (2009) suggest that the concepts of “validity, reliability and generalisability are the 
essential markers of sound quantitative research” (2009, p.1448) and that these are “analogous 
to the principles of “credibility, dependability, and transferability, respectively” (ibid) for qual-
itative research. The challenge for mixed methods research is to balance these concepts to 
generate dependable and rigorous research. 
Transferability is the degree to which the research findings from one setting can be applied 
to another setting (Curry et al. 2009; Krefting 1991). Krefting (1991) suggests that the situation-
al uniqueness of qualitative research often complicates its level of transferability. In the 
present research, the observation of variances in behaviour between oﬃcers who are routinely 
armed (at SAC) and routinely unarmed (at NZC) does not necessarily indicate that such a 
variance will exist in further comparisons in similar research sites. The present research cor-
roborates the literature, which describes how the behaviour of oﬃcers is influenced by the 
behaviour of citizens, and the qualities of the ecological environment: behaviours in some 
spaces are not tolerated in other spaces. While the present research poses that procedural 
conflict is a widespread phenomenon, the study was limited to observations at one station of 
each agency. With this caveat noted, the broader theoretical claim espoused throughout this 
dissertation that oﬃcers are exposed to procedural conflict during police-citizen encounters 
and use a combination of information exchange and control behaviour to overcome proce-
dural blockages and frustrations appears robust. This latter principle is founded on the joint 
analysis of quantitative and qualitative data.  
8.4.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The present study poses several questions that would benefit from further empirical research. 
First, increase the saturation of theoretical sampling. As the present research was staged in po-
lice stations with diﬀerent patrol types—NZC had predominantly vehicular-based patrols 
whereas SAC was predominantly beat-based—further research at an NZPOL beat-based sta-
tion would provide opportunities to observe NZPOL oﬃcers dealing with a higher proportion 
of ‘street-level’ event-types, particularly those which were oﬃcer-initiated. Similarly, further 
research at a SAPOL vehicular-based station would provide an increase of opportunities to 
observe victim-based encounters to corroborate the use of verbally controlling behaviour. 
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Second, it would be advantageous to observe an alternative Australian police agency, and a 
further routinely unarmed police agency to provide a wider corroborative basis for discussion. 
The continuing use of the mixed-method approach to measuring police behaviour (combining 
the behavioural and observational approaches) may provide a useful protocol to map the be-
havioural tendencies of other police agencies.  
In the last chapter, the theory is explored in more detailed through a discussion of ten the-
oretical propositions. This research has taken a police-centric perspective of police-citizen 
interaction, conflict, and conflict resolution. Central to this approach has been the reliance of 
police oﬃcers’ perspectives. While there were some opportunities to incorporate the experi-
ences of citizens, the ‘citizen voice’ was not explored to the same extent as the ‘police 
perspective’. As such, further research would provide opportunities to explore how citizen 
goals aﬀect the procedural conflict model. Equally, further research staged in more aggressive 
policing environments would provide opportunities to explore procedural conflict in diﬀerent 
cultural settings.   
8.4.4 FINAL WORDS 
At the completion of the fieldwork—before fully exploring the quantitative data—I wrote a di-
ary note suggesting that despite the diﬀerence in armed status between the two police 
agencies, oﬃcers from both agencies behaved in the same way in the field. Other than the 
diﬀerence in the questioning script/style of oﬃcers (due to legislative diﬀerences between the 
jurisdictions) I could not discern any observable diﬀerences between the operational behav-
iour of the oﬃcers from each research site. Oﬃcers from NZC behaved the same way as those 
from SAC when they were resolving conflict: they followed the same diagnostic and treatment 
procedure during encounters. This was an unexpected conclusion to draw as my previous re-
search had identified that there were operational diﬀerences between RAP and RUP oﬃcers 
(Hendy 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
202 | Discussion – Conclusion  
 
 9 
Towards a new theory of conflict 
The purpose of this last chapter of the dissertation is to discuss procedural conflict theory in a 
broader theoretical context. In part, it is a continuation of the narrative from Alpert and Dun-
ham’s essay about authority maintenance theory (2004). They proposed that AMT could be 
applied to understand all police oﬃcer behaviour during all police-citizen encounters (includ-
ing those that lack any police use of force). The present essay addresses this contention. While 
it incorporates aspects of AMT, the role of strain and general strain theory (Agnew 1992) is 
significant. Following the examples of Deutsch (1973) and Alpert and Dunham (2004), the 
theory is now outlined as a series of theoretical propositions. As Alpert and Dunham suggest, 
new theory ought to be presented first as a general concept, then discussed as a set of theoreti-
cal propositions so that logically deduced hypothesis that may be tested (2004). 
9.1 Procedural conflict theory 
PCEs are a special kind of interactional ritual. In the present research, PCEs have been dis-
aggregated into two phases. The first is a diagnostic phase where oﬃcers focus their attention 
to gather information to identify the most appropriate police response. The second is the 
treatment phase where oﬃcers implement the response.  
In one sense, police-citizen encounters are no diﬀerent from other diagnostic bureaucratic 
encounters (i.e. between a government agent and citizen) such as those involving social work-
ers, teachers, medical professionals, or firefighters: oﬃcers behave as street-level bureaucrats 
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acting as agents of their respective police agency (see Lipsky 1980). But police-citizen encoun-
ters have one important distinction: actors assume, to the most extreme degree, power roles of 
order takers and order givers (Collins 2004). And unlike most other agents of the state, police 
oﬃcers (as construed in the broadest definition) have the legitimate right to use coercive or 
physical force to achieve their tasks.  
Within the modern policing context, oﬃcers mix their performance of traditional police 
functions of order maintenance, crime control, or community safety, with functions such as 
rescue, medical intervention, or emergency disaster response. While oﬃcers might leverage 
their legitimate authority when engaged in the former (as described through AMT), the latter 
rely less on the oﬃcers’ ability to establish a legal or moral authority, but more on attaining 
utilitarian goals.    
Procedural conflict theory (PCT) is proposed to be a substantive theory (Glaser & Strauss 
1999). Substantive theories are generated to explain empirical social phenomena within a spe-
cific substantive social group. Discussion of PCT within the present research has been 
cautious thus far. Procedural conflict was described previously as conflict which occurs during 
police-citizen encounters when the intentional or unintentional actions of a citizen interfered, 
frustrated, or blocked the oﬃcer’s ability to achieve a procedural goal. Procedural conflict 
aligns with general strain theory. Procedural blockages (i.e. conflict) frustrate the achievement 
of goals and are a “disjunction between expectations and actual achievements” (Agnew 1992, 
pp.51-52). Procedural conflict originates from the strain associated with an oﬃcer’s inability to 
achieve their aspired procedural goal. It may occur at any stage of the police-citizen encounter 
and may be covert or overt.  
Procedural conflict diﬀers from other interpersonal conflicts that may arise from incivili-
ties, insults, verbal abuse, or physical abuse directed at an oﬃcer. This type of disobedience 
may be a challenge an oﬃcer’s sense of authority rather than a citizen’s defiance to participate 
in the encounter. Such incivilities are adversarial and will lead to a non-procedural strain, 
whereas procedural conflict originates from a feeling of frustration when oﬃcers are prevent-
ed from attaining their task-orientated goals. 
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Proposition 1. Police-citizen encounters are a power ritual, but the role of authority is 
not central in all police-citizen encounters. 
AMT provides a helpful starting point for understanding the behaviour of oﬃcers during po-
lice-citizen encounters. AMT is grounded in the Goﬀmanian-approach to social interaction 
and ritual (Alpert & Dunham 2004), and it advances the general system theory approach of 
Sykes and Brent; it incorporates the principles of asymmetry, authority, power, and reciproci-
ty. AMT focuses on the centrality of authority—oﬃcers hold both legal authority and 
traditional authority1—and how oﬃcers with authority function during police-citizen encoun-
ters. Authority influences citizen decision-making to acquiesce or resist oﬃcer control. AMT 
explains why oﬃcers may use verbal or physical control to overcome resistance. Although 
primarily concerned with the use of force, Alpert and Dunham posit that AMT applies to all 
police-citizen interaction: “… police-citizen encounters revolve around the oﬃcer’s exercise of 
authority (coercion) and the citizen’s submission to that authority (deference or resistance)” 
(2004, p.175).  
However, in an increasingly de-specialised public sector, oﬃcers are not necessarily only 
focused on crime control or order maintenance; oﬃcers problem-solve when engaged with 
problem-orientated policing or situational crime prevention (Høigård 2011), disaster emer-
gency crisis response (McLean et al. 2012), medical intervention, societal generative initiatives 
(Herbert 2006), and when acting as producers and disseminators of information for other 
agencies of the state (Ericson & Haggerty 1997). These functions are the antithesis of Bittner’s 
construction: “the role of the police is best understood as a mechanism for the distribution of 
non-negotiable coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of an institutive grasp 
on situational exigencies” (Bittner 1991, p.43). 
For AMT to function as a general theory, it must explain participants’ behaviour during all 
police-citizen encounters: force is used by oﬃcers to overcome citizen resistance; citizens re-
spond as deferent, because they are aware that oﬃcers are permitted use force to achieve their 
goals and do not pose any resistance, or become deferent after their resistance it is overcome 
by the oﬃcer. For AMT to function as the explanation of all citizen behaviour, all citizen be-
haviour must be a function of the decision to be deferent or resistant. The decision is 
informed by the degree to which a citizen accepts the oﬃcer’s authority and consents to the 
                                               
1 Alpert and Dunham use traditional authority in the Weberian sense. 
206 | Procedural conflict 
oﬃcer’s objectives. In other words, a citizen must recognise that oﬃcers are indeed agents of 
the state with legitimate authority and then choose to be deferent or resistant.  
Consequently, AMT relies on a citizen’s cognitive capacity to make a ‘sensible’ decision. 
That is not too dissimilar from social interactionist theory (Tedeschi & Felson 1994) which de-
scribes how an actor considers the eﬃcacy of an action according to the likelihood of 
achieving a “tangible benefit” (Felson & Tedeschi 1993, p.296). However, as Felson and 
Tedeschi point out, a temporarily or permanently impaired person has a limited level of ‘ra-
tionality’ to take a decision. Indeed, an impaired citizen—such as someone unconscious due 
to extreme intoxication or a person suﬀering from severe mental impairment—is unable to 
decide to be deferent or resistant cognitively. Moreover, the impairment of person does not 
revoke the authority conferred to an oﬃcer by the state (see de Lint 2014), however, as the im-
paired person does not have the capacity to recognise authority, a decision to be deferent or 
resistant cannot be taken. PCT explains conflict between citizens and oﬃcers during encoun-
ters when the cognitive calculus of ‘authority’ is absent. In this sense, PCT relies on Sykes and 
Brent’s application of general systems theory (1983) to explain how strains are evident in cov-
ert conflict. A general theory of police oﬃcer behaviour must incorporate explanations of 
behaviour from citizens who are incapable of behaving with deference or resistance.  
It can be agreed that a lack of deference causes overt conflict; in a PCT framework, this can 
be resolved with oﬃcers’ control behaviour. However, with the earlier example of an extreme-
ly impaired intoxicated person, any attempts by an oﬃcer to interact with the citizen are 
frustrated by the citizen’s impairment. In this situation, the frustration (or strain) is not a 
function of deliberate ‘rational’ resistance; covert conflict emerges from the oﬃcer’s frustra-
tion at failing to progress through the encounter procedure. In a similar vein, a mentally 
impaired person who is unable to understand a situation is unable to recognise or interpret 
authority; thus, is unable to defer or resist authority. While the impaired person’s actions may 
be overt resistance, their actions are not necessarily the product of deliberate action. In this 
manner, the resistance (conflict) is overt.  
PCT explains why oﬃcers use control behaviour in all police-citizen encounters, unlike 
AMT’s explanation of police-citizen encounters. In this way, PCT provides an alternative ex-
planation of the interaction between oﬃcer and citizen. In the context of the PCT framework, 
control behaviour is not limited to physical control or coercive verbal control. Conflict may 
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occur when a citizen behaves with deference towards an oﬃcer (thereby not a direct challenge 
to authority) which generates covert resistance.  
Proposition 2. An oﬃcer follows a diagnostic and treatment process during a police-
citizen encounter: they diagnose the ‘problem’, construct an incident narrative, deter-
mine the roles of any citizen present, and determine a course of action. If treatment is 
necessary, the oﬃcer advises their course of action, enforces the outcome against any cit-
izen rejection or negotiation, then disengages from the encounter.  
PCT assumes that oﬃcers are goal-driven, they identify goals to achieve during police-citizen 
encounters, and subsequently follow a set procedure to realise their goals. All encounters 
begin with a definitional diagnostic phase. During the diagnostic phase, definitional (Sykes & 
Brent 1980) and corroborative questioning are used by oﬃcers to collect information. Defini-
tional questioning helps to define the ‘type’ of the event that has caused the encounter to 
begin, whereas corroborative questioning is used to confirm the circumstances of the event. 
Together, definitional, and corroborative questioning provides information for the oﬃcer to 
identify if a problem exists, diagnose the type of problem if one does exist, and then determine 
the appropriate police response. In addition, oﬃcers incorporate input from other perceptive 
senses such as visual, aural and smell.  
Oﬃcers progress through this police-citizen encounter procedure sequentially; their diagno-
sis informs their treatment. Oﬃcers collect information to construct and authenticate an 
incident narrative which is used to inform a decision as to whether a treatment is necessary 
(or appropriate). If treatment is deemed necessary, it is administered by the oﬃcers. If citizens 
reject or block oﬃcers’ attempt to treat, or treatment, then oﬃcers either enforce the treat-
ment or disengage from the encounter. Blockages or frustrations which impede oﬃcers’ 
encounter procedure are procedural conflicts. These procedural conflicts are related to proce-
dural and encounter goals.  
Oﬃcers’ progress is influenced by their degree of motivation to attain the encounter goal. 
Oﬃcers who are motivated to provide an elevated level of commitment to achieve the encoun-
ter goal will progress through the diagnostic phase with a proactive and probing manner to 
collecting and corroborating information during the construction of the incident narrative. 
Oﬃcers who are less motivated may not collect information with the same vigour or asser-
tiveness. Oﬃcer goals vary according to the type of problem identified during the encounter. 
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Common oﬃcer goals include the investigation an oﬀence, solving a community problem, 
rescue of a vulnerable person, providing a medical intervention, protecting a person, or pro-
tecting property. Sometimes oﬃcers may interact socially with a citizen to provide positive 
community relations. As an oﬃcer works through the diagnosis to collect information to de-
fine the event-type, they also determine the roles of those citizens present at the encounter. 
Citizen-roles may also influence how an oﬃcer will determine the best course of action.  
PCT explains how control behaviour is inexorably linked to goal attainment during an en-
counter. Sykes and Brent (1980) proposed that oﬃcers seek four goals during police-citizen 
encounters: to collect information, assert or maintain order, achieve respect from citizens, 
and/or achieve an acceptable resolution. In a PCT framework, oﬃcer goals are more nuanced 
as they are dependent on the type of encounter. Enforcement and investigative encounter-types 
have diﬀerent goals from protection or rescue encounters-types. Oﬃcer goals for investigative 
encounters are associated with an attempt to establish and examine the factors of an incident 
or an oﬀence: oﬃcers seek information from citizens relating to events by asking questions or 
collecting other information. An investigative encounter may transform into an enforcement 
encounter if the oﬃcer determines that suﬃcient information exists to action a criminal jus-
tice sanction. Oﬃcer goals for rescue encounters are less investigative but more 
interventional: rapid response, searching, medical intervention (such as psychiatric or medi-
cal). Social encounters featured very little investigative or interventional behaviour. They were 
characterised by more general conversational behaviour and the sharing of personal anec-
dotes.  
Proposition 3. Conflict may arise during a police-citizen encounter when the oﬃcer’s 
goal is frustrated or blocked by the participating citizen(s). This procedural conflict will 
be either overt or covert. The conflict will cause the oﬃcer strain. 
An oﬃcer expects that they will attain their encounter-goal during a police-citizen encounter. 
When they face diﬃcult circumstances or behaviour from citizens that frustrate their attempts 
to progress through the encounter, they will develop negative emotions. According to General 
Strain Theory (Agnew 2006), these negative emotions lead to strain. The strain occurs because 
the oﬃcer is unable to continue to progress through the encounter procedure (diagnosis, 
treatment) and it thus becomes a procedural conflict. A goal frustration or blockage may arise 
with or without the knowledge of the citizen present during the police-citizen encounter. 
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Covert conflict occurs without the knowledge of the citizen and manifests as an internalised 
cognitive strain in the mind of the oﬃcer. The strain impedes the oﬃcer’s ability to attain their 
goal. Overt conflict occurs with the knowledge of the citizen. This too creates an internalised 
cognitive strain in the oﬃcer’s mind but can also lead to verbal and physical frustrations.  
Proposition 4. An oﬃcer uses control behaviour to overcome any goal frustration or goal 
blockage when non-control behaviour does not work or not deemed to be appropriate. 
The use of control behaviour as corrective actions occurs when an oﬃcer deems it to be 
necessary.  
Conflict resolution, within the PCT framework, occurs when oﬃcers successfully influence, 
coerce, or use force to overcome a procedural conflict. Oﬃcers influence citizen behaviour us-
ing control behaviour (including verbal and physical control) and non-control behaviour such 
as information exchange. Oﬃcers may use a combination of these conflict resolution behav-
iours. As with the use of police force, oﬃcers use the diﬀerent conflict resolution behaviours 
as corrective actions to overcome a goal blockage or frustration. 
Covert conflict necessitates diﬀerent conflict resolution behaviours to overt conflict. Covert 
conflict originates from situations where one actor (either oﬃcer or citizen) is not aware that 
their behaviour is causing a strain on the other actor. For instance, the unconscious, intoxicat-
ed person who has no means of identification on their person is unaware that those 
circumstances create a strain for the oﬃcer attempting to identify them. Similarly, the emo-
tionally distressed victim of an incident whom an oﬃcer is attempting to collect information 
is unaware that their emotional distress is causing strain on the oﬃcer, or indeed that the ac-
tions of the oﬃcer may exacerbate the victim’s distress. In the latter, oﬃcers use verbal control 
behaviour to elicit the required information from the victim; either in the style of questioning 
or conversational management. This conflict resolution behaviour is quite diﬀerent to the 
physical control behaviour used by an oﬃcer to control a suspect who is attempting to resist 
arrest or escaping custody.  
Proposition 5. When citizen-goals compete with oﬃcer-goals, citizen actions may im-
pede, frustrate, or block oﬃcer-goals (i.e. resistance). The intent of these actions may be 
to achieve citizen-goals and are not necessarily from mischief or belligerent intent. 
Deutsch (1973) explains that when the goals of the two parties are incompatible, conflict will 
arise. Like oﬃcers, citizens engaged in PCEs are goal-driven. When citizen goals are compati-
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ble with oﬃcer goals, conflict is less likely to occur. However, when citizen goals are incom-
patible with oﬃcer goals, citizens may experience frustration and take corrective actions to 
overcome the strain inherent with goal frustration or blockage. However, unlike oﬃcers, citi-
zens do not always have the same legal powers to resist or overcome oﬃcer goals. For 
instance, an oﬃcer has lawful authority to use force to overcome a citizen attempting to es-
cape an arrest, whereas the citizen does not have lawful authority to use force to resist or 
evade the arrest (see Alpert & Dunham, 2004, pp.179-182). Citizens’ corrective actions in other 
cases may be lawful and legitimate. Citizens may negotiate when an oﬃcer conveys a course of 
action. For instance, an oﬃcer may decide that it not in the public interest to intercede in a 
neighbourly dispute; one citizen may expect the oﬃcer to take specific action against the other 
citizen. The complaining citizen may experience a strain and take corrective actions to negoti-
ate with an oﬃcer or make a complaint to the police agency of the oﬃcer’s conduct. Such 
actions are legitimate.   
Proposition 6. Not all physical or verbal control behaviours are corrective actions. 
PCT provides a framework for classifying some control behaviours as corrective actions. In 
this model, corrective actions have a function: they are used to overcome procedural conflict. 
Thus, not all control behaviours are corrective actions; but some non-corrective control behav-
iour can be functional. Control behaviours that do not have any corrective utility (i.e. not used 
in response to goal frustration or blockage) may still be functional. For instance, the custodial 
actions of handcuﬃng, physical escort, and pat-down searches have a clear function.  
A control behaviour is non-functional when it is unnecessary or is not a proportional re-
sponse to the citizen’s behaviour. For instance, the use of verbal control behaviour with a 
person who is not causing procedural conflict is unnecessary; the behaviour is non-functional 
and thus arbitrary. Arbitrary behaviour may be classified as excessive control behaviour and 
may also constitute as ‘excessive force’. Geller and Toch outline that definitions of excessive 
force may include “any force when none is needed” (1996, p.292). Indeed, within the frame-
work of PCT, the definition of excessive control behaviour—including undesirable or unlawful 
behaviour—may include oﬃcer use of physical control and verbal control when there is no 
procedural conflict to overcome.  
Proposition 7. The use of controlling behaviour—both in necessity and proportionality—
can vary among diﬀerent oﬃcers, teams, stations, and agencies. 
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Because procedural conflict manifests as a strain for an oﬃcer, the perceptions of the severity 
of the strain, and the necessity and proportionality of corrective actions, are subjective. Sub-
jectivity explains why corrective actions may vary from diﬀerent oﬃcers, workgroups, and 
among other policing agencies. Waddington et al. (2009) found that oﬃcers from diﬀerent ju-
risdictions perceived risks at a diﬀerent level of severity; perceptions were shaped by social 
factors prevalent in the occupational environment where oﬃcers worked. Euwema et al. 
(2004) found that oﬃcers who were suﬀering from burnout were less dominant during en-
counters, which the authors proposed positively correlated with an increased eﬀectiveness in 
conflict resolution. However, Muir’s work towards defining a ‘good’ police oﬃcer is instruc-
tive: “morally, he has to resolve the contradiction of achieving just ends with coercive means” 
(1977, pp.1-2). In other words, to be just, the use of coercion/control must be necessary and 
proportionate. 
Proposition 8. Procedural conflict can be prevented, reduced, resolved without the use of 
control behaviour if citizens cease to frustrate or block oﬃcer goals that lead to the con-
flict. 
The literature is consistent with support of the transactional nature of police-citizen interac-
tion during police-citizen encounters. Sykes and Brent’s social behaviourist approach to 
general systems theory (1983) and social interactionist theory (Tedeschi & Felson 1994), both 
advanced through AMT, discuss how the behaviour of one party present at an encounter in-
fluences the behaviour of another. Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) approach suggests that 
citizen cooperation with police can be enhanced if citizens believe that they are treated in a 
procedurally fair manner as this improves police legitimacy over time (Mazerolle et al. 2012; 
Augustyn & Ray 2016). Implicit in this framework is the expectation for procedural justice to 
occur, the outcome of an encounter (and enhancement of police legitimacy) relies on the be-
haviour of the oﬃcer to be procedurally fair and just. Thus, success in a PJT framework is 
achieved through oﬃcer-responsible actions. This view is somewhat problematic as fairness is 
subjective determination: the citizen is the arbiter of the fairness, evaluator of the quality of 
the police decision-making and the quality of their treatment (Augustyn & Ray 2016).  
An impaired citizen will lack the cognitive capacity to respond positively to oﬃcer non-
control behaviour. Citizens who are cognitively impaired—either through illness or intoxica-
tion—may not be able to understand or empathise with oﬃcer questions or non-coercive 
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requests. In these circumstances, citizen disobedience originates from a failure of cognitive 
ability. Rossler and Terrill’s (2016) recent analysis of interactions with PMI (persons with 
mental illness) discovered that oﬃcers used higher levels of force during police-citizen en-
counters (although they were not at an enhanced risk of injury) than those who were not 
mentally ill. Indeed, Rossler and Terrill suggest that disparity in the incidence of force be-
tween PMI and non-mentally ill relates to the inability of the former group to ‘correctly’ 
interpret oﬃcer cues and behaviour.    
Within the framework of PCT, an oﬃcer uses control behaviour as a corrective action to 
overcome resistance or to clear a goal blockage that has originated from covert or overt con-
flict. Corrective actions include verbal control statements and physical control actions. The 
present research indicates that corrective actions are unnecessary if an oﬃcer’s progress 
through the diagnostic and treatment encounter phases is unimpeded. Thus, corrective ac-
tions may be unnecessary if citizen behaviour does not frustrate or block oﬃcer encounter-
goals. In other words, citizens may avoid being the recipient of corrective actions if their be-
haviour does not constitute a goal blockage or goal frustration. In this manner, PCT takes an 
opposite view to PJT: success (the lack of conflict) is achieved through citizen-responsible ac-
tions. As procedural conflict occurs when citizen actions frustrate or block oﬃcer-goals 
during encounters, a citizen’s behaviour can be deterministic of the outcome. 
Proposition 9. Procedural conflict arising from incivilities or personal abuse from the 
citizen will be tolerated depending on the extent of professionalism of the oﬃcer.   
Oﬃcers diﬀerentiate between their negative emotions arising from incivilities or personal 
abuse from citizens before or during an encounter from their negative emotions associated 
with strains from procedural blockages. Tolerance of incivilities and personal abuse will vary 
among oﬃcers and is dependent on their sense of professionalism. Analysis of the behaviour 
of oﬃcers during the present study has revealed diﬀerences in how oﬃcers respond to these 
interpersonal conflicts of procedure and incivility. During the present research, oﬃcers toler-
ated incivilities or personal abuse directed towards them—they did not actively respond to 
such behaviour. It is plausible that oﬃcers displayed a greater degree of tolerance to incivilities 
because they were being observed: they may have believed that tolerance was the correct and 
expected response to such behaviour. However, the non-tolerance and active response to 
procedural conflict to resolve or to overcome procedural blockages suggest that the use of non-
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controlling verbal communication, controlling verbal communication or controlling physical 
behaviour was perceived to be legitimate and utilious. 
9.2 Conclusion 
The purpose of this essay was to discuss procedural conflict as a formal theory. PCT provides 
an alternative social-psychological framework to understand the behaviour of oﬃcers during 
police-citizen encounters. While previous theoretical frameworks have focused on deference 
(Sykes & Clark 1975), system theory (Sykes & Brent 1980), or authority (Alpert & Dunham 
2004), PCT focuses on procedure, strain and goal blockages (Agnew 1992) which may cause a 
procedural conflict. An advantage of PCT is that it provides a framework to understand police 
behaviour outside of the usual frames of the use of force (i.e. was the force used reasonable or 
excessive), professionalism (i.e. was the behaviour polite or rude and were their actions 
utilious) and fairness (i.e. where the oﬃcer’s actions fair). PCT provides a framework for un-
derstanding the utility and merit of the totality of oﬃcer control behaviour (both verbal and 
physical).  
This analytical approach provides a framework to consider covert internalised conflict ex-
perienced by oﬃcers and overt interpersonal conflict. It also factors in the transactional 
impact of citizen behaviour. A transactional behaviour approach provides an opportunity to 
consider how corrective actions may be reduced, limited, or prevented through the modifica-
tion of citizen behaviour. Recent tensions of excessive police use of force have focused on the 
proportionality and necessity of oﬃcer responses to citizen behaviour. However, as the PCT 
framework considers how citizen behaviour can be a trigger of procedural conflict, further 
discussion is warranted to understand how this can be mitigated.  
This framework was conceived after observational research of police oﬃcers in two highly-
democratic liberal societies which experience high levels of public trust and confidence in the 
police and high levels of police legitimacy. Further research in less stable and more aggressive 
environments would provide opportunities to test the theory and propositions and provide a 
deeper exploration of factors that might influence police oﬃcer behaviour, especially the in-
teraction of oﬃcer perceptions of risk and fear, and how this aﬀects the use of corrective 
actions.  
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Table A4.1 
Sample ethnicities 
 Census Popula,on Sample ‘Self-Ini,ated’ sample 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
White / European  83.2  83.8  80.9  73.7 27 96.4 102 73.9 
Māori  7.0  0.1  14.8  0 1 3.6 0 0 
Asian / Indian  4.9  8.1  2.7  3.4 0 0 4 2.9 
Pacific Peoples  1.9  0.1  1.6  0 0 0 0 0 
Middle Eastern / Latin  1.0  1.1  0  0.1 0 0 11 8.0 
Aboriginal  0  0.1  0  8.5 0 0 21 0 
Other  2.1  6.8  0  0 0 0 0 0 
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CHAPTER 5 
Table A5.1 
Event-types of all O2C1 encounters 
 Dispatched Beginning End 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Arrest warrant       1 0.9   3 2.7 
Attempted suicide 6 7.2 1 0.9 6 7.2 1 0.9 5 6.0 1 0.9 
Breach bail 1 1.2   1 1.2 5 4.5 2 2.4 8 7.1 
Burglary 1 1.2   1 1.2   1 1.2   
Court orders 1 1.2   2 2.4   2 2.4   
Disorder 5 6.0 11 9.8 6 7.2 31 27.7 4 4.8 26 23.2 
Domestic dispute 1 1.2 1 0.9 1 1.2 3 2.7 2 2.4 3 2.7 
Domestic violence 12 14.5   12 14.5   10 12   
Drugs (cannabis)       2 1.8   3 2.7 
Drugs (not cannabis)       5 4.5   3 2.7 
Drugs (search)       1 2.7   1 2.7 
Enquiries     7 8.4   7 8.4   
Escort duty     1 1.2 1 0.9 1 1.2 1 0.9 
Firearms offence 1 1.2           
Intimidation 1 1.2 1 0.9 1 1.2 2 1.8 1 1.2 1 0.9 
Intoxicated person 3 3.6 1 0.9 3 3.6 3 2.7 3 3.6 4 3.6 
Liquor offences   1 0.9   11 9.8 1 1.2 12 10.7 
Lost property     1 0.9     1 0.9 
Mental health 1 1.2   1 1.2   1 1.2 1 0.9 
Minor assault 4 4.8 3 2.7 7 8.4 4 3.6 10 12 1 0.9 
Missing person 3 3.6 1 0.9 2 2.4 2 1.8 1 1.2 1 0.9 
Obstruction       2 1.8 2 2.4 2 1.8 
Offensive weapon       1 0.9   2 1.8 
Preventative task 2 2.4   6 7.2   6 7.2   
Property damage 2 2.4 2 1.8 3 3.6 2 1.8 3 3.6 1 0.9 
Public relations 4 4.8   4 4.8   4 4.8   
Silent emergency call 2 2.4   1 1.2       
Serious assault 1 1.2 1 0.9 1 1.2 1 0.9 1 1.2 1 0.9 
Sexual affronts 2 2.4   2 2.4   1 1.2   
Suspicious behaviour 1 1.2 1 0.9 1 1.2 7 6.3   5 4.5 
Theft 3 3.6 3 2.7 4 4.8 2 1.8 3 3.6 3 2.7 
Traffic incident 1 1.2   3 3.6 14 12.5 4 4.8 14 12.5 
Trespass 3 3.6   3 3.6 2 1.8 3 3.6 2 1.8 
Youth incident 1 1.2   2 2.4   2 2.4   
Vagrancy   2 1.8   5 4.5   5 4.5 
Vehicle collision 2 2.4   2 2.4   2 2.4   
Weapons search (random)       3 2.7     
Not dispatched 19 22.9 83 74.1         
Nil offence         1 1.2 7 7.3 
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Table A5.2 
Event-types of all O2C2 encounters 
 Dispatched Beginning End 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Arrest warrant     1 2.1   1 2.1   
Attempted suicide 1 2.1   1 2.1   1 2.1   
Breach bail 1 2.1   2 4.3 1 4.5 2 4.3 1 4.5 
Burglary 1 2.1   1 2.1   1 2.1   
Civil dispute 2 4.3   3 6.4   3 6.4   
Court orders     1 2.1   1 2.1   
Disorder 4 8.5   3 6.4 3 13.6 1 2.1 3 13.6 
Domestic dispute 3 6.4   1 2.1   1 2.1   
Domestic violence 7 14.9   8 17.0   8 17.0   
Drugs (cannabis)       1 4.5   1 4.5 
Drugs (not cannabis)       1 4.5     
Drugs (search)       1 4.5   1 4.5 
Enquiries     3 6.4 1 4.5 3 6.4 1 4.5 
Escort duty     1 2.1   1 2.1   
Firearms offence     1 2.1   1 2.1   
Intimidation 3 6.4   3 6.4 1 4.5 3 6.4 1 4.5 
Intoxicated person     1 2.1       
Liquor offences       2 9.1   2 9.1 
Mental health         1 2.1 1 4.5 
Minor assault 5 10.6   5 10.6 1 4.5 7 14.9 1 4.5 
Missing person 1 2.1   1 2.1   1 2.1   
Obstruction     1 2.1 2 9.1 1 2.1 1 4.5 
Offensive weapon 1 2.1   1 2.1   1 2.1   
Property damage 1 2.1   1 2.1   1 2.1   
Silent emergency call 2 4.3           
Sexual affronts 1 2.1   1 2.1 1 4.5 1 2.1 1 4.5 
Suspicious behaviour 2 4.3   2 4.3 2 9.1   2 9.1 
Theft 3 6.4 2 9.0 3 6.4 3 13.6 1 6.4 3 13.6 
Traffic incident     1 2.1 1 4.5 1 2.1 1 4.5 
Trespass         1 2.1   
Youth incident 2 4.3   1 2.1   1 2.1   
Vagrancy       1 4.5   1 4.5 
Not dispatched 7 14.9 20 90.9         
Nil offence         1 2.1 1 4.5 
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Table A5.3  
Event-types of O2C1 victim-encounters 
 Dispatched Beginning End 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Attempted suicide 2 3.7   2 7.4   2 7.4   
Disorder 1 3.7   1 3.7   1 3.7   
Domestic incident   1 33.3   1 33.3   1 33.3 
Domestic violence 3 11.1   3 11.1   4 14.8   
Enquiries     5 18.5   4 14.8   
Firearms offence 1 3.7           
Intimidation 1 3.7   1 3.7   1 3.7   
Intoxicated person 2 3.7   2 7.4 1 33.3 2 7.4 1 33.3 
Lost property       1 3.33   1 33.3 
Mental health         1 3.7   
Minor assault 1 3.7   2 7.4   2 7.4   
Missing person 2 3.7   1 3.7       
Preventative task 2 7.4   3 11.1   3 11.1   
Property damage     1 3.7   1 3.7   
Public relations 3 11.1   2 7.4   2 7.4   
Silent emergency call 1 3.7           
Suspicious behaviour 1 3.7   1 3.7       
Theft 1 3.7   1 3.7   1 3.7   
Traffic incident         1 3.7   
Youth incident 1 3.7   2 7.4   2 7.4   
Not dispatched 5 18.5 2 66.7         
 
 
Table A5.4  
Analysis of behaviours during O2C1 encounters victim-encounters 
Analysis  Dura,on of behaviours for par,cipants expressed as a 
percentage of overall behaviour 
Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per 
PCE 
Research site  NZ (n=27) SA (n=3) NZ (n=27) SA (n=3) 
Mean dur. (sd) 16:14 (26:54) 12:40 (17:44)     
Par,cipants  O2 C1 O2 C1 O2 C1  O2 C1 
Behaviours ¯ (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%)     
Information Exc. 35.89 28.46 47.10 31.62 8.56 4.89 7.33 4.00 
Verbal affirmation 1.86 - 0.75 - 1.74 - 3.67 - 
Verbal control 4.20 - 2.89 - 2.44 - 1.67 - 
Verbal refutation 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 
Physical control 0.20 - 0.00 - 0.11 - 0.00 - 
Refuse verbal control - 0.29 - 0.63 - 0.37 - 0.00 
Refuse phys. control - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 
Verbal abuse - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.15 - 0.00 
Inactive 14.68 3.32 10.52 0.84 2.52 0.41 3.33 0.00 
Absent 9.39 0.03 5.05 0.00 0.78 0.00 1.67 0.00 
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Table A5.5  
Event-types of O2C1 suspect-encounters 
 Dispatched Beginning End 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Arrest warrant           1 2.4 
Attempted suicide 3 23.1 1 2.4 3 23.1 1 2.4 1 7.7 1 2.4 
Breach bail       2 4.9   2 4.9 
Court order     1 7.7   1 7.7   
Disorder 1 7.7 5 12.2 1 7.7 14 34.1 1 7.7 9 22.0 
Domestic incident       1 2.4 1 7.7 1 2.4 
Domestic violence 1 7.7   1 7.7   1 7.7   
Drugs (cannabis)       1 2.4   2 4.9 
Drugs (not cannabis)       3 7.3   1 2.4 
Drugs (search)           1 2.4 
Intimidation       1 2.4     
Intoxicated person 1 7.7   1 7.7 1 2.4 1 7.7 3 7.3 
Liquor offences       1 2.4   1 2.4 
Mental health           1 2.4 
Minor assault 1 7.7 1 2.4 2 15.4   2 15.4   
Obstruction           1 2.4 
Preventative task     2 15.4   2 15.4   
Property damage   1 2.4   2 4.9   1 2.4 
Public relations     1 7.7   1 7.7   
Serious assault   1 2.4   1 2.4   1 2.4 
Suspicious behaviour   1 2.4   6 14.6   5 12.2 
Theft   1 2.4   1 2.4   1 2.4 
Traffic incident 1 7.7   1 7.7       
Trespass       1 2.4   1 2.4 
Youth incident         1 7.7   
Vagrancy   1 2.4   1 2.4   1 2.4 
Weapons search (random)       3 7.3     
Not dispatched 5 38.5 29 70.7         
Nil offence         1 7.7 7 17.1 
 
Table A5.6  
Analysis of behaviours during O2C1 suspect-encounters 
Analysis  Dura,on of behaviours for par,cipants expressed as a 
percentage of overall behaviour 
Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per 
PCE 
Research site  NZ (n=13) SA (n=41) NZ (n=13) SA (n=41) 
Mean dur. (sd) 13:55 (9:56) 8:29 (10:33)     
Par,cipants  O2 C1 O2 C1 O2 C1 O2 C1 
Behaviours ¯ (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%)     
Information Exc. 33.48 28.59 26.75 25.66 7.15 4.62 6.10 5.34 
Verbal affirmation 3.45 - 2.05  2.23 - 0.90  
Verbal control 1.33 - 7.63  1.31 - 2.68  
Verbal refutation 0.00 - 0.14  0.00 - 0.07  
Physical control 0.12 - 2.33  0.15 - 0.51  
Refuse verbal control - 0.26  2.33 - 0.31 - 0.61 
Refuse phys. control - 0.00  0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 
Verbal abuse - 0.06  1.38 - 0.08 - 0.54 
Inactive 16.60 2.50 14.18 3.20 2.46 0.54 2.37 0.68 
Absent 11.13 0.00 12.02 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.59 2.00 
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Table A5.7  
Event-types of O2C1 field-arrest-encounters 
 Dispatched Beginning End 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Arrest warrant       1 4.8   2 9.5 
Attempted suicide 1 3.8   1 3.8   2 7.7   
Breach bail 1 3.8   1 3.8 3 14.3 2 7.7 6 28.6 
Burglary 1 3.8   1 3.8   1 3.8   
Disorder 1 3.8 3 14.3 1 3.8 4 19.0   3 14.3 
Domestic violence 4 15.4   4 15.4   1 3.8   
Drugs (cannabis)       1 4.8   1 4.8 
Drugs (not cannabis)       1 4.8   1 4.8 
Enquiries     1 3.8   1 3.8   
Escort duty     1 3.8 1 4.8 1 3.8 1 4.8 
Intimidation       1 4.8   1 4.8 
Intoxicated person   1 4.8   1 4.8     
Liquor offences   1 4.8   3 14.3 1 3.8 2 9.5 
Mental health 1 3.8   1 3.8       
Minor assault 2 7.7   3 11.5 1 4.8 6 23.1 1 4.8 
Missing person 1 3.8 1 4.8 1 3.8 1 4.8 1 3.8   
Obstruction       1 4.8 1 3.8   
Offensive weapon       1 4.8   2 9.5 
Preventative task     1 3.8   1 3.8   
Property damage 1 3.8 1 4.8 1 3.8   1 3.8   
Serious assault 1 3.8   1 3.8   1 3.8   
Sexual affronts 2 7.7   2 7.7   1 3.8   
Theft 2 7.7   3 11.5   2 7.7   
Traffic incident     1 3.8   1 3.8   
Trespass 2 7.7   2 7.7   2 7.7   
Youth incident 1 3.8           
Vagrancy   1 4.8   1 4.8   1 4.8 
Not dispatched 5 19.2 13 61.9         
 
Table A5.8  
Analysis of behaviours during O2C1 field-arrest-encounters 
Analysis  Dura,on of behaviours for par,cipants expressed as a 
percentage of overall behaviour 
Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per 
PCE 
Research site  NZ (n=26) SA (n=21) NZ (n=26) SA (n=21) 
Mean dur. (sd) 23:12 (11:02) 12:57 (9:54)     
Par,cipants  O2 C1 O2 C1 O2 C1  O2 C1 
Behaviours ¯ (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%)     
Information Exc. 25.14 25.23 22.34 23.62 10.54 10.31 10.52 9.86 
Verbal affirmation 1.10 - 2.68 - 1.23 - 2.19 - 
Verbal control 4.05 - 14.16 - 3.63 - 7.59 - 
Verbal refutation 0.15 - 0.13 - 0.27 - 0.10 - 
Physical control 2.40 - 7.45 - 1.38 - 3.62 - 
Refuse verbal control - 0.77 - 1.89 - 0.69 - 2.14 
Refuse phys. control - 0.30 - 0.76 - 0.19 - 0.38 
Verbal abuse - 0.69 - 1.90 - 0.81 - 1.48 
Inactive 17.71 5.83 12.39 4.60 4.85 2.04 4.05 1.10 
Absent 15.35 0.09 6.31 0.00 1.65 0.04 0.95 0.00 
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Table A5.9  
Event-types of O2C1 field-action-encounters 
 Dispatched Beginning End 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Court orders 1 16.7   1 16.7   1 16.7   
Disorder   1 3.7   7 25.9   8 29.6 
Domestic violence 1 16.7   1 16.7   1 16.7   
Drugs (not cannabis)       1 3.7   1 3.7 
Liquor offences       6 22.2   7 25.9 
Minor assault   1 3.7   2 7.4     
Public relations 1 16.7   1 16.7   1 16.7   
Traffic incident 1 16.7   3 50 11 40.7 3 50 11 40.7 
Not dispatched 2 33.3 25 92.6         
 
Table A5.10  
Analysis of behaviours during O2C1 field-action-encounters 
Analysis  Dura,on of behaviours for par,cipants expressed as a 
percentage of overall behaviour  
Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per 
PCE 
Research site  NZ (n=6) SA (n=27) NZ (n=6) SA (n=27) 
Mean dur. (sd) 6:08 (4:01) 10:57 (7:29)     
Par,cipants  O2 C1 O2 C1 O2 C1 O2 C1 
Behaviours ¯ (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%)     
Information Exc. 34.56 26.09 33.34 28.51 8.50 6.17 7.04 5.82 
Verbal affirmation 0.39 - 2.25 - 0.33 - 1.11 - 
Verbal control 1.28 - 8.71 - 1.50 - 3.29 - 
Verbal refutation 0.06 - 0.19 - 0.17 - 0.14 - 
Physical control 0.00 - 0.97 - 0.00 - 0.21 - 
Refuse verbal control - 0.00 - 0.53 - 0.00 - 0.46 
Refuse phys. control - 0.00 - 0.03 - 0.00 - 0.04 
Verbal abuse - 0.00 - 0.69 - 0.00 - 0.46 
Inactive 13.66 1.09 10.62 2.11 2.17 0.50 1.39 0.25 
Absent 15.66 3.64 6.07 0.25 1.67 0.83 0.43 1.00 
 
 
Table A5.11  
Event-types of O2C1 field-warning-encounters 
 Dispatched Beginning End 
 NZ SA NZ SA NZ SA 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Disorder 1 20 2 11.1 2 40 3 33.3 2 40 6 33.3 
Domestic dispute 1 20   1 20 1 5.6 1 20 1 5.6 
Intimidation   1 5.6         
Liquor offences       1 5.6   2 11.1 
Minor assault   1 5.6   1 5.6     
Property damage 1 20   1 20   1 20   
Suspicious behaviour       1 5.6     
Theft   1 5.6   1 5.6   2 11.1 
Traffic incident       3 16.7   3 16.7 
Trespass 1 20   1 20 1 5.6 1 20 1 5.6 
Vagrancy       3 16.7   3 16.7 
Not dispatched 1 20 13 72.2         
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Table A5.12  
Analysis of behaviours during O2C1 field-warning-encounters 
Analysis ® Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a 
percentage of overall behaviour  
Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per 
PCE 
Research site ® NZ (n=5) SA (n=18) NZ (n=5) SA (n=18) 
 13:45 (11:27) 6:24 (4:14)     
Par,cipants ® 2 Off. C1 2 Off. C1 2 Off. C1  2 Off. C1 
Behaviours ¯ (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%)     
Information Exc. 26.33 28.92 24.16 26.24 9.2 6.20 7.00 7.18 
Verbal affirmation 2.84 - 4.10 - 1.00 - 1.88 - 
Verbal control 4.17 - 17.10 - 3.20 - 7.00 - 
Verbal refutation 0.26 - 0.49 - 0.40 - 0.24 - 
Physical control 0.00 - 0.98 - 0.00 - 0.47 - 
Refuse verbal control - 1.52 - 3.94 - 1.00 - 1.76 
Refuse phys. control - 0.56 - 0.00 - 0.20 - 0.00 
Verbal abuse - 0.42 - 1.12 - 1.00 - 0.76 
Inactive 12.54 1.66 8.21 1.59 3.6 0.80 1.76 0.53 
Absent 19.02 0 9.01 0 2.4 0 0.59 0 
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DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
ESF-EF: Encounter Form 
 
 
Cambridge*Institute*of*Criminology:*Conflict*Resolution*Study*|*Encounter*Form ESF$EF1
Type+of+encounter 1 Full*encounter Encounter+start+time+(24+hour)
2 Brief*encounter
3 No*citizens*or*not*applicable Encounter+end+time+(24+hour)
General+location Type+of+location 1 Public*G*Outdoors
2 Public*G*Indoors
Any+previous+knowledge+about 0 No Info 3 Private*G*Outdoors
the+location? 1 Yes*G*from*briefing 4 Private*G*Indoors
2 Yes*G*Another*officer 5 Mass*private*G*outdoors
3 Yes*G*Direct*experience 6 Mass*private*G*indoors
4 Yes*G*Basis*unclear 7 Other:
Information+source+that+led+to+ 1 Own*initiative Type+of+second+location 1 Public*G*Outdoors
this+encounter 2 Dispatch (if*applicable) 2 Public*G*Indoors
3 Supervisor*or*briefing 3 Private*G*Outdoors
4 Request*by*another*officer Info 4 Private*G*Indoors
5 Citizen*G*On*scene 5 Mass*private*G*outdoors
6 Other: 6 Mass*private*G*indoors
7 Other:
Type+of+problem (Enter*900*Code) Second*type*of*problem 0 No
1 Yes:
A.*Dispatch
Part*of*a*larger*problem 0 No
B.*Beginning*of*encounter 1 Yes:
C.*End*of*encounter
Ride+Along+Code Encounter+Code
Cambridge*Institute*of*Criminology:*Conflict*Resolution*Study*|*Encounter*Form ESF$EF2
Encounter+part+of+longterm+plan+to 0 No Actions+to+prevent+repeat+occurrence? 0 No
deal+with+the+problem? 1 Yes*G*specific*location*or*people 1 Yes:
2 Yes*G*General*problem
3 Other:*
Did+the+police+seek+info+from+another 0 No
source? 1 Yes:
No.+of+bystanders/participants
Agency*code
%+of+encounter+observer Enter*citizen*number
(or*type*of*citizen)
Observer+perform+any+police+tasks? 0 No
1 Yes*G*offered*information,*advice*or*an*opinion
2 Yes*G*performed*some*physical*aspect*of*police*work
3 Yes*G*had*more*than*a*casual*conversation*with*citizen(s)
4 Yes*G*two*or*more*the*above
Type+of+action+taken: 1 Charge(s)*laid Occurrence+number+assigned? 0 No
(Indicate*all*that*apply) 2 Taken*into*custody 1 Yes
3 Use*some*degree*of*force
4 Notify*supervisor
5 More*than*one*unit
6 Counsel,*advise*citizen
7 Provide*personal*assistance
8 Unfounded*call
9 Other:*
Dispatch+&+encounter+info:
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ESF-CIF: Citizen Information Form 
 
 
Cambridge*Institute*of*Criminology:*Conflict*Resolution*Study*|*Citizen*Information*Form ESF$CF1
Ride+Along+Code Citizen+Code++++++++++++++++++++++++++++Encounter+Code Citizen+Role+Code
Citizen+Sex 1 Male Date+of+Birth ___*/*___*/___
2 Female
Age+Range Preschool*(up*to*5*years)
Child*(6G11*years*old)
Officer's+prior+knowledge 0 No*knowledge*at*all;*citizen*is*a*stranger 12*years*old
1 Recognizes*the*citizen*or*knows*reputation;*not*detailed 13*years*old
2 Knows*by*name*and*a*little*knowledge;*not*detailed 14*years*old
3 Knows*citizen*but*unclear*how*well 15*years*old
4 Knows*citizen*well*(personal*background,*offences) 16*years*old
5 Unknown*degree*of*knowledge 17*years*old
Young*adult*(18G20*years)
Under+the+influence 0 No*indication*of*alcohol/drug*use;*not*applicable*(no*contact) Twenties*(21G29*years)
1 Indication*of*use*but*no*visible*effects*on*behaviour Adult*(30G44*years)
2 Slight*behavioural*indications*(slight*impairment) MiddleGaged*(45G59*years)
3 Strong*behavioural*indications*(significant*impairment) Senior*(60*years*and*older)
4 Unconscious;*severe*impairment*(limited*communication) Unknown
Signs+of+mental+illness? 0 No Signs+of+Injury No
Type*(if*known) 1 Yes Yes*G*Minor
Yes*G*Serious
Weapon No
Self$harm 0 No*********************************************************** Present? 1 Yes
1 Yes*G*Reasonable*suspicion
2 Yes*G*Evidence*of*harm************************* 1X 0 No
3 Other:                            1 Yes
____________________________________________
0
1
2
14
0
12
13
10
11
8
9
6
7
4
5
1
2
3
Cambridge*Institute*of*Criminology:*Conflict*Resolution*Study*|*Citizen*Information*Form ESF$CF2
Citizen+summons+police 0 No Citizen+requests+a+charge+or+arrest 0 No
Yes 1 Yes:*
Citizen+requests+info+on 0 No Citizen+requests+that+another+person 0 No
how+to+deal+with+a+problem Yes leave+the+area 1 Yes
Officer+provides+advice+or+ 0 No Agency+contacted+by+police 0 No
information Yes 1 Yes
Intel+Check+(NIA)+for+criminal+ 0 No Offences+under+investigation
convictions+/+traffic+violations? Yes
Confession/admission+provided 0 No Prior*record
(or*victim*forthcoming) Yes*G*Partial
Yes*G*Complete
Not*applicable
Disrespect+shown+towards+the 0 No Accused+by+other+citizens No*/*not*applicable
officer+at+any+point Yes Citizen+# Yes*G*description
Yes*G*name*and*description
Search+conducted 0 No;*N/A Citzen+restrained No
(all*that*apply) Not*chargeable 1 Yes*G*Cage
2 Person 2 Yes*G*Handcuffs
3 Area*immediately*around*person 3 Both
4 Citizen's*personal*possessions
5 Citizen's*vehicle Formal+complaint 0 No
6 Citizen's*home 1 This*citizen's*request
7 Search*conducted*after*an*arrest 2 Officer*request
3 Other*citizen
0
1
1 1
2
2
3
0
1
1
1
1
1
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Cambridge*Institute*of*Criminology:*Conflict*Resolution*Study*|*Citizen*Information*Form ESF$CF3
Request+to+leave+a+person+alone 0 No Request+for+a+person+to+cease+a 0 No
or+to+leave+the+premises Citizen*request behaviour 1 Citizen:*this*or*another
2 Officer*request Officer:*this*citizen
3 Both 3 Officer:*other*citizen
Request+to+control+(or+cease)+a 0 No Officer+request+to+provide+info+on+a+ No
behaviour+of+a+person+or+animal Citizen*request person+of+interest+or+suspect 1 Yes*G*conversational
2 Officer*request 2 Yes*G*persuasion
3 Both Yes*G*command
Citizen+shoud+contac+the+police+ No Any+conflict+with+another+citizen?
again+in+repeated Yes (Enter+citizen+number)
Extent+of+conflict+between+citizens No*conflictual*behaviour Relationship+between+parties Strangers
Calm*verbal*disagreement Casual*acquaintances
Agitated*verbal*disagreement Neighbours
3 Threat*of*harm 4 CoGhabitate:*roommates
4 Assaulted*another*citizen CoGworkers:*institutional
Assaulted*by*a*citizen Friends
Other*_________________ Boyfriend/girlfriend
7 Not*applicable*(e.g.*Traffic) 8 Relatives
9 Marital/CommonGlaw
10 Not*applicable
Emotional+state+at+the+start 1 Not*elevated*(calm) Emotional+state+at+the+end Not*elevated*(calm)
of+the+encounter Fear of+the+encounter 2 Fear
(All+that+apply) 3 Anger (All+that+apply) 3 Anger
4 Anxiety 4 Anxiety
5 Unstable;*unpredictable 5 Unstable;*unpredictable
6 Emotionally*distressed*(sad,*crying,*remorse) 6 Emotionally*distressed*(sad,*crying,*remorse)
7 Happy,*relieved 7 Happy,*relieved
8 Belligerent;*uncooperative 8 Belligerent;*uncooperative
9 Other 9 Other
1
2
1
5
5 6
6 7
0 1
1 2
2 3
3
0
1
1
2
0
Cambridge*Institute*of*Criminology:*Conflict*Resolution*Study*|*Citizen*Information*Form ESF$CF4
Taken+into+custody 0 No Charges+laid+or+ION+Issued 1st
Yes
2 Not*appropriate
3 Not*chargable
3rd
4th
Action+taken+with+youth 0 No*further*aciton Action+taken+with+adult No*further*aciton
1 Verbal*warning Verbal*warning
Written*caution ION
Referral*to*a*community*programme Charge*laid
4 Referral*to*Youth*Justice Not*chargeable
Other*means PreGcharge*warning
ION*issued
Charge(s)*laid Sufficient+evidence+to+issue+ION+etc? No
8 Not*chargeable 1 Yes
Sufficient+evidence+to+lay+a+criminal No
charge? Yes
Citizen+and+event+description
0
1
5 5
6
7 0
1
2 2
3 3
4
1
2nd
0
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ESE-SIF: Shift Information Form 
 
Cambridge*Institute*of*Criminology:*Conflict*Resolution*Study*|*Shift*Information*Form ESF$SIF1
Date+of+shift
Shift+type
Shift+Start+time+(24+hour)
Shift+End+time+(24+hour)
Officer+1+Rank 1 Constable Length+of+time+on+patrol+in+this
2 Detective station+(months)
3 Sergeant
4 Other: Total+time+on+patrol+(months)
Sex 1 Male Previous+assignments
2 Female
Years+of+service+(months)
Officer+2+Rank 1 Constable Length+of+time+on+patrol+in+this
2 Detective station+(months)
3 Sergeant
4 Other: Total+time+on+patrol+(months)
Sex 1 Male Previous+assignments
2 Female
Years+of+service+(months)
Weather+conditions 1 Clear Temperature
2 Overcast
3 Light*precipitation
4 Heavy*precipitation
5 Snow
6 Windy
7 Other:
Ride+Along+Code
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Oﬃcer Participant Information Sheet (NZ variant) 
 
 
 
R Hendy | PhD Research Project | Ethics Participant Information Sheet    1 
 
Institute of Criminology  
 
 
Understanding How Routinely Unarmed Police  
Resolve Interpersonal Conflict  
— Ross Hendy, PhD Candidate 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet – NZ Police Officer 
 
Before you decide to take part in this study it is important for you to understand why 
the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. The researcher 
can be contacted if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
Research title 
To understand how routinely unarmed first response police resolve interpersonal conflict during 
police-citizen encounters. 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study is to gain an understanding of how routinely unarmed police resolve 
interpersonal conflict during police-citizen encounters. Data about police-citizen encounters will be 
collected in three ways: by observing encounters as they take place, interviewing officers once the 
encounters have ended, and measuring the personalities of officers involved in the encounters. The 
study will take place in two research sites, one in New Zealand and the other in Australia. This is to 
allow for a comparison between routinely unarmed officers and routinely armed officers. Data 
collection will occur during 2015 and the findings of the study will be submitted in a research thesis 
in 2016.  
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been selected to participate in the research through a non-random nomination process. 
The researcher has provided the Police Response Shift Manager with a list of available dates which 
would be suitable for the research to occur. As your workgroup is rostered to work on one of these 
dates, your supervisor has nominated you as someone who may be willing in taking part of the 
study.  
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Do I have to take part? 
No, participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may refuse or withdraw your involvement 
at any time. This will incur no penalty or loss, now or in the future. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you give your consent to participate in the study then your supervisor will assign you, and a 
second officer who has agreed to participate in the research, to a double-crewed patrol unit. The 
researcher will accompany you and your colleague during your rostered shift.  
 
Before the shift commences you will be asked to complete two online surveys. This should take 
between 15 and 30 minutes. You will be assigned a unique key code so that your responses and 
behaviours are recorded anonymously. Your name will not be recorded on the online surveys. Only 
the researcher will know your key code. 
 
• The first survey asks you to answer a series of questions designed to describe your personality. 
For instance, you will be asked whether you agree or disagree (using a scale of 1 to 5) to 
questions like, “Do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?”  
 
• The second survey has been designed especially for police officers to measure your exposure to 
physical resistance during your police service. For example, it asks you to rate the type of 
resistance you might have experienced when dealing with different types of police incidents.  
 
During the shift, the researcher will accompany you wherever you go. When you engage with a 
member of the public then the researcher will make a series of notes about the incident. The 
researcher will also annotate (using a hand-held device) the behaviours used by you and the member 
of the public. The behaviours will be annotated such as “Information Give”, “Support”, “Threat”, 
or “Physical”. (Refer to the appendix for the complete list of behavioural categories to be used).  
 
At the end of the shift, the researcher may ask for you to complete a 30-minute interview. The 
purpose of the interview will be to gain a better understanding of your approaches to conflict 
resolution and to debrief any conflict-prone encounter you may have had during the shift. A list of 
possible questions is included in the appendix). This interview will be recorded using a digital audio 
recorder so that a transcription can be made.  
 
The researcher may also make notes of any relevant informal or casual conversations that occur 
during the shift.  
What do I have to do? 
If you agree to participate, you may need to come into work about 30 minutes earlier than normal 
to prepare for the research.  
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Are there possible disadvantages and/or risks in taking part? 
You may feel a little strange being observed. This is to be expected. Most people feel uncomfortable 
when they are being observed.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You may find it informative discussing your conflict resolution techniques with others.  
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
The data collected about you (such as the personality survey and resistance survey) will be 
confidential. It will be stored securely and anonymously. No one other than the researcher will have 
access to this information. Your supervisor will not have access to the information. 
 
• Your name will not be associated with the electronic record or data. Similarly, when the 
researcher makes annotations of your behavioural tactics the research your name will not be 
recorded with the data; neither will your name be used during the audio-recording. These data 
sources will be stored electronically in password-protected directories. Only the researcher will 
have access to your name and key code.  
 
• Your supervisor and work colleagues will be aware of your involvement in the study. However 
they will not have access to the confidential data. 
 
• The members of the public whom you interact with will become aware of your involvement in 
the research. At the end of an encounter the researcher will speak briefly the person and seek 
their approval for their data (which is limited to their behaviours during the encounter) to be 
included in the study. The researcher will not disclose your identity to the member of the public.  
 
• New Zealand Police will not have access to individualized data.  
 
It is important to note that the researcher is bound by the NZ Police Code of Conduct and is 
therefore obliged to report breaches of the Code. 
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The research data collected during your shift will be added to an aggregated data set (anonymously) 
and analysed during the analysis phase of this study. If you have agreed to be interviewed then a 
transcription of the interview will be made. You will have the opportunity to read the transcript, 
and make changes or corrections, before it is used for data analysis.  
 
At the completion of the study, the data analysis and research findings will be submitted as a thesis 
to the University of Cambridge for assessment. The thesis will be deposited in the libraries of the 
University and the Institute of Criminology. A copy of the thesis will also be submitted to the New 
Zealand Police and the Australian Police force studied during the research. 
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Data collected during the course of the project might be used for additional or subsequent research. 
Once the thesis is submitted the researcher may wish to publish selected parts of the results in 
academic journals. Any published versions of the data will present aggregated or group data. Should 
quotations sourced from your interviews be used they will be attributed as “Interviewee X”. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is a being organized and managed by Ross Hendy as a part of doctoral research at the 
Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, UK. Dr. Justice Tankebe, University Lecturer in 
Criminology, is supervising the research. Various bodies have provided funding to support the 
research: Dawes Trust (UK), Cambridge Institute of Criminology (UK), New Zealand Police (NZ), 
Smuts Memorial Fund (UK), and Wakefield Trust (UK). 
 
Ethical review of the study 
The project has received ethical approval from the Institute of Criminology Research Ethics 
Committee, University of Cambridge. 
 
Contact for further information 
Researcher and Principal Investigator:  
Ross Hendy, reh81@cam.ac.uk  
+44 7557 333 483 
 
www.ConflictResolution.info 
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Encounter Behavioural tactics Coding Schema 
following Braithewaite’s taxonomy (Braithwaite, 998, p.2) 
 
 
   
Dimension Officer Tactics Citizen Tactics 
 
Information exchange Information seek Information seek 
 Information give Informational give 
  Refuse 
  Self defence 
Legitimacy Support 
 Accept 
 Reject 
Power Control Refuse 
Anti-social strategies Threat Verbal abuse 
Coercion Physical Physical abuse 
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Interview Questions 
 
 
1. What kinds of incidents give you the most satisfaction as a police officer? What is it about 
these incidents that makes them satisfying?  
 
2. When you are on patrol, either on foot or in a vehicle, what type of event would cause you 
to stop and intervene?  
 
3. Do you see any differences in the way you attempt to resolve conflict compared to the way 
other officers you work with? 
 
4. How did you learn to resolve conflict when dealing with members of the public? 
 
5. Describe an encounter where you witnessed effective conflict resolution tactics being used. 
(This can be either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed). 
 
6. Describe an encounter where you witnessed ineffective conflict resolution tactics used. (This 
can be either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed). 
 
7. From time to time, police officers run into situations where someone is a bully. What do you 
think is the best way to deal with a bully?  
 
8. When thinking about when you attempt to resolve conflict, please provide an example when 
you think it would be appropriate to use communication tactics (such as talking) and when it 
would be appropriate to use coercive tactics (such as physical force)? 
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Institute of Criminology  
 
 
Understanding How Routinely Unarmed Police  
Resolve Interpersonal Conflict  
— Ross Hendy, PhD Candidate 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet – NZ Citizen 
 
Your encounter with the police has been observed by a researcher who is conducting 
research on how the police interact with members of the public. It is a normal 
requirement for research involving human subjects for informed consent to be granted 
prior to the collection of research data. However for practical and safety reasons the 
researcher was unable to obtain permission prior to the start of your encounter. This 
form provides information about the research project in order to explain the reasons 
for the research and seeks your approval for your behavioural data to be included. 
Research title 
To understand how routinely unarmed first response police resolve interpersonal conflict during 
police-citizen encounters. 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study is to gain an understanding of how routinely unarmed police resolve 
interpersonal conflict during police-citizen encounters. Data about police-citizen encounters will be 
collected in three ways: by observing encounters as they take place, interviewing officers once the 
encounters have ended, and measuring the personalities of officers involved in the encounters. The 
study will take place in two research sites, one in New Zealand and the other in Australia. This is to 
allow for a comparison between routinely unarmed officers and routinely armed officers. Data 
collection will occur during 2015 and the findings of the study will be submitted in a research thesis 
in 2016.  
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Why have I been chosen? 
Your selection to participate in the research project is random; your involvement has arisen from 
your interaction with the officers being researched. The officers whom you have engaged with have 
agreed to be part of the research project.  
Do I have to take part? 
Although your behaviour has already been observed, you may refuse for these behaviours to be 
added to the research data set. This will incur no penalty or loss, now or in the future.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
Nothing. The researcher has used a hand-held device to record the behaviours used by you and the 
officer. The behaviours have been annotated such as “Information Give”, “Support”, “Threat”, or 
“Physical”. (Refer to the appendix for the complete list of behavioural categories to be used). Video 
footage has not been recorded. 
What do I have to do? 
No further involvement is required. If you agree to participate in the research then you will be asked 
to provide explicit consent. This can be given in writing or verbally.  
Are there possible disadvantages and/or risks in taking part? 
You may feel a little strange being observed. This is to be expected. Most people feel uncomfortable 
when they are being observed.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The most beneficial advantage of taking part is that the encounter you have had with the police will 
be used to help us understand how conflict is resolved. There is very little research about this topic 
and most research originates from the United States.   
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
Yes. The data collected about you will be confidential. It will be stored securely and anonymously. 
No one other than the researcher will have access to this information.  
 
• Your name will not be associated with the electronic record or data. In fact you don’t even have 
to give your name to the researcher. You will be assigned a unique key code so that your 
behaviours are recorded anonymously. The code will be similar to ‘Citizen NZ123’. New 
Zealand Police will not have access to your individualized behavioural data collected during the 
encounter.  
 
• If you have given your name to the police officer and the police officer has undertaken a police 
computer check (or the officer knows you from previous encounters) then the researcher may 
gain access to relevant information from your police record. Relevant details from your police 
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record include whether you have been convicted of any criminal offence in New Zealand.  
 
• You can choose for the researcher not to add this information in the research data set. If you do 
consent, then the number and type of criminal convictions will be added to the data set. This 
information will be stored anonymously. For instance, it will be recorded as ‘Citizen NZ123 has 
one conviction for dangerous driving’.   
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The research data collected during your encounter will be added to an aggregated data set 
(anonymously) and analysed during the analysis phase of this study. At the completion of the study, 
the data analysis and research findings will be submitted as a thesis to the University of Cambridge 
for assessment. The thesis will be deposited in the libraries of the University and the Institute of 
Criminology. A copy of the thesis will also be submitted to the New Zealand Police and the 
Australian Police force studied during the research. Data collected during the course of the project 
might be used for additional or subsequent research. Once the thesis is submitted the researcher 
may wish to publish selected parts of the results in academic journals. Any published versions of the 
data will present aggregated or group data.  
 
Individualised data, such as the types and sequences of your behaviour, will be deleted within 12 
months of the submission of the thesis. This will also include any consent forms you have signed 
with your name. The anonymous aggregated research data will be held in an electronic data file 
indefinitely. The aggregated data will not hold any personal details that could lead to your 
identification. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is a being organized and managed by Ross Hendy as a part of doctoral research at the 
Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, UK. The research is being supervised by the 
Institute of Criminology. Various bodies have provided funding to support the research: Dawes 
Trust (UK), Cambridge Institute of Criminology (UK), New Zealand Police (NZ), Smuts Memorial 
Fund (UK), and Wakefield Trust (UK). 
 
Ethical review of the study 
The project has received ethical approval from the Institute of Criminology Research Ethics 
Committee, University of Cambridge. 
 
Contact for further information 
Researcher and Principal Investigator:  
Ross Hendy, reh81@cam.ac.uk  
+44 7557 333 483 
 
www.ConflictResolution.info 
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Encounter Behavioural tactics Coding Schema 
following Braithewaite’s taxonomy (Braithwaite, 998, p.2) 
 
 
   
Dimension Officer Tactics Citizen Tactics 
 
Information exchange Information seek Information seek 
 Information give Informational give 
  Refuse 
  Self defence 
Legitimacy Support 
 Accept 
 Reject 
Power Control Refuse 
Anti-social strategies Threat Verbal abuse 
Coercion Physical Physical abuse 
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